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ABSTRACT
Influence has long been a focus of scholarly work on C. S. Lewis (1898-1963), but this scholarly
conversation largely neglects the nineteenth-century. In this project I will establish the profound
influence of nineteenth-century texts, authors, and ideas on Lewis’s thought and work, arguing
that the Romantic metanarrative—which traces the individual’s progression through innocence,
experience, and higher innocence—provides the foundation for Lewis’s self-construction as well
as his fictional work.
While the Romantics provide the initial concepts to Lewis, it is Victorian iterations of the
Romantic metanarrative that Lewis most heavily revises. In his 2013 biography of Lewis, Alister
McGrath suggests that Lewis views the middle ages through “Victorian spectacles” because of
his affinity for Victorian Medievalist, William Morris; I propose that these “Victorian
spectacles” apply more broadly and influence not only Lewis’s interpretations of past texts, but
also his entire worldview—literary, intellectual, spiritual and otherwise. Lewis’s fiction presents
Romantic metanarrative as seen through his unique nineteenth-century (re)vision and adapted by
his Christian imagination.
The scope of the study will include works from the long nineteenth century—from William
Blake’s Songs of Innocence and Experience (1795) to Frances Hodgson Burnett’s The Secret
Garden (1911)—as well as Lewis’s full writings, including his poetry, fiction, prose, diary,
letters, autobiography, apologetics, criticism, and marginalia. My chapters will focus on 1)
Surprised by Joy as romantic autobiography, 2) Till We Have Faces as neo-Victorian
Bildungsroman, 3) Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra, and That Hideous Strength as neoVictorian genre fiction, and 4) The Chronicles of Narnia as a revision of Golden Age children’s
literature. In each case, I will demonstrate how the Romantic metanarrative shapes both the
original nineteenth-century texts as well as Lewis’s revisions of those texts.
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INTRODUCTION
“My own prolonged cold, having lasted out the term, worked up into a sore throat and
temperature and a few days in bed […] and was not unpleasant. It gave me the excuse to be idle
and the chance to re-read some old favourites,” wrote a cheerful C. S. Lewis (1898-1963) in a
1929 letter to his father, Albert (Collected Letters: Vol I 795). A similar letter to his older brother
Warnie mentions that these “old favourites” were “The Antiquary, Sense and Sensibility, and
Pickwick” (792), three hefty nineteenth-century novels. These family letters reveal Lewis’s
famous passion for reading. William Empson once called Lewis “the best read man of his
generation, one who read everything and remembered everything he read” (qtd. in Downing,
Planets 121). Empson—who disliked and disputed Lewis’s scholarly views—did not exaggerate;
Lewis’s personal letters and diaries document his extensive, impressive, and sometimes eccentric
reading habits. Perhaps most interesting in this correspondence is Lewis’s choice of pleasure
reading material: in these particular letters (as in many others) his selections are exclusively from
the nineteenth-century. This dissertation analyzes Lewis’s relationship with such nineteenth
century texts.
Influence has long been a focus of scholarly work on Lewis, but the scholarly
conversation largely neglects nineteenth-century authors, texts, and ideas. In this project I will
demonstrate the profound influence of the nineteenth century on Lewis’s thought and work,
arguing that nineteenth-century conceptions of the individual’s progression through a Blakean
psychic journey of innocence, experience, and higher innocence provide a primary narrative for
both Lewis’s self-construction and his fictional work. The scope of the study will include works
from the long nineteenth century—from William Blake’s Songs of Innocence and Experience
(1795) to Frances Hodgson Burnett’s The Secret Garden (1911)—as well as works from across
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Lewis’s oeuvre, including his poetry, short and long fiction, prose, diary, letters, autobiography,
apologetics, and criticism.1 Because his first literary publication (Spirits in Bondage) appeared in
1919, Lewis serves as a transitional figure from the long nineteenth century into Modernism, and
he revises and reinterprets Romantic and Victorian texts in conversation with a growing sense of
futility in twentieth-century art and culture. Instead of indulging in burgeoning Modernist
schools—such as high Modernism, the Avant Garde, Futurism, Symbolism, Surrealism,
Primitivism, Expressionism, Imagism, or Vorticism—Lewis looked to the past, using older
manifestations of genre, style, and content to develop his own literary work. Alister McGrath
suggests that Lewis viewed the middle ages through “Victorian spectacles” because of his love
for William Morris (2990). I will expand McGrath’s rather offhand comment into a larger
concept and propose that these “Victorian spectacles” influence not only Lewis’s interpretations
of past texts, but his entire worldview—literary, intellectual, spiritual and otherwise. Most
significantly, nineteenth-century literature and thought provided Lewis with the Romantic
metanarrative, a model for individual development that he reinterpreted in his autobiography and
in every one of his major fictional works. While the Romantics provide these initial concepts to
Lewis, it is Victorian iterations of the Romantic metanarrative that Lewis most heavily revises,
so that his fiction presents Romantic metanarrative as seen through Lewis’s own, unique
“Victorian spectacles.”

1

Lewis’s literary publications span from Spirits in Bondage in 1919, to The Last Battle and Till We Have Faces in
1956; however, his published letters and journals begin as early as 1905 and his final theological book, Letters to
Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer, was published in 1964, a year after Lewis’s death. Additionally, Walter Hooper
(literary executor of the Lewis estate) has continued to posthumously publish new collections of Lewis’s lectures,
essays, and other writings, the most recent, Image and Imagination, being published in 2013.
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Lewis in Context
Scholars continually compare Lewis’s work to older texts and authors because of his antiModernism.2 Despite his historical moment, Lewis did not fit into the typical mold of the
Modernist author and even represented an antithesis to the overall philosophy of Modernism,
characterized by “the banner of the New” (Levenson 9).3 At a moment when artists and thinkers
were casting off old ways of knowing, Lewis struck an anachronistic chord. Stolid, traditional
Lewis was converted to Christianity by aesthetic, spiritual experience and traditional reasoning;
his commitment to older traditions, texts and ideas did not fit well into the Modernist discourse
of literature, philosophy, science or theology. In particular, Lewis separated himself from two
key Modernist concepts: myth and evolutionism. First, Modernism, most characteristically the
overly-intellectual and enigmatic High Modernism of Joyce, Eliot, and other canonized authors
2

In his article “Modern Man and His Categories of Thought” Lewis attests, “In the last hundred years the public
mind has been radically altered” (643). The idea of Lewis as a traditional opponent of Modernism is widely accepted
in the scholarship, although rarely discussed in detail. See Gilchrist’s The Anti-Modernism of C. S. Lewis, as well as
Barfield, Downing, Duriez and Porter, Green and Hooper, West, and Wilson, among others. While Gilchrist’s is a
specific treatment of Lewis’s reaction against Modernism, the rest largely imply this opposition as a part of their
various arguments and biographical treatments.
3
Scholars largely disagree on an exact definition of Modernism. Some, in line with Peter Nicholls’s Modernisms: A
Literary Guide, suggest that it is impossible to characterize the many literary movements of the early twentieth
century under a single term. Others, however, treat the various “isms” of the first half of the twentieth century as
related, though distinct. Astradur Eysteinsson describes Modernism as a characteristically “oppositional aesthetic”
(4), and explains, “There is a rapidly spreading agreement that ‘Modernism’ is a legitimate concept broadly
signifying a paradigmatic shift, a major revolt, beginning in the mid- and late nineteenth century, against the
prevalent literary and aesthetic traditions of the Western world” (2). Similarly, Michael Levenson suggests that “the
decisive event was the emergence of an oppositional culture,” (8) and, “[t]he ideology of Modernism[…] was an
ideology of radical novelty, perpetually self-surpassing” (48). In using the term “Modernism,” therefore, I reference
not only High Modernist art, but a sweeping cultural movement away from older traditions of thought and form and
towards the ever-evolving “New.” While scholars trace the origins of this movement back into the nineteenth
century, I propose that Modernism does not reach full maturity until the second decade of the twentieth century; Fin
de siècle and Edwardian era literature retain a certain Victorian sensibility that evaporates amidst World War I, at
which time Modernism comes into full swing. One reason I have defined Modernism on this timeline is that I
believe it is how Lewis would have defined it. K. J. Gilchrist explains in A Morning After War, “That the war is tied
in Lewis’s mind directly to the Modern reveals that his reaction against Modernism was decidedly more than, as
Humphrey Carpenter called it, a ‘profound dislike.’ Rather, his reaction to Modernism had far more to do with his
fears and with his means of self-preservation […] than it had to do with matters of taste” (50).
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of the period, used a new manifestation of myth, rather than a traditional one. Modernist myth
was no longer an explanation for the meaning of reality, but rather a constructed meaning used to
give order, albeit arbitrary, to a chaotic (or meaningless) reality.4 Lewis, on the other hand,
perceived myth as metanarrative, as story that encapsulated the overarching meaning of reality.
Secondly, Lewis separated himself from evolutionism, which he called “scientism,” in modern
society.5 For many in the twentieth century, a faith in technological and scientific (fueled by
evolutionary) progress effectively replaced religious faith, yet Lewis opposed the idea of what he
calls “chronological snobbery” (Surprised By Joy 207), and his writing recommends that
sometimes looking backwards is the best way to move forward.6
The centrality of myth in Lewis’s philosophy makes it particularly important to
distinguish Lewis’s perspective on the concept from that of canonical Modernist authors. In The
Loss and the Silence (2011), Margaret Hiley attempts to associate Lewis and his fellow Inklings
with Modernism, focusing on the influence of war, silence, loss and myth in their writing.7 While
Hiley’s analysis of modern texts and her attention to the undervalued influence of World War I
on Tolkien and Lewis is insightful, she neglects a central divide between Inkling and Modernist

4

Peter Nicholls argues against the characterization of Modernism “primarily by its commitment to reactionary
‘grand narratives’ of social and psychic order,” calling it a “caricature” of the complex and diverse movement (vii).
Nonetheless, other scholars tend to agree that this new mythology was an aspect of much Modernist thought.
Maurice Beebe identifies the “use of myth as a structuring device” as one of the four main characteristics of
Modernism (Eysteinsson 10). Similarly, Bradbury and McFarlane identify Modernism as “the one art that responds
to the scenario of our chaos” (27), and recommend that it is “less a style than a search for a style in a highly
individual sense” (29), as though each distinct manifestation of Modernism were its own unique search for order.
5
Extensive scholarship exists on this topic. See Downing, West, Purtill, Schwartz, Shumaker, or any analytical
treatment of Lewis’s space trilogy. The topic of scientism interests me not only as proof of Lewis’s anti-Modernism,
but also in distinction from Lewis’s feelings about actual science. Many argue for a Lewis who aligns with
conservative Christian anti-science. I propose a more moderate and nuanced Lewis, who values science and seeks to
integrate his scientific and spiritual understandings into a cohesive and holistic worldview.
6
The concept of progress as a sort of religion existed not only in the soft and hard sciences, but also in the literary
arts, particularly Futurism. Michael Levenson explains, “That the past was inferior to the future was the cultural
axiom of Futurism” (46).
7
The term “Inklings” denotes a group of like-minded, Oxford-associated writers, which includes C. S. Lewis, J. R.
R. Tolkien, Owen Barfield, Charles Williams, and others. Inklings studies is a well-established scholarly genre,
focused largely on mythopoeia and Christian thematics in the literature of this group.
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employments of myth. Although Lewis (along with his close friends and fellow-writers) heavily
employed mythological structures and themes in his writing, his conception of myth was
fundamentally different from that of many notable Modernists. For a number of Modernists,
myth provides a catalyst for enforcing order on a chaotic world through artistic interpretation;
myth serves the Modernist as a frame to impose meaning on the meaninglessness of reality. This
is perhaps nowhere more evident than in T. S. Eliot’s glowing review of James Joyce’s Ulysses
(1918-20), published in The Dial in November, 1923. Eliot states:
In using the myth […] Mr. Joyce is pursuing a method which others must pursue
after him. [….] It is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape
and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is
contemporary history. [….]Instead of narrative method, we may now use the
mythical method. It is, I seriously believe, a step toward making the modern
world possible for art, toward […] order and form […]. And only those who have
won their own discipline in secret and without aid, in a world which offers very
little assistance to that end, can be of any use in furthering this advance.
While these Modernist authors considered themselves to be imposing order on a chaotic
reality, Lewis perceived the world to be inherently full of order and meaning. Furthermore, he
believed spiritual and physical reality to be inescapably mingled, most profoundly in the
incarnate figure of Christ—a “myth become fact.” In his essay “Myth Became Fact” (1944),
Lewis outlines his entire philosophy concerning myth—its impact and its relation to the
Christian story. He confirms the existence of the Christian story as that of the “true myth,”
suggesting that it is just like any and every other myth, with the single, compelling distinction
that it is true and thereby the source of all mythology:
Now as myth transcends thought, Incarnation transcends myth. The heart
of Christianity is a myth which is also a fact. The old myth of the Dying
God, without ceasing to be myth, comes down from the Heaven of legend
and imagination to the earth of history. (“Myth” 66)
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For Lewis, therefore, not only does reality represent a true, meaningful mythology, but
mythology in general becomes a route through which to approach truth. Lewis states, “I suspect
that men have sometimes derived more spiritual sustenance from myths they did not believe than
from the religion they professed” (67), and concludes that because God—the origin and creator
(or poet) of the universe—is “mythopoeic,” humanity must therefore be “mythopathic” (67).
Human mythology therefore inherits its order and meaning through mimesis of God’s original,
orderly creational work. Myth, by Lewis’s estimation, is the most fundamental medium for the
revelation of actual truth, in contrast to Modernist myth as a substitute for non-existent truth.
The second most important way in which Lewis diverged from popular thought of his
day, choosing instead to build on nineteenth-century thought, was in his perspective on science,
evolution, and human progress. While Modernist authors were using myth to make sense of what
they perceived to be a chaotic or meaningless existence, scientists and philosophers of the day
were undergoing a similar paradigm shift.8 In contrast to the popular mid-Victorian
perspective—which saw science, and specifically evolution, as an explanation and exploration of
an orderly and complex world9—twentieth-century intellectuals characterized evolution as a
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James Herrick attests that “it was not scientific research that concerned Lewis but Modernist philosophical
convictions scientists had adopted to guide their work” (243).
9
This is perhaps nowhere more clear than in mid-Victorian writers’ employments of evolutionary ideas and
structures as a means of narrative organization. Gillian Beers states:
Evolutionary ideas proved crucial to the novel during that century not only at the level of theme but at the
level of organisation. At first evolutionism tended to offer a new authority to orderings of narrative which
emphasised cause and effect, then, descent and kin. Later again, its eschewing of fore-ordained design (its
dysteleology) allowed chance to figure as the only sure determinant. On the other side, the organisation of
The Origin of Species seems to owe a good deal to the example of one of Darwin’s most frequently read
authors, Charles Dickens, with its apparently unruly superfluity of material gradually and retrospectively
revealing itself as order, its superfecundity of instance serving an argument which can reveal itself only
through instance and relations (6).
Although it could be argued that Darwin eventually came to see his own theories as proof of chaos, Victorian
literature suggests that the spirit of the age characterized evolution in terms of order. Only with the slow
development of proto-modernism and naturalism did evolutionary ideas become a source of narrative disorder.

6

chaotic power that humanity must harness and control for its own species’ sake.10 Furthermore,
twentieth-century thinkers completed the work of their Enlightenment and Victorian precursors
by ruling out any semblance of the spiritual or supernatural. The result was a reverence, even
worship, of progress itself, correspondent with the “Make it new!” enthusiasm of the Modernist
movement.11 Philosophically, this societal shift resulted in a casting off of past ideologies, and a
commitment to the forward progress of humanity as the highest evolutionary advancement.
Some, like Modernist founder Ezra Pound, supported eugenics and selective breeding
movements, even to the extremes taken by the Nazi regime.12 For Lewis, however, such
scientism represented a perversion of true science and a dangerous step towards humankind’s
destruction, as he argues in The Abolition of Man (1943).
Addressing the Modernist disavowal of an inherent value system, Lewis characterizes
moderns as “Men Without Chests” in The Abolition of Man. He states: “Until quite modern times
all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be such that certain emotional reactions on
our part could be either congruous or incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not
merely receive, but could merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence, or our contempt”
(25). This universal idea of value and meaning Lewis characterizes as “the Tao” (29), and
suggests that,
10

J. B. S. Haldane in Possible Worlds (1928), describes humans as “a super-organism with no limits to its possible
progress,” and argues for “no theoretical limit to man’s material progress but the subjugation to complete conscious
control of every atom and every quantum of radiation in the universe” (qtd. in Herrick 248). Lewis wrote his space
trilogy in response to the asserted ideology of Haldane (among others), and Haldane published an open critique of
the series, titled “Auld Hornie, F. R. S.” (1946).
11
Bradbury and McFarlane encapsulate the rupture from the old and pursuit of progress associated with Modernism
thus: “overwhelming dislocations, those cataclysmic upheavals of culture, those fundamental convulsions of the
creative human spirit that seem to topple even the most solid and substantial of our beliefs and assumptions, leave
great areas of the past in ruins[…], question an entire civilization or culture, and stimulate frenzied rebuilding” (19;
emphasis added).
12
I do not suggest that all authors, or all “Modernists,” in the early twentieth century supported eugenics or facism,
but merely that some notable and influential figures within the Modernist movement (both literary and scientific) did
so. In fact, Michael Levenson points out that “Modernism was a heterogeneous episode in the history of culture. It
depended as much on its enemies as on its proponents” (8). The very existence of the Modernist movement as we
now perceive it, was therefore also dependent on more traditional, opposing voices, like that of Lewis.
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If you will not obey the Tao, or else commit suicide, obedience to impulse (and
therefore, in the long run, to mere ‘nature’) is the only course left open.
At the moment, then, of Man’s victory over Nature, we find the whole human
race subjected to some individual men, and those individuals subjected to that in
themselves which is purely ‘natural’—to their irrational impulses. (79-80)
To Lewis, twentieth-century scientism—which embraced theories of emergent evolution, and
ultimately eugenics—was deeply rooted in the Modernist loss of value and therefore of a greater
meaning. Just as Eliot and Joyce were employing myth to simulate, rather than elucidate,
meaning, so popular Modernist thought wished to use science as a tool with which to impose
structure artificially on the chaos of nature, rather than implementing science as a vehicle for the
discovery of pre-existing truth.13
Because of his resistance to the forward-focused ethos of the time, Lewis necessarily
embraced non-modern ideas, values, and ways of thinking, or “habits of thought” (“World’s Last
Night” 101). Rather than applying his faith and imagination to Modernist sensibilities, Lewis
adopts older notions of reality, revising and refining them in a progressive yet respectful manner;
hence one of the oldest practices in Lewis scholarship: influence studies. Because Lewis was not
only a literary academic, but also a voracious reader, scholars have rightly focused on the way
his reading influenced his thought and work. Furthermore, such research has tended to categorize
Lewis as characteristic of various literary periods or movements. Among these studies, three
categories emerge most popular: Medieval, Renaissance, and Inklings studies.
In recent years, scholars have made compelling arguments for the influence of medieval
texts on Lewis, and suggested that he was first and foremost a medieval thinker and systematist.
Michael Ward’s Planet Narnia (2008) became instantly authoritative in the field, suggesting that
Lewis was a “medievally-minded writer” and that his work, the “Narniad” specifically, is
therefore marked by a heretofore unacknowledged intricacy, rather than its seeming
13

The Magician’s Twin, edited by John West, addresses Lewis’s views on science and scientism.
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disorganization (11). Ward makes a powerful argument for viewing the medieval conception of
the cosmos as the overarching structure of the Narnia series and of Lewis’s thought more
generally. Robert Boenig also argues for a fundamentally medieval Lewis in C. S. Lewis and the
Middle Ages (2012), suggesting that not only the medieval idea of the cosmos, but also ideas of
“chivalry, love, and spirituality” saturate his writing (4). Boenig positions the medieval practice
of “constructing […] imaginative narratives […] as dialogues with prior texts” in the center of
Lewis’s creative process (3). Similarly, scholars focus widely on the literature of the
Renaissance, with which Lewis engaged on a deep, scholarly level. 14 Elizabeth Baird Hardy’s
Milton, Spenser and The Chronicles of Narnia (2007) emphasizes the centrality of The Faerie
Queene and Paradise Lost on both the Narnia series and the space trilogy, suggesting that Lewis
was most deeply influenced by his scholarly work, in contrast to his incessant pleasure reading.
Robert Downing has also written on the influence of Paradise Lost on Lewis’s space trilogy in
his book Planets in Peril (1992).
Perhaps the most popular influence studies of C. S. Lewis are those concerned with his
group of scholarly and creative friends, the Inklings. Shelves of books have been written on the
group (which, most notably, included Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, Charles Williams, and Owen
Barfield), on the mutual influence between all of the members, and on the relationships between
single members of the group. While Humphrey Carpenter’s The Inklings (1979) is still
considered the authoritative biography of the group, criticism of the authors in conversation
includes the work of Diana Glyer, Colin Manlove, James T. Como, Colin Duriez, Candace
14

The connection to Medieval and Renaissance texts is particularly easy to make as Lewis held the Chair in
Medieval and Renaissance English at Cambridge University, and published multiple scholarly treatments of
Medieval and Renaissance literature: The Allegory of Love (1936), A Preface to Paradise Lost (1942), English
Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama (1944), The Discarded Image (1964), Studies in Medieval and
Renaissance Literature (1966), and Spenser’s Images of Life (1967). Incidentally, Lewis would find this distinction
between Medieval and Renaissance literature irksome, as one of his greatest scholarly breakthroughs was the radical
suggestion that the Renaissance never happened in English literature.
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Fredrick and Sam McBride, Martha C. Sammons, and Clyde S. Kilby, among others. The most
recent biography of the Inklings, The Fellowship: The Literary Lives of the Inklings (2015), is by
Philip and Carol Zaleski. Furthermore, this area of interest has sparked a variety of scholarly
journals focused on the group, including the Journal of Inklings Studies, Mythlore, and VII.
Inklings studies focus on various aspects of the relationships between their subjects, yet all agree
on the central premise of artistic conversation amongst the group. Inklings studies focus on the
shared philosophical, literary, and religious values of the group, particularly in reaction to their
mid-twentieth century moment.
An era that has not received exhaustive attention, and into which this study plunges, is
that of nineteenth-century British literature. While scholars have spent some time analyzing
Lewis’s relationship with the Romantics, my project aims to offer a new perspective, focusing on
a metanarrative that originates in Romanticism, passes through the Victorians, and is transfigured
in Lewis’s own worldview and writing. Robert Reilly’s Romantic Religion (1971) is a study of
Lewis, Tolkien, and Barfield in which Reilly explores the Romantic roots of their theology.
Lewis, Reilly contends, is a Christian romantic because his theology focuses on “not an idea but
a happening, or a series of happenings” (6). Reilly’s study establishes an important foundation
for this particular area of study, although he stops short of deep textual analysis and explores
largely on philosophical and theological concepts. Prothero and Williams have written the most
recent book on Lewis and Romanticism, entitled Gaining a Face: The Romanticism of C. S.
Lewis (2013), which focuses on his relation to William Wordsworth. Prothero and Williams
posit—like several scholars before them—that Lewis shared characteristics and values with
Wordsworth.15
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For other sources on Lewis and Romanticism, see also Carnell, Sandner, Carter, and Rice.
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While scholars have acknowledged a romantic Lewis, criticism has barely begun to
recognize the massive neo-Victorian strain in Lewis’s fiction. In her article “Kidnapped
Romance: From Walter Scott to C. S. Lewis” (2013) Elsie Michie argues that Lewis appropriates
and revises a Victorian theme of kidnapping in children’s literature. While Michie’s study is a
very specific examination of individual texts from Scott, Stevenson, and Lewis, it is an important
foray into mixing nineteenth-century studies with Lewis studies. First, Michie opens the door to
further discussions of Lewis as a neo-Victorian, or nineteenth-century reviser. Second, she infers
Lewis’s place within a decidedly nineteenth-century tradition of children’s literature. In short,
the current criticism on Lewis in a nineteenth-century context is limited and centered primarily
on the influence of Romantic texts. Scholarship needs to expound on Lewis’s investment in
larger nineteenth-century ideas. For this reason, my study will emphasize the way in which the
Romantic metanarrative—established by the Romantics and adapted by the Victorians—
influenced Lewis’s work.
Scholarly Contributions
In the field of Lewis scholarship, my work contextualizes Lewis not only in his own day,
but along a historical continuum that begins in the nineteenth century. By understanding Lewis’s
connection with the nineteenth century, we can better understand whence his thought springs,
and where it is tending, effectively inscribing him in his proper literary genealogy.
As the first study to analyze Lewis’s revisions of the Romantic metanarrative, my work
not only establishes a connection with nineteenth-century influences, but also challenges
previously held suppositions about Lewis’s worldview and writing. Scholars and popular readers
alike have long considered Lewis the quintessential Christian author and have therefore assumed
his works to be written along biblical narrative lines. Specifically, readers have hitherto
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considered Lewis’s fiction to follow the biblical metanarrative of creation, fall, and redemption.
While my research shares this supposition—after all, Lewis is writing deliberately Christian
fiction—it also offers an important qualification. Although Lewis became eventually enthralled
by the Biblical metanarrative, the Romantic one first captured his heart. Before he reconverted to
Christianity he gave himself over to romantic experience and literature, and only through that
romanticism did he eventually find his way back to Christianity. Because of this, the Romantic
metanarrative of innocence, experience, and higher innocence is irrevocably written across
Lewis’s work, even as he mingles it with the Biblical metanarrative.
My work also challenges another long-standing notion in Lewisiana: that Lewis despised
Victorian culture, ideas, and authors.16 This supposition, which is attached to a similarly narrow
characterization of the Victorian era, assumes that because science encroached on religion and
order gave way to disorder in the Victorian era, Lewis had no appreciation for the literature of
the epoch, with the exception of Victorian Romantics like George MacDonald and William
Morris. On the contrary, my research demonstrates Lewis’s appreciation for many Victorian
authors and ideas, spanning from authors of the realist novel to science fiction and fantasy to
children’s writing. By demonstrating Lewis’s investment in Victorian texts, I am putting pressure
on recent trends in Lewis scholarship that posit Lewis as a “systematist.” While critics like Ward
and Durie insist that Lewis’s investment in Medievalism made him a strict, methodical thinker,
writer, and apologist, I argue that Lewis was slightly messier in his ideas and opinions. Lewis
was famously attracted to dialectic, and I believe he found a heady space for debate and

16

For the clearest example of this attitude, see Durie. The assumption that Lewis disliked the Victorians, however, is
implicit in most scholarship. Even McGrath’s assertion about “Victorian spectacles” is attached only to William
Morris, who is, in many ways, seen as an exception to the Victorian norm, being highly romantic in his ideas and
aesthetics.
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conversation with the Victorians. He was also changeable in his opinions, as his personal
correspondence reveals, and highly impressionable, as his many literary relationships attest.
Another contribution this study offers to Lewis scholarship is a more in-depth look at
Lewis’s nineteenth-century related marginalia than has yet been attempted by other scholar. My
work provides the most comprehensive look at Lewis’s reading of nineteenth-century texts that
has yet been accomplished. In so doing, I have noticed certain patterns in Lewis’s reading habits.
Readers will find that as the dissertation progresses the depth of marginal evidence provided in
each chapter will decrease. From this fact, I would risk a conjecture about the way Lewis read
and annotated texts. Because the study proceeds chronologically through the nineteenth century,
it would appear that Lewis took the most extensive notes, did the most extensive underlining and
indexing, on early nineteenth century works—such as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Burke, Austen,
and Lamb. One may assume that Lewis wrote more extensively in these texts because they were
considered a part of the literary canon at Oxford in Lewis’s day.17 For this reason, Lewis
probably made less marginal notation in his Victorian novels, genre fiction, and children’s books
because all of these texts shared the distinction of pleasure reading, rather than career-related
reading. This disparity in marginal detail does not reflect Lewis’s interest (or lack thereof) in
these texts, or even how deeply they influenced him, but only that he did not rely on these texts
in his scholarly and pedagogical endeavors. Lewis is known to have written the kind of fiction he
longed to read, and these Victorian texts, while lacking extensive marginalia, certainly evidence
multiple readings based on their physical wear, as well as Lewis’s reports of reading and re17

The Oxford English faculty in Lewis’s time taught only texts published before 1830 (Heck 9). Heck has a
forthcoming book on the intellectual climate of Lewis’s Oxford. The fact that Lewis, with Tolkien, actually fought
to keep this date the same, thus barring the Victorians from University study, has caused many to speculate about
Lewis’s distaste for the Victorians; however, a cursory look at Lewis’s correspondence will discredit the notion that
he disliked the Victorians. One suspects that he merely considered Victorian literature too new to be of serious
scholarly interest—and even this supposition does not detract from either his potential pleasure in the Victorians, nor
his potential revision of those Victorians in his own fiction.
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reading in his letters, essays, and diary. In other words, my research in Lewis’s marginalia
suggests that he, like most of us, engaged in different styles of reading distinguished by work and
pleasure.
Finally, as a scholar of the nineteenth century, my work not only promotes greater
understanding and appreciation for Lewis, but sheds light back upon the nineteenth-century texts
I address. While it is easy to trace nineteenth-century realism through naturalist and protomodern style into Modernism, I believe that understanding Lewis as a nineteenth-century reviser
will effectively acknowledge a branch of modern literature that is equally related to its
nineteenth-century ancestors; while Modernism typically represents a materialism descended
from the evolutionary and naturalistic Victorians, Lewis’s brand of literature descends from a
more amphibious, and indeed quite common, Victorian tradition—one that integrated advancing
scientific knowledge into a traditional, faith-based worldview. By understanding Lewis’s
interpretations and applications of nineteenth-century ideas, we may turn back and re-interpret or
re-interrogate those sources themselves. For instance, Lewis’s conception of Victorian religious
doubt as an important struggle or dialogue, rather than the slow death depicted in much popular
scholarship, casts new light on the Victorian crisis of faith, and one that coincides well with
recent scholarship.18 Similarly, understanding Lewis’s use of the Romantic metanarrative
illuminates the lasting, widespread, and evolving impact of the nineteenth-century child. It
amplifies our understanding of the Romantic metanarrative in Victorian high realism, genre
fiction, and Golden Age children’s literature. My goal in this project is not simply to use
nineteenth-century texts as a microscope for Lewis, nor to use Lewis to reinterpret nineteenth-
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See LaPorte, Blair, and Kreuger. All three authors have made attempts to revitalize scholarly interest in religion
and spirituality as they relate to the Victorians.
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century texts; instead, I hope to shine a mutually reflective light on both, illuminating twentiethcentury texts and the Romantic and Victorian ones that inspired them.
Methodology
As previously mentioned, my research has relied heavily on Lewis’s marginalia as it
relates to nineteenth-century topics and authors. Over the course of research, I cataloged
references to nineteenth-century texts and authors in Lewis’s collected letters and diary. I spent
considerable time with Lewis’s Library at the Marion E. Wade Center in Wheaton, Illinois,
combing through Lewis’s copies of nineteenth-century books to examine his underlining and
marginal comments. Taylor University in Upland, Indiana also graciously allowed me to see
some of Arthur Greeves’s copies of George MacDonald’s work, which contained Lewis’s
handwritten annotations. Finally, I travelled to the Bodleian Library and the Magdelen College
archives in Oxford, England to examine Lewis’s notebooks, manuscripts, and various newspaper
clippings. Although many scholars have spent time with portions of these collections, this study
will provide a more comprehensive view of Lewis as a reader of the nineteenth century than has
any previous work, and my argument and analysis rely, where possible, on Lewis’s first-hand
reactions to the texts in question.
Influence studies on Lewis are, as previously discussed, extremely common. Like many
other scholars in this field, my aim is to establish the prominent influence that a certain type of
text had on Lewis and his work. Nonetheless, it is necessary to defend this approach against
some strong reticence in Lewis scholarship. In a recent essay collection, C. S. Lewis’s
Perelandra (2013), Walter Hooper contributed an essay on “C. S. Lewis and the Anthropological
Approach.” Hooper contends that influence studies on Lewis are too fraught and dangerous to
undertake, based on his own experience writing about Lewis and on Lewis’s writing about what
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he called the “anthropological approach.” The anthropological approach, as Hooper has it, is a
form of criticism that not only posits potential sources for a given work, but also demystifies that
work by dissecting its various elements into mere reanimations of older ideas or images. Hooper
recounts having written a book on Lewis’s influences as a young man, only to meet Lewis and,
upon explaining the work to its subject, have his suppositions systematically obliterated. He
claims that upon hearing each of his proposed influencers Lewis “boomed out, ‘Anthropological
approach!,’” and sometimes added, “I have never even heard of that story” (Hooper, “C. S.
Lewis and the Anthropological Approach” 9). In essence, Hooper wishes to protect the meaning
and power of Lewis’s work, encouraging criticism to look less at “influences” and focus more on
“thoughtful read[ings]” that elucidate our understanding of the text.
I share Hooper’s interest in readings that illuminate, rather than dissect, Lewis’s writing.
In fact, each chapter in this dissertation seeks to provide not only a potential source for Lewis’s
work, but to do so in a way that enriches our understanding of the literary and theological
implications of that work. Just as Hooper admits that Lewis himself wrote pieces on literary
influence that “illuminated both” the older and the newer text (7), my project offers new readings
of both Lewis and the nineteenth-century texts with which he interacts. My interpretive methods
places Lewis’s texts in productive conversation with their nineteenth-century forbears, rather
than vivisecting Lewis’s dynamic works into static, worn-out building blocks.
One must take exception with Hooper’s wish to protect Lewis to the exclusion of
significant scholarly contribution. While Hooper’s view is colored by a personal relationship
with Lewis, who disliked having his work compared to that of others, it does not discount the
reality that Lewis was deeply influenced and inspired by a variety of literary sources. Michael
Ward has answered this objection well in Planet Narnia by observing that Lewis often
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deliberately obscured or hid the real meanings and sources of his fiction from friends and
correspondents. Indeed, Ward quotes from one of Lewis’s letters to schoolchildren in which he
states, “you must not believe all that authors tell you about how they wrote their books. […] This
is not because they mean to tell lies. It is because a man writing a story is too excited about the
story itself to sit back and notice how he is doing it” (qtd. in Ward 14). Perhaps it is safest, in the
pursuit of sound scholarship, to dismiss some of Hooper’s—and by extension, Lewis’s—
concerns about the sacred originality of the text.
In The Anxiety of Influence (1973) Bloom asserts that “self-appropriation involves the
immense anxieties of indebtedness” (5). Lewis (and now Hooper) no doubt suffered from this
anxiety, often wishing to distance himself from the texts that inspired him in order to protect his
own originality and to safeguard the emotional impact of his work. For this reason, Lewis admits
to little direct connection between any of the works I will compare in this study; however, by
reading carefully in the texts themselves, and in Lewis’s various marginal writings, the
connections become quite clear. Furthermore, it becomes clear that Lewis is not merely
borrowing ideas from the Romantics and Victorians, but that he is engaged in a conscious
intertextual dialogue. In fact, Lewis is practicing what Bloom’s taxonomy would identify as
“Tessera,” a “completion and antithesis” of his nineteenth-century precursors (14). Lewis revises
these earlier authors as if their works were incomplete and required a final, further step, which
his fiction provides. Specifically, his object is a further spiritualization of the Romantic
metanarrative.19 This makes particular sense within the frame of romantic experience, for
Lewis’s various revisions of Romantic metanarrative imply that the Romantics struggled to
understand transcendent experience, that the Victorians further explored it, and that Lewis finally
19

In this central assertion, I acknowledge a similarity to Prothero and Williams, who argue that Lewis saw himself
as completing Wordsworth’s vision through Christianization, specifically working in the same strain as George
MacDonald.
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understood it in the light of Christian theological belief. In other words, I do not propose that
Lewis merely recycles Romantic or Victorian texts, but that he takes already meaningful
narratives and further develops them through revision, expanding their significance and
imaginative appeal.
In addition to influence study, my methodology depends heavily upon the analysis of
literary forms. Formalism has fallen out of vogue, yet Lewis was certainly invested in the textual
unity that formalism emphasized, as it not only echoed the Coleridgean polarity he loved (which
I will define in chapter one), but also because it emphasized, by inference, the supposedly perfect
union of God’s ultimate creative act, which Lewis believed, via Tolkien’s ideas on subcreation,
all human work aspires to emulate. Because Lewis was so invested in forms—calling his creative
idea “an image longing for a form”—I sometimes highlight the (attempted) formal unity of his
works, and my readings especially emphasize his play with various forms. My attention to
formal polarity in Lewis’s work, particularly in chapters three and four, resonates with a
resurgent interest in forms, namely that of Caroline Levine. In Forms (2015), Levine describes
“literary texts” as “inevitably plural in their forms—bringing together multiple ordering
principles, both social and literary, in ways that do not and cannot repress their differences” (40).
Along these lines, I find in Lewis collisions between Romantic metanarrative, Biblical
metanarrative, realist forms, fantasy forms, science fiction forms, etc.; these collisions—I
argue—do not fight for dominance in the texts, but co-exist in polarity, they are distinct, yet
wedded, held in paradoxical tension and union in Lewis’s texts.
As a final methodological note, it is necessary to explain some of the terminology I have
chosen to employ in this project. For the purposes of this study, I will use the word
“romanticism” in two senses. The first, “Romanticism,” refers to the nineteenth-century British
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literary movement, spanning from roughly 1789 to 1850, or the start of the French Revolution to
the death of William Wordsworth. Authors who lived and wrote within this movement I will
refer to as the “Romantics.” The second sense in which I use the term, “romanticism,” refers
merely to surviving ideas and philosophies from that historically bound movement. When I refer
to C. S. Lewis as a “romantic,” I am therefore suggesting that he shares many ideas with the
historical Romantics, but not that he was a part of that particular movement. When scholars
discuss Lewis’s “romanticism,” they typically refer to Lewis’s affinity with the experiential,
emotional, and aesthetic ideals of that particular literary movement. Similarly, when discussing
Lewis’s relation to Victorian texts and authors, I will employ the term “neo-Victorian.” This
term, as defined by Heilmann and Llewellyn, has become popular in nineteenth-century studies
and thereby useful for my purposes. While it is somewhat common for authors to refer to Lewis
and his ideas as “romantic,” it is not common practice to refer to a person or text as “Victorian”
unless they fall into the historical timeframe of Victorian England (roughly 1937 to 1901,
corresponding with Queen Victoria’s reign). For this reason, I will refer to aspects of Lewis’s
texts or textual practices that revise or reflect Victorian texts/practices as “neo-Victorian.”
Chapters
I organize chapters by nineteenth-century chronology and genre. The Romantic
metanarrative that is so central to Lewis’s work originates with the Romantic poets, and
therefore my study begins with a chapter in which I establish that metanarrative within the
Romantics, then demonstrate Lewis’s internalization of that same narrative in his autobiography.
Next, I move further into the nineteenth century, examining the way in which realist novelists
took up the Romantic metanarrative via bildungsroman, and suggesting that Lewis revised not
only the Romantic metanarrative turned coming-of-age tale, but also the realist approaches of
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Brontë and Dickens in Till We Have Faces. Progressing on to late nineteenth-century genre
writing, I will then analyze the manner in which Lewis blends Victorian fantasy and science
fiction to embody the Romantic metanarrative in his space trilogy. Finally, I will examine the
tradition of Golden Age children’s literature in relation to The Chronicles of Narnia, employing
the Romantic metanarrative one final time to illustrate how Lewis revises and builds on the turnof-the-century view of innocence, experience, and higher innocence.
Chapter one, “Lewis’s Metanarrative: Surprised by Joy as Romantic Autobiography,”
establishes the foundations upon which the rest of the dissertation build. Looking specifically at
Lewis’s readings and revisions of William Blake, John Keats, Percy Shelley, William
Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, this chapter will define what the Romantic
metanarrative is and how Lewis adapts it in his own self-construction, as expressed in Surprised
by Joy. Having established both the Romantic and the Lewisian conceptions of innocence and
experience, I will spend an extended amount of time defining higher innocence as the Romantics
imagined it and as Lewis re-imagines it. Specifically, Lewis rejects the higher innocence offered
in Keats and Shelley, turning instead to Wordsworth’s Prelude as a model for Surprised by Joy.
Yet, even in Wordsworth Lewis finds a lack that requires completion. Ultimately it is in
Coleridge’s conception of polarity that Lewis finds the best image for higher innocence,
probably borrowing the term “Joy” from Coleridge’s “Dejection: An Ode.” These concepts
attached to the Romantic metanarrative—of innocence, experience, higher innocence, and
especially of higher innocence as Coleridgean polarity—will reappear in each preceding chapter.
In chapter two, “‘I might—’: Spiritualizing the Neo-Victorian Bildungsroman in Till We
Have Faces,” the focus will shift from the Romantics to early Victorian realism. I will argue that
Lewis employs the realist practice of bildungsroman, specifically as undertaken by Charles
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Dickens in Bleak House and Charlotte Brontë in Jane Eyre, to shape Orual’s first person
narrative in Till We Have Faces. Having established a connection between the Romantic
metanarrative and the bildungsroman, I will argue that, like Dickens and Brontë before him,
Lewis uses the psychological realism of the first person female narrator to achieve a formal
polarity between realism and romance in his novel. Lewis depicts Orual on a similar path of
personal growth to that of Esther Summerson and Jane Eyre, yet he also revises or lengthens that
path. While Esther’s and Jane’s narratives rely on matrimony for resolution, Orual’s narrative
conclusion is centered on a spiritual experience of divine, rather than human, union.
Having explored Lewis’s employment of formal polarity in Till We Have Faces, chapter
three, “‘Science Fantasy’ as Higher Innocence: Neo-Victorian Genre Blending in The Space
Trilogy,” will focus on a similar formal innovation in Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra, and
That Hideous Strength. By examining the influence that George MacDonald’s fantasy and H. G.
Wells’s science fiction exert on the Ransom stories, I will demonstrate how Lewis is deliberately
engaging in Victorian ideas about spirituality and science. In particular, Lewis undertakes a neoVictorian approach of genre- and narrative-blending by writing what he calls “Science Fantasy.”
Lewis borrows on two types of Victorian narrative, one focused on spiritual progress, and the
other on evolutionary progress, combining these diverging narratives in another instance of
formal polarity. Furthermore, Lewis mirrors this formal polarity within the Romantic
metanarrative of the trilogy, bringing the entire series to its climax with an instance of “myth
become fact,” and thereby emphasizing higher innocence as a polar logic between reality and
myth, in the same manner that he views Christ’s incarnation as the ultimate polarity between the
natural and supernatural.
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Chapter four, “Romantic Metanarrative in The Chronicles of Narnia: How Lewis
Empowers the Nineteenth-Century Child,” will trace the Romantic metanarrative through
Golden Age children’s stories and into The Chronicles of Narnia. I will argue that the
nineteenth-century concepts of the secret garden, the talking animal, the dead—or static—child,
and the agelessness of higher innocence all make their way into Lewis’s writing for children via
the Romantic metanarrative. While Golden Age depictions of the innocent child tend to
disenfranchise the child reader and character, I suggest that Lewis deliberately empowers the
child by providing her a real rather than an imagined fantasy world, allowing her to make
mistakes, refusing to hold her in eternal innocence, and emphasizing higher innocence over
innocence. Again I will demonstrate the central image of the Incarnation as a model for polarity,
or higher innocence, in the Chronicles, this time emphasizing the image of God becoming a
human as the ultimate empowerment of the child.
Finally, I will conclude by tracing the lineage of Romantic metanarrative, with all its
implications, forward from Lewis into two twenty-first-century authors: Neil Gaiman and Lev
Grossman. Gaiman and Grossman both continue the tradition of Lewis, and the Victorians and
Romantics before him, utilizing Lewis’s depictions of the Romantic metanarrative in The
Chronicles of Narnia to inspire their own fantasy worlds in Coraline and The Magicians Trilogy.
Both of these authors perform a similar revision on Lewis as Lewis does on his nineteenthcentury precursors. Gaiman and Grossman launch Lewis’s fantasy into a postmodern setting,
putting pressure on Lewis’s fictional strivings for higher innocence, and instead questioning
whether such a state can be achieved in the fantasy world. Both offer a less spiritual and more
humanistic vision of higher innocence. Gaiman and Grossman confirm my argument about the
tradition of the Romantic metanarrative, which originates in the Romantics, flows through the
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Victorians, is transfigured and spiritualized by Lewis, and finally revised by his literary
descendants. Gaiman’s and Grossman’s revisions of Lewis are a testament to Lewisian
intertextuality, and a confirmation that Lewis not only brought Romantic and Victorian dialogue
into the twentieth century, but did so in a manner compelling enough to capture twenty-firstcentury attention.
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CHAPTER ONE: Lewis’s Romantic Metanarrative: Surprised by Joy as Romantic
Autobiography
“If I am a romantic my parents bear no responsibility for it,” says C. S. Lewis at the
beginning of Surprised by Joy (5). He goes on to explain that “There was no copy either of Keats
or Shelley in the house, and the copy of Coleridge was never […] opened,” yet these were “the
kind of literature to which my allegiance was given the moment I could choose books for
myself” (5). That Lewis was, indeed, a romantic, has never been a subject for debate. Almost as
soon as Surprised by Joy (1955) was published, reviewers were calling it “the conversion of a
pure romantic” (Fremantle qtd. in Hooper, A Companion and Guide 193).20 Because Lewis
admits his own romanticism in Surprised by Joy, The Pilgrim’s Regress, and elsewhere, scholars
have spent a great deal of time detailing various romantic notions in Lewis’s theology,
philosophy and art.21 What has not been duly explored is the intricate role romanticism plays in
his autobiography, and thus in Lewis’s self-construction. Surprised by Joy is a conversion
narrative, and Lewis might appropriately have employed the Confessions of Augustine, or
Newman’s Apologia as models for the work; yet Lewis chose to base his spiritual autobiography
on a romantic model, not merely in content, but in structure. Surprised by Joy is, at heart,
romantic autobiography, detailing Lewis’s movement through a Romantic metanarrative. This
chapter will define that Romantic metanarrative (a term of my own coining, which will become
the key to understanding Lewis’s relationship with nineteenth century authors, texts, and ideas)
and demonstrate its role as the central structuring agent of Lewis’ self-construction in Surprised
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Commonweal, February 3, 1956.
Lewis found romanticism, hand-in-hand with Christianity, to be a necessary rebellion against the growing
materialist and nihilist ideology of his own day. He reveals this attitude in a review of Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings,
exclaiming, “This book is like lightning from a clear sky; as sharply different, as unpredictable in our age as Songs
of Innocence were in theirs. […] in it heroic romance, gorgeous, eloquent, and unashamed, has suddenly returned at
a period almost pathological in its anti-romanticism” (“The Gods Return to Earth” 99). For more on Lewis’s antimodernism, see Gilchrist.
21
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by Joy. In understanding the Romantic metanarrative, which consists of the stages of innocence,
experience, and higher innocence (known to some as the Blakean paradigm), it will be necessary
to explain each component in detail, particularly focusing on higher innocence. It is in higher
innocence that Lewis is most interested, and most innovative. Numerous scholars have hinted at
the connection between the Romantic sublime and Lewis’s Joy. In Surprised by Joy Lewis
describes Joy as a sensation of “enormous bliss,” “desire,” and “longing,” which made
“everything else that had ever happened […] insignificant in comparison” (16). It is no surprise
that critics have examined this Joy as a late iteration of the sublime experiences of Wordsworth
and other Romantics. What has not been duly examined, however, is first the influence that early
textual theories of the sublime may have had on Lewis’s conception of Joy, and second the
relationship that Joy has not only to the sublime, but also to the Romantic ideal of higher
innocence, specifically via Coleridge’s concept of polarity.
This chapter will trace the direct influence of William Blake, John Keats, Percy Bysshe
Shelley, William Wordsworth, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge on C. S. Lewis’s autobiographical
self-construction. While Blake provides the basic narrative trajectory of innocence, experience,
and higher innocence, Lewis relies on the other Romantics to fill out this narrative. Keats and
Shelley provide Lewis with his earliest examples of the sublime and inform his early pursuit of
Joy. Eventually, however, Lewis rejects the younger Romantics, finding their sublime too
strongly materialistic and abortive. He then turns to Wordsworth, whose Prelude provides the
primary model for Surprised by Joy, and Coleridge, whose concept of polarity shapes, perhaps
even names, Lewis’s sublime concept of higher innocence as Joy.
Lewis did not publish his autobiography until March 1955, after the majority of his major
fiction had already been written (with the notable exception of Till We Have Faces [1956]). This
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fact raises a hen-and-egg question about the romantic structures in Lewis’s fiction: does the
autobiography owe its structure to his previous fictional work, or do the fictional works owe their
structure to Lewis’s actual romantic life experience. This is a question without a clear answer.
On the one hand, Surprised by Joy is famously inaccurate. Scholars have illustrated Lewis’s
many chronological mistakes (such as incorrectly dating his conversion), as well as his selective
omission of indiscretions (such as the relationship with Janie Moore) and of people who played a
significant role in his life (such as J. R. R. Tolkien). These inaccuracies suggest a level of artifice
in the book and could support the argument that Lewis is simply writing another piece of fiction,
using the romantic elements to spice up the narrative as he is wont to do. On the other hand,
Lewis’s letters reveal the truth of much of Surprised by Joy. Lewis expresses a self-awareness of
Joy early in his letters to Arthur Greeves, and Lewis’s letters and diary frequently document the
sort of romantic experiences that the autobiography describes. Ultimately, one can conclude that
the romantic autobiographical structure (or Romantic metanarrative) was so ingrained in Lewis’s
psyche as to inform his own self-construction and drive his fictional endeavors. While the
fictional outworking of this internal romantic narrative will be explored in later chapters, it is the
work of this chapter to illustrate whence this metanarrative originates, and how Lewis employs it
in his own story.
William Blake: Romantic Metanarrative and the Argument from Desire
Many treatments of literary Romanticism begin with William Blake, and Lewis’s own
romanticism certainly originates with this visionary. But exploring the relationship between
Lewis and Blake is difficult. First, very few scholars have investigated the links between these
authors. Second, Lewis makes little open reference to Blake. However, in contrast to the current
critical consensus (or, rather, critical silence) on Lewis and Blake, this chapter will demonstrate
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that Lewis was not only deeply familiar with Blake’s work, but that he was deeply indebted to
Blake for his own romantic self-understanding, particularly in relation to his conversion to
Christianity. Most importantly, Blake gave Lewis an initial understanding of innocence,
experience, and the longing for higher innocence.
Until now the only critically recognized connection between Lewis and Blake is that
asserted in the Preface of Lewis’s The Great Divorce (1945), which begins thus: “Blake wrote
the Marriage of Heaven and Hell. […] I have written of their Divorce (viii). This prefatory
comment has led critics to suppose that The Great Divorce is Lewis’s platform upon which to
reject Blake.22 Yet Lewis is not a Blake scholar, and in this prefatory comment he openly admits
both the difficulty of Blake’s writing, as well as his own interpretive uncertainty. Elsewhere he
uses Blake as a standard of textual abstruseness, writing that Charles Williams’s Taliessin
Through Logres “will seem as difficult as Blake” (“Charles Williams” 138). Even in the Preface
he admits that he does not consider himself “a fit antagonist for so great a genius, nor […] feel at
all sure […] what he meant,” suggesting that the only actual conversation between The Great
Divorce and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell may be their respective titles (vii).23
Lewis’s only other direct Blakean references appear in his letters, and although they do
not evince a passion for the poet, they do reveal a knowledge and enjoyment of Blake’s work and
genius. In a December 12, 1927, letter to Warnie, a young Lewis expresses a distinct lack of
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For the most detailed treatment, see Manganiello.
Intruigingly, Lewis seems to have gotten the title for The Great Divorce from a line in John Keats’s 1820 letter to
John Brown: “Land and sea, weakness and decline, are great separators, but death is the great divorcer for ever”
(371). Lewis underlined this passage in his copy of Keats’s letters, and was clearly familiar with it, thus having it
ready to hand when naming his book. Most interesting for our purposes, however, is the fact that Keats’s use of the
phrase “great divorce,” is not at all with the same intent as Lewis’s, and Lewis surely understood that he was
appropriating Keats’s words in a completely new sense. While Keats refers to the separation death enforces between
the living and the dead, Lewis is interested in the separation between Heaven and Hell, and finds the phrase a witty
contrast to Blake’s Marriage. This extraction and use of Keats’s words outside of their true context implies that
Lewis may be similarly extracting and responding to Blake’s title without much interest in the actual content of the
work.
23
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interest in Blake, describing him as: “one of those unhappy authors whom we are bored with
years before we read him” (Collected Letters: Vol I 740). Nonetheless, Lewis knows Blake’s
material well enough to reference various works and passages in his correspondence. In 1939 he
jocularly quotes The Marriage of Heaven and Hell to Owen Barfield (Vol II 249), and he
similarly references Songs of Experience in a 1942 letter to Dorothy Sayers, in which he prepares
her for her first reading of Milton, saying, “‘Hear the voice of the Bard!’” (Vol II 534). Lewis’s
investment in Blake is most apparent through his friendship and regular correspondence with
Kathleen Raine, a Cambridge colleague and Blake scholar. Lewis critiques, encourages and
admires Raine’s criticism in his correspondence with her. 24 The existing letters, which
acknowledge the publication of Raine’s pieces on Blake, are all dated from 1957 and 1958, two
or three years after the publication of Surprised by Joy; however, Raine arrived in Cambridge as
a research fellow in 1954 (Hooper, Companion 1705), and the fact that Lewis writes to her about
her Blake-related publications suggests that she discussed her work with him beginning in 1954
and 1955, when Lewis would have been putting the finishing touches on Surprised by Joy.
Indeed, in her contribution to Light on C. S. Lewis, Raine hints that Lewis’s knowledge of Blake
was actually quite impressive, “I remember conversation with him as delightful because even
24

In May 12, 1958, he writes to Raine in response to her essay “The Little Girl Lost and Found and the Lapsed
Soul”: “This is an absolute stunner: one of the most important discoveries (of that kind) made in our times. [….]the
first step is to know what it is about and you have got us up that” (Nov. 7, 1957; Vol II 893). Later, he congratulates
her on another essay, saying, “There is a certain monotony in commenting on your Blakiana, for the best fact,
namely that you are quite clearly right, makes the dullest proposition. Your case about Tiriel is really quite
unanswerable” (Vol III 943-44; See Raine’s “Some Sources of Tiriel” in The Huntington Library Quarterly [Nov.
1957]). He also provides support for her most important work, Blake and Tradition, which would not be published
until after his own death: “When the Big Book finally appears I think all pre-Raine views of Blake will be obsolete
forever” (Dec. 5, 1958; Vol III 994). The fact that Lewis so glowingly approves of Raine’s work demonstrates not
only a scholarly interest in Blake, but also a particular allegiance to Raine’s school of “Blakiana,” which establishes
that “nearly every one of Blake’s affirmations is essentially Platonic” (Raine, Blake and Tradition 102). In a review
of Harold Bloom’s The Visionary Company: A Reading of English Romantic Poetry (1962), Lewis criticizes Bloom
for being “anxious to separate [Blake] from […] ‘the swamp of Neoplatonism’” and therefore ignoring Raine’s
important contributions: “the names of Porphyry, Taylor, and Kathleen Raine do not appear in the index” (“Poetry
and Exegesis” 313). In her work, Raine demonstrates not only that Blake was reading deeply in the Neo-Platonic
work of Porphyry, but that he was also immersed in the writings of Thomas Taylor, who integrates Platonic thought
into the philosophia perennis. See “The Little Girl Lost and Found and the Lapsed Soul.”
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though at the full extent of my own learning, beyond (and even within) the narrow field in which
I had been working he was more than a match for me” (“From a Poet” 104). If Lewis possessed
the necessary knowledge of Blake to engage with Raine, he certainly knew enough of Blake to
be influenced by the poet’s ideas from the Songs and elsewhere. Having established Lewis’s
familiarity with Blake, we can therefore argue for the most central concept in Lewis’s selfcomprehension: Blake’s innocence, experience, and higher innocence. I will first build on
Romantic scholarship to establish how Blake defines these concepts, then explain/demonstrate
how Lewis revises them in Surprised by Joy.
Blake published his Songs of Innocence in 1789, presenting a revolutionary new vision of
childhood innocence—one that was in opposition to the strict, Puritan standards of eighteenthcentury England. Blake turned the concept of Original Sin on its head, suggesting that children
are naturally innocent and sinless, echoing a Christian pre-lapsarian state. In Blake, innocence, or
childhood, is a time in which a person experiences wholeness and unity with the world and with
God.
The natural world of the Songs of Innocence is largely pastoral, peaceful and friendly,
reflecting its union with the innocent child. Thus “The School Boy” reports his own harmony
with the natural world, saying, “I love to rise in a summer morn / When the birds sing on every
tree; / The distant huntsman winds his horn, / And the sky-lark sings with me” (37). Similarly,
the “Nurse’s Song” depicts a mingling between the sounds of children and the natural world:
“the voices of children are heard on the green, / And laughing is heard on the hill” (39). This
union is perhaps best shown in the “Laughing Song,” where the laughter of the children is
literally shared by nature: “the green woods laugh with the voice of joy, / And the dimpling
stream runs laughing by” (40). The song is an invitation into the wholeness of innocence, saying,
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“Come live & be merry, and join with me, / To sing the sweet chorus of ‘Ha, Ha, He!’” (40).
This universal chorus, however, is not simply a unity within nature, but a harmony between God
and his creation.
Many of the Songs of Innocence express a simple and solid faith, characterized by a
harmony between God and humankind. This is often depicted through a catechistic structure of
question and answer. The poem “On Another’s Sorrow” follows a sort of call and response in
which the narrator asks questions and then answers them. First, it addresses the unity of
humanity, asking “Can I see another’s woe, / And not be in sorrow too?” (36). The answer is no.
Next it moves through parental relationships, questioning whether mothers and fathers can view
their children in distress without empathy. “No, no! never can it be!” is the answer, reaffirming
the shared sympathy of human relationships (36). Finally, the question shifts to God, asking
“And can he who smiles on all / Hear the wren with sorrows small, / Hear the small bird’s grief
& care, / Hear the woes that infants bear/ […] And not sit both night & day, / Wiping all our
tears away?” (36-7). Again, the answer is “O! no, never can it be!” and the narrator expounds
upon the deep empathy of God for humanity: “He doth give his joy to all; / He becomes an infant
small; / He becomes a man of woe; He doth feel the sorrow too” (37). In Blakean innocence,
therefore, the child experiences a firm and simple faith and a harmonious relationship with both
God and the world.
Unfortunately, innocence is also vulnerable. Figures like the Shepherd and the Nurse
represent protection and adult nurturing within the songs, so that the child may remain “in peace”
(35). In “The Divine Image” God is a “father dear” who takes care of “Man, his child and care”
(44). The child in “A Dream” has an “Angel-guarded bed” (44), and the child of “A Cradle
Song” is protected not only by its mother’s presence, but by the “Sweet dreams” that “form a
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shade / O’er my lovely infant’s head” (50-1). All of this protection suggests that innocence is not
only vulnerable, but short lived. In “Night” innocence is seen to be fleeting, as the day gives way
to night, and one must say “Farewell, green field and happy groves” hearing instead the “wolves
and tygers howl for prey” (54-5). Blake makes it clear that innocence will ultimately give way to
a fall—experience.
Five years after Songs of Innocence, Blake published Songs of Innocence and of
Experience (1794), with the subtitle, “Shewing the Two Contrary States of the Human Soul”
(Songs of Experience i). This new volume introduced the Songs of Experience and placed the two
poem collections side by side, thereby contrasting the states of innocence and experience. The
Songs of Innocence are light-hearted, naïve, but happy, simple, complete. They offer a vision of a
unified world from a child’s perspective, not yet tainted. On the other hand, the Songs of
Experience are cynical, pained, and disillusioned. They ask unanswerable questions about the
world and express an incompleteness and lack.
In contrast to the unity of innocence, experience is disunity, chaos, a lack of meaning.
While the innocent “On Another’s Sorrow” emphasized unity between humanity and God
through a question and answer format, the experience poem “The Clod & the Pebble” utilizes a
similar format in order to depict contradiction and disunity on both a natural and spiritual level.
The poem presents a parallel structure in which the clod makes an orthodox statement—“Love
seeketh not Itself to please”—and the pebble replies by directly contradicting it—“Love seeketh
only Self to please” (28). In this way, nature itself is seen in discord, and the simple Christian
maxims of innocence are carelessly shoved aside for wicked, experienced ones. In “The Fly”
humanity no longer lives in harmony with nature, but destroys it, saying, “Thy summers play, /
My thoughtless hand / Has brush’d away” (33). Additionally, the recognition of death as “some
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blind hand” that “Shall brush my wing” is present in “The Fly,” and in “The Sick Rose” where
an “invisible worm […] Does thy life destroy” (33). This death is not only present, but blind, and
seemingly indiscriminate, emphasizing the lack of unity or meaning in experience.
By contrasting the companion poems in Songs of Innocence and Songs of Experience it is
possible to further emphasize the characteristics Blake assigns to these opposing states. One such
instance is “The Lamb” and “The Tyger.” The narrator of “The Lamb” poses the question,
“Little Lamb, who made thee?” and then suggests, “Little Lamb, I’ll tell thee” (53). This
catechistic question and response once again suggests innocence’s sense of completion and
surety, as well as its delight with the world (“Making all the vales rejoice”) (53). “The Tyger,”
on the other hand is a stream of questions without answers, like, “Tyger […] What immortal
hand or eye / Could frame they fearful symmetry,” “What dread hand? & what dread feet,” and
“Did he who made the Lamb make thee?” (34-35). Kathleen Raine notes that “The Tyger is, from
beginning to end, an unanswered question” (Blake and Tradition 20). By ending the poem with a
repetition of the first stanza’s question, yet altered to “What immortal hand or eye / Dare frame
they fearful symmetry,” Blake emphasizes that experience is a state of unanswered questions,
disillusionment, awareness of sin and anger at the powers (or lack thereof) that allow wickedness
(35).
Although the basic movement from innocence to experience seems an inevitable and
tragic cycle, Blake offers a glimpse of hope. Both volumes of Songs hint at a hope for future
innocence, a higher innocence that lies beyond experience. The “voice of the Bard” in the
“Introduction” to Songs of Experience expresses a longing for “fallen light renew” and exclaims,
“O Earth, O Earth return!” (27). This longing anticipates higher innocence as a renewal of nature
and humankind via resurrection, since “Mercy changd death into sleep” (“To Tirzah” 41). The
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“Introduction” to Songs of Innocence depicts the poet in interaction with an innocent child,
suggesting that poetry itself may be a vehicle for achieving higher innocence, for as U. C.
Knoepflmacher recalls, the creative process involved in literature about children requires “an
adult reactivation of childhood selves” (xiv). The child enjoys the poet’s song and asks him to
“write […] a book” (Blake, “Introduction” 35). The creation of this art entails a necessary
corruption of innocence, as the poet must whittle a reed into a “rural pen” and “stain[…] water”
in order to write his “happy songs,” yet this experience is the necessary means towards higher
innocence, as the poems will invoke “joy to hear,” thereby recovering the unity of innocence. In
this manner Blake hints to the reader about something beyond, a reality higher and better than
innocence, a Heavenly reality.
Lewis was indisputably impacted by Blake’s Songs. He writes of the Songs as charming,
alluring, enchanting. In an August 10, 1946, letter to Ruth Pitter he describes Blake’s poetry as a
“frolic” that has “dropped out of the sky” and has “the same charm as a child dancing in the
waves,” suggesting that he finds Blake both other-worldly and delightful (Vol II 734). He also
recognizes Blake’s songs, which are like “Heavenly music” and “lightening from a clear sky”
(Vol III 897; “Gods Return to Earth” 99), to be visionary in their own right, and his revision of
Blake’s states in Surprised by Joy suggests that he found the concepts directly applicable to his
own experience.
If one thing is true of Surprised by Joy, it is Lewis’s internalization of these romantic
ideas about the child’s spiritual succession through innocence, experience and higher innocence.
The book is a story of Lewis’s conversion to Christianity, and we could easily place that story
within the Biblical framework of creation, fall and redemption; however, while Lewis certainly
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intends to evoke the Biblical metanarrative, he does so in romantic terms, exploring this
framework in terms of romantic innocence and experience.
Lewis describes his “childhood” (a word with which he typically denotes life until his
mother’s death in 1908) in terms highly resonant with Blake’s version of innocence. The child
Lewis is like Blake’s naïve, happy lamb, living in “a period of humdrum, prosaic happiness”
(SBJ 8). He repeatedly refers to the time as one of “general happiness,” and “settled happiness”
(SBJ 8)—the type of happiness enjoyed by Blake’s joyful innocents, ignorant of the evils of the
world around them. This naïveté Lewis emphasizes by explaining that, “Like other children, we
had no standard of comparison” (SBJ 30), that he and Warnie were “humble and childlike and
self-forgetful” (SBJ 68), and that children are typically innocent of the sinful motives necessary
to actual sin: “Adults often accuse a child of vanity without pausing to discover on what points
children in general, or that child in particular, are likely to be vain. [….] I was being accused of
an offense which I lacked resources to commit” (SBJ 49). This Blakean innocence, however,
cannot continue indefinitely.
Flora Lewis’s death serves as the one, major marker of the transition from innocence to
experience. Along with Flora’s death comes a complete rupture of “settled happiness,” the unity
that Lewis perceives in his earlier life. As Flora dies of cancer, experience, with all its
characteristic evils, creeps into the Lewis household. The first image of experience that Lewis
offers the reader is decidedly Blakean: “There came a night when I was ill and crying both with
headache and toothache and distressed because my mother did not come to me” (SBJ 18). Just as
parental protection—the image of the mother bending over the cradle in “Infant Joy” or “Cradle
Song”—is a hallmark of innocence, so parental neglect characterizes experience. Furthermore,
the trope of the unanswered question or plea typifies Blake’s description of experience, just as
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Lewis’s mother fails to answer him in his distress. One protector figure having failed, Lewis
turns to God himself and makes a fervent attempt at prayer. When Flora is known to be sick, he
offers “prayers for her recovery,” but they go unanswered and “nevertheless she die[s]” (SBJ 20).
Again, this echoes not only the parental neglect of Blake’s experience, but the fact of God, Priest
and King making “a Heaven” of the child’s distress, as in Blake’s “Chimney Sweeper”
(Experience 32). It is a failure to answer the sorts of questions about parental and divine empathy
that are raised in “On Another’s Sorrow.” The result is disunity in Lewis’s world, and an
alienation not only from parental nurturing, but from the physical world as well. In an echo of
the transition from the familiar laughter of innocent nature to the darkness and woe of
experienced nature in “Night,” Lewis reports a sudden transformation in his own home, writing,
“our whole existence changed into something alien and menacing, as the house become full of
strange smells and midnight noises and sinister whispered conversations. [….] It divided us from
our father as well as our mother” (SBJ 19). Additionally, sin and deceit begin to grow in the boys
with the onset of experience and they are alienated from the father to whom “we […] were
already learning to lie” (SBJ 19). Lewis describes himself and Warren at this point in a
particularly Blakean image, as “two frightened urchins huddled for warmth in a bleak world”
(SBJ 19), and makes a final statement of the disunity of experience, saying, “With my mother’s
death all settled happiness, all that was tranquil and reliable, disappeared from my life. [….] no
more of the old security. It was sea and islands now; the great continent had sunk like Atlantis”
(SBJ 21).
Not only is this final image significant for its demonstration of disunity, alienation, and
lack of security, but the reference to Atlantis has a potentially Blakean origin. Raine attests that,
for Blake, “The lost Atlantis is yet another version of the myth of the lost paradise” (Blake and
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Tradition vol. 1 339), and Atlantis appears significantly in America and Visions of the Daughters
of Albion as well as other places in Blake’s mythology (Holley 109). Raine further explains that
“The Biblical story of the expulsion from Eden and the closing of the gate, and that of the
Deluge, are, of course, quite distinct; but to Blake they are, in symbolic terms, the same story,
and he therefore does not scruple to combine them” in the symbol of the sunken Atlantis (Blake
and Tradition, vol. II 268). Whether Lewis absorbed this image from his own reading of Blake,
or from conversations with Raine, he once again evokes a Blakean symbol of the fall from
innocence with this reference to Atlantis.
Flora’s death is the onset of experience in Lewis’s self-construction, but certainly not its
fulfillment; school also plays a distinct role in Lewis’s loss of innocence. At the beginning of his
chapter “Concentration Camp,” Lewis again invokes what he believes to be another Blakean
image, perhaps from “The School Boy,” writing, “the putting on of the school clothes was, I well
knew, the assumption of a prison uniform” (23). Blake’s “School Boy” laments that “to go to
school in a summer morn, / […] drives all joy away,” for “Under a cruel eye outworn, / The little
ones spend the day / In sighing and dismay” (37). In a November 1917 letter to Arthur Greeves,
Lewis mentions “‘The rules of our prison-house’ as Blake called them” (Vol I 343). Lewis
misattributes this phrase to Blake. In fact, “the rules of our prison-house” is a direct quote from a
W. B. Yeats’s introduction to Blake’s poetry (xxxiv), which Lewis would certainly have read,
being an avid Yeats fan. Strangely enough—it seems most likely that the phrase “the rules of our
prison-house” occurred to Yeats as an echo of the “Shades of the prison-house” from
Wordsworth’s “Intimations Ode” (68). That both Yeats and Lewis should naturally associate this
phrase with Blake, however, reveals how universally Blake is credited as the source of romantic
innocence and experience. Even when Wordsworth employs these structures, he is leaning
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heavily on Blake’s foundational ideas—or so, at least, it seemed to Yeats and Lewis. Lewis
depicts his loss of innocence, as an ongoing process, begun by his mother’s death, which sent
him to boarding school, where he loses his faith and becomes sexually corrupt, “a fop, a cad, and
a snob” with a “vulgarize[d …] mind” (SBJ 68-69). This progression is highly reminiscent of the
progression from innocence to experience that Wordsworth sets forth in the Intimations Ode, and
wherein appears the famous “shades of the prison-house” line which Lewis misattributed to
Blake. He describes his school days as the setting for “my loss of faith, of virtue, and of
simplicity” (SBJ 70), evoking the image of Blake’s “School Boy,” wilting in his desk. The
growth of literary pride he also describes as “a kind of Fall” (SBJ 104), saying that his simple
enjoyment of literature was an “innocence” that “did not last” (103). Thus the boyhood of
Lewis’s school days is a Blakean one.
With adolescence, however, Lewis again borrows on Blake, this time invoking higher
innocence through the reintroduction of Joy. Joy’s reappearance represents his “personal
Renaissance”:
[…]this wonderful reawakening which comes to most of us when puberty is
complete. It is properly called a rebirth not a birth, a reawakening not a wakening,
because in many of us, besides being a new thing, it is also the recovery of things
we had in childhood and lost when we become boys. [….] The dreams of
childhood and those of adolescence may have much in common; between them,
often, boyhood stretches like an alien territory in which everything (ourselves
included) has been greedy, cruel, noisy, and prosaic, in which the imagination has
slept and the most unideal senses and ambitions have been restlessly, even
maniacally, awake. (SBJ 71)
This re-awakening paradoxically represents higher innocence, and yet only the longing for
higher innocence, the anticipation of it. Just as Blake’s songs merely hint at, anticipate, and long
for higher innocence, so Lewis sees it as only paradoxically attainable in life, for it is ultimately
a future, Heavenly reality. In this manner, Lewis borrows from Blake but revises him, giving
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higher innocence a significantly larger portion of his attention than did Blake, who only hinted at
it. Lewis suggests that higher innocence is paradoxically present, even while a longed-for, future
reality, in a certain stage of experience. Simply by reading the title of Siegfried and the Twilight
of the Gods, Lewis catches and briefly attains a glimpse of higher innocence: “I at once had what
I had now lacked for years, […] I was returning at last from exile and desert lands to my own
country; […] a single unendurable sense of desire and loss [….]. And at once I knew (with fatal
knowledge) that to ‘have it again’ was the supreme and only important object of my desire” (SBJ
73). The experience of Joy, therefore, represents simultaneously a taste of higher innocence and
a longing for it. While Blake offers only hints of higher innocence within the stages of innocence
and experience, Lewis’s Joy is both a “having” and a “wanting,” so that the longing for higher
innocence (which he ultimately understands to be God and Heaven) is both a present attainment
of that higher innocence and an anticipation of the future reality of higher innocence:
a longing (yet it was also fruition) [….] I had tasted Heaven then. [….] True, it
was desire, not possession. […] only possession in so far as that kind of desire is
itself desirable, is the fullest possession we can know on earth; […] the very
nature of Joy makes nonsense of our common distinction between having and
wanting. There, to have is to want and to want is to have. (SBJ 166)
Surely Lewis’s treatment of higher innocence as a present and future reality is influenced by the
“already and not yet” inaugurated eschatology that was becoming theologically popular in the
early 20th century, and rose to particular prominence around 195025—when Lewis would have
been writing Surprised by Joy; again, however, the original idea is rooted in Blake. Higher
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The concept of “already and not yet,” or inaugural eschatology, supposes that the Kingdom of God both arrived
with Christ’s incarnation, and yet is still to come with Christ’s second coming. While this concept is present in much
theological writing, ranging back to Calvin and Luther, it was largely popularized by Geerhardus Vos. In The
Teaching of Jesus Concerning the Kingdom of God and the Church (1903), Vos explains, “the kingdom might be
present in one sense, and yet have to come in another” (46). George Eldon Ladd’s The Gospel of the Kingdom:
Scriptural Studies in the Kingdom of God (1959) brought inaugural eschatology into further prominence. In The
Presence of the Future (2002), Ladd explains the central idea of inaugural eschatology in simplistic terms: “the
Kingdom of God is in some sense both present and future” (3).
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innocence for Blake is a hinted-at, future reality, but it is also accessible through the imagination,
for:
This world of Imagination is the world of Eternity; it is the divine bosom into
which we shall all go after the death of the Vegetated body. This World of
Imagination is Infinite & Eternal, whereas the world of Generation, or Vegetation,
is Finite & Temporal. (“Vision of the Last Judgment” 410)
The use of imagination for Blake, therefore, is much like Lewis’s Joy. It is both an entrance into
and a prophecy of Heaven. Although Lewis further Christianizes Blake’s Neo-Platonic concept,
he builds his higher innocence from Blake’s.
Another characteristic of Lewis’s higher innocence, which he inherits originally from
Blake, is the idea that it is a higher state, yet childlike. Having rediscovered Joy in his
adolescence, Lewis remarks, “My childhood is at unity with the rest of my life; my boyhood not
so” (SBJ 71-2). Not only does this description signal back to the Blakean concept of innocence
and higher innocence as states of unity, but it suggests that the child-like is a model for higher
innocence, with all its themes of Paradise regained. This idea resurfaces in The Great Divorce
when one of the spirits encourages an inhabitant of Hell, “Once you were a child. Once you
knew what inquiry was for. There was a time when you asked questions because you wanted
answers, and were glad when you had found them. Become that child again: even now” (41).
Blake’s innocent narrator in “The Lamb” asks questions that have answers, while the
experienced narrator of “The Tyger” asks unanswered or unanswerable questions, but “Earth’s
Answer” suggests a potential answer to the questions of experience, longing for a time when it
may “Break this heavy chain” (28). Higher innocence thus becomes an answer not to the easy
questions of innocence, but a state in which the questions of experience become as easily and
earnestly answerable as those of innocence. For Lewis, therefore, higher innocence does not
suggest so much a “growing up” as a return to the best characteristics of childhood:
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“grown-up conversation” […] I had no taste for. In my experience it meant
conversation about politics, money, deaths, and digestion. I assumed that a taste
for it, as for eating mustard or reading newspapers, would develop in me when I
grew older (so far, all three expectations have been disappointed). The only two
kinds of talk I wanted were the almost purely imaginative and the almost purely
rational. (SBJ 136)
Higher innocence here means a transcendence beyond being “grown up” and instead a childlike
reveling in the adult capacity for imagination and reason. In other words, Lewis’s conception of
higher innocence represents a child-like pursuit of truth and beauty that gives no credence to the
“rules of our prison-house”—the social laws of “grown-up” society. Again, he embraces a
romantic rejection of oppressive society, just as Blake condemns the abusive power structures of
his own day, whether the “mind-forg’d manacles” of social convention and the “blackning
Church” (“London,” Songs of Experience 37), or the “dark Satanic Mills” (“Milton” 238). Like
Blake, therefore, Lewis describes higher innocence as a child-like state.26
Furthermore, Blake’s concept of desire plays a key role in Lewis’s understanding of
higher innocence. Despite Lewis’s repudiation of any attempt to “marry Heaven and Hell,” both
his autobiography and his own depiction of the afterlife in The Great Divorce corroborate Blake
on the topic of desire. Both Blake and Lewis see evil as a negation, and good as a positive—evil
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One could easily argue that Lewis’s embrace of the child-like in higher innocence owes as much to George
MacDonald as it does to William Blake. Upon experiencing Joy through the “Holiness” of George MacDonald’s
Phantastes, Lewis reports, “For the first time the song of the sirens sounded like the voice of my mother or my
nurse” (SBJ 179). Furthermore, many of Lewis’s favorite MacDonald texts—such as the Princess books, and the
stories in Dealings with the Faeries—display a higher innocence that is clearly linked with the child (as I will
further discuss in chapter four). Prothero and Williams argue that “[i]f we can trace any clear influence of Lewis
from Wordsworth or Coleridge, it most likely takes the form of indirect influence through the good offices of
George MacDonald” (21-22). While I agree with Prothero and Williams, I would also temper this idea of
transmission, for Lewis’s love for MacDonald by no means over-rides his familiarity with the original Romantic
texts. Nonetheless, Lewis very well may have acquired some of his Blakean imagery and ideas from MacDonald.
MacDonald’s biographer, Rolland Hein confirms that MacDonald owned a biography of Blake (Gilchrist's Life of
Blake, 1863), and that, “The presence in MacDonald's writings of ideas very similar to Blake's is so noticeable that
MacDonald must have had some early acquaintance with his work” (119-20). MacDonald’s characters frequently, if
not always, undergo a fall from innocence, and undertake a quest for higher innocence, which MacDonald
doubtlessly inherits from Blake. Additionally, MacDonald's personal bookplate was designed after Blake’s “Death’s
Door,” which Blake illustrated for Robert Blair’s poem The Grave. A copy of this bookplate is on display in the
Marion E. Wade Center.
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as non-existence, while good is more real than earthly existence. In his descriptive notes for
Vision of the Last Judgment, Blake explains that judgment will be based upon whether an
individual embraces or negates his/her passions:
Men are admitted into Heaven not because they have curbed & governd their
Passions, or have No Passions, but because they have Cultivated their
Understandings. The Treasures of Heaven are not Negations of Passion, but
Realities of Intellect, from which All the Passions Emanate Uncurbed in their
Eternal Glory. [….] Those who are cast out are All those who having no Passions
of their own because No Intellect, have spent their lives in Curbing & Governing
other People’s by the various arts of Poverty & Cruelty of all kinds. (“Vision”
415)
In this light, good is a cultivated passion, while evil is the absence or negation of passion.
Additionally, this implies that evil exists only as a corruption or absence of good, while good
exists freely outside of evil. Good, or Heaven, is therefore a true existence, while evil or Hell is a
non-existence. Similarly, in The Great Divorce George MacDonald (Lewis’s fictional tour guide
to Heaven) tells the narrator, “Without self-choice there could be no Hell. No soul that seriously
and constantly desires joy will ever miss it. Those who seek find. To those who knock it is
opened” (75). Through the character of MacDonald, Lewis suggests that the embrace of true
desire means an embrace of Heaven, while the choice of Hell is a repression or negation of the
individual’s fundamental desire. This idea of good as existence and evil as non-existence also
bleeds over into both men’s presentation of Heaven as the Neo-Platonic ideal.
Blake asserts his Neo-plantonic view of reality and the imagination in his Vision of the
Last Judgment:
This world of Imagination is the world of Eternity; it is the divine bosom into
which we shall all go after the death of the Vegetated body. This World of
Imagination is Infinite & Eternal, whereas the world of Generation, or Vegetation,
is Finite & Temporal. There Exist in that Eternal World the Permanent Realities
of Every Thing which we see reflected in this Vegetable Glass of Nature. (“Vision
of the Last Judgment” 410)
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By this description, the physical world (which is as close to a literal Hell as Blake gets) is merely
a shadow or “reflect[ion]” of the Eternal, ideal world. Lewis’s Heaven in The Great Divorce is
similarly Neo-Plantonic, for it appears to represent the ideal forms, of which earthly and hellish
objects are merely shadows. Thus the narrator notes that the bus of visitors “were as they had
always been; as all the men I had known had been perhaps. It was the light, the grass, the trees
that were different; made of some different substance, so much solider than things in our country
that men were ghosts by comparison” (21). In contrast to the reality of Heaven, “The whole
difficulty of understanding Hell is that the thing to be understood is so nearly Nothing” (Great
Divorce 77). Like Blake, Lewis sees Heaven as ultimate reality and Hell as ultimate un-reality.
And if Heaven is ultimate reality, it is also the ultimate answer to all human desire.
Because it is the central characteristic of Joy, desire is the driving force towards Lewis’s
higher innocence and Blake’s own arguments about desire appear to be a definite foreshadowing
of what Peter Kreeft has titled Lewis’s “argument from desire.” In There is No Natural Religion
Blake rejects the idea that man can approach the divine through nature, instead asserting that
“Man has no notion of moral fitness but from Education” (14). He then explores human desire,
noting that “the desires & perceptions of man untaught by any thing but organs of sense, must be
limited to objects of sense” (14). In other words, if man limits himself only to the material world
and his senses, he will only experience desires that are attached to material things. However, if
he is taught to use his imaginative perception, he will perceive things beyond the material world,
“more than sense (tho’ ever so acute) can discover” (15). With this expanded, or liberated,
perception comes an unquenchable desire: “More! More! is the cry of a mistaken soul; less than
ALL cannot satisfy Man” (15). One must eventually confront the question of whether every
desire has an object. Recognizing that “If any could desire what he is incapable of possessing,
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despair must be his eternal lot,” Blake determines that “The desire of Man being Infinite, the
possession is Infinite, & himself Infinite” (15). In this way, Blake uses the materially
unquenchable human desire as a proof of spiritual reality. For Blake, of course, this is a proof of
man’s divinity as much as it is a proof of God (with which Lewis takes strong exception), yet his
argument from desire translates easily into Lewis’s own philosophical journey to God.
In Surprised by Joy Lewis is haunted by Joy, which is itself both a form of higher
innocence, and a longing or desire for higher innocence. Lewis reports that “I was sick with
desire,” yet recognizes that this was a pleasant state, a “sickness better than health” (SBJ 119).
Ultimately, Joy leads Lewis from atheism through idealism and theism to Christianity in a
similar train of thought to that of Blake. Lewis explains this argument from desire in a letter to
Sheldon Vanauken in December, 1950:
[a] point about wishes. A wish may lead to false beliefs, granted. But what does
the existence of the wish suggest? At one time I was much impressed by Arnold’s
line ‘Nor does the being hungry prove that we have bread.’ But, surely, tho’ it
doesn’t prove that one particular man will get food, it does prove that there is such
a thing as food? i.e. if we were a species that didn’t normally eat, wasn’t designed
to eat, wd. one feel hungry? You say the Materialist universe is 'ugly'. I wonder
how you discovered that? If you are really a product of a materialistic universe,
how is it you don't feel at home there? Do fish complain of the sea for being wet?
Or if they did, would that fact itself not strongly suggest that they had not always
been, or wd. not always be, purely aquatic creatures? Notice how we are
perpetually surprised at Time. ('How time flies? Fancy John being grown-up &
married? I can hardly believe it!') In Heaven's name, why? Unless, indeed, there is
something in us which is not temporal” (Vol III 76).
Just as humanity’s capacity for infinite desire proves to Blake that such an infinite reality exists,
so Lewis believes that every desire has its ultimate object, and that the very existence of a desire
for something outside of this world proves such otherworldly existence.
Blake again presents his argument from desire in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,
which Lewis is known to have read, and supposed to have rejected, yet Blake’s platonic
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Christianity again anticipates Lewis’s own argument. The “Voice of the Devil,” in which the
Devil, we may assume, does not necessarily represent any actual devil so much as a
revolutionary opponent of the established church, seeks to amend three incorrect ideas: 1) that
man is divided into “a Body & a Soul,” 2) that “Energy, calld Evil”—which we could also
denote as desire, or the drive towards desire fulfillment—is bodily, while “Reason, calld Good”
dwells in the soul, and 3) that God will punish humanity for “following his Energies,” or desires
(87). The truth, the Devil tells us is 1) that all of man is a soul, the body is only a portion of it, 2)
that “Energy is the only life” and “Reason” is not its opponent, but its “outward circumference,”
and 3) that “Energy is Eternal Delight” (87). The first of these three assertions reappears in
George MacDonald, and is particularly noted by Lewis. In a copy of MacDonald’s Annals of a
Quiet Neighborhood Lewis’s marginal notes state that humans are souls and simply possess
bodies; he also makes a marginal line to emphasize the following passage from the novel:
And here let me interrupt the conversation to remark upon the great mistake of
teaching children that they have souls. The consequence is, that they think of their
souls as of something which is not themselves. For what a man has cannot be
himself. Hence, when they are told that their souls go to Heaven, they think of
their selves as lying in the grave. They ought to be taught that they have bodies;
and that their bodies die; while they themselves live on. Then they will not think
as old Mrs Tomkins did, that they will be laid in the grave. It is making altogether
too much of the body, and is indicative of an evil tendency to materialism, that we
talk as if we possessed souls, instead of being souls. We should teach our children
to think no more of their bodies when dead than they do of their hair when it is cut
off, or of their old clothes when they have done with them. (Annals of a Quiet
Neighborhood 480)
This idea of the body as a possession of the soul, which Lewis clearly noted in MacDonald,
resonates equally with the voice of Blake’s Devil. Of even more importance, however, is that
Devil’s assertion that “Energy is Eternal Delight,” for in this statement we find another important
resonance between Blake and Lewis’s conceptions of desire and Heaven. Just as Blake wishes to
overturn the concept of energy (desire) as sin, so Lewis demonstrates the dynamic pursuit of
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desire as central to the very delight of Heaven. MacDonald tells the narrator of The Great
Divorce, “Every one of us lives only to journey further and further into the mountains” (74). The
image of climbing or pursuing a mountain represents, for Lewis, the following of ultimate desire
(of Joy), which is higher innocence—simultaneously the pursuit and enjoyment of Heaven.27
Also like Blake, Lewis consistently recognizes the divine source of desire, despite its
ability to be corrupted by earthly sin. Blake emphasizes and celebrates unrepressed sexual desire
throughout his poetry and visions, and in an essay on the work of Charles Williams Lewis
appropriately attributes to Blake the “glorification of the body” and its sexual urges (“A Sacred
Poem” 126). In discussing the pederasty at Malvern College, he recalls that, despite the sin in
these actions, “Eros, turned upside down, blackened, distorted, and filthy, still bore the traces of
his divinity” (SBJ 110). This is strikingly similar to Blake’s words in A Vision of the Last
Judgment, when he accusingly states that “The Modern Church crucifies Christ with the Head
Downwards” (415). Blake recognizes in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell that desire can
become corrupted: “Those who restrain desire do so because theirs is weak enough to be
restrained; and the restrainer or reason usurps its place & governs the unwilling. And being
restrained it by degrees becomes passive till it is only the shadow of desire” (87). In the same
way Lewis (via his fictional George MacDonald) suggests that “the sensualist [….] prefers to joy
the mere fondling of unappeasable lust” (72), and that “Lust is a poor, weak, whimpering,
whispering thing compared with that richness and energy of desire which will arise when lust has
been killed” (114). Dominic Manganiello cites these passages in order to contrast Blake’s
embrace of lust with Lewis’s rejection of evil, yet it seems that Lewis and Blake are closer to
each other on this point than Manganiello would like to admit. Both emphasize the difference

27

The mountain climbing image also appears as the central plot of The Pilgrim’s Regress (1933), and the
culminating moment in Perelandra (1943) and The Last Battle (1956).
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between the energy of a true desire, which leads to God, and that of a weak and therefore wrong
desire. In fact, Blake’s idea of desire versus its negation is unmistakably present in “The Weight
of Glory.” Here Lewis rebukes modern Christians for considering “Unselfishness,” which is “a
negative term,” the highest virtue, rather than “Love,” which is “a positive” (25). He suggests
that it is wrong to think that “our abstinence and not their happiness was the important point”
(25). Instead of recommending “abstinence,” or the restraining of one’s desires, Lewis asserts:
Indeed, if we consider the unblushing promises of reward and the staggering
nature of the rewards promised in the Gospels, it would seem that Our Lord finds
our desires not too strong, but too weak. We are half-hearted creatures, fooling
about with drink and sex and ambition when infinite joy is offered us, like an
ignorant child who wants to go on making mud pies in a slum because he cannot
imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday at the sea. We are far too easily
pleased. (“Weight of Glory” 26)
In this passage, we see Lewis revising Blake’s arguments about desire, and about sin as a
manipulation or negation of a God-given passion. Surely it is no coincidence that the source of
Lewis’s higher innocence would be similarly focused on the foundational role that desire plays in
that highest state.
Like Blake, Lewis emphasizes desire. This desire, which Blake so champions, becomes
for Lewis a “signpost” pointing towards eternal truth, and it is no surprise that, just as Blake
revels in human desire, Lewis should choose a positive rather than a negative name for his own
sublime experience of lack and longing: Joy. In this light, however, Lewis’s famous closing to
Surprised by Joy becomes potentially problematic. After more than a hundred pages about Joy
and its pursuit, Lewis writes, “To tell you the truth, the subject has lost nearly all interest for me
since I became a Christian” (238). He suggests that Joy is merely a “signpost” towards its true
object and that “we shall not stop and stare, or not much; not on this road, though their pillars are
of silver and their lettering of gold. ‘We would be at Jerusalem’” (SBJ 238). On the one hand,
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this seems a betrayal of the argument from desire that he inherits from Blake; but on the other
hand, it is as much a celebration of that desire as ever, for it recognizes the deep longing to be “at
Jerusalem”—a longing which Blake famously shares, though his work leaves it unresolved.
While Lewis’s final quote is from Walter Hilton’s Scale of Perfection, written in the fourteenth
century, it is also a well known scriptural image for Heaven—the new Jerusalem. For an
Englishman who had fought in the first and lived through the second World War, however,
Jerusalem would also have a strong Blakean association. Jerusalem is the subject of the prefatory
poem, “And did those feet in ancient time,” in Blake’s Milton, which alludes to Jesus’s reputed
visit to England as a child in the care of his uncle, Joseph of Arimathea. Hurbert Parry set the
poem to music in 1916 as an intended bolster for England’s flagging morale in the Great War.
The song became England’s unofficial anthem, retitled simply “Jerusalem,” and remains a
cultural fixture.28 Just as Lewis’s parting comment in Surprised by Joy suggests a longing to
reach higher innocence, as embodied in the coming of the Kingdom of God, so Blake’s poem is
an expression of the desire to usher the Kingdom into England. Thus Blake calls upon his
“Arrows of desire” and attests that “I will not cease from Mental Fight, […] Till we have built
Jerusalem, / In England’s green & pleasant Land” (Milton 238). When Lewis chose Jerusalem as
the image for Joy’s ultimate object, and the closing image of Surprised by Joy, he was doubtless
aware of the popular Blakean image, and the “arrows of desire” associated with that image.
Ultimately, the Jerusalem image is simply one final instance of the Blakean influence that
pervades Surprised By Joy, providing its overall structure of innocence, experience, and higher
innocence, and shaping Lewis’s relentless focus on Joy, or higher innocence, as desire.

28

“Jerusalem” is still sung alongside the British national anthem as the official closing of the final Proms concert
every year, and it also received international attention as a part of the Opening Ceremony for the London Olympics
in 2012. It is quite commonplace to hear “Jerusalem” sung across England, from pubs, to churches, to street corners.
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Blake laid the foundations for the Romantic metanarrative, which Lewis would take up in
his autobiography; yet it was not Blake alone who influenced Lewis’s understanding of his self
and experience. The concept of Joy, so integral to Lewis’s autobiography (and to all his fictional
work, which we will discuss in chapters two, three, and four) is significantly shaped not only by
Blake, but by various Romantic experiences and analyses of the sublime.
Joy and the Sublime
The Romanticists M. H. Abrams, Thomas Weiskel, and Frances Ferguson all illuminate
the way in which the Romantics transform the sublime into a source of individual experience,
transcendence and empowerment. David Sandner builds on this work to develop the concept of
the fantastic sublime, which is important for understanding Lewis’s Joy. On Lewis and Joy,
Walter Hooper and Roger Lancelyn Green, Peter Kreeft, Clyde S. Kilby, and major Lewis
biographers offer extensive and thoughtful comments. Each treatment of Lewis’s experience of
longing provides further insight and depth to an understanding of that experience, and what it
meant for Lewis’s personal and professional life. Finally, Margaret Carter, John Lawlor, Robert
Rice, Andrew Lazo, Daniel K. Kuhn and David Sandner analyze Joy as a romantic phenomenon,
whether sehnsucht, the sublime, or both.
Joy and the sublime are such popular topics that Prothero and Williams feel the need to
disclaim: “That fact [of Joy as romantic experience] has been already well-documented and will
not be the focus of this study. What we wish to do here is to focus on the entirety of Lewis’s
Romanticism” (xi). This chapter will by no means labor over ground that has been previously
explored. In fact, Joy and its relation to the sublime only matter to this particular study insomuch
as they function within the Romantic construction of the child and its development. In other
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words, Joy is useful for our purposes, and indeed for Lewis, only insofar as it partakes in the
Romantic metanarrative by pointing towards higher innocence.
As previously discussed in comparison of Blake and Lewis, Joy represents for Lewis a
sort of momentary higher innocence, a flash of unity that leaves him longing for such unity in the
future. This experience, of course, has been linked to the romantic sublime; however, to say that
Joy is the sublime could have an obscuring rather than a clarifying effect on the concept, for the
substance and significance of the sublime have undergone incessant debate since the dawn of the
Romantic movement. In Surprised by Joy Lewis makes it clear that understanding the true
substance of Joy—as a “signpost” towards higher innocence—was the final essential step in his
journey back to Christianity, and therefore the most important question surrounding any
conversation of Joy or the sublime. However, this realization came only after a long, drawn-out
exploration of Joy, and that exploration consisted of much experimentation with various versions
of romantic sublimity. It will be useful, therefore, to trace important nineteenth-century thought
on the sublime through Lewis’s descriptions of Joy, and then to examine his relationship to the
romantic figures who inspired the various steps in his journey towards higher innocence.
In The Critique of Judgment (1790) Immanuel Kant says that the Sublime may be defined
as “what is absolutely great” (94). It is “a pleasure that only arises indirectly, being brought
about by the feeling of a momentary check to the vital forces followed at once by a discharge all
the more powerful, and so it is an emotion that seems to be no sport, but dead earnest in the
affairs of the imagination” (91). This pleasure Kant describes as a “negative pleasure” (91),
because it is more akin to a sudden cessation of pain, than to an actual, positive pleasure. Indeed,
Lewis’s description of the experience of Joy aligns well with Kant’s, both in terms of the actual
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process, and its corresponding emotions and thoughts. Lewis describes his first experience of Joy
thus:
As I stood beside a flowering currant bush on a summer day there suddenly arose
in me without warning, and as if from a depth not of years but of centuries, the
memory […]. It is difficult to find words strong enough for the sensation which
came over me; Milton’s ‘enormous bliss’ of Eden (giving the full ancient meaning
to ‘enormous’) comes somewhere near it. It was a sensation, of course, of desire;
but desire for what? Not, certainly, for a biscuit tin filled with moss, nor even
(though that came into it) for my past. [“Oh, I desire too much”]—and before I
knew what I desired, the desire itself was gone, the whole glimpse withdrawn, the
world turned commonplace again, or only stirred by a longing for the longing that
had just ceased. It had taken only a moment in time; and in a certain sense
everything else that had ever happened to me was insignificant in comparison.
(SBJ 16)
Lewis’s assertion that the memory arose from “centuries,” and that there are not “words strong
enough” to describe the feeling, as well as his use and following re-emphasis of the word
“enormous,” certainly indicate Kant’s sense of the “absolutely great.” Additionally, Kant’s
description of the sublime as “no sport, but dead earnest” aligns with Lewis’s sense of the
experience’s deep significance. Not only are the corresponding emotions similar, however, but
Lewis describes his experience of Joy in a very traditional structure. From Kant to Weiskel,
every critical description of the sublime seems to understand the sublime as a basic threefold
process: 1) Familiar experience of an object, 2) Defamiliarization, causing the individual to be
overwhelmed by a recognition of the infinite, which the finite mind cannot fully comprehend,
and 3) Refamiliarization, but with added significance and a recognition of loss. Clearly, Lewis’s
experience (or at least his description of the experience) aligns with this common narrative. He
was 1) having a completely familiar experience with a currant bush, when 2) the bush suddenly
awoke a memory of limitless proportion and significance, which he had striven towards but not
quite grasped when 3) “the world turned commonplace again,” although still “stirred by a
longing” (16).
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In addition to Kant, one must also look to Edmund Burke as a nineteenth-century
authority on the sublime. Although Lewis is known to have read Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,
there is no copy of the Critique of Judgment in his existing library. We may assume that he was
familiar with the work, as he frequently references Kant’s theories, particularly in his “Great
War” letters with Owen Barfield, but it seems likely that Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into
the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1756) influenced Lewis more directly.
Lewis owned a multivolume collection of Burke’s works, and of the volume in which “An Essay
On the Sublime and the Beautiful” appears, only the pages of that particular essay have been cut
to allow for reading. In the essay, Lewis marks several passages in which Burke admits the
pleasure associated with the sublime. He makes a marginal line next to the phrase “but at certain
distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are, delightful, as we every day
experience” (72), underlining the single word “delightful.” He also underlines a passage
describing the “delightful horror, which is the most genuine effect and truest test of the sublime”
(101), as well as the proposition that “terror is a passion which always produces delight when it
does not press too closely” (80). Finally, he places a marginal line next to Burke’s comment that
“if the sublime is built on terror, or some passion like it, which has pain for its object, it is
previously proper to inquire how any species of delight can be derived from a cause so
apparently contrary to it. I say delight, because, as I have often remarked, it is very evidently
different in its cause, and in its own nature, from actual and positive pleasure” (147). Clearly
Lewis had Burke’s essay in mind when compiling his descriptions of early Joy, particularly
focusing on the idea of its delight. Lewis’s statement that Joy is “sharply distinguished both from
Happiness and from Pleasure. [….] it might almost equally well be called a particular kind of
unhappiness or grief. But then it is a kind we want” (SBJ 18), is too similar to Burke’s
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“delightful horror” as distinguished from “positive pleasure” to be coincidental. Lewis seems to
have had Burke’s theory in mind.
Burke also emphasizes that the sublime as shocking or astonishing, based upon
momentary inspiration, rather than careful construction: “by no art can we cause such a shock by
the same means when we expect and prepare for it” (Burke 158; Lewis’s underlining). This is
exactly the language Lewis uses about Squirrel Nutkin: “it administered the shock, it was a
trouble” (SBJ 16). Again, Lewis seems to borrow from Burke the idea that Joy is a “shock” and
that is it desirable, yet not “ordinary pleasure.”
Finally, Burke introduces to the sublime the concept of loss, and Lewis shows attention to
this detail by marginally lining the following passage: “if you listen to the complaints of a
forsaken lover, you observe that he insists largely on the pleasures which he enjoyed, or hoped to
enjoy, and on the perfection of the object of his desires; it is the loss which is always uppermost
in his mind” (Burke 72). Just as the “loss […] is always uppermost” in Burke’s forsaken lover,
“a longing for the longing” is the only recognizable residue of Lewis’s Joy (SBJ 16).
Furthermore, Lewis notes in Burke a sense of loss in reference to childhood, placing a marginal
line next to the following passage:
In the morning of our days, when the senses are unworn and tender, when the
whole man is awake in every part, and the gloss of novelty fresh upon all the
objects that surround us, how lively at that time are our sensations, but how false
and inaccurate the judgments we form of things? I despair of ever receiving the
same degree of pleasure from the most excellent performances of genius which I
felt at that age from pieces which my present judgment regards as trifling and
contemptible. (Burke 65-66)
Burke insists that particular people are more sensitive to the sublime, and that the child is
naturally more sensitive than the adult, because of its lack of education and refined judgment.
Lewis corroborates this idea by demonstrating his own ability to experience Joy even in the
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“absence of beauty” that characterized his childhood, confirming that his “earliest aesthetic
experiences […] were already incurably romantic” (SBJ 6-7). In addition, the objects with which
his childhood Joy associates are notably humble: a “biscuit tin filled with moss,” Squirrel Nutkin,
even Tegner’s Drapa is encountered only through “idly turned […]pages” (17). In this way,
Lewis, like Burke, locates the source of the sublime within his own capacity of perception, and
particularly in his child self, thus associating himself with the romantic child, and thereby
placing himself on the trajectory through innocence, experience, and higher innocence.29
Yet, just as important as the Romantic ideas Lewis embraces are those he rejects. Lewis
interacts with and enacts romanticism in a variety of ways as he moves from innocence, through
experience, towards higher innocence. Early on in Surprised by Joy the first Romantics
mentioned as those winning Lewis’s “allegiance” are Keats and Shelley. Having (re)discovered
Joy, after the barren landscape of boyhood experience, Lewis was hungry for any literary
experience that might reawaken it, and quickly discovered the passionate and otherworldly
poetry of the second generation Romantics.30 Lewis was first attracted to these younger

29

Having established the use Lewis makes of Kant and Burke’s definitions and descriptions of the sublime, one
cannot help but question why Lewis turned to romantic theories of the sublime to describe his own experience. Two
possibilities arise. In the first case, Lewis may have legitimately believed his own experiences to be manifestations
of the romantic sublime and therefore found Kant and Burke’s theories the best descriptions ready to hand. A
second, more skeptical reading of Surprised by Joy (which has become increasingly popular) might suppose that
Lewis deliberately chooses to align himself with romantic thought in order to achieve some rhetorical or apologetic
strategy. This is further compounded by the fact that Lewis does not openly identify Joy with the sublime, nor does
he make any mention of Kant or Burke. One explanation could suppose that Lewis found these past ideas helpful,
but wished to assert his own experience as new, unique and different. Another might speculate that he hoped to
avoid the dense philosophical baggage of Romanticism, which could make his text less accessible for the common
reader. Still another explanation could be that Lewis hopes to achieve a sort of spontaneous credibility, presenting
his experience as if he were largely ignorant of past descriptions and ideas, yet deliberately providing the dots for an
intelligent reader to connect. This would assume some sort of authorial sprezzatura on Lewis’s part that would not
be altogether alien to his accustomed style, so renowned for making the complex accessible. There is, no doubt,
truth to each of these assertions, for Lewis truly identified with romanticism and therefore employed its language,
but he also constructs a deliberate persona within the autobiography—one that willingly extracts authority from the
romantic tradition, while refusing to be subsumed by it.
30
In dividing Wordsworth and Coleridge from the “younger romantics,” I am referring to the fact that Wordsworth
and Coleridge are largely perceived as having abandoned their youthful revolutionary passions, and instead turning
to a settled Christian conservatism in their later lives. Keats and Shelley were a part of a second generation of
romantics who felt that Wordsworth and Coleridge had hypocritically abandoned much of their early fervor. The
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Romantics, rather than Coleridge and Wordsworth, and particularly associated himself with
Keats and Shelley.31 The first evidence of Lewis’s reading the younger romantics appears in a
Dec. 22, 1914 letter to Warren: “There are also several new books, but most of them are not in
your line: the only two you might care for are the works of Shelley and Keats” (Vol I 98). If we
are to trust Lewis’s timeline, this would be roughly three years after his adolescent
“Rennaissance,” which we could identify as his reawakening to a hope and desire for higher
innocence. At a time of particular literary hunger, therefore, Lewis discovers Shelley and Keats,
poets who seem to share his longing and to express their desires in joy-invoking poetry. At this
time in his life, Lewis is studying with W. T. Kirkpatrick and is a decided atheist, a devoted
follower of “It”—his early term for Joy—and a close friend and correspondent to Arthur
Greeves. The friendship with Greeves begins only months before Lewis discovers Keats and
Shelley, and the two find an instant connection in their love for “It,” quickly realizing that they
share a similar aesthetic taste and experience. In this period, therefore, Lewis and Greeves
correspond frequently, discussing what they are reading and recommending books to each other.
Additionally, Lewis uses these letters to document his various episodes with Joy and to discuss
his own poetic ambitions. In essence, Lewis was ripe to fall under the spell of the second
generation Romantics. In his yearnings to pursue and capture Joy, Lewis found in Keats and
Shelley a mirror for his desires, his poetic ambitions, and his aversion to Christianity.
In Surprised by Joy Lewis reports his young self amazed to discover “the dangerous
secret that others had, like me, found [in literature] ‘enourmous bliss’ and been maddened by

fact that both Keats and Shelley died in their twenties only served to immortalize their respective poetic reputations
as young, ardent and subversive. This distinction between the younger and older (or the first and second generation)
of Romantics was well known to Lewis.
31
Lewis never developed much of a taste for Byron. His most significant comment on Byron may be the note he
inscribed at the end of his copy of Don Juan: “Never again!” (Marginal Notes, Wade Center). He recalls this reading
experience, quoting his exasperated endnote, in Surprised by Joy.

54

beauty” (103), and we see him quickly applying the words of Keats and Shelley to his own
experiences of Joy. For example, eighteen-year-old Lewis writes to Greeves in 1916, “I well
remember the glorious walk of which you speak, how we lay drenched with sunshine on the
‘moss’ and were for a short time perfectly happy—which is a rare enough condition, God knows.
As Keats says ‘Rarely, rarely comest thou, spirit of Delight’” (Vol I 171). This happens not to be
a quote from Keats, but instead from Shelley’s “Song” (1821). Nonetheless, the significance for
Lewis in his current state is clear. Shelley’s poem is a hymn to sublime joy, begging this “spirit”
to return, and avowing that “I love Love […] / But above all other things, / Spirit, I love thee— /
Thou art love and life! Oh, come, / Make once more my heart thy home” (43-48). Just as
Shelley’s poem sets about to worship the passions as a god, so Lewis admits that as his own
religion faded his “attitude towards [Joy] contained elements which my religion ought to have
contained and did not” (SBJ 76). For Lewis, Joy becomes a sort of devotional life in which “the
sense ached. I was sick with desire; that sickness better than health” (SBJ 118-19). Yet the
feeling was elusive for Lewis as for Shelley, and he seems to have identified with the young
Romantics in their Promethean quest for ecstasy amidst agony. In Keats’s letters Lewis
underlines that poet’s lamentation, “I assure you I sometimes feel not the influence of a passion
or affection during a whole Week” (Letters of Keats 43). Similarly, we see him associating
Shelley with his own imaginative life in a 1917 letter to Greeves. Lewis describes University
College, Oxford, where he is currently living and preparing for Responsions:
The only other thing I can think of that may interest you—in that way—is the
Shelley memorial which you would love. I pass it every morning on the way to
my bath. On a slab of black marble, carved underneath with weeping muses, lies
in white stone the nude figure of Shelley, as he was cast up by the sea—all tossed
into curious attitudes with lovely ripples of muscle and strained limbs. He is
lovely. <(No—not since I came back. Somehow I haven’t even thought of it.)>
(Vol I 298)
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Surely it is no coincidence that Lewis moves from an almost worshipful description of Shelley’s
monument into a parenthetical update on Joy (“it”). Clearly the adolescent Lewis found in Keats
and Shelley a model for his own pursuit of higher innocence.
Additionally, the young Lewis was an aspiring poet, and he seemingly identified himself
more with the Romantics than with the sort of war poetry that was popular in his own time.32 The
lyric cycle Spirits in Bondage, which Lewis began as early as 1915, was not published until
1919, after he returned from the Great War. Naturally, many of the lyrics include war imagery
and are doubtlessly akin to the horrific images Lewis witnessed on the battlefield and they reflect
his corresponding philosophical despair. Yet, while K. J. Gilchrist maintains that Spirits in
Bondage “remains centrally a book of war poetry, a record of the trauma of Lewis’s war” (5),
Alister McGrath objects, “it is questionable whether Spirits in Bondage can properly be
classified as war poetry. […]over half of the poems in this collection were written before Lewis
actually went to France and saw active service” (63). I would add to McGrath’s argument by
pointing to Lewis’s romantic associations and the obvious shadow that Keats and Shelley cast
over his early poetic endeavors. Lewis’s letters reveal comparisons between his own writing and
that of Keats in particular. Of a certain poetic project he writes to Greeves in 1919, “It […] is
rather indebted to ‘St Agnes’” (Vol I 466). Particularly in the time leading up to his participation
in the war, Lewis seems to have had a sense of his own place in a romantic tradition of young,
tragic poets who, like Keats and Shelley, were extinguished before their time. Spirits in Bondage
may have seemed like his own Endymion to the young Lewis, preparing for the front. He writes
to Greeves on June 10, 1917:
I am in a strangely productive mood at present and spend my few moments of
spare time in scribbling verse. When my 4 months course in the cadet battalion is
at an end, I shall, supposing I get a commission alright, have a 4 weeks leave
32

Such as that of Rupert Brooke, Wilfred Owen, Siegfried Sassoon.
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before joining my regiment. During it I propose to get together all the stuff I have
perpetrated and see if any kind publisher would like to take it. After that, if the
fates decide to kill me at the front, I shall enjoy a 9 days immortality while friends
who know nothing about poetry imagine that I must have been a genius. (Vol I
321)
One cannot help but imagine that Lewis is here thinking of John Keats’s assertion, “I think I
shall be among the English poets after my death” (Letters of Keats 171), which Lewis underlines
in his personal copy.
In fact, perhaps more than anything, Lewis’s self-construction as a romantic poet reveals
itself in his letters, where he consciously seeks to construct his own philosophy of poetry, and
apparently emulates Keats’s famous epistolary style. In an October 1926 letter to Owen Barfield,
Lewis quips, “How tiresome about the letter [getting lost in the mail]. I had trusted to acquire
fame by it.” (Vol III 1505). While this comment is clearly meant in jest, it still indicates that
Lewis was aware of a potential audience for his letters beyond the recipient. No doubt a younger,
more poetically ambitious Lewis wrote his letters to Arthur Greeves imagining how they might
be read after his death, when he was a great poet, for, as McGrath observes, “Lewis wanted to be
remembered as a poet, and believed that he had the talent necessary to achieve this calling” (64).
Another possible insight in this matter is Lewis’s personal copy of Keats’s Letters.
Lewis’s underlining in the text suggests an empathy with the anxieties of a young, aspiring poet.
One such passage reads:
“I have asked myself so often why I should be a poet more than other men,
seeing how great a thing it is[….] When I consider that so many of these pinpoints go to form a bodkin-point (God send I end not my life with a bare bodkin,
in its modern sense!), and that it requires a thousand bodkins to make a spear
bright enough to throw any light to posterity, I see nothing but continual uphill
journeying. Now is there anything more unpleasant[…]than to be so journeying
and to miss the goal at last?” (Letters of Keats 12; Lewis’s underlining).
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Lewis certainly understood these types of questions, and they simmer below the surface of his
correspondence with Greeves. He would also have been familiar with the discouragement of
being “in such a state of Mind as to read over my Lines and hate them” (13; Lewis’s
underlining), the elation of “flatter[ing] oneself into an idea of being a great Poet” (16; Lewis’s
underlining), and the longing for a “temple of fame” (34; Lewis’s underlining).
In order to more fully comprehend Lewis’s self-construction as a romantic poet, we must
return again to Spirits in Bondage, the poem cycle that he hoped would immortalize his poetic
reputation in the event of his early death. This work owes a great debt to the influence of Shelley,
particularly in the Promethean figure. Lex McMillan proposes that Lewis deliberately constructs
himself as a “Christian Prometheus” in Surprised by Joy, turning the romantic persona on its
head as a reaction to modern skepticism. While McMillan’s argument is compelling, perhaps its
biggest weakness is its failure to recognize Lewis’s deep associations with Shelley’s
Prometheus. For, indeed, before he ever dreams of being a “Christian Prometheus,” Lewis
certainly considers himself a Promethean figure in Shelley’s vein.
When Lewis first reads Prometheus Unbound in October of 1916,33 he reports to
Greeves, “It is an amazing work. I don’t know how to describe it to you; it is more wild & out of
the world than any poem I ever read, and contains some wonderful descriptions. Shelley had a
great genius” (Vol I 232). At this moment in 1916, Lewis had already begun some of the poems
that would later appear in Spirits in Bondage (1919), and the influence of Shelley’s Promethean
figure is clear in the final work.
Obviously, the very name of Spirits in Bondage has a Promethean overtone, but the lyrics
themselves also betray a similar language to Shelley’s play. Shelley’s Prometheus shakes a
33

According to his letters, Lewis rereads Prometheus Unbound at least twice more before 1922. April 2, 1920, to
Greeves: “ I am now on […] ‘Prometheus Unbound’” (Vol I 478). Feb. 25, 1921, to Leo Baker: “I have been reading
Prometheus Unbound” (Vol I 521).
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rebellious fist at the sky, making his own “[s]corn and despair [… an empire m]ore glorious
than” God’s whole creation (I.i.15-17). Likewise, Lewis’s lyrics echo this tone of caustic
triumph, palpably communicating and repudiating the hateful rage of God. He writes in “De
Profundis,” “Laugh then and slay. Shatter all things of worth, / Heap torment still on torment for
thy mirth— / Thou art not Lord while there are Men on earth” (21). In Prometheus Unbound
Shelley promotes the sublime imagination as the answer to God’s tyranny, saying, “To defy
Power, which seems omnipotent; / […] This […] is to be / Good, great and joyous, beautiful and
free” (IV.i.572-77). Similarly again, Lewis posits that the imagination—particularly as
manifested in the pursuit of Joy, which is “fantasy’s new-born treason” (“Satan Speaks” 3) and
“frett[ing] desire” (“In Praise of Solid People” 44)—is the only defense and escape for humanity.
Just as Shelley’s “hope” can “create” a better reality, so Lewis suggests that “men’s yearning”
can “build” “A place of vision and of loosening chains, / A refuge of the elect, a tower of
dreams,” an eternal fortress against the hate of God (“Oxford” 57). In addition to the resonances
between Prometheus and Spirits, Lewis also acknowledges Shelley’s potential influence in
Surprised by Joy, recalling how he was “hurling Promethean […] defiances at” a god he did not
even believe in (204-05). Both Shelley and the young Lewis attempt to achieve higher innocence
through the imaginative embrace of desire, and the parallels between them only confirm that
Lewis was, at this time, trying to follow Shelley’s particular path to sublimity. The result,
however, was a failure both in terms of philosophy and ambition: Spirits in Bondage was only
sparsely reviewed and sold very few copies.34
34

In another echo of the Promethean theme, Lewis found identity with the young romantics in their rebellion against
established religion. In Surprised by Joy Lewis describes his religious attitude of the time: “one had to look out on a
meaningless dance of atoms[…] to realize that all the apparent beauty was a subjective phosphorescence, and to
relegate everything one valued to the world of mirage. That price I tried loyally to pay. [….] I exulted with youthful
and vulgar pride in what I thought my enlightenment” (SBJ 172-73). With this “exultation” in the midst of
godlessness, the idea of the Promethean figure—so associated with Shelley—again creeps into Lewis’s selfdescription. It also bears a resemblance to Keats’s idea of Negative Capability, for this was a time at which Lewis
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More than anything Lewis adored Keats and Shelley for their pursuit of the sublime.
They awakened longing in Lewis, and he felt that he shared in their romantic questing. While he
would later reject this as a false Joy, or a misappropriated sublime, the sensuality of Keats and
Shelley seemed, to the young materialist Lewis, a perfect object for Joy. In a 1917 letter to
Greeves he attests that Keats “is one of my gods” (Vol I 288), and characterizes that poet as
“voluptuous” (Vol I 290). Clearly the voluptuousness that Lewis found in Keats was an object of
desire, and Lewis thus attempted to find the answer for Joy in the sensual pleasures that Keats
embraced as sublimity. In Endymion Keats acknowledges the search for sublime transcendence,
making Endymion say:
[…]my higher hope
Is of too wide, too rainbow-large a scope,
to fret at myriads of earthly wrecks.
Wherein lies happiness? In that which backs
Our ready minds to fellowship divine,
A fellowship with essence; till we shine,
Full alchemized, and free of space. Behold
The clear religion of Heaven! (I.774-781)
Just a few lines later Endymion notes the hoped-for unity of higher innocence, towards which the
sublime reaches: “that moment have we stepped / Into a sort of oneness, and our state / Is like a
floating spirit’s” (I.795-7). These passages are marked in Lewis’s copy of Endymion and

essentially worshipped Joy, yet did not “believe” in it. Keats describes the concept in his letters: “I mean Negative
Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching
after fact and reason.” (Letters of Keats 48; Lewis’s underlining). Surely Lewis would have considered the
disconnect between his real and imaginary lives at this time to be held in a sort of Negative Capability, for he
refused to let the dissonance between his love of faerie and his strict materialism disturb him. On February 15, 1917
he writes to Greeves, “I am sorry Obadiah Walker should have been at Univ! However, Shelley & I going there
should make up for it” (Vol I 277). Obadiah Walker was head of University College in the seventeenth century and a
devout Catholic. Most likely Walker’s loyalty to the deposed James II, along with his Catholicism, would have
made him a local embarrassment, yet Lewis seems to single him out purely for his religious devotion, identifying
himself with Shelley and, therefore, the atheism for which Shelley was kicked out of the college after publishing The
Necessity of Atheism (1811). One can only imagine the pleasure this young Lewis felt in identifying himself with
that great poet. Similarly, Lewis underlines Keats’s frustrations with Christianity in his letters: “and do Christians
shudder at the same thing in a newspaper which they attribute to their God in its most aggravated form?” (Letters of
John Keats 10). At a time when Lewis was young, an aspiring poet, and a growing atheist, he doubtless found these
second generation Romantics an inspiration and a comfort.
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obviously interested him as an expression of Joy’s longing.35 Endymion’s answer to this “higher
hope,” however, is ultimately material. At the pinnacle of human existence, he says:
hangs by unseen film, an orbed drop
Of light, and that is love: its influence,
Thrown in our eyes, genders a novel sense,
At which we start and fret; till in the end,
Melting into its radiance, we gland,
Mingle, and so become a part of it (I.806-11)
Love, therefore, is the object of longing, and the door to higher innocence. The ascent of love is
described by Keats as a movement from innocence, to experience, to higher innocence, as
expressed in another passage marked by Lewis: “First Heaven, then hell, and then forgotten
clear, / Vanished in elemental passion” (II.374-75). But the union between Cynthia and
Endymion does not feel transcendent. Try as he might, Keats cannot convince us that this is a
spiritual experience, so much as a material sex act.
In Surprised by Joy Lewis reports being increasingly unfulfilled by the sensuality he
found in Keats, and admits that he was trying to force an enjoyment of it:
I was in the midst of the Romantics now. [….] Some poems I could not enjoy as
well as others. It never occurred to me that these might be the inferior ones; I
merely thought that I was getting tired of my author or was not in the right mood.
The longueurs of Endymion I attributed wholly to myself. The ‘swoony’ element
in Keats’ sensuality […] I tried hard to like, and failed. (SBJ 163)
In a 1916 letter to Greeves he recommends Endymion but admits that is it “somewhat ‘sticky,’”
then recommends, “If you get an edition of Keats perhaps you would like ‘St. Agnes Eve’—it is
shorter than Endymion, written in Spenser’s metre, and very romantic—though perhaps rather
‘sticky’ also” (Vol I 220-21). Lewis’s admission of the “stickiness” of the sensuality in both
pieces marks his dawning recognition that this depiction of physical pleasure is not a plausible
object for otherworldly desire.
35

Lewis placed dashes next to lines 777, 781 and 797 (Marginal Notes: The Complete Poetical Works of John
Keats).
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Lewis’s own experience of Joy eventually convinced him that sex was only a weak and
transitory answer for his longing. He came to associate his ensnarement in Keats’s poetry with an
abuse of Joy via the attempt to reach the sublime through sensuality. The hold of Keats, in
particular, Lewis began to associate with a lust, or an unhealthy possession. He writes in his
journal in 1923, “I am a bit scared of Keats for he could resume complete dominion over me
with very little trouble” (All My Road 228), and admits in Surprised by Joy, “I came to know by
experience that it [Joy] is not a disguise of sexual desire. [….] Joy is not a substitute for sex; sex
is very often a substitute for Joy. I sometimes wonder whether all pleasures are not substitutes
for Joy” (SBJ 170). Having been exorcised of his Keats possession, Lewis was able to read
Endymion more objectively and offers Arthur a detailed critique of its attempted sensual sublime
in a 1931 letter:
[One] fault is the lack of spiritual experience. [Keats] knows about the hunting for
‘it’ and longing and wandering: but he has, as yet, no real idea of what it wd. be if
you found it. Hence […] his actual meetings with Cynthia are (to me) failures: not
because they are erotic but because they are erotic in a rather commonplace
way—all gasps and exclamations and a sort of suburban flirtatious air. (Vol II 1113)
Clearly, an older Lewis understood that it was Joy, or the search for higher innocence, that first
drew him to Keats. He also attributes the folly of imagining sex as the object of Joy, or even a
ladder towards transcendence, to Keats’s youth, as he does to his own.
In Dymer (1926) Lewis explores this particular folly more deeply, and actually borrows a
scene from Endymion to drive his point home. In Keats’s poem, Endymion lays down to rest
from his quest and finds himself suddenly visited in the utter darkness by the naked form of his
lover:
[…]he found
The smoothest mossy bed and deepest, where
He threw himself, and just into the air
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Stretching his indolent arms, he took—O bliss!—
A naked waist[…] (II.709-13)
Keats presents this consummation is a sublime experience, Endymion later attesting, “Now that
I have tasted her sweet soul to the core / All other depths are shallow” (II.904-5). For Dymer, on
the other hand, the result of such sexual experience is not an apotheosis, but destruction. In a
nearly direct echo of Keats, Dymer has a seemingly sublime encounter in the dark:
[…] he went on: then, stooping, found
A knee-depth of warm pillows on the ground.
[….] He opened wide
His arms. The breathing body of a girl slid into them. (Narrative Poems 24)
With the onset of day, and light, however, Dymer is not confronted with a goddess lover, but a
“wrinkled,” “puckered,” “gnarled,” and “uncleanly […] likeness of a woman” (29). This union
of “Mortal with her immortal” results in the begetting of the very monster that kills Dymer (86).
Thus, Lewis translates the sensuality through which Keats hoped to attain the sublime into a
horror, leading only to his hero laying “dead among the flowers and pinned beneath / The brute”
(91).
Dymer represents one step in Lewis’s realization of the false, or deceptive, sublime
offered by Keats and Shelley. Although Lewis had not yet converted to Christianity when he
wrote and published Dymer, he had already begun to move beyond the younger Romantics in his
pursuit of higher innocence. After becoming a Christian, we see a further step for Lewis. In
contrast to the self-absorbed, aspiring poet his letters reveal in the young Romantic era of his
experience, the Christian Lewis seems to take a different approach to his own art, recognizing
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that poetic fame may not be his destiny, and that such fame might not fulfill his lust anyway.
Within months of his conversion36 he writes to Greeves:
Nobody knows what the result of your writing, or mine, […] will be. [….] The
situation may be just the reverse of the nightingale in Endymion, who
‘Sings but to her mate, nor e’er conceives
How tiptoe night holds back her dark grey hood.’
Unsuccessful writers like us thought that night would stand tiptoe to hear us:
perhaps we really are singing to some mysterious mate within. [….]Beauty
descends from God into nature: but there it would perish and does except when a
Man appreciates it with worship and thus as it were sends it back to God: so that
through his consciousness what descended ascends again and the perfect circle is
made (Vol I 933).
At this point Lewis becomes less focused on his own poetic identity and success. A Godbelieving Lewis has come to understand that Joy was leading him towards the higher innocence
of faith in Heavenly realities, rather than sexual pleasure, or poetic fame. This is the Lewis on
whom Keats and Shelley have lost their grip and Wordsworth and Coleridge now take
prominence.
Lewis and Wordsworth
There is no lack of criticism linking C. S. Lewis and William Wordsworth. R. J. Reilly’s
Romantic Religion: A Study of Barfield, Lewis, Williams, and Tolkien established Lewis’s place
within the larger romantic tradition, and James Prothero and Donald T. Williams’s recent book,
Gaining a Face: The Romanticism of C.S. Lewis, focuses more exclusively on both Lewis and
Wordsworth, arguing that Lewis was responsible for “refining and finishing” Wordsworth’s
vision (34). Obviously, the focus of this study is slightly broader, as it contends that Lewis’s self-
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While Lewis claims in Surprised by Joy that he converted to Theism in Trinity term of 1929, Andrew Lazo has
demonstrated that it was more likely the next year—1930—based upon the evidence of Lewis’s letters, as well as an
early prose attempt at an autobiographical conversion story, dubbed “Early Prose Joy.” McGrath similarly locates
Lewis’s initial conversion to Theism “possibly as early as March 1930, but more likely in the Trinity Term of that
year” (185). I therefore feel confident in asserting that the above letter to Greeves (from August, 1930) was written
as little as three months following Lewis’s conversion.
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construction does not borrow simply a Wordsworthian narrative, but the larger Romantic
metanarrative. Nonetheless, Wordsworth plays an important role in the development and
establishment of that narrative. The “Intimations Ode.” “Tintern Abbey,” and The Prelude all
describe Wordsworth’s spiritual and poetic development, employing Romantic paradigms of
innocence, experience, and higher innocence. Lewis naturally borrows from these narratives, as
they assist him in constructing his own romantic autobiography.
Before suggesting Wordsworth’s influence on Surprised by Joy, we must confront the
fact that Lewis is often openly condescending, even hostile, to Wordsworth in his letters and
prose.37 At sixteen years old, Lewis writes of “the complete works of Wordsworth” as a
“nightmare” that enjoys a “deluding longevity” (Vol I 154). Lewis also tends to write negatively
of Wordsworth in his more mature prose. He accuses Wordsworth of worshipping nature in The
Four Loves, and in Surprised by Joy he is careful to emphasize the sense of loss in Wordsworth,
twice referencing the line “wither is fled the visionary gleam” from the Intimations Ode. Yet,
there is a wide scholarly consensus to show that Lewis was deeply influenced by Wordsworth, as
well as the fact that Lewis lists The Prelude as one of the ten books that “did most to shape my
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Prothero and Williams explain this difficulty by suggesting that much of what Lewis gleaned from Wordsworth is
actually filtered through the fiction and prose of George MacDonald. This is certainly true. Lewis’s very
romanticism could be said to be a neo-Victorian romanticism, heavily influenced by his reading of Phantastes. Yet,
Lewis is too obviously aware of Wordsworth’s work to subconsciously absorb him only through a Wordsworthian
strain in MacDonald. In fact, the very language he uses in describing the impact of MacDonald is Wordsworthian.
Lewis recalls that upon reading Phantastes, “my imagination was, in a certain sense, baptized” (SBJ 181). This
phrase is apparently borrowed from Wordsworth’s “The Cuckoo at Laverna,” which reads: “the power, the faith, /
Of a baptized imagination” (71). Another reason we might see Lewis attempting to distance himself from
Wordsworth—despite any depth of interest and influence—is because Lewis is himself “a failed poet who found
greatness in other spheres of writing” (McGrath 64). Poor readership forced him to redirect his energies from poetry
to prose fantasy, more akin to that of MacDonald. Lewis may identify more closely with MacDonald (at least
seemingly) because he wishes to emphasize his own successes in prose fantasy, rather than his poetic failures. Don
King, in C. S. Lewis, Poet, confirms that despite his transition from long narrative poetry to fiction in the mid-1930s,
“Lewis’s penchant to be ‘enamoured of metrical subtleties,’ his lusting ‘after a metre as a man might lust after a
woman,’ his ache to turn a verse and ‘be “with poem” again,’ was lifelong” (King 15; the quotations within are from
Lewis’s letters). In this light, Wordsworth would fall into the same category of poetic ambition as Keats and Shelley,
and it is only natural that Lewis—who may have carried a life-long sensitivity about his failed poetic attempts—
would demure from associating himself with the most famous English poet of the 19th century.
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vocational attitude and my philosophy of life” in the Christian Century (“Top Ten Books”).
Careful attention to Lewis’s letters and diary suggests a simple solution to the
Lewis/Wordsworth problem: Lewis’s appreciation for Wordsworth grows over time.
Wordsworth is the logical next step from Keats and Shelley, for his exploration of the passions is
tempered with a rationality and level-headedness that the younger men lacked. In Lewis’s letters
and journal we see a growing interest not merely in Wordsworth and Coleridge, but in these two
authors in contrast to Keats and Shelley. In January of 1927—less than a year after he had
published Dymer, his fictional rebuke to the younger Romantics—Lewis records in his journal:
“Decided to work up the whole doctrine of Imagination in Coleridge as soon as I had time—and
the thought of Wordsworth was somehow very re-assuring. That’s the real imagination, no
bogies, no Karmas, no gurus, no damned psychism there. I have been astray among second rate
ideas too long…” (All My Road 432). Obviously Lewis is not referencing Keats and Shelley as
the sole purveyors of these “second rate ideas,” but in turning away from their particular version
of transcendence, Lewis turns away from material sensuality masquerading as transcendence—
certainly a bogey. Similarly, in 1940 he writes to Warren that he has just finished reading Robert
Southey’s letters and that the experience has convinced him, “How much nicer people, tho’
worse writers, the Tory romantics were than the other crew—the Shelleys […]and even Keats”
(Vol II 421). As Lewis’s love for the younger Romantics wanes, therefore, we see a greater
respect for and interest in Wordsworth and Coleridge.
In particular, Lewis develops a special admiration for The Prelude. He reports having
read The Prelude for the first time in September 1919, writing to Greeves:
You will perhaps be surprised to hear that I am reading ‘The Prelude’ by way of
graduating in Wordsworth-ism. What’s even funnier, I rather like it! I’m coming
to the conclusion that there are two orders of poetry—real poetry and the sort you
read while smoking a pipe. ‘The Prelude’ nearly always on the second level but
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very comfortable and interesting all the same—better than Rousseau’s
Confessions in something the same style. You read it, didn’t you? I expect like me
you recognized lots of the early parts from recollections of your own childhood. I
fancy the first Book is the best. (Vol I 466)
Though we do not hear about The Prelude again for quite some time, Lewis mentions reading it
again in a 1939 letter to Warren (Vol II 273). This is at least his third or fourth time reading the
long poem, because the final page of The Prelude in his Everyman copy of Wordsworth’s poetry
bears an inscription that mentions reading the book for the second time in March of 1923
(Marginal Notes: The Longer Poems), and in June of 1924 Lewis records in his diary, “I brought
Wordsworth out to the garden and there in the delicious coolness I read Book I of The Prelude.
This poem is really beginning to replace Paradise Lost as my literary metropolis” (All My Road
333). In 1941 he divulges that he likes to “occasionally refresh” himself by “a dip into the
Prelude” (Vol II 487), and in 1947 he is again “re-reading the Prelude,” which is “[a]lways just a
little better than one remembers from the last reading” (Vol II 764). Thus, when he admits to
Dom Bede Griffiths in 1951, “The Prelude has accompanied me through all stages of my
pilgrimage” (Vol III 111), it is undoubtedly true. Lewis, a very busy man, read Wordsworth’s
Prelude at least five times, and apparently returned to small portions of it with far greater
frequency.
While Prothero and Williams trace a similar narrative of spiritual development in The
Prelude and Perelandra (54), no one has yet noted the striking similarities in structure between
The Prelude and Surprised by Joy. No doubt because he was so steeped in Wordsworth’s poem,
the narrative of The Prelude, structured as it is by the Romantic metanarrative, is particularly
influential to the structure of Surprised by Joy. In 1940 Lewis excitedly writes to Warren about
receiving a privately published book in the mail: “Revolution Thompson’s autobiography in
verse, in fact his Prelude” (Vol II 424). The fact that Lewis already considers an autobiography,
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particularly one that deals with spiritual development, to be “a Prelude” indicates that he may
very well have thought of his own spiritual autobiography in this way. And, indeed, he
comments in Surprised by Joy, “The thing has been much better done by […] Wordsworth, but
every man must tell his own tale” (SBJ 16). The problem with this theory, of course, is the
question of form. If Lewis intended to write his own Prelude, would he not have resorted to
verse? The fact is, he had already attempted to do so.
Lewis’s first attempt to write his spiritual autobiography occurred shortly after his
conversion to Theism in 1930 and resulted in an unfinished, prose piece in which he began to
explain his views as an “empirical Theist” (Lazo 52). We know from Surprised by Joy that this
conversion, while pivotal, was not necessarily significant for Lewis’s imaginative life. On the
contrary, “There was no strain of music from within, no smell of eternal orchards […] when I
was dragged through the doorway. No kind of desire was present at all” (230-31). Lewis’s
conversion to Christianity, however, reawakened his imagination, and invested the experience of
Joy with new meaning. Christianity for Lewis meant a realization of the incarnation as a “true
myth,” which he documents in a letter to Greeves on October 18, 1931, and this realization
seemingly renewed his interest in telling the story of his conversion. Less than seven months
later he had begun a long poem—now known as “I Will Write Down”—detailing his spiritual
autobiography. The full fragment, which consists of less than 40 lines of iambic hexameter in
rhyming couplets, appears in a letter to Owen Barfield, and has been transcribed in full in Don
King’s C. S. Lewis, Poet (2001). The fragment describes Lewis’s childhood as “leaping / And
climbing, running, wearying out the day, and sleeping,” and King notes in this a similarity to
Wordsworth’s “coarser pleasures” in “Tintern Abbey” (138-39). Even more than “Tintern
Abbey,” however, I suspect Lewis was thinking about The Prelude as he began this prototype of
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Surprised by Joy, for he writes a tongue-in-cheek postscript to Owen Barfield in March of 1932,
stating “I have written about 100 lines of a long poem in my type of Alexandrine. It is going to
make the Prelude […] look silly” (Vol II 55). Lewis then sends “the opening of the poem” (the
portion that King reproduces) to Barfield on May 6th, 1932 (Vol II 77). There is no doubt that this
fragment, which consists of rhyming alexandrine couplets, is the same poem that Lewis earlier
compared to The Prelude. Lewis’s first Christian attempt at spiritual autobiography was
therefore modeled after The Prelude, and I maintain that the autobiography he finally publishes
in 1955 is still Lewis’s Prelude, despite its prose form.
Surprised by Joy follows the same general pattern as The Prelude, focusing on the
author’s development from innocence through experience and towards higher innocence; the
primary difference, however, is that Lewis’s sublime (Joy) is found not in nature, but in the
imagination itself, made manifest in books. Prothero and Williams assert, “More cosmopolitan in
his tastes than Wordsworth, Lewis could receive it [Joy] not just from Nature (the Castlereagh
Hills) but also from literature (Norse mythology), music (Wagner), or art (a toy garden made by
his brother on the lid of a biscuit tin and brought into the nursery)” (5). I, on the other hand,
would contend that Lewis does not prefer these things because he is cosmopolitan (and, in fact,
Prothero and Williams go on to illustrate his deep attachment to the natural world, particularly
the Northern Irish landscape), but because his sublime is more linked to fantasy and the
imagination than it is linked to physical nature.
Lewis feels Wordsworth himself to be divided on this issue. On the back cover of his
copy of The Poems of William Wordsworth, Lewis draws a two-column diagram. In the first
column he transcribes a quote from Wordsworth’s Preface to The Lyrical Ballads, that poetry’s
“object is truth,” and in the second column he quotes from Wordsworth’s later supplement to the
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Preface: “The appropriate business of poetry […] is to treat of things not as they are, but as they
appear; not as they exist in themselves, but as they seem to exist to the senses, and to the
passions” (“Essay Supplementary”; Marginal Notes, Poems of William Wordsworth). Clearly the
distinction he finds here is a question of whether poetry relates objective or subjective truth, and
he finds no clear answer in Wordsworth, for he goes on to provide various quotes from “Tintern
Abbey” and The Prelude, placing two in the first column, two in the second column, and two on
the line in between the two. Perhaps most telling is the following passage from “Tintern,” which
Lewis places in between the columns: “all the mighty world / Of eye and ear, both what they half
create, / And what perceive” (108-10; Marginal Notes, Poems of William Wordsworth). Clearly
Lewis suspected that Wordsworth’s experiences of the sublime in nature were not grounded
purely in nature itself, but deeply connected to Wordsworth’s own consciousness—his
imagination. By depicting his own first experience of Joy as an encounter not with actual nature,
but with Warnie’s miniature, Lewis emphasizes the role of the imagination as superior: “What
the real garden had failed to do, the toy garden did. It made me aware of nature—not, indeed, as
a storehouse of forms and colors but as something cool, dewy, fresh, exuberant” (SBJ 7). In
another nod to Wordsworth he also emphasizes the role of memory in Joy: “I do not think the
impression was very important at the moment, but it soon became important in memory. As long
as I live my imagination of Paradise will retain something of my brother’s toy garden” (SBJ 7).
So Lewis immediately establishes a Wordsworthian connection to his childhood, but deliberately
distinguishes it from Wordsworthian nature. His reason for this becomes increasingly clear
throughout the book.
Like The Prelude, which is often more concerned with the poet’s perspective on reality
than reality itself, Surprised by Joy is, by Lewis’s own admission, “suffocatingly subjective”
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(viii). In other words, it is concerned with his own subjective experience of things, rather than
the hard biographical facts. Many have argued that this subjectivity actually strays into utter
falsehood, or deliberate repression—painting an unrealistically rosy picture of Lewis’s life.
Perhaps most obvious is the complete erasure of his non-traditional, almost certainly sexual,
relationship with Janie Moore, who is never mentioned at any point, outside of a possible
reference in Chapter Thirteen.38 Lewis also refers to his earlier sexual indiscretions only vaguely,
omitting the fixation with sadism that he describes in early letters to Greeves. While these
omissions may have sprung from self-protection, they also protect the purity of Lewis’s romantic
narrative. Eugene Stelzig identifies the modern autobiography, with its emphasis on the
development of the individual’s subjectivity, as a romantic invention: “Just as eighteenth-century
fiction writers used autobiographical devices (the letter, the diary, the first-person narrative), so
autobiographers made use of the resources of fiction to emphasize and highlight the subjective
and the personal” (249). Patricia Meyer Spacks calls the practice of autobiography “the
conversion of life into story” (18), and it is not altogether surprising that in this conversion Lewis
should pick and choose details and events in order to mold his life into the romantic narrative he
has clearly chosen. Chronologically, these sexual indiscretions would occur later in the narrative,
after Lewis’s adolescent “Renaissance,” and therefore in the section that could be identified as
either higher innocence, or the quest for higher innocence; therefore, Lewis deems them
irrelevant to the trajectory of the story and omits them. Furthermore, Lewis may have found a
precedent for this “suffocating[…] subjectiv[ity]” in Wordsworth.

38

“I returned to Oxford—“demobbed”—in January 1919. But before I say anything of my life there I must warn the
reader that one huge and complex episode will be omitted. I have no choice about this reticence. All I can or need
say is that my earlier hostility to the emotions was very fully and variously avenged. But even were I free to tell the
story, I doubt if it has much to do with the subject of the book” (SBJ 198).
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Lewis owned a copy of Dorothy Wordsworth’s journals, which is held in the Wade
Center in Wheaton Illinois. On the final page of the journal, Lewis records the date as November
18, 1959, in blue ink. His markings throughout the text, however, appear in pencil, suggesting
that 1959 was probably not his first reading of the book. Additionally, references in his letters to
Dorothy Wordsworth in 1920 and 1954 suggest that he was certainly familiar with her journals
by the time he wrote Surprised by Joy. 39 Reading Dorothy’s journals, Lewis must have been
struck not only by the similarities between her entries and Wordsworth’s poetry (he notes in his
copy of “I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud” some of the verses that are clearly taken from
Dorothy’s journal [Marginal Notes, The Poems of William Wordsworth 313]), but also many
details of Wordsworth’s daily life and relationships that pass unmentioned in The Prelude.
In Lewis’s copy of Dorothy Wordsworth’s journals, one perceives a pattern in the
marginalia. Lewis repeatedly marks three distinct types of passages. First, those passages of
poetic description, which doubtless served as inspiration for William.40 Second, linguistic
curiosities, such as passages where Dorothy refers to illness as being “in” a toothache or
headache.41 Third—and most intriguing—he marks passages that make reference to Annette
Vallon,42 and those that hint at latent sexuality between William and Dorothy. For instance,
Lewis marks the following journal entries: “Went to bed at about 12 o’clock. Slept in Wm.’s bed
39

April 11, 1920; to Albert Lewis: “A few miles away is a little fishing town called Watchet, which saw at least one
interesting scene in its obscure history: it was here that Coleridge and the Wordsworths slept (or ‘lay’ as they would
have said) on the first night of their walking tour. During that afternoon the germ of the Ancient Mariner occurred in
conversation and in the inn at Watchet the first lines were jotted down” (Vol I 484).
Jan. 9, 1954; to Belle Allen: “Thank you for your nice woody and earthy (almost like Thoreau or Dorothy
Wordsworth) letter of the 6th” (Vol III 406).
40
Such passages as the following, which he marked with a marginal line: “The sound of the sea distinctly heard on
the tops of the hills, which we could never hear in summer. We attribute this partly to the bareness of the trees, but
chiefly to the absence of the singing of birds, the hum of insects, that noiseless noise which lives in the summer air”
(Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth 4).
41
Such as: “In the afternoon from excessive heat I was ill in the headach and toothach and went to bed” (Marginal
Notes, Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth 43; Lewis’s underlining).
42
Wordsworth’s mistress from his time in France, and the mother of his daughter Caroline. In Dorothy’s journals,
Lewis underlines when “Wm. Wrote to Annette” (Marginal Notes, Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth 105), or
received “A letter from Annette” (120).
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and I slept badly, for my thoughts were full of William” (Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth 120);
“After dinner we made a pillow of my shoulder—I read to him and my Beloved slept” (134); and
“I was tired to death, and went to bed before him—he came down to me, and read the Poem to
me in bed” (135). In addition to these and other passages, Lewis also highlights the famous entry
about William’s wedding day, and Dorothy’s frenzy of grief, in which she “could stand it no
longer, and threw myself on the bed” (198). Lewis is not the only reader to have puzzled over
these passages; the relationship between William and Dorothy Wordsworth has attracted a
similar scholarly scrutiny as that which has focused on Lewis and Janie Moore. Lewis must have
noted the absence of any mention of Vallon, or any hint of inappropriate filial affection in The
Prelude. He may, therefore, have considered his own omissions appropriate to the type of
writing in which he labored.
Having established Lewis’s conscious participation in the romantic practice of
autobiography, and his particular association of The Prelude with this genre, we may draw the
comparison even further. Not only does Lewis’s narrative follow the Romantic metanarrative as
originated in Blake, but Lewis seems to have deliberately mirrored his text with that of
Wordsworth’s Prelude. A comparison between the Books of Wordsworth’s Prelude and the
Chapters in Surprised by Joy reveals some striking parallels in structure.43 In order to understand
these parallels one must examine the basic content of each pairing. The reflection is imperfect,
yet too close to permit mere coincidence.
Book and Chapter One both deal with childhood innocence. This is perhaps the easiest
connection to make between the two works, for Lewis expressed open admiration for Book One
of the Prelude, writing to Arthur, “I fancy the first Book is the best” (Vol I 466). He attests
elsewhere, “I certainly think I had Wordsworthian experiences as a boy” (Vol II 955). Indeed,
43

I refer to the 1850 Prelude, as Lewis does not appear to have owned or read any other version.

73

there are great similarities between Book and Chapter One, though Lewis has transformed
Wordsworth’s narrative somewhat. First and foremost in both accounts is the innocent child,
wandering solitary through sublime nature, in “unconscious intercourse with beauty / Old as
creation” (Prelude I.562-63; Lewis’s underlining). With Lewis, however, nature has been
exchanged for his own preferred medium—books:
I am a product of long corridors, empty sunlit rooms, upstairs indoor silences,
attics explored in solitude, distant noises of gurgling cisterns and pipes, and the
noise of wind under the tiles. Also, of endless books. My father bought all the
books he read and never got rid of any of them. There were books in the study,
books in the drawing rom, books in the cloakroom, books (two deep) in the great
bookcase on the landing, books in a bedroom, books piled as high as my shoulder
in the cistern attic, books of all kinds reflecting every transient state of my
parents’ interest, books readable and unreadable, books suitable for a child and
books most emphatically not. Nothing was forbidden me. In the seemingly
endless rainy afternoons I took volume after volume from the shelves. I had
always the same certainty of finding a book that was new to me as a man who
walks into a field has of finding a new blade of grass. (SBJ 10)
Lewis overtly describes his experience reading as a sublime equivalent to the sense of
endlessness and power Wordsworth experiences in nature. Additionally, he makes a comparison
between books and blades of grass, again reminding us that his experience with books is the
same as Wordsworth’s with nature. Just as we find the young Wordsworth making “one long
bathing of a summer’s day” (I.290; Lewis’s underlining), we therefore see Lewis enjoying
“endless rainy afternoons” of reading. While Lewis describes his childhood as “settled
happiness,” with an “absence of beauty,” he also admits to “momentary joy that glorifies the
past” (SBJ 6; 8). Wordsworth’s childhood is similarly characterized by a “vulgar joy,” yet “even
then I felt / Gleams like the flashing of a shield;—the earth / And common face of Nature spake
to me / Rememberable things” (I.581; 585-88). Lewis explains that after first experiencing Joy
he “went back to the book, not to gratify the desire […] but to reawake it” (SBJ 17), just as the
Wordsworthian child “bounded […] Wherever nature led; more like a man / Flying from
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something that he dreads, than one / Who sought the thing he loved” (“Tintern Abbey” 71-75).
Most significantly, both men report that their glimpses of transcendence in childhood would
become the central narrative of their lives. Wordsworth describes his childhood experience as “a
song that winds / Through ever changing scenes of votive quest” (Prelude I.180-81; Lewis’s
underlining), and Lewis writes that “in a sense the central story of my life is about nothing else”
(SBJ 17).
A final resonance between Wordsworth and Lewis’s descriptions of innocence in
Book/Chapter One is their emphasis on the power and centrality of memory. Margaret Carter
notes that “Lewis, like Wordsworth, finds in the remembered and transformed past a special
stimulus to imagination” (10). In Book One, Wordsworth celebrates the memory’s ability to
recall childhood, but also to transmute it into sublime vision: “Those recollected hours that have
the charm / Of visionary things, those lovely forms / And sweet sensations that throw back our
life, / And almost make remotest infancy / A visible scene, on which the sun is shining” (I.63135; Lewis’s underlining). Lewis similarly admits the capacity of memory both to conjure up and
transform when he characterizes himself in Chapter One as the solitary, imaginative (thus,
Wordsworthian) child: “My real life—or what memory reports as my real life—was increasingly
one of solitude. [….] It will be clear at this time—at the age of six, seven, and eight—I was
living almost entirely in my imagination; or at least that the imaginative experience of those
years now seems to me more important than anything else” (SBJ 11; 15). Just as Wordsworth
longs nostalgically for his own childhood, Lewis admits his childhood to have been the most
important period of his existence, or at least his romantic existence.
Yet for Lewis, as for Wordsworth, the happiness of childhood cannot continue
indefinitely, and innocence gives way to experience via the schoolroom. The second and third
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installments of each work deal with school; for Wordsworth it is “School-Time” and
“Cambridge,” for Lewis “Concentration Camp” at the Wynyard School, and “Mountbracken and
Campbell.” From experience, Wordsworth lamentingly asks, “One is there, though the wisest
and the best / Of all mankind, who covets not at times / Union that cannot be; —who would not
give, / If so he might, to duty and to truth / The eagerness of infantine desire?” (II.22-26). This
“Union that cannot be,” which Lewis underlines in his copy of the poem, is clearly a hint of
higher innocence, the longing for which pervades experience. Wordsworth’s experience of
school-time, however, is not akin to Lewis’s, for he remembers his early school days as a
continuation of his childhood, “With God and Nature communing” (II.430). Lewis’s immediate
school experience, of which he remembers that “putting on the school clothes was […] the
assumption of a prison uniform” (SBJ 23), is more reminiscent of Wordsworth’s “Residence at
Cambridge.” Wordsworth’s description of Cambridge as ruled by a “blind Authority beating
with his staff / The child that might have led him” (III.608-09; Lewis’s underlining), bears
striking resemblance to the image of Oldie’s “well-used canes,” which transformed the innocent
child into a “pale, quivering, tear-stained, obsequious slave” in Lewis’s narrative (SBJ 25; 31). In
Cambridge Wordsworth finds himself alienated from nature and the imagination, thus beginning
experience, “the second act” of life, in which “Imagination slept” (III.259-60). Similarly, Lewis
reports that in his school days, “There was also a great decline in my imaginative life. For many
years Joy (as I have defined it) was not only absent but forgotten” (SBJ 34). Another similarity in
this period of experience is what Wordsworth describes as reading “lazily in trivial books”
(III.254), while Lewis also recalls reading poor literature: “I read twaddling school stories in The
Captain” (SBJ 35). Wordsworth’s primary source of imaginative alienation is, of course, not
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merely through bad reading, but in being kept indoors by that reading, but the result is the same
for both men: experience engenders a lack of imagination.
While the Fourth Book (“Summer Vacation”) and Chapter (“I Broaden My Mind”) have
less clear connection, the “Summer Vacation,” is a recurring theme in Surprised by Joy. Lewis
describes holidays and the anticipation of them as a taste of higher innocence: “Life at a vile
boarding school is in this way a good preparation for the Christian life, that it teaches one to live
by hope. Even, in a sense, by faith; for at the beginning of each term, home and the holidays are
so far off that it is as hard to realize them as to realize Heaven” (SBJ 36). Lewis is no doubt
aware of Wordsworth’s own descriptions of summer delights when writing about school
holidays.
Book and Chapter Five both deal with a reawakening. In Wordsworth’s “Books,” it is the
recognition that books can have a similar power to that of nature:
[….]Hitherto,
In progress through this Verse, my mind hath looked
Upon the speaking face of earth and Heaven
As her prime teacher, intercourse with man
Established by the sovereign Intellect,
Who through that bodily image hath diffused,
As might appear to the eye of fleeting time,
A deathless spirit. Thou also, man! hast wrought,
For commerce of they nature with herself,
Things that aspire to unconquerable life;
[….]
all the adamantine holds of truth
By reason built, or passion, which itself
Is highest reason in a soul sublime;
The consecrated works of Bard and Sage,
Sensuous or intellectual, wrought by men,
Twin labourers and heirs of the same hopes; (V.11-20; 39-44)
This sublime is, for Wordsworth, secondary to that of nature, for while nature is a “deathless
spirit,” books are the “shrines so frail” in which she can “lodge” (V.49). Lewis reverses this
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process, detailing his personal “Renaissance,” in which Joy returns, and is now available not
only through books, but through nature as well:
this imaginative Renaissance almost at once produced a new appreciation of
external nature. [….] soon (I cannot say how soon) nature ceased to be a mere
reminder of the books, became herself the medium of real joy. I do not say she
ceased to be a reminder. All Joy reminds. It is never a possession, always a desire
for something longer ago or further away or still “about to be.” But Nature and the
books now became equal reminders, joint reminders[…]. (SBJ 77-8)
Lewis’s language is very deliberate here, for two reasons. First, he wishes to clearly demonstrate
that he is reversing Wordsworth’s model. Instead of books “aspiring” to nature, nature is “a mere
reminder of books”: “to walk in it [nature] daily gave one the same sort of pleasure that there is
in the labyrinthine complexity of Malory or the Faerie Queene” (SBJ 146). Second, he begins to
establish here the difference that he will draw between himself and Wordsworth. He does not
attempt to argue for books as the original source of Joy, but instead attests that books and nature
are both “reminders” of what he will later identify as God and Heaven. Wordsworth, on the other
hand, seemingly recommends nature as the actual wellspring of the sublime. This distinction will
become more important as Lewis continues to develop his own Prelude.
The sixth and seventh installments of The Prelude and Surprised by Joy bear little
resemblance to one another aside from mutual adolescent experience, but in Book/Chapter Eight
both detail a sort of escape. Wordsworth’s “Retrospect” is a return to “the scenes of childhood”
in the Lake District (VIII.50; Lewis’s underlining), while Lewis’s “Release” documents both his
figurative escape from school via Joy (“can I have been unhappy, living in Paradise?” [SBJ
118]), and his literal escape from Malvern College, into the tutorship of W. T. Kirkpatrick. In
Book Eight Wordsworth learns to love humanity through the love of nature, and in Chapter Eight
Lewis strikes up a life-long friendship with Arthur Greeves based upon their mutual
understanding of Joy as an “arrow […] shot from the North” (SBJ 130). Lewis compares this

78

“first friend” to a “first love, or even greater” (SBJ 131). Clearly this education in friendship, via
imaginative reading, is akin to Wordsworth’s “thoughts by slow gradations […] drawn / to
human-kind, and to the good and ill / Of human life” because “Nature had led me on” (VIII.67779).
Books/Chapters Nine and Ten deal with major intellectual and philosophical shifts;
Wordsworth’s experiences in France teach him about human nature and he succumbs to
revolutionary fervor (“Great was my transport, deep my gratitude / To everlasting Justice”
[X.576-77]), while Lewis learns rationality from Kirkpatrick and aesthetics from Greeves, falling
more deeply under the voluptuous spell of Keats, Shelley, and Morris (“I was in the midst of the
Romantics now” [SBJ 163]).
Next, both experience disenchantment and are forced to significantly revise their
philosophies. Book Eleven concludes Wordsworth’s time in France, and ends with his rejection
of Godwinian philosophy. Wordsworth rejects the sort of inhuman reasoning that he had
embraced in his revolutionary passion, explaining it as “errors into which I fell, betrayed / By
present objects, and by reasonings false / From their beginnings, inasmuch as drawn / Out of a
heart that had been turned aside / From Nature’s way by outward accidents” (XI.287-91; Lewis’s
underlining). In this moment, Wordsworth realizes that he cannot follow a form of reason devoid
of imagination, but must integrate the transcendent power of imagination with his reason. In a
similar turn from the material to the immaterial, Chapter Eleven (“Check”) describes Lewis’s
realization that Joy cannot be satisfied by any material object, and must, therefore, imply a
supernatural one. Lewis describes this shift as a “drop of disturbing doubt” interrupting “my
Materialism” (SBJ 175).
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Books Twelve and Thirteen of the Prelude describe the poet’s retreat back to the Lake
District and his growing understanding of feeling, climaxing with the influential friendship of
Coleridge, who teaches him about the unity between the imagination and reality, thereby
encouraging him into full fruition as a poet. Lewis’s Chapter Twelve, “Guns and Good
Company” describes not so much Lewis’s war experience as his relational experience with other
men, and his coming “to know and pity and reverence the ordinary man” (196). Chapter Thirteen
depicts his growing understanding of non-material reality, reaching a crescendo with the
influential friendship of Owen Barfield, who teaches him that “our logic was participation in a
cosmic Logos” and pushes him into belief in “the Absolute” (209; 211). Barfield, who was a
respected Coleridge scholar, certainly represents Coleridge’s influence in Lewis’s personal
Prelude. While Coleridge helps Wordsworth mature as a poet—which is the ultimate end of The
Prelude—Barfield assists Lewis closer to the realization of God—which is the goal of Surprised
by Joy.
Finally, Book and Chapter Fourteen serve as the final recognitions towards which all the
past narrative development has tended. Wordsworth presents the reader with a picture of the
sublime in nature, and carefully explains how this sublime experience leads one, through the love
of nature and man, into the love of God: “all affections by communion raised / From earth to
Heaven, from human to divine” (XIV.117-18). Lewis’s “Checkmate” similarly climaxes with his
final recognition that “God was God” (228), and the final object of Joy.
So far so good, but we are finally faced with the problem of Lewis’s extra chapter.
Surprised by Joy consists of fifteen chapters to The Prelude’s fourteen books. With Prothero and
Williams’s argument in mind, however, the puzzle pieces fall into place. As Prothero and
Williams report, Lewis apparently believed that Wordsworth practiced a sort of pagan nature
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worship, insisting that Wordsworth’s sublime experience set nature as its object: “Wordsworth, I
believe, made this mistake all his life. I am sure that all that sense of the loss of vanished vision
which fills The Prelude was itself vision of the same kind [as Joy], if only he could have
believed it” (SBJ 167). Lewis, on the other hand, believed that Joy was directed not at the object
that evoked it, but at something outside of experience: “Only when your whole attention and
desire are fixed on something else—whether a distant mountain, or the past, or the gods of
Asgard—does the thrill arise. It is a by-product. Its very existence presupposes that you desire
not it but something other and outer” (SBJ 168). Whether accurate or not, Lewis clearly believed
Wordsworth to be no true Christian, and even conceived of himself—in Prothero and Williams’s
words—as “completing” Wordsworth’s vision.44 In this light, it comes as no surprise that Lewis
would choose to add one additional chapter onto his own Prelude—the chapter which details his
conversion from “Theism, pure and simple” to Christianity (230). He makes this particularly
clear by reminding the reader on the last page, “I cannot, indeed, complain, like Wordsworth,
that the visionary gleam has passed away” (SBJ 238). In this reference, Lewis is confirming that
he will not end like Wordsworth, but go a step beyond the great Romantic poet.
Furthermore, the use of the title “The Beginning” for this chapter emphasizes Lewis’s
forward movement, as opposed to what he perceived to be Wordsworth’s mistaken nostalgia for
the past. Joy looks simultaneously backwards and forwards, being “a desire for something longer
ago or further away or still ‘about to be’” (SBJ 78). It is:
44

I wish to amend Prothero and Williams’ argument slightly, however. They claim that Lewis corrects
“Romanticism’s fatal flaw,” which they identify as the Romantics’ “reject[ion of] the focus on reason that was
characteristic of the Enlightenment” (36). While Lewis certainly performs a marriage of imagination and reason in
his work, he seems to have associated this very practice with Romanticism. In a review of George Steiner’s The
Death of Tragedy (1961), Lewis writes, “I could wish, however, that he [Steiner] had not, without qualification,
connected Romanticism with Revolution as a liberation from reason. It was not for nothing that the Revolution made
Reason a goddess. It attacked the ancien régime not only for iniquities but for ‘absurdities’ […]. The ‘reason’ from
which Wordsworth records his liberation in The Prelude is not that of Descartes but that of Godwin” (“Tragic Ends”
77-78).
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a longing (yet it was also fruition) [….] I had tasted Heaven then. [….] True, it
was desire, not possession. But then what I had felt on the walk had also been
desire, and only possession in so far as that kind of desire is itself desirable, is the
fullest possession we can know on earth; […] the very nature of Joy makes
nonsense of our common distinction between having and wanting. There, to have
is to want and to want is to have. (SBJ 166)
In this description we see once again the “already, not yet” character of Lewis’s higher
innocence. Joy is both a present taste of Heaven, as well as an anticipation of Heaven, even when
it arises out of memory. Clearly Lewis found Wordsworth’s sublime to be too fixated on the
vanished past. He seems to have been unconvinced by Wordsworth’s commitment to “grieve not,
rather find / Strength in what remains behind” (“Intimations of Immortality” 182-83), instead
finding Wordsworth’s vision in need of revision. Indeed, by mirroring the structure of The
Prelude in his own autobiography, then adding a final chapter, Lewis effectively offers Surprised
by Joy as a sort of new, improved Prelude.45 Indeed, by offering a new, improved model of The
Prelude in Surprised by Joy, Lewis also reveals his larger project of writing a new, improved
Romantic metanarrative, for his higher innocence is more dynamic than Wordsworth’s, thanks,
in large part, to Samuel Taylor Coleridge.
Joy and Coleridgean Polarity

45

Another distinction Lewis clearly wishes to make between Wordsworth and himself, is that of the egotistical
sublime versus the fantastic sublime. Lewis does, for a time, embrace what might be called Wordsworth’s sublime,
the egotistical sublime, saying, “I concluded that it was a mood or state within myself” (SBJ 169), but he eventually
moves beyond this idea.45 Lewis comes to understand his own Joy as what David Sandner has named the “Fantastic
Sublime.” The fantastic sublime is not “anchored in the world of sense-experience” but “unmoored from reality”
(Sandner, The Fantastic Sublime 59), and Lewis believes that this helps one to focus outwardly, rather than
inwardly. In describing his “ideal,” or “normal” day, he describes a day full of reading, writing, tea, eating, and a
walk in nature (SBJ 141-43). This description sounds like a very Wordsworthian day, particularly if we—like
Lewis—are familiar with Dorothy Wordsworth’s journals. The great difference, however, arises when Lewis
examines the ultimate result or tendency of this day: “it is a life almost entirely selfish. Selfish, not self-centered: for
in such a life my mind would be directed toward a thousand things, not one of which is myself. The distinction is not
unimportant” (SBJ 143). Indeed, it is not, for it places Lewis’s relish of the fantastic sublime, which is selfish, yet
focused outward, in direct contrast to Wordsworth’s egotistical sublime, which is concerned more than anything
with his own poetic genius, his own subjective experience, his own memories.
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Lewis, like Wordsworth, owes much to Samuel Taylor Coleridge; in particular, his
concept of higher innocence as unity is heavily rooted in Coleridge’s understanding of polar
logic. It is utterly impossible to leave Owen Barfield—the Coleridgean character in Lewis’s own
Prelude—out of any conversation about Lewis and Coleridge, for Barfield was not only
influential in Lewis’s conversion, but he was a respected and passionate Coleridge scholar.
Furthermore, Coleridgean polarity is the key concept in Barfield’s scholarship, with which Lewis
was undoubtedly familiar, and I propose that polarity is a key concept through which to
understand Lewis’s unique characterization of higher innocence in Surprised by Joy and
throughout his fictional work (as discussed in chapters two, three, and four).
In The Friend Coleridge describes “the universal law of polarity or essential dualism” in
the following manner: “Every power in nature and in spirit must evolve an opposite as the sole
means and condition of its manifestation: and all opposition is a tendency to re-union” (The
Friend 97). He also writes in the margin of Swedenborg’s De Infinito et Causa Finali Creationis,
“we seek first for the Unity, as the only source of Reality, and then for the two opposite yet
correspondent forms, by which it manifests itself” (qtd in Barfield, “Either: Or” 52). In his
ground-breaking book, What Coleridge Thought (1971), Owen Barfield attempts to explain this
concept:
Polarity is dynamic, not abstract. [….] Where logical opposites are contradictory,
polar opposites are generative of each other—and together generative of new
product. Polar opposites exist by virtue of each other as well as at the expense of
each other; [….] Moreover each quality or character is present in the other. We
can and must distinguish, but there is no possibility of dividing them. (What
Coleridge Thought 36)
Elsewhere, Barfield describes polar logic as “Coleridge’s way out of the great either : or with
which contemporary humanity is confronted” (“Either: Or” 58-9). In other words, Coleridgean
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polarity is an instance or state of dynamic unity in which seeming opposites are held in harmony,
paradoxically synthesized, yet distinct in their uniqueness.
In Lewis’s autobiography he focuses on Joy as the unifier of his outer and inner lives,
finally synthesizing his reason and imagination into a cohesive whole of experience and
knowledge. In this way, Coleridge’s concept of polarity comes to represent higher innocence in
Lewis’s self-construction. Surprised by Joy reveals Lewis as torn between many seeming
dualisms: romantic and Victorian sensibilities, the sublime and the homely, the life of
imagination and daily life, poetry and the novel, fantasy and realism, etc. Arthur Greeves helps
Lewis to appreciate both poetry and the novel, fantasy and realism, the romantic and the
Victorian:
He[…] side by side with his love for myth and marvel, which I fully shared, had
another taste which I lacked till I met him and with which, to my great good, he
infected me for life. This was the taste for what he called ‘the good solid, old
books,’ the classic English novelists. [….] Under Arthur’s influence I read at this
time all the best Waverleys, all the Brontës, and all the Jane Austens. They
provided an admirable complement to my more fantastic reading, and each was
the more enjoyed for its contrast to the other. The very qualities which had
previously deterred me from such books Arthur taught me to see as their charm.
What I would have called their ‘stodginess’ or ‘ordinariness’ he called
‘Homeliness’—a key word in his imagination. [….] He meant the rooted quality
which attaches them to all our simple experiences, to weather, food, the family,
the neighborhood. [….] This love of the ‘Homely’ was not confined to literature;
he looked for it in out-of-doors scenes as well and taught me to do the same.
Hitherto my feelings for nature had been too narrowly romantic. (SBJ 151-52)
Lewis admits that allowing fantasy alongside realism, poetry alongside the novel, the romantic
alongside the Victorian, the extraordinary, distant, indistinct and beautiful alongside the
ordinary, present, distinct and sometimes ugly, has the positive impact of “emphasiz[ing] it,
enrich[ing] the contrast, sharpen[ing] the dualism” and enlivens the perspective which holds
them simultaneously in view (SBJ 155). Though Lewis uses the term “dualism,” one cannot help
wondering if he is really witnessing Coleridge’s polar logic in his mind’s eye, for the two sides
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of this dualism seem to melt deliciously into one another, to reveal to Lewis a more unified
vision of literature and the world around him.
He explains the whole idea by describing the Irish countryside outside Little Lea:
Your horizon from here is the Antrim Mountains, probably a uniform mass of
grayish blue, though if it is a sunny day you may just trace on the Cave Hill the
distinction between the green slopes that climb two-thirds of the way to the
summit and the cliff wall that perpendicularly accomplishes the rest. That is one
beauty; and here where you stand is another, quite different and even more dearly
loved—sunlight and grass and dew, crowing cocks and gaggling ducks. In
between them, on the flat floor of the Valley at your feet, a forest of factory
chimneys, gantries, and giant cranes rising out of a welter of mist, lies Belfast.
Noises come up from it continually, whining and screeching of trams, clatter of
horse traffic on uneven sets, and, dominating all else, the continual throb and
stammer of the great shipyards. And because we have heard this all our lives it
does not, for us, violate the peace of the hilltop; rather, it emphasizes it, enriches
the contrast, sharpens the dualism. [….] Now step a little way[…] and you will
see, looking south with a little east in it, a different world. And having seen it,
blame me if you can for being romantic. For here is the thing itself, utterly
irresistible, the way to the world’s end, the land of longing, the breaking and
blessing of hearts. You are looking across what may be called, in a certain sense,
the plain of Down, and seeing beyond it the Mourne Mountains. (154-55)
There is something about the “sharpen[ing]” of “the dualism” between the beauty and peace of
Lewis’s hilltop and the wretched bustle of Belfast that leads directly into the “Now” of the
sublime “land of longing” he finally describes. And, of course, if we remember our Blakean
imagery—which is assimilated in the larger romantic idea—we recall the imagery of innocence
in the quiet, happy hilltop, and that of experience in the “factory chimneys” and “stir” of the city
(SBJ 154). This sublime prospect is of course an allusion to Joy, but also thereby an allusion to
higher innocence, or the anticipation of higher innocence. It may have somehow come about
through the polar opposition of nature and civilization, the imagination of innocence and the
reality of experience. Indeed, Heaven for Lewis, as for Blake is frequently a unified vision of the
garden of innocence and the city of experience—transmuted into the perfected city of God, the
new Jerusalem. Lewis gives one final example of this polar logic at work:

85

[…]best of all we liked it when the Homely and the unhomely met in sharp
juxtaposition: if a little kitchen garden ran steeply up a narrowing enclave of
fertile ground surrounded by outcroppings and furze, or some shivering quarry
pool under a moonrise could be seen on our left, and on our right the smoking
chimney and lamplit window of a cottage that was just settling down for the night.
(157-8)
Again Lewis presents us with a picture of polarity, finding in the seeming opposition of wild
natural beauty and homely human existence a unity, achieved through the power of imagination.
This striving for polarity becomes key for Lewis’s return to Christianity, for the central narrative
of polarity in the autobiography is story of Lewis’s conversion. Lewis recalls of his nonChristian self:
Such, then, was the state of my imaginative life; over against it stood the life of
my intellect. The two hemispheres of my mind were in the sharpest contrast. On
the one side a many-islanded sea of poetry and myth; on the other a glib and
shallow ‘rationalism.’ Nearly all that I loved I believed to be imaginary; nearly all
that I believed to be real I thought grim and meaningless. (SBJ 170)
This tension of “car[ing] for almost nothing but the gods and heroes, the garden of the
Hesperides, Launcelot and the Grail, and […] believ[ing] in nothing but atoms and evolution and
military service” (SBJ 174), was a tension that required resolution. Lewis’s quest for higher
innocence, therefore, necessitated the synthesis of his feelings with his beliefs, thus requiring a
polar unity between the imaginary and the real. In George MacDonald he began to find this
resolution. After reading Phantastes he recalls:
Up till now each visitation of Joy had left the common world momentarily a
desert—‘The first touch of the earth went nigh to kill’.46 But now I saw the bright
shadow coming out of the book into the real world and resting there, transforming
all common things and yet itself unchanged. Or, more accurately, I saw the
common things drawn into the bright shadow. [….] That night my imagination
was, in a certain sense, baptized; the rest of me, not unnaturally, took longer. (SBJ
181)
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This is a “visitation of Joy” in which Lewis has moved closer to higher innocence, taking a step
towards unity between human imagination and physical reality. The use of baptism in this
description is particularly pertinent to the overall image, as baptism represents a simultaneously
physical and spiritual reality; in the baptismal water the spiritual reality is united with the
physical sign of covenant.
Shortly after the reconciling experience of Phantastes, Lewis becomes what he calls an
“Absolute Idealist.” This is probably the moment in which his belief system is closest to that of
Barfield, and it is therefore unsurprising that he explains it very much as a synthesis of polar
opposites:
The Absolute was ‘there,’ and that ‘there’ contained the reconciliation of all
contraries, the transcendence of all finitude, the hidden glory which was the only
perfectly real thing there is. In fact, it had much of the quality of Heaven. [….]
What I learned from the Idealists (and still most strongly hold) is this maxim: it is
more important that Heaven should exist than that any of us should reach it. (SBJ
210-11)
Later he again recognizes this Idealism as a striving for the unity of higher innocence, saying,
“that is why we experience Joy: we yearn, rightly, for that unity which we can never reach
except by ceasing to be the separate phenomenal beings called ‘we’” (SBJ 222). This Idealism,
of course, is what ultimately gives way to Theism, and finally Theism gives way to Christianity.
And Christianity, which is centered on the incarnation, is itself the ultimate synthesis between
polar opposites, for the incarnation represents a final reconciliation between myth and fact,
spiritual and physical reality.47 Lewis writes: “Here and here only in all time the myth must have
become fact; the Word, flesh; God, Man” (SBJ 236). Christianity, via the incarnation, therefore
resolves the dualisms of Lewis’s former life and simultaneously manifests and points towards
higher innocence. In this way Coleridge’s polar logic becomes a central and integral piece of
47
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Lewis’s personal understanding of higher innocence, and will play a key role not only in his
autobiography, but also in his fictional endeavors. Furthermore, Coleridge, with his emphasis on
polar logic, is most likely the source from which Lewis firmed up his own technical term for
higher innocence: Joy.
Lewis most likely borrowed the term “Joy” not directly from the Wordsworthian sonnet
that gives the autobiography its name (“Surprised by Joy”), but from Coleridge’s “Dejection: an
Ode.” Barfield suggests that Coleridge’s term for the self-other recognition between man and
nature (the sublime) is “joy,” as seen in the Dejection Ode (“Either: Or” 55). In “Either: Or:
Coleridge, Lewis and Romantic Theology” Barfield entertains the theory that Coleridge’s term
might bear connection to Lewis’s Joy, but quickly and decidedly dismisses the notion. Yet, an
analysis of Joy and its function within the “Dejection Ode” provides a distinct glimpse of what
may very well have been the source and prototype of Lewis’s Joy.
“I write melancholy, always melancholy: You will suspect that it is the fault of my
natural Temper,” writes Coleridge in his notebook in October of 1803 (The Notebooks 1609). It
is true that the poet is often distinguished for a certain flavor of despair, and yet he parries that,
“Alas! no.—This is the great Occasion that my Nature is made for Joy—impelling me to
Joyance—& I never, never can yield to it.—I am a genuine Tantalus—” (1609). This Joy, for
which Coleridge perceives himself to have been created, figures prominently in his “Dejection:
an Ode,” and would seemingly elucidate the poet’s conception of polarity. By examining the
definition and role of Joy in “Dejection: an Ode” we may reach a new understanding of polar
logic and of its unique meaning for C. S. Lewis.
In “Dejection: an Ode” Coleridge depicts an experiential process in which polarity plays
a key role via Joy. First, the poet mourns over the brokenness of the world and of humanity,
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which manifests itself in his own creative impotence. This grief expresses an anxiety, a sense of
disunity in the world, and a simultaneous longing for wholeness. Second, the poet finds himself
effectively surprised by Joy, discovering in nature, or perhaps through nature, a glimpse of
something transcendent. This is the moment in which Joy appears, invoking concurrently an
awareness that the world is not ideal and the longing for a better world. This longing is not an
unpleasant sensation, but rather ecstatic, so that, thirdly, the poet experiences an inexpressibly
beautiful impression of a new, unified and perfected world, and thereby a flash of the creative
capacity in its highest degree: the Primary Imagination, which is achieved through the
comprehension of polarity. Unfortunately, this joy, as Coleridge laments in his notebook, is no
more than a tantalizing glimpse of a wholly absent perfection; it can neither realize itself, nor
fulfill its inherent longings. Coleridge therefore continues to “write melancholy,” always poised
for a new, tantalizing manifestation of joy. All in all, this series of events is not simply
reminiscent of the traditional sublime experience, but it also bears a shocking resemblance to
Lewis’s own descriptions of Joy in his autobiography.
“Dejection: an Ode” begins with Coleridge sitting at his window, frantically searching
through nature in pursuit of some unnamed feeling. He lists off the beauty that spreads itself
before him, as if making a catalog of the sights. He anticipates a coming storm, hoping that,
“Those sounds which oft have raised me, whilst they awed, / And sent my soul abroad, / Might
now perhaps their wonted impulse give, / Might startle this dull pain and make it move and live”
(17-20). However, whatever the feeling Coleridge searches for in this scene of natural grandeur,
he does not find it. Lewis similarly admits that Joy cannot be harnessed through deliberate
pursuit, saying “I woke from building the temple to find that the God had flown” (SBJ 165). Just
as Lewis regrets the divide between what he loves and what he believes, Coleridge laments that
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his gaze is not accompanied by feeling and concludes, “I see, not feel, how beautiful” the natural
scene is (“Dejection” 38). This distinction between sight and feeling, between the eye and the
heart, represents the essential brokenness or disunity of the world as Coleridge experiences it.
Furthermore, this disconnect manifests itself in a “dull sobbing draft” that “moans and rakes /
Upon the strings of this Aeolian lute, / Which better far were mute” (6-8). As the image of the
Aeolian lute is a common metaphor for the poet, played upon by nature, Coleridge thereby
asserts that his current state of disjuncture enables him only to create bad poetry that would be
better left unwritten. Without the polar logic of the Primary Imagination, Coleridge’s poetry has
no unifying power.
The anxiety Coleridge expresses in these first two stanzas is characterized by a desperate
longing. Exclamation points abound in his descriptions of the scene, as though he wished to
work himself into a frenzied state, yet his longing finds “no natural outlet, no relief” (23), and he
continues only to gaze with “how blank an eye” (30). Hence the descent into dejection:
unsatisfied urges and a growing sense that “It were a vain endeavor, / Though I should gaze for
ever / On that green light that lingers in the west,” have led the poet to cease his anxious search
and confess himself unable to force from “outward forms” the sensations “whose fountains are
within” (42-46). In this admission of defeat, Coleridge confesses that his longings are not
actually directed towards nature itself but that he longs for an intellectual, emotional experience
that is somehow connected with nature. The comparison is strikingly similar to Lewis’s own
recollections of “the fatal determination to recover the old thrill, and at last the moment when I
was compelled to realize that all such efforts were failures” (SBJ 166). Like Coleridge, Lewis
finds that whenever he focuses on any particular object as a source of Joy, Joy eludes him.
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In stanza 4 of “Dejection” Coleridge begins by explaining the brokenness of man’s
relationship to nature. He explains that nature is only meaningful in so much as man interprets
meaning from it: “in our life alone does Nature live” (48). Furthermore, humanity’s
correspondence with nature represents both nature’s “wedding-garment” and “shroud” (49),
suggesting that while man is meant to commune with nature in an intimate, mutually-nurturing
relationship, this relationship is disrupted by death. Up until this point, the poem has effectively
established an image of brokenness, of broken relationship, of void where there ought to be
feeling, of death where there ought to be nurture, and in all of this, a desperate longing that these
relationships should be healed.
Suddenly, however, this unanswered desire seems to stumble upon an answer:
And would we aught behold, of higher worth,
Than that inanimate cold world allowed
To the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd,
Ah! […] (“Dejection” 50-53)
At the moment the poet ceases his “ever-anxious” search for fulfillment, the possibility arises
that there may exist certain encounters, certain sights that invoke the very feeling he has
despaired of experiencing. He admits the possibility of a moment of transcendence, a moment in
which the “inanimate cold world” and the “poor loveless ever-anxious crowd” momentarily
reach beyond their brokenness and provide a glimpse of something of “higher worth” (50-52).
This sudden, inexplicable occurrence is the feeling Coleridge has hitherto wished for: it is Joy.
As Lewis will later concur, the appearance of Joy is seemingly unpredictable, and cannot
be forced or anticipated. While Coleridge searches anxiously for Joy through the first two
stanzas of the poem, he finds it not, yet, in the midst of ensuing despair, he suddenly realizes its
potentiality with a surprised, “Ah!” (53). In this moment the poet is effectively surprised by Joy,
as Lewis would later characterize the sublime experience. Coleridge now begins to describe it:
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Ah! From the soul itself must issue forth
A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud
Enveloping the Earth—
And from the soul itself must there by sent
A sweet and potent voice, of its own birth,
Of all sweet sounds the life and element! (53-58)
The experience of Joy (although Coleridge has not yet identified it as such) is described as
emanating from the soul, and granting both “light” and “glory,” despite its being a “cloud” (54).
The paradoxical nature of a “luminous cloud” suggests the paradoxical nature of joy itself (54),
for joy represents both an obscuring and an enlightening of the Earth: it obscures the reality of a
sin-wrecked world with the impression of a potentially perfected one. He further explains this
transcendent experience as allowing the soul to send out “A sweet and potent voice, of its own
birth, / Of all sweet sounds the life and element” (57-58). This voice, which emerges from man’s
soul, is of divine origin, being the source of “all sweet sounds.” The voice’s self-origination also
evidences its origin in God, for Coleridge, according to Jonathan Wordsworth, perceives God to
be the only, or original, self-determining thing in the universe when he titles himself “I AM” to
Moses (31). This transcendence therefore allows the human soul to echo the voice of God, and
this echoing is no small thing for Coleridge—it is an apprehension of polarity.
The fifth stanza of “Dejection” finally identifies this experience as that of Joy, and more
fully explains its power and role. Coleridge attests that the “pure of heart” already know what he
alludes to (59), having a nature less tainted by sin and therefore more receptive to Joy. He now
defines Joy more fully, as a “beautiful and beauty-making power” (63). Joy is simultaneously
“Life, and life’s effluence, cloud at once and shower” (66), for it is both a longing for and a
realization of transcendence. Furthermore, this Joy is explicitly represented as a glimpse of a
perfected world:
Joy, Lady! Is the spirit and the power,
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Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower
A new Earth and new Heaven,
Undreamt of by the sensual and the proud—
Joy is the sweet voice, Joy the luminous cloud—
We in ourselves rejoice!
And thence flows all that charms our ear or sight,
All melodies the echoes of that voice,
All colours a suffusion from that light. (“Dejection” 67-75)
Joy, for Coleridge, engages a human capacity for the Primary Imagination, which, echoing the
eternal, creative act of God, can perceive of a world of polar logic, in which humanity is truly
wedded to nature, and no longer its grave-clothes. In other words, Joy in “Dejection” is the
realization of polarity, the realization of a perfected world, and, therefore, a transcendent
moment of powerful, redemptive imagination.48
Unfortunately, Coleridge returns immediately from his raptures on Joy in stanzas 4 and 5
to a state of dissatisfaction and creative impotence in stanza 6. He bemoans that “afflictions bow
me down to earth,” “rob me of my mirth,” and “Suspend[….] / My shaping spirit of
Imagination” (82-6). He thus resigns Joy to a mere memory, and it is at this point that Lewis sees
himself diverging from Coleridge, just as he diverges from Wordsworth. In Surprised by Joy
Lewis attempts to paint a rosier picture than the tortured romantic longing of The Prelude and
“Dejection,” and thus Lewis claims that he has lost all interest in Joy post-conversion.
Nonetheless, Lewis’s Joy appears a clear descendant of Coleridge’s and that same Joy that
tantalized Coleridge assists Lewis in reaching his “Jerusalem.” Lewis’s Joy, like Coleridge’s in
“Dejection,” is best described as an apprehension of polarity, a unifying force, a decidedly
Coleridgean higher innocence, which will reappear in all of Lewis’s fiction.
In conclusion, just as Blake, Shelley, Keats, and Wordsworth contribute to Lewis’s
understanding and internalization of the Romantic metanarrative in Surprised by Joy, so
48
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Coleridge offers an integral contribution, solidifying Lewis’s conception of higher innocence
around the theory of polarity and possibly providing Lewis with Joy as a term for the
apprehension of polarity. By establishing the parallels between Surprised by Joy and these
various depictions of innocence, experience, and higher innocence, it becomes clear that the
Romantic metanarrative was central to Lewis’s conception of his own development; however, in
each case Lewis not only appropriates, but builds on the Romantic metanarrative, extending and
revising it into a more definite, more Christian narrative. He clarifies and solidifies Blake’s
higher innocence, rejects Keats and Shelley’s sublime, extends Wordsworth’s narrative, and
moves beyond Coleridge’s Joy to deep fulfillment. The practice of tessera—completing the
Romantic metanarrative in its various manifestations, is one that echoes through all of Lewis’s
fiction. As the following chapters will demonstrate, all of Lewis’s fiction revises various
Victorian interpretations of the same Romantic structure behind Surprised by Joy.
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CHAPTER TWO: “I might—”: Spiritualizing the Victorian Bildungsromane in Till We
Have Faces
“‘You can’t get a cup of tea large enough or a book long enough to suit me,’ said C. S.
Lewis” (Hooper, “Preface” v). These may be Lewis’s most cherished words, oft quoted by fans
and academics alike. Less well known is Walter Hooper’s recollection that, “he meant it, for at
that moment I was pouring his tea into a very large Cornish-ware cup and he was reading Bleak
House” (v). Hooper playfully implies that Dickens’s longest novel is positive proof of Lewis’s
unquenchable love of story—one must be truly devout to make it all the way through this
exemplar of Victorian long-windedness. Yet it is intriguing that a Dickens novel should be the
book to evoke such an encomium from Lewis. This biographical anecdote, from which the quote
has been carefully memorialized and the specific book forgotten, captures how scholarship and
popular memory have neglected Lewis’s taste for the Victorian novel. This chapter aims to
remedy this neglect.
Alongside Romantic poetry, Lewis’s adolescent and adult literary diets consisted of
generous portions of Victorian novels, fantasies and prose romances; it should come as no
surprise that these authors, whom Lewis discovered during his “personal Renaissance” and
continued to admire in his later life, left a deep impression on his literary work (SBJ 71). On
March 7, 1916, Lewis writes to Arthur Greeves with a complaint about George MacDonald’s
Phantastes:
There are one or two poems in the tale—as in the Morris tales you know—which,
with one or two exceptions are shockingly bad, so don’t TRY to appreciate them:
it is just a sign, isn’t it, of how some geniuses can’t work in metrical forms—
another example being the Brontes. (Collected Letters Vol I 169-70)
This young, arrogant reader (Lewis was 17 at the time of writing) did not yet know that his
critique would one day apply equally well to himself. Lewis at this time believed himself
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destined for poetic fame, yet he would later find his greatest artistic successes in novels, prose
romances, and fantasies akin to those of Charlotte Brontë, Morris, and MacDonald. In fact, the
reading he undertook in these adolescent years—particularly the novels and fantasies—would
shape his ongoing perspective on literature. As evidence of this formative impact, one finds
Lewis drawing comparisons between Victorian writers and other works he encounters. Just as
McGrath notices Lewis’s “Victorian spectacles” in viewing the Middle Ages (2990), we see
Lewis judging older texts against the standard of his favorite Victorian authors. In one such
instance he writes to Arthur in 1916,
the ‘Arcadia’ continues beautiful: in fact it gets better and better. There has been
one part that Charlotte Bronte could not have bettered [….] that is equal to if not
better than the scene where Jane Eyre wakes up on the moor—do you remember?
(Vol I 201-02)
Most literary scholars would find this comparison troubling, either because they believe Sidney’s
Arcadia (1590) more important and influential than Jane Eyre (1847), or simply because it is
illogical to judge an older text by a newer one. But Lewis, just seventeen-years-old, was not yet a
sophisticated literary scholar. Instead, he openly allowed texts to impact him, and Brontë’s
emotional impact, for Lewis, made her the yardstick by which to judge Sidney. Immature though
it may seem, it demonstrates the primacy of these Victorian texts and authors in Lewis’s
developing imagination.
This chapter will establish what no existing scholarship has yet acknowledged: that Lewis
was in conscious intertextual dialog with Victorian realism. To prove this I will demonstrate that
Till We Have Faces (1956) can be effectively and meaningfully read as a revision of Charlotte
Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847) and Charles Dickens’s Bleak House (1853). In order to understand
what drew Lewis to these Victorian non-poets, we must turn once again to the legacy of
Romanticism. Lewis’s most direct literary influences are those Victorians who continually revise

96

and adapt the Romantic metanarrative, and the Victorian realist novel owes a great debt to
Romanticism, for it carries on the Romantic metanarrative via the Bildungsroman. Lewis builds
on and borrows from this novelistic tradition. While he derives his philosophy of mythopoeia
from Tolkien, he seems also to infuse it with the formal elements of nineteenth-century high
realism. In Till We Have Faces he models Orual and her narrative on those of Jane Eyre and
Esther Summerson, who both undergo female Bildungsromane, a form built on the Romantic
metanarrative. The idea of Coleridgean polarity as higher innocence (as discussed in chapter one)
is particularly prevalent in this reading, because Brontë and Dickens both concern themselves
with the unifying or harmonizing of seemingly antithetical concepts, feelings, and even genres.
The form of Jane and Esther’s narratives maintains (or, attempts to maintain) a strict polar logic
between realism and romance, and both heroines illustrate growth through their ability to
balance, even synthesize, their reason and passions. Orual’s story follows the same pattern.
Though Lewis makes great strides in the psychological realism of his “novel,” Till We Have
Faces has all the fantastical trappings of a mythopoeic romance.49 Furthermore, Orual, like Jane
and Esther, attains higher innocence through the reconciliation of her reason and imagination. It
is the paradoxical union of romance and realism in Brontë and Dickens which initially attracts
and confuses Lewis, and Till We Have Faces becomes the incarnation of his desire to achieve
that unity between realism and romance, just as Jane, Esther, and Orual also seek a higher
innocence in which reason and passion harmoniously co-exist. Ultimately, Lewis not only
rewrites Jane and Esther’s narratives, but seeks to complete them in Orual; in the manner of
Bloom’s tessera, Lewis exchanges the marriages with which the Victorian narratives end for a
greater, more mystical union with the divine, suggesting that Orual’s more deeply spiritual
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ending is a more perfect image of higher innocence, better incarnating the polar logic of
imagination and reason, realism and romance, as well as physical and spiritual.
This chapter, along with those to follow, will in some manner counteract the widespread
notion that Lewis disliked, even despised, the Victorians. Kate Durie summarizes this viewpoint,
stating:
[Lewis] felt a deep disquiet about the nineteenth century. […] there is a great gulf
fixed—of consciousness and sensibility—between the age when Scott and Austen
wrote and the modern age. This gulf reflects changes consequent on the birth of
the machine, and the loss of a superstructure of belief. There is little real sense of
where the Victorians figure in this account, except that they are obviously on the
wrong side of the divide. Lewis’s medieval training made him a systematist; the
Victorian period is not tidy. The very qualities that excite many Victorian
enthusiasts—the period’s stretching of norms, the shaking of the foundations of
both religious belief and personal morality, the fertility of experiment, the
extremes of post-Romantic exuberance and despair, appall Lewis. (228-29)
I will argue that it is exactly the “not tidy” nature of Victorian thought, culture, and art that
attracts Lewis. No doubt Durie is, on a large scale, correct. Lewis finds Victorian culture and
thought often troubling; he perceives the era as a dangerous intellectual climate and traces a
direct lineage from thinkers like Matthew Arnold to the modernist philosophies that he so
despises. Nonetheless, Lewis also finds in the Victorians an openness to dialog, even to
paradoxical unity in the midst of tension. Victorian authors manage to embrace seemingly
disparate ideas, genres, and emotions, combining faith and doubt, fantasy and realism, feeling
and rationality; Lewis endeavors to follow this example, as it appeals to his Blakean and
Coleridgean sensibilities. For Lewis, the Victorian era and Victorian art represent not simply a
dangerous moment, but a moment of greater intellectual diversity than the early twentieth
century, a moment when the atheistic, materialist legacy of Keats and Shelley battles with, but
has not yet destroyed, the Christian romanticism of Wordsworth and Coleridge. It is an era of
open conversation, of possibility. While the Victorian era eventually gives way to the malaise of
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Modernism, it nonetheless shows great resistance before doing so. I believe Lewis perceived
many of these Victorian authors as the last ditch defenses against Modernism—tragic figures,
ultimately doomed, yet noble and strong in their convictions. Even the Victorian realists enjoyed
this admiration from Lewis, contrary to popular perception. Thus, when Screwtape proposes his
toast he says of the Victorian era, “Believe me, Gentledevils, the threat of something like a really
healthy state of society seemed then perfectly serious” (“Screwtape” 88).50
Realism and Fantasy: Lewis’s Higher Innocence of Form
While following chapters will examine Lewis’s engagement with Victorian fantasy,
science fiction, and children’s literature, we must first establish his relationship with the
Victorians’ most characteristic literary mode: realism. Most readers would not associate Lewis
with realism; however, nineteenth-century high realism is, in many ways, the stylistic father of
high fantasy—or, at least, Lewis saw it as such. Nineteenth-century high realism owes its birth,
in some manner, to the philosophical and political underpinnings of the Romantic movement (the
same Romantic movement that is, arguably, the central inspiration for Tolkien, Barfield and
Lewis’s philosophy).51
Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man (1791) was published a year before the French
monarchy’s overthrow and played a significant role in revolutionary thought. Paine’s assertion
that “Men are born and always continue free and equal in respect of their rights” (26) stirred the
hearts of many at the dawn of the French Revolution, yet, even when the blood and dust of Paris
had turned Revolutionary fervor to disenchanted horror, these ideals had a profound impact on
the way many artists and thinkers viewed the common person.
50

This Victorian “threat,” of something like a really healthy state,” however, has apparently been “averted” in the
twentieth century, “Thanks to” Satan himself (“our Father Below”) (88).
51
See Reilly’s Romantic Religion.
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William Wordsworth was one such artist. As a supporter of the French Revolution,
Wordsworth embraced Paine’s ideas about human rights. Unfortunately, Wordsworth’s firsthand
experience of the revolution was disillusioning. He witnessed the descent of French society into
the Reign of Terror and was eventually forced to flee the country, returning to England in a deep
malaise. Living for some time in the Lake District, however, Wordsworth found the peasantry a
balm to his cynicism—they restored his hope in the human dignity asserted by revolutionary
thought. Marilyn Butler characterizes Wordsworth’s interest in the English peasantry as “the
counter-revolution’s taste for hearth and home” (66), and Marjorie Levinson suggests that
“Wordsworth is most distinctively Wordsworth” when he is avoiding “polemic or position” (4),
yet it is impossible to entirely divide Wordsworth’s work from the revolutionary philosophies of
individuality and freedom that first inspired him. In Book XII of The Prelude (1805) he attests
not to a new, but to a renewed interest in men: “I found / Once more in man an object of delight,
/ Of pure imagination, and of love” (XII.53-55; my emphasis). Nancy Yousef explains this shift
as Wordsworth recognizing his interdependence with society, and thus his rejection of his own
“seeming independence” (115). According to Yousef, this return to human society is the
manifestation of the ultimate “thesis” or “moral” of The Prelude, “the title of book 8: ‘Love of
Nature Leading to Love of Mankind’” (118). Wordsworth became convinced that “Nature
through all conditions hath a power / To consecrate—if we have eyes to see—/ The outside of
her creatures, and to breathe / Grandeur upon the very humblest face / Of human life” (XII.28286), and he therefore focused much of his poetic attention on the common people living around
him, finding in their lives and labor a deep philosophical comfort.
When the 1800 edition of the Lyrical Ballads was published, Wordsworth made it clear
that his interest in the common person was a deciding aesthetic factor in his art. His “Preface”
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states that in “[l]ow and rustic life […] the essential passions of the heart find a better soil in
which they can attain their maturity, are less under restraint, and speak a plainer and more
emphatic language” (203). Because rustic life presents this opportunity, Wordsworth therefore
seeks to revolutionize poetry into something that no longer relishes its own artificiality, but
actually “imitate[s], and, as far as possible, adopt[s], the very language of men” (205).
Wordsworth’s revolutionary interest in portraying the commoner and in creating art that closely
mirrors reality is taken up by the realist novel, which Ian Watt and Nancy Armstrong, among
others, characterize as a literary development correlated with the burgeoning of middle-class
individuality. We therefore find the same Wordsworthian interest in the common man
reappearing in George Eliot’s Adam Bede. Eliot’s narrator famously reflects on his own writerly
vocation, explaining, “I aspire to give no more than a faithful account of men and things as they
have mirrored themselves in my mind” (175). Thus, the nineteenth century realist’s attempts to
ennoble the world and its inhabitants through fiction finds its roots in Romanticism, and borrows
from the Romantics’ ennobling metanarrative for human existence.
The thread of influence from Romanticism to Victorian realism continues on from
Victorian realism to twentieth-century mythopoeia. In particular, an examination of Eliot’s
realist manifesto (as proposed in Adam Bede) side by side with Tolkien’s “On Fairy Stories” and
several of Lewis’s essays on stories, writing, and fantasy, reveals a startling similarity of purpose
and argument. I am, in some capacity, arguing against such scholars as John Haigh, who seeks to
“disengag[e] Lewis’s fiction from the modern realistic novel and establish it as a variety of the
prose romance” (192). While Lewis’s fantasies are certainly “prose romances,” they—and Till
We Have Faces in particular—are nonetheless influenced by Victorian realism. To suggest that
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Lewis is in conversation only with prose romancers like William Morris would be shortsighted,
failing to acknowledge the breadth and complexity of his fiction.
In Adam Bede, George Eliot argues for the realist novel as a medium for “deep human
sympathy” (178), an art form in which the humble and often unheralded aspects of daily life may
be celebrated, brought to light, and appreciated. She admits, “Falsehood is so easy, truth so
difficult” (176), and castigates wish-fulfillment fiction, writing,
I would not, even if I had the choice, be the clever novelist who could create a
world so much better than this, in which we get up in the morning to do our daily
work, that you would be likely to turn a harder, colder eye on the dusty streets and
the common green fields—on the real breathing men and women, who can be
chilled by your indifference or injured by your prejudice; who can be cheered and
helped onward by your fellow-feeling, your forbearance, your outspoken, brave
justice. (176)
By this standard the novelist’s work is to reveal the “beauty in […] commonplace things, and
delight in showing how kindly the light of Heaven falls on them” (Eliot 178). According to Eliot,
fiction should paint a picture that sends readers back to reality with a deeper appreciation for its
beauties.
On first glance, Eliot’s literary agenda might appear antithetical to that of Tolkien, and
therefore Lewis, but a closer look reveals that realist and fantasist have a similar vocabulary,
similar approaches, and similar purposes. Like Eliot, Tolkien regards the appearance of
falsehood (with its need for a “willing suspension of disbelief”) as poor work, instead suggesting
that “a genuine fairy-story[…] should be presented as ‘true’” (14). This “truth” signifies the
underlying truth of Biblical metanarrative to Tolkien, but it is also found in the mundane truths
of reality itself, flowing into the secondary world, transmuted, yet intact. He argues,
Faërie contains many things besides elves and fays, and besides dwarfs, witches,
trolls, giants, or dragons: it holds the seas, the sun, the moon, the sky; and the
earth, and all things that are in it: tree and bird, water and stone, wine and bread,
and ourselves, mortal men, when we are enchanted. (9)
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The focus and “truth” of Tolkien’s fantasy is therefore akin to the focus and “truth” of Eliot’s
realism; both hinge on their accurate and appreciative depiction of real things and people.
Furthermore, Tolkien shares Eliot’s purpose to reveal “beauty in […] commonplace things, and
delight in showing how kindly the light of Heaven falls on them” (Eliot 178), although his
approach differs from her own. Tolkien shows humanity “enchanted” and Eliot depicts people in
“the light of Heaven.” Like Eliot’s realism, Tolkien’s fantasy gives the reader a deeper
appreciation for reality; fantasy, he says, facilitates
Recovery […]—regaining of a clear view. [….] Of all faces those of our
familiares are the ones both most difficult to play fantastic tricks with, and most
difficult really to see with fresh attention, perceiving their likeness and
unlikeness: that they are faces, and yet unique faces. [….] They have become like
the things which once attracted us by their glitter, or their colour, or their shape,
and we laid hands on them, and then locked them in our hoard, acquired them,
and acquiring ceased to look at them. [….] Creative fantasy, because it is mainly
trying to do something else (make something new), may open your hoard and let
all the locked things fly away like cage-birds. The gems all turn into flowers or
flames, and you will be warned that all you had (or knew) was dangerous and
potent, not really effectively chained, free and wild; no more yours than they were
you. (58-9)
Upon close examination, the similarity in Tolkien and Eliot’s language is surprising. Both
describe the need to recognize the beauty of familiar faces and the dignity of the mundane.
Tolkien’s call to recognize the “likeness […] and unlikeness” of the familiar faces that one
“ceased to look at” (Tolkien 58), mirrors Eliot’s call to “remember [the] existence” of “common,
coarse people” (Eliot 178); the “light of Heaven” Eliot’s realism casts resembles the “flames” lit
by Tolkien’s fantasy (Eliot 176; Tolkien 59); Eliot’s assertion that realism makes “lovable”
“those homes with their tin pans, their brown pitchers, their rough curs, and the clusters of
onions” (177-78), resurfaces in Tolkien’s affirmation that fairy-stories reveal “the wonder of the
things, such as stone, and wood, and iron; tree and grass; house and fire; bread and wine” (59).
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The similarities between these respective literary philosophies reveal how easily Lewis
could have integrated the two modes of writing. For whether Tolkien was engaged with Eliot’s
writing or not, Lewis certainly was. 52 In fact, Adam Bede was the first Eliot novel Lewis read,
writing about it in a December 1917 letter to Arthur, “I have just finished ‘Adam Bede’. As you
know, it is the first of hers I have read, and I earnestly advise you to read it. [….] I am writing
home for […] another George Eliott [sic]” (Vol I 348-49). By the beginning of 1918 he reports
reading both The Mill on the Floss and Middlemarch as well, explaining that he is “quite
‘caught’ by George Eliot’s books” (Vol I 362).53 Lewis read most of Eliot’s works in the trenches
and hospital during his service in the first World War. Lewis’s copy of Middlemarch (vol. 1)
contains an inscription explaining that he first read the novel in 1918, while entrenched on the
front in Monchy le Preux (Marginal Notes).54 K. J. Gilchrist confirms Lewis’s connection to
Eliot, and even the romantic associations Lewis may have had with her realism, writing, “Set
against [the reality of the Great War] was Lewis’s mental world. It was a world much like that he
would find in reading George Eliot’s novels. It was not a world without pain, not without
turmoil, but the idyllic, rural England—the England of a long literary and romantic tradition—
with which he increasingly identified himself” (48).
Lewis’s essays on the subject of story and fantasy are famously similar to Tolkien’s “On
Fairy-Stories,” but also appear to be in conscious dialog with Eliot. This appreciation for
Tolkien’s brand of high fantasy (Lewis claims that Tolkien’s “On Fairy-Stories” is “perhaps the
most important contribution to the subject that anyone has yet made” in “On Three Ways of
52

It is not within the scope of this chapter to prove a definite connection between Eliot and Tolkien (although some
connection doubtless exists).
53
Jan. 4, 1918; Albert: “I think I told you that I had read ‘Adam Bede’ and am now at ‘The Mill on the Floss’,
which I like even better. Do you know of any life of George Elliot [sic] published in a cheap edition? If you can find
one, I should like to read it” (Vol I 352).
Feb. 22, 1918; to Albert: “I […] have also begun ‘Middlemarch.’” (Vol I 362).
54
For more on Lewis’s wartime reading of Eliot, see Gilchrist.
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Writing for Children” [26]), coupled with his appreciation for the detailed realism of Eliot,
creates Lewis’s own unique perception of good mythopoeic art as fiction that blends romance
and realism. Take, for example, his critique of Alexandre Dumas’s The Three Musketeers in his
essay “On Stories”:
The total lack of atmosphere repels me. There is no country in the book—save as
a storehouse of inns and ambushes. There is no weather. When they cross to
London there is no feeling that London differs from Paris. [….] If that is what is
meant by Romance, then Romance is my aversion and I greatly prefer George
Eliot or Trollope. (7)
For Lewis, a truly good romance must have an “atmosphere,” flowing apparently from the sort of
descriptions provided by Victorian realists like Eliot and Trollope. The same applies not only to
the real-world romance, but also to the fantasy or fairy-tale, for Lewis similarly suggests that
“[t]he logic of a fairy-tale is as strict as that of a realistic novel” (“On Stories” 13). The best
mythopoeia, therefore, will employ invention, but with an air of realism.
Additionally, like Eliot and Tolkien, Lewis proposes an interest in the reader’s altered
perspective—helping them to appreciate reality through reading. In his essay “On Three Ways of
Writing for Children” Lewis acknowledges that fairy stories are “accused of giving children a
false impression of the world they live in,” but responds, “I think no literature that children could
read gives them less of a false impression. I think what profess to be realistic stories for children
are far more likely to deceive them. I never expected the real world to be like the fairy tales. I
think that I did expect school to be like the school stories” (“On Three” 28). Lewis argues here
that the desire aroused by fairy stories is different and, in fact, preferable to that aroused by
unrealistic stories set in the real world. The school story provides a wish-fulfillment fantasy
about real life, one which will cause the child to look at its own life and find it lacking. As for
fairy tales, on the other hand,
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Does anyone suppose that he really and prosaically longs for all the dangers and
discomforts of a fairy tale?—really wants dragons in contemporary England? It is
not so. It would be much truer to say that fairy land arouses a longing for he
knows not what. It stirs and troubles him (to his life-long enrichment) with the
dim sense of something beyond his reach and, far from dulling or emptying the
actual world, gives it a new dimension of depth. He does not despise real woods
because he has read of enchanted woods: the reading makes all real woods a little
enchanted. (“On Three” 29-30)
In “On Stories” he describes Kenneth Grahame’s The Wind in the Willows (1908) as having this
effect:
[…]it paints a happiness under incompatible conditions—the sort of freedom we
can have only in childhood and the sort we can have only in maturity—and
conceals the contradiction by the further pretense that the characters are not
human beings at all. [….] It might be expected that such a book would unfit us for
the harshness of reality and send us back to our daily lives unsettled and
discontented. I do not find that it does so. The happiness which it presents to us is
in fact full of the simplest and most attainable things—food, sleep, exercise,
friendship, the face of nature, even (in a sense) religion. That “simple but
sustaining meal” of “bacon and broad beans and a macaroni pudding” which Rat
gave to his friends has, I doubt not, helped down many a real nursery dinner. And
in the same way the whole story, paradoxically enough, strengthens our relish for
real life. This excursion into the preposterous sends us back with renewed
pleasure to the actual. (“On Stories” 14-15)
The Wind in the Willows is not only a paradoxically realistic fantasy, but a secondary world that
increases the reader’s appreciation for the actual world. Lewis clearly desires good, true fantasy
to avoid the pitfall of striking “an amazing figure in literature by general discontent with the
universe as a trap of dullness into which […] great souls have fallen by mistake” (Eliot,
Middlemarch, Vol. II 267). Lewis places a marginal line next to this passage in his copy of
Middlemarch, and clearly pondered its implications (Marginal Notes).55 In essence, fantasy, by
Lewis’s estimation, should encourage the same positive result as Eliot’s realism, shedding “the
light of Heaven” on everyday life. Thus we find a similarity to Eliot’s language when Lewis
describes his first reading of Phantastes:
55

It is one of only two passages that Lewis marked in this particular copy of Middlemarch.
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Up till now each visitation of Joy had left the common world momentarily a
desert—‘The first touch of the earth went nigh to kill’. But now I saw the bright
shadow coming out of the book into the real world and resting there, transforming
all common things and yet itself unchanged. Or, more accurately, I saw the
common things drawn into the bright shadow. [….] That night my imagination
was, in a certain sense, baptized; the rest of me, not unnaturally, took longer. (SBJ
181; emphasis added)
It is impossible to imagine that Lewis, whose memory for words and texts was so vast and
unrelenting, is not conscious of echoing Eliot’s realist philosophy in this description of the
fantasy that “baptized” his imagination. He subtly forges a link between the two literary
approaches.
This puzzling marriage between fantasy and realism comes even more clearly into focus
alongside Lewis’s understanding of “homeliness.” In “On Stories” he suggests that “The Hobbit
escapes the danger of degenerating into mere plot and excitement by a very curious shift of tone.
As the humour and homeliness of the early chapters, the sheer ‘Hobbitry’, dies away we pass
insensibly into the world of epic” ( “On Stories” 19; emphasis added).56 “Homeliness” is a
concept that Lewis first learned from Arthur Greeves, and specifically from reading the realist
novels Arthur recommended to him. As he recalls in Surprised by Joy,
Under Arthur’s influence I read […] all the best Waverleys, all the Brontës, and
all the Jane Austens. They provided an admirable complement to my more
fantastic reading, and each was the more enjoyed for its contrast to the other. The
very qualities which had previously deterred me from such books Arthur taught
me to see as their charm. What I would have called their ‘stodginess’ or
‘ordinariness’ he called ‘Homeliness’—a key word in his imagination. [….] He
meant the rooted quality which attaches them to all our simple experiences, to
weather, food, the family, the neighborhood. He could get endless enjoyment out
of the opening sentence of Jane Eyre. (151-52)
But Lewis does not appreciate homeliness purely on its own merit; his favorite occasions of
homeliness appear in conjunction with the sublime or fantastic, as he explains:
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The Hobbit is Tolkien’s fantasy epic for children, published in 1937, followed by Lord of the Rings (1954-55).
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[…]best of all we liked it when the Homely and the unhomely met in sharp
juxtaposition: if a little kitchen garden ran steeply up a narrowing enclave of
fertile ground surrounded by outcroppings and furze, or some shivering quarry
pool under a moonrise could be seen on our left, and on our right the smoking
chimney and lamplit window of a cottage that was just settling down for the night.
(SBJ 157-8)57
Just as Lewis preferred the juxtaposition of the homely and sublime in landscapes, therefore, he
appreciates The Hobbit for its blending of realism and epic romance. He seems to find an
intermingling of realism and fairy tale to be preferable to one or the other, and thus declares, “I
now enjoy Tolstoy and Jane Austen and Trollope as well as fairy tales and I call that growth: if I
had had to lose the fairy tales in order to acquire the novelists, I would not say that I had grown
but only that I had changed” (“Three Ways” 26). A taste for works that are simultaneously
realistic and fantastic shows up time and time again in Lewis’s letters. In one such example, he
asserts that Malory is good because he somehow fuses Austen and Morris—realism and
romance:
As to ‘Malory’ I liked it so awfully this time—far better than before—that I don’t
know what to say. How can I explain? For one thing, to me it is a world of its
own, like Jane Austen. Though impossible, it is very fully realized, and all the
characters are old friends, we know them so well: you get right away in those
forests and somehow to me all the adventures & meetings & dragons seem very
real. (Vol I 245)
In this formative era Lewis cements what will become a life-long preference for nineteenth
century style realism and fantasy in dialog—a dialog he learns to appreciate in Dickens and
adores in Brontë.
Over time, Lewis’s appreciation for Dickens grew from strong dislike to love as he began
to understand the draw of Dickens’s romantic realism. Kate Durie argues that we cannot
necessarily trust what Lewis says about the Victorians in his letters, because most of those letters
57

See chapter one for more detailed analysis of this passage and the concept of homeliness, as well as its
connection with Coleridgean polarity.
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are written by an adolescent Lewis, and “he clearly reread many of the books he discusses in
them, only rarely are second thoughts and later judgments given. Sometimes he changed his
mind; sometimes he did not” (228). Lewis read extensively in Dickens’s work early on and some
of his early correspondence about Dickens is openly derisive. He tells Albert in 1915 that “the
novels of Dickens” are “nightmares” with a “deluding longevity” (Vol I 154). In March 2, 1919
he writes to Arthur that, “Chaucer was very like Dickens—a virtuous, bourgeois story teller fond
of highly moral vulgarity & indecency for its own sake, incapable (at the Tales period not in his
early life) of appreciating romance” (Vol I 442). In such letters he faults Dickens for being too
realistic. And yet elsewhere he describes Dickens as being mythopoeic, rather than realistic.
Apparently he is baffled by the very thing he comes to love and emulate in Dickens—the
blending of romance and realism. In 1927 he suggests that “to enjoy […] Dickens, you must get
rid of all idea of realism—as much as in approaching William Morris or the music hall” (Vol I
727). Despite his censure, he finds in Dickens a possible source of Joy, comparing it to Morris
and to live music—both repeatedly mentioned repositories of Joy. G. K. Chesterton58 explains
Dickens’s romantic realism thus: “His art is like life, because, like life, it cares for nothing
outside itself, and goes on its way rejoicing. Both produce monsters with a kind of carelessness,
like enormous by-products; […]. Art indeed copies life in not copying life, for life copies
nothing. Dickens’s art is like life, it is incredible” (14). Furthermore, Chesterton insists that
“Dickens did not strictly make a literature; he made a mythology” (61). Robert Newsom has
similarly argued that Dickens “imposes upon the reader a kind of unsettled and unsettling double
perspective which requires us to see things as at once ‘romantic’ and ‘familiar’” (7). As this
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Chesterton was one of Lewis’s favorite authors and critics. While Chesterton’s book on Dickens, Charles
Dickens, The Last of the Great Men (1942), is not in the Lewis Library Collection at the Marion E. Wade center,
Lewis did own other critical works by Chesterton, and very likely read this one, as well as Chesterton’s Charles
Dickens: A Critical Study (1906), which helped re-popularize Dickens with readers and critics.
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statement strikingly resembles Lewis’s taste for the sublime and the homely, one can only
assume that Lewis eventually shared Chesterton and Newsom’s readings of Dickens, and thus
came to appreciate Dickens more profoundly.
By 1948 Lewis writes, “I hated Dickens as a boy” (Vol II 898), suggesting that he now, in
contrast, appreciates the novelist. Clearly Dickens is one of those cases in which Durie suggests
that Lewis “changed his mind.” In 1954 he reports, “The best Dickens always seems to me to be
the one I have read last! But in a cool hour I put Bleak House top for its sheer prodigality of
invention” (Vol III 522). Indeed, Lewis re-read Bleak House with pleasure up until the very end
of his life, writing on November 7th, 1963 (just 15 days before his death), “I am, as you say,
being ‘very good’. But so far I rather like it. It was lovely to feel that I need not read Rowse on
the Sonnets! Instead I re-read the Iliad, the Daisy Chain, Bleak House and In Memoriam: a good
balanced diet” (Vol III 1478). We may suppose that Lewis came to love the Dickensian blend of
romance and realism, particularly as it appears in Bleak House, and as he would revise it in Till
We Have Faces.
In Brontë, on the other hand, he consciously enjoyed the union of realism and fantasy
from start to finish. In a Feb. 1, 1916 letter to Arthur Greeves he reports, “I […] have also reread Jane Eyre from beginning to end—it is a magnificent novel. Some of those long, long
dialogues between her and Rochester are really like duets from a splendid opera, aren’t they?
And do you remember the description of the night she slept on the moor and of the dawn?” (Vol I
161). Lewis here reads realist details like dialog and description as magical, even fantastical—
they are what give the book its power over him. In another instance from the same year, Lewis
values Jane Eyre alongside the text that “baptized” his imagination: “for instance ‘Phantastes’,
‘Jane Eyre’” (Vol I 189). Just as he compares Dickens to Morris and “the music hall,” so he
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suggests that Brontë evokes the same emotional experience: “Aye me! How our tastes and
feelings have changed since the days when Wagner was the great common ground of talk, when
Morris was only a name […] and I had never read Charlotte Brontë” (1917, to Greeves; Vol I
281). Essentially, while Lewis recognized Jane Eyre as a representative of realist homeliness, he
also enjoyed the novel for its more fantastic elements. In Till We Have Faces Lewis would
employ a similar fantastical element, and he would do so in conjunction with another realist
accomplishment as well—a psychologically real, first-person female narrator.
Lewis’s marginalia in nineteenth-century realist fiction has not been previously studied,
but it crucially reveals his interest in the psychological realism of characters and narrators;
specifically, and most importantly, in their emotional, spiritual, and cognitive transformations.
The marginal evidence supports my supposition that realist representations were of particular
importance to Lewis, and heavily influenced his own writing. In his copy of Austen’s Emma
(1815), Lewis makes a marginal note of three page numbers addressing the concept of
consciousness (Marginal Notes). He also records the page numbers of those passages in which
Emma reflects on and realizes her love for Knightley, recognizing her own self-deception and
thus experiencing a personal transformation: “She was proved to have been universally
mistaken” (Emma 250). Similarly, in the back cover of his first volume of Mansfield Park (1814)
he notes passages concerned with “self knowledge,” characters being “‘entirely deceived,’” and
“deceiving” themselves, as well as moments where Fanny “observed” these self-deceptions (26,
66, 231, 193). In the back of the second volume of Mansfield Park, he lists page numbers and
excerpts the following quotations from the novel: “did not know yourself” (157) “darkened yet
fancying itself light” (193), “my eyes are opened” (328), and “How have been deceived!”
(Mansfield Park 333). Again, he shows interest in the question of knowledge and deception.
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Fanny knows and sees through things that others—though clever, even good, like Edmund—do
not; however, everything is eventually brought to light, and the characters are un-deceived. His
Northanger Abbey (1818) marginalia highlights the passages concerned with Catherine’s
disillusionment (“The visions of romance were over. [….]” [269-70]) and her “resolution
formed, of always judging and acting in future with the greatest good sense[….]” (272). Again
when reading Sense and Sensibility (1811), he records in the back of the book the page numbers
for Marianne’s realizations of “how barbarous[ly]” she has acted, and her promise that “my
feelings shall be governed and my temper improved. [….] it shall be regulated, it shall be
checked by religion, by reason, by constant employment” (107, 234). Lewis apparently used
these notes from his copies of Austen when writing his essay “A Note on Jane Austen,” in which
he identifies “undeception” as the common thread between the Austen novels, and notes that “the
undeception […]is the very pivot or watershed of the story[.…] it precipitates the happy ending”
(4265-4266). These marginal notes, along with the resulting essay on Austen, emphasize Lewis’s
interest in the trope of the heroine’s movement towards a climactic moment of self-realization,
with its resulting balance between imagination and reason. This is a plot that he would similarly
undertake in Till We Have Faces, as the entire plot hinges on Orual’s realization of selfdeception.
Lewis’s interest not only in Austen, but also in this particular trope of personal
undeception is significant for many reasons. First, we must recognize this theme in Austen as
being related to—if not directly caused by—key ideas in the Romantic movement. Just as the
Romantics were interested in individual human experience and perception, so Austen focused on
the way a character subjectively observes and understands the world around her, and then
reevaluates and corrects those observations based upon personal growth. This depth of character
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psychology is ground-breakingly communicated through her use of free indirect discourse in
Emma.
Second, Austen’s heroines traditionally progress not only towards matrimony, but also
towards greater self-knowledge, and greater self-unity, depicted through the heroine’s ability to
balance her passions and her reason. Dynamic heroines like Catherine Morland, Emma
Woodhouse, Marianne Dashwood, and Elizabeth Bennett undergo this transformative growth,
while static heroines, such as Fanny Price and Eleanor Dashwood already possess this unity, and
therefore function as transformative influences on those who do not. This longed-for unity
between feeling and common sense, sense and sensibility, is akin to the unity of Blake’s higher
innocence and of Coleridge’s polarity. Thus, the theme to which Lewis seems most strongly
attracted in Austen’s novels is a transposition of the Romantic metanarrative, as well as a
hallmark of nineteenth-century psychological realism.
In Austen, we therefore see Lewis’s interest in both the female consciousness and the
Romantic metanarrative played out in novelistic form. Yet it is not Austen’s narratorial style that
Lewis revises in Till We Have Faces; instead, he turns to the first person autobiographical style
narration employed by Brontë’s Jane Eyre and Dickens’s Esther Summerson. Despite any faults
Lewis may find in Brontë (and his letters are certainly critical at times), he apparently sees
Brontë’s psychological realism as her greatest strength.59
Lewis loved Brontë from the start, but his appreciation for Jane’s character matures over
time. While his earliest letters rank Brontë with Morris and MacDonald, highlighting the depth
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1945, to Greeves: “I’ve re-read Shirley for the first time almost. [….] through it all the character of Shirley herself
triumphs” (Vol II 640). In another 1952 letter he critiques a book draft, saying, “The only page that I can’t enter into
at all is p. 83. I can’t conceive not being afraid, as a child, of those unseen presences. I shd. have behaved like little
Jane Eyre in the Red Room when she dried her tears for fear a ghostly voice should awake to comfort her” (Vol II
262-63). He thus chooses Jane as an example of realistic psychological response.
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of her impact on his romantic consciousness, Lewis continues to reread Jane Eyre with a deeper,
more critical interest in Jane’s psychology:
This week I have re-read Jane Eyre. It is quite prodigiously better than the other
Bronte books. [….] Part of the interest lies in seeing in the most apparently
preposterous male characters how quite ordinary people look through the eyes of
a shy, naïve, inflexibly upright, intelligent little woman of the mouse-like
governessy type. It opens vistas[…]. Particularly delicious is her idea of conjugal
bliss when she says almost on the last page ‘We talk, I believe, all day.’ Poor
husband! (Vol II 291)
Despite its chauvinistic tone, this 1939 letter documents an interest in Brontë’s careful
representation of Jane’s subjective experience. Lewis’s disdain for Jane must have diminished
somewhat over time, as did some of his grossest misunderstandings of women more generally. In
particular, his friendship with Joy Davidman, to whom he dedicates Till We Have Faces, may
have been the turning point in his perspective on women—both real and literary—for the
depiction of Orual that he distills from Jane is brutally honest, but not contemptuous. Cynthia
Linder describes Jane Eyre as “a perfect example of the Romantic style of writing” wherein “the
character is portrayed from the core of the personality outwards, thus exposing the inner life of
the soul and the workings of heart and mind, as well as the external stimuli which evoke these
responses” (67); Lewis practices this “Romantic style of writing” in Till We Have Faces,
focusing on the central, realism of Orual’s character and presenting the rest of the story, with its
fantastical elements, from Orual’s realist(ic) perspective. Orual’s narrative, like Jane and
Esther’s, is a specific incarnation of the Romantic metanarrative in novel form—a
Bildungsroman.
The concept of Bildungsromane as fictional manifestations of the Romantic
Metanarrative is not a new idea. Franco Moretti’s concept of the Bildungsroman suggests that
youth constitutes the perfect symbol for modernity—and therefore the ideal hero for its
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literature—because of its inherent motion towards becoming, and because of its ability to morph
into numberless things as it develops (556). Similarly, Steven Cohan argues that the English
novel has an agenda—it seeks to convince readers that the transition from innocence to
experience is a good thing, a growth. The way this experience can be construed in a positive light
is by emphasizing the insight, understanding, and wisdom that is gained in experience, and
casting these qualities as the repair for the alienation of experience. In other words, the desire of
innocence is exchanged for understanding, which allows the alienated protagonist to repair
relationships back to a prelapsarian state of harmony. Cohan also notes a tension within the novel
genre: the realist novel focuses on experience as growth (embodying forward momentum), while
the romance encourages backward movement or no movement at all, seeking to return to
innocence (and its desires) or to remain in that innocence. According to Cohan, this paradigm
can also be thought about as a movement from romance to realism, or from illusion to reality. He
admits that “realism—or the novel itself, for that matter—[cannot] be so easily disentangled
from the romance form it tries to reject” (8). In this paradigm of romance as innocence and
realism as experience, it seems that Lewis believed in a realm of higher innocence for the
novelistic form, that realism could relate not only physical, but spiritual reality, with a childlike
faith, yet experienced understanding—a polar logic of realism and romance. It naturally follows
that Lewis may have interpreted the English novel slightly differently than Cohan, seeing in the
female Bildungsromane of Jane Eyre and Esther Summerson not simply a rejection of innocence
or romance, but a movement from romance, to realism, and finally to a higher form of realist
romance, or mythopoeia—embodied in the spiritual and imaginative maturation of the female
narrators of these fictions.
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Romantic Metanarrative in the Bildungsromane of Jane, Esther, and Orual
By comparing the development of Jane Eyre, Esther Summerson, and Orual, it becomes
clear that Lewis not only read Brontë and Dickens’s fictions within this paradigm, but that he
modeled his own heroine’s transformation upon these Victorian models of Romantic
metanarrative.60 We will now turn to these three texts—Jane Eyre, Bleak House, and Till We
Have Faces—to draw comparisons between the central female characters and their respective
journeys from innocence to experience to higher innocence. The result will be a fuller vision of
exactly how these Victorian authors are influencing Lewis, how he employs their ideas,
characters and approaches to represent a higher innocence in both Orual and her narrative, and
how he revises or extends the Romantic metanarrative by diverging from his Victorian
predecessors.
Short-Lived Innocence
The innocence of all three protagonists is shattered very early—so early that its existence
is more implied than exhibited in the texts. The result is an air of loss, a tragic longing for an
elusive, prematurely snuffed innocence. Specifically, all three novels begin with pictures of
abused innocence, innocence that is maintained only through ignorance and which is short-lived..
Jane’s narrative opens with an implied description of her wretched, orphaned state. She
expresses approbation of the “[im]possibility of taking a walk” because it would be an inevitable
reminder of her own “physical inferiority” to her cousins, who now “cluster[…] round their
mamma” (5). Jane’s isolation in the window seat, and the recognition of her difference from her
60

Colin Manlove notes a common theme in Lewis’s work: “dislocation. His characters are constantly having their
assumptions about the world widened or reversed” (“Narrative Structures” 258). Arguing that “the stress in all
Lewis’s novels is on spiritual growth” (263), Manlove recommends that this “journey out of self” helps characters to
discover themselves, the “other,” and reality itself (265). While he does not identify this journey or growth as
characteristically Romantic, Manlove is nevertheless noticing Lewis’s central reliance upon the Romantic
metanarrative, which is, perhaps, most apparent in Till We Have Faces.
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cousins demonstrates her endangered innocence. Aunt Reed describes (or, perhaps, prescribes)
this lack of innocence by suggesting that Jane is not a natural child. Thus Jane reports:
She regretted to be under the necessity of keeping me at a distance; but that until
she heard from Bessie and could discover by her own observation that I was
endeavoring in good earnest to acquire a more sociable and childlike disposition,
a more attractive and sprightly manner—something lighter, franker, more natural,
as it were—she really must exclude me from privileges intended only for
contented, happy, little children. (5)
Aunt Reed’s displeasure causes Jane to take the final step towards experience, asking, “What
does Bessie say I have done?” (5). Such questioning will inevitably destroy the ignorance of
innocence and complete the transition to experience. Indeed, it is this impulse to question and
rebuff that drives Jane to attack cousin John, resulting in her banishment to the “red-room,”
wherein she finally confronts and answers her own questions. Asking herself, “Why could I
never please? Why was it useless to try to win any one’s favour?” (12), Jane concludes that she
is “a strange child” whose orphan status makes her “an uncongenial alien” to the Reeds (13). Her
innocence is shattered in the recognition that her aunt “could not love” her (13).
Esther’s narrative, of which the first chapter is suggestively titled “A Progress,” begins
with a short summary of her early life as an orphan in the house of a stern, tyrannical, unloving
godmother. Like Jane, Esther’s innocence is intact only through her own ignorance—she does
not yet know the shameful associations of her birth. This innocence slips quickly away as Esther
is driven, like Jane, to ask her godmother, “Why am I so different from other children, and why
is it my fault […]?” (17). Esther is told that she is an “unfortunate girl, orphaned and degraded,”
and that her young life has “a shadow on it” (17-18). Much like Jane, experience for Esther is a
revelation of her own unlovability, an ugliness (though figurative) that makes her attractive “to
no one on earth” (18).
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Oruals begins Till We Have Faces with a childhood account similar to that of Jane and
Esther. She implies innocence by contrast with her revelations of experience. She writes, “I will
begin my writing with the day my mother died and they cut off my hair” (4). Obviously, this
recollection of loss—both of mother and hair—represents also the loss of innocence. Like Jane
and Esther, Orual is brought up in a place where she is unloved, unwanted, and even abused.
Orual is not technically an orphan like Jane and Esther, because she has lost only her mother, but
her father effectively orphans her through rejection and neglect. The king desires a son, and
therefore despises Orual’s existence, referring to her as part of a “plague of girls” (16). Just as
Jane overhears the Reed’s servants saying, “if she were a nice, pretty child, one might
compassionate her forlornness; but one really cannot care for such a little toad as that” (21),
Orual notices that the palace slaves show her less compassion because of her own ugliness: “As
the shears snipped and Redival’s curls fell off, the slaves said, ‘Oh, what a pity! All the gold
gone!’ They had not said anything like that while I was being shorn” (TWHF 5). Also like Esther
and Jane, Orual’s last shred of innocence appears to be her ignorance, which is quickly
eradicated. When adults make veiled comments about her ugliness, she initially reports, “I didn’t
understand that, but I knew it was like things I had heard people say of me ever since I could
remember” (7). Soon, however, when the King commands that Orual be veiled, she reflects, “I
think that was the first time I clearly understood that I am ugly” (TWHF 11). Like Jane and
Esther, Orual’s innocence is short-lived, and experience rushes in on her in the recognition of her
own unlovability. For Orual, as for Jane and Esther, ugliness is not only representative of the
broken-ness of the world, but of one’s own disempowerment and alienation.
Experience: Gazing into the Narrative Mirror
Ugliness and its recognition represent experience for these heroines, which is symbolic of
their alienation from others. Although Lewis’s marginal commentary on Jane Eyre is all but non118

existent, he did own the novel,61 and his letters reveal multiple re-readings of the book, centered
on a special interest in Jane’s psychology as an ugly woman. He clearly sees Jane’s ugliness and
isolation as integral to her character, calling Jane “shy,” “little,” “mouse-like,” and “governessy”
(Collected Letters Vol II 291), and writing elsewhere to Jill Flewett, “What an excellent Jane you
would make—if the dresser could make you plain enough” (April 17, 1946; Collected Letters
Vol II 706). As ugliness (both literal and figurative) plays an important role for Jane and Esther,
it also becomes the central marker of Orual’s spiritual state and ongoing transformation.
The narrative result of Jane’s and Esther’s progression from innocence to experience is a
continued forward momentum, a longing to reach beyond experience. Having become aware of
their own ugliness (both figurative and literal), both heroines set themselves the task of
transcending their undesirability. Jane avows, “if others don’t love me, I would rather die than
live—I cannot bear to be solitary and hated. […] to gain some real affection […] I would
willingly submit to have the bone of my arm broken, or to let a bull toss me, or to stand behind a
kicking horse, and let it dash its hoof at my chest” (58-9). In the same vein, Esther twice recalls
that her life goal was and is “to do some good to some one, and win some love to myself” (18
and 25). Although Orual makes no overt purpose statement, Lewis clearly internalized Jane and
Esther’s missions when shaping his heroine, for Orual’s desire to be loved is the central driving
force behind her actions throughout the story. Thus her greatest sorrow at Psyche’s being
sacrificed to the God of the Grey Mountain is that, “[t]he parting between her and me seemed to
cost her so little” (71). When Psyche asks, “Is the world[…] so much to lose?” (73), Orual feels
it like a “stabbing” (74), because she wishes Psyche to love her more than anything, even more
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His copy of Jane Eyre is among the Wade Center’s holdings, but contains very little annotation. Though
disappointing, it is unsurprising that Lewis would mark very little in a book that he read purely for pleasure. The fact
does not discredit any possible influence which the book may have had on his own work.
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than any potential spiritual fulfillment. The major theme of experience, for Orual—as for Jane
and Esther—is the desire to be lovable to others.
Because Lewis not only borrows the central growth plot shared by Jane and Esther, but
also uses ugliness as a physical metaphor for the alienation of experience, he also takes up a
central thematic element from Jane and Esther’s writing: the use of mirrors. In the Victorian
novels, mirrors represent both the recognition of experience, but also the desire to transcend it,
the movement towards higher innocence. The heroine may find reproach in the mirror, seeing her
own plainness, and thus her entrapment in experience. On the other hand, mirrors are also given
a transformative power, a hint of the supernatural, in which they reflect change, aspiration, and
ultimately higher innocence. Jane and Esther both find themselves changed not only in actual
mirrors, but in their own reflections in the eyes of others. Furthermore, the texts that these
women write become mirrors themselves, transforming the heroine through the reflection of (and
on) her own image and story.
Mirrors can be devices of truth-telling—thus John Reed demands that Jane “stand […]
out of the way of the mirror” before hurling a book at her head, an action which he wishes to
deny later (Jane Eyre 8). Along these lines, Jane uses the looking-glass as a means of selfreproach. She punishes herself for her feelings towards Rochester, saying, “Listen, then, Jane
Eyre, to your sentence: to-morrow, place the glass before you, and draw in chalk your own
picture, faithfully, without softening one defect; omit no harsh line, smooth away no displeasing
irregularity; write under it, ‘Portrait of a Governess, disconnected, poor, and plain.’” (137). The
mirror, in this way, reflects the reality of experience to Jane, by reminding her of her own
unlovable plainness.
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But mirrors also reveal more than physical reality, or experience, to Jane. As a child
contemplating the possible appearance of her dead uncle’s spectre, she gazes tremulously at “the
dimly gleaming mirror” of the red-room (13), and sees in it a reflection not of her ugliness, but of
an otherworldly quality in herself:
Returning, I had to cross before the looking-glass; my fascinated glance
involuntarily explored the depth it revealed. All looked colder and darker in that
visionary hollow than in reality: and the strange little figure there gazing at me,
with a white face and arms specking the gloom, and glittering eyes of fear moving
where all else was still, had the effect of a real spirit: I thought it like one of the
tiny phantoms, half fairy, half imp, Bessie’s evening stories represented as
coming out of lone, ferny dells in moors, and appearing before the eyes of belated
travellers. (11)
In this instance the mirror reveals more than reality to Jane. It becomes a “visionary hollow,”
able to reveal a “depth” in herself. In fact, it is this other-worldly, faerie quality—the potency of
her spiritual self—to which Rochester is drawn, and Rochester’s love for Jane acts also as a
mirror, reflecting a beauty that her physical person does not possess for other eyes. After
Rochester’s declaration of love, Jane finds that her reflection is transformed:
While arranging my hair, I looked at my face in the glass, and felt it was no
longer plain: there was hope in its aspect and life in its colour; and my eyes
seemed as if they had beheld the fount of fruition, and borrowed beams from the
lustrous ripple. I had often been unwilling to look at my master, because I feared
he could not be pleased at my look; but I was sure I might lift my face to his now,
and not cool his affection by its expression. (219)
Jane is beautified by Rochester’s love, so that “lift[ing her] face to his” she will find a more
beautiful version of herself reflected in his eyes, just as she now finds it in the mirror. Thus, as
the novel’s end John, the servant, says of Jane, “If she ben’t one o’ th’ handsomest, she’s noan
faâl and vary good-natured; and I’ his een she’s fair beautiful, onybody may see that” (383; [“If
she isn’t one of the handsomest, she’s no fool and very good-natured; and in his eyes she’s fair
beautiful, anybody can see that”]). Rochester’s blindness is both literal and symbolic, for it
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rejects what the glass tells Jane, instead reflecting the beauty that he sees (or the ugliness that he
does not see—being blind) in her. In this way the image and function of the mirror reflects not
Jane’s experience-stage self, but her present/approaching higher innocence. Rochester’s love acts
as mirror for Jane, being itself a mirror image of the beautifying, divine love that the marriage
sacrament is instituted to reflect.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Jane’s narrative itself functions as a mirror. In
writing her autobiography, Jane not only views herself realistically, but also meditates (or
reflects) on her own growth and transformation—her sanctification.62 With the exception of the
exchange in which Jane views Bertha’s “reflection” in her bedroom mirror, the word “reflection”
signifies deep thought or meditation in Jane’s narrative. “Reflection” on a given person or
situation often allows a new insight to Jane, helps her gain perspective, as if the reflection were
somehow more potent than observation of the thing itself. Early in the narrative, Jane reports this
process: “when my reflections were concluded, and I looked up and found that the afternoon was
gone, and evening far advanced, another discovery dawned on me, namely, that in the interval I
had undergone a transforming process” (71-2). In this particular instance Jane realizes that she
has outgrown Lowood and must continue her journey elsewhere, but the connection between
reflection and transformation applies throughout her story, and even to the narrative itself. Just as
reflection (that mental mirroring process) transforms and guides Jane’s actions throughout the
plot, so her larger reflection through narrative writing transforms her by allowing her to
transcend experience and draw towards higher innocence. Thus Jane’s marriage becomes an
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Linder notes this mirror function within the text, although she does not discuss the mirroring role of the narrative
itself: “Running parallel with the comments of other characters there is also the mirror device, which Charlotte
Brontë has used to give the reader another kind of objective view of Jane. By describing how Jane sees herself in the
mirror, she has hit on a method of externalizing Jane’s thoughts about herself, and thus the mirror serves to objectify
subjective states of mind in an immediate and concrete image” (47). In light of the autobiographical form of the
novel, it is technically Jane who employs the “mirror device”; it is a part of her narratorial approach.
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aspirational mirror image of the divine unity towards which her entire narrative tends, ending
appropriately with St. John’s words of “come, Lord Jesus!” (385).63
Esther’s Bildungsroman in Bleak House is strikingly similar to Jane’s, employing mirrors
and the metaphor of reflection in the same manner.64 Mirrors function for Esther as a medium for
self-reproach, a reminder of her humble position, as well as her physical ugliness after her
illness.65 Early in her narrative Esther recalls scolding herself in the mirror for being discontent:
“For I naturally said, ‘Esther! You to be low-spirited. YOU!’ And it really was time to say so, for
I— yes, I really did see myself in the glass, almost crying. ‘As if you had anything to make you
unhappy, instead of everything to make you happy, you ungrateful heart!’ said I” (235).
Although Esther does not yet admit it, saying only “I was […] rather low-spirited. I don’t know
why. At least, I don’t think I know why. At least, perhaps I do, but I don’t think it matters” (235),
she is love-sick for Allan Woodcourt and sad because of her own unworthiness of him. She
believes herself to be below him in beauty and station, and thus reproaches herself in the
looking-glass, forcing herself to see reality, both literally and figuratively. Similarly after her
disfiguring illness, and having accepted John Jarndyce’s proposal of marriage she writes, “By
and by I went to my old glass. My eyes were red and swollen, and I said, ‘Oh, Esther, Esther, can
that be you!’ I am afraid the face in the glass was going to cry again at this reproach, but I held
up my finger at it, and it stopped” (611). By looking in the mirror and addressing herself as “my
plain dear” (612), Esther simultaneously reminds herself of her physical ugliness and of her
societal humility and isolation. She is still mired in experience.
63

This transcendence toward higher innocence is possibly what leads Robert Keefe to observe, “Jane Eyre
represents the culmination of Charlotte Brontë’s esthetic victory over death” (96).
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Further research is required to establish the actual connection, if any, between Jane Eyre and Esther’s narrative,
and it is outside the purposes of this chapter. Biographer Jane Smiley claims that “Dickens himself never read it,”
but that those who recommended the first-person style to him probably had (83). It is impossible to imagine that
Dickens did not read Brontë’s famous novel, or that Brontë’s heroine did not exert some influence on Dickens’s.
65
In the case of her physical disfigurement, it is actually the absence of mirrors that reproaches her. She wakes from
illness to find “[t]he mirror […] gone from its usual place” (491).
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Yet mirrors also function for Esther, as they did for Jane, as reflections of aspiration, of
deeper spiritual and emotional truth. Despite the hard truths Esther’s mirror tells her, it also
reveals hints of higher innocence: “I had occasionally known little momentary glimpses of my
own old face to look out upon me from the glass” (822). Similarly, the affection of other people,
like Jarndyce, Ada, and Richard, provide reflections of Esther’s spiritual worth and beauty. Most
significant is the reflective love of Allan Woodcourt. Esther’s marriage to Woodcourt, like
Jane’s marriage to Rochester, serves as a reflection of deeper spiritual unity. In particular, a
passage from the narrative’s end displays this love as a mirroring of transformation,
beautification, and higher innocence:
“My dear Dame Durden,” said Allan, drawing my arm through his, “do you ever
look in the glass?”
“You know I do; you see me do it.”
“And don't you know that you are prettier than you ever were?” (880).
Esther’s journey is not one back to innocence, but out of experience towards a higher innocence,
for she does not return to her original beauty, but surpasses it. And who better to convey that
truth than Allan? For he is the mirror of her true self, the transformed self towards which she
progresses.
As in Jane Eyre, the narrative itself acts as a mirror, reflecting Esther’s real, actual story,
yet simultaneously transforming her into a wiser, more beautiful, more empowered, and more
unified self. At the beginning of the narrative, Esther writes timidly, saying, “It seems so curious
to me to be obliged to write all this about myself! As if this narrative were the narrative of my
life!” (26). At this early stage, she is similarly timid in viewing herself: “I […] took a peep at my
bonnet in the glass to see if it was neat” (29). She is shy of meditating upon herself in the glass,
just as she is reticent about focusing on herself in her narrative, because she is stuck in the stage
of experience, aware of her own humble origins, her plainness, her general unlovability. By the

124

end of the narrative, however, she has grown, transcended experience and grasped towards
higher innocence. Thus the final image in her narrative is not only Allan’s confirmation of her
beauty, but her admission that she does frequently look at herself in the mirror. Her writing style
has evolved from insecurity to confidence, ending with the suggestive phrase “even supposing—
” (880).
Lewis emulates Brontë and Dickens through his use of mirrors as a literal and symbolic
device of transformation in Till We Have Faces. Jane Eyre and Bleak House are female
Bildungsromane in which female narrators employ narrative—cleverly symbolized through the
feminine object of the looking-glass—to subvert what Charlotte Mathieson has identified as the
“gendered differences” of Victorian mobility, wherein movement is a “naturalized process” only
for the male (398). Jane and Esther use their narratives to simultaneously reflect where they have
been (literally and metaphorically), and to determine where they might be going. As for Jane and
Esther, the mirror serves dual purposes for Orual. On the one hand, it serves as a medium for
reproach. While Jane and Esther scold themselves in mirrors, Orual is scolded by others and
forced to confront her ugly reflection. On the other hand, however, the mirror is a positive device
for the heroine, because it reveals not only Orual’s physical state, but also her spiritual state, and
therefore reflects her eventual beautification. Finally, Lewis borrows the self-reflective narrative
style of Jane Eyre and Bleak House, transforming Orual through her own narrative-writing
experience; the gods hold Orual’s narrative up to her as a mirror, and the reflection transforms
her. Till We Have Faces thus represents a twentieth-century revision of the Victorian realist
Bildungsromane, specifically echoing the Victorian female’s developing narrative subjectivity.
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While Jane and Esther use mirrors to scold themselves, others use Orual’s reflection to
punish and regulate her. The King subjects Orual to public reproach in the palace mirror when
she attempts to save Psyche’s life by offering herself as a sacrifice to Ungit:
The King, without a word, came up to me, took me (softly enough) by the
wrist and led me the whole length of the room, to where his great mirror hung.
[….] Our common mirrors were false and dull; in this you could see your perfect
image. As I had never been in the Pillar Room alone, I had never looked in it. He
stood me before it and we saw our two selves, side by side.
“Ungit asked for the best in the land as her son’s bride,” he said. “And
you’d give her that.” He held me there a full minute in silence; perhaps he thought
I would weep or turn my eyes away. (TWHF 61-2)
The mirror reproaches Orual with a picture of experience, reminding her of her ugliness, her
complete lack of power, and the fact that she is desirable to neither man nor god.
Later in life, in a dream, Orual meets the now-long-dead King, who asks her “Who is
Ungit?” and leads her across the throne room. She recalls,
I saw that mirror on the wall, just where it always had been. At the sight of
it my terror increased, and I fought with all my strength not to go on. [….] I was
not so much dragged as sucked along till we stood right in front of the mirror.
And in it I saw him, looking as he had looked that other day when he led me to
the mirror long ago.
But my face was the face of Ungit as I had seen it that day in her house.
“Who is Ungit”” asked the King.
“I am Ungit.” My voice came wailing out of me[…]. (276).
Ungit is revealed to represent experience itself—the reality of fallen humanity, ugly in sin, and
unacceptable to the perfectly harmonious beauty of the divine. Psyche, on the other hand,
represents higher innocence by taking on the role of Christ, passing into the world of death in
order “to fetch the beauty” that will transform Ungit (now Orual) (306), making her as beautiful
as Psyche. Again, in this final transformative moment, the mirror device repeats a final time,
casting a transformed reflection of Orual:
[….]I cast down my eyes.
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Two figures, reflections, their feet to Psyche’s feet and mine, stood head
downward in the water. But whose were they? Two Psyches, the one clothed, the
other naked? Yes, both Psyches, both beautiful (if that mattered now) beyond all
imagining, yet not exactly the same.
“You also are Psyche,” came a great voice. (307-08)
This, of course, is simply a dream vision, itself no more real than a reflection. When Orual
awakes, she is still her own, ugly, and now severely aged and weakened self, yet she rests on the
very cusp of the higher innocence reflected in her dream, for she is about to die. Just as Jane’s
narrative ends with the anticipatory “come, Lord Jesus!” (Brontë 385), and Esther finishes with a
forward-looking “even supposing—” (Dickens 880), Orual’s final written narrative ends with “I
might—” (TWHF 308), written at the moment of her death.
Beyond the use of mirrors within the text, Lewis also borrows the larger mirroring
structure of Jane Eyre and Bleak House, employing Orual’s narrative as a mirror that first
reflects her state of experience, and only then offers a transformed vision of her movement
towards higher innocence. In this, Lewis deliberately distinguishes Orual’s narrative work from
Jane and Esther’s. While Jane and Esther realize their own power and higher innocence through
the reflective work of writing, Orual must first recognize her own wallowing in experience,
before the narrative can reflect transformation for her. She admits her narrative work is the root
of her spiritual growth, saying, “What began the change was the very writing itself. Let no one
lightly set about such a work” (253). Yet it is not simply the writing that leads to its own
transformative conclusion. Unlike Brontë and Dickens, Lewis chooses to give Orual two
narratives. The first and primary narrative reflects the stage of experience, while her second
narrative reflects higher innocence, detailing the transformation she undergoes after seeing her
true reflection in the first narrative.66 While Jane and Esther discover their significance to
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Thus Mara Donaldson reflects, “The centrality of stories in this narrative—written, deconstructed and rewritten—
attests to the power of narrative to transform a life” (163).
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themselves, God, and others through writing, Orual sets out to do much the same but ends up
learning not to love herself, only to give herself away (which, incidentally, is what Esther and
Jane are already doing) before she can once again see herself as lovable.
When Orual actually reads her narrative, her “complaint” (287), to the court of the gods,
she sees it and herself more clearly. The narrative casts a realistic reflection of her own selfish,
consuming love for Psyche. Even in that reading she recalls that “the voice I read it in was
strange to my ears. There was given to me a certainty that this, at last, was my real voice” (292).
She now admits that “the complaint was the answer” (294), and asks, “How can [the gods] meet
us face to face till we have faces?” (294). In this way, Orual’s narrative activity is the mirror that
reveals her face, and thus leads her towards transformation and higher innocence.
Higher Innocence Through Polarity: Beauty as Balance
Jane’s, Esther’s and Orual’s stories depict higher innocence through the realization of
beauty, or being the object of love, whether human or divine. This exterior beauty, however, is
indicative of a much more complex internal transformation in the heroine. Real beauty is seen to
be more than subjective perception, to be something essential to the heroine. The beauty that
Jane, Esther, and Orual attain within themselves is a personal symmetry, a wholeness, a
harmony; in particular, all three heroines experience higher innocence as a form of Coleridgean
polarity. Jane, Esther, and therefore also Orual, reach a polar logic between reason and passion
(alternately understood as a unity between the material and the spiritual, reason and imagination,
realism and fantasy, or truth and beauty—I will use these terms somewhat interchangeably, but
am always referring to this same central polarity). Lewis has a strong, life-long “awareness of
how spiritual and material realities co-inhere” (Carnell 117), and it comes as no surprise that he
would mimic the work of Victorian writers who similarly incarnate this co-inherence in their
work.
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Jane Eyre is arguably a novel about the tension between material and spiritual reality,
reason and passion.67 Jane is a clever, passionate and imaginative child, seeing in John Reed “a
tyrant: a murderer” and flying at him in “a picture of passion” (9). But Jane is also a Christian,
and must rule her life by the dictates of Biblical law and sound reason. Jane’s journey and
transformation is therefore more than a love story; it is the story of Jane’s learning to balance the
two conflicting tendencies in her soul, and thus of her movement towards a unified self, a higher
innocence. Most of the characters in Jane Eyre serve as warnings against the rule of reason or
passion, or as models for their reconciliation. Thus, Mr. Brocklehurst and St. John Rivers
represent the tyrannical rule of reason, Bertha Mason represents the ultimate rule of passion,68
and Helen Burns provides a picture of higher innocence by balancing her passionate intellect
with a simple, reasonable faith.
When Jane attests, “I felt that Helen Burns considered things by a light invisible to my
eyes” (47), she refers to Helen’s higher innocence. Helen embodies the unity of passion and
reason as well as the spiritual and material, so that she can see the material world through
spiritual eyes and “live in calm, looking to the end” (50). Helen’s constant reference to death is
more than a morbid fixation brought on by her illness and impending decease; instead, Helen’s
polar logic views the material world as only half of reality, mingled in perfect unity with the
spiritual world. She critiques Jane:
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This argument provides the foundation for many studies of Jane Eyre. For a brief summary, see Nicholas Johnson.
Of St. John and Bertha, Marianne Thormählen writes:
The black-haired, vile-looking monster incarcerated in the top storey at Thornfield, a personification of
unreason and animality, is at one extreme in the novel’s thorough-going tension between reason and
feeling; at the other we find the handsome, fair-haired parson who rules his household with quiet sternness
and is a self-avowed champion of reason. It is odd that the pair of opposites does not seem to have been
perceived as such. The hero of the novel is tricked into marrying the former, and but for Divine
intervention the heroine would have committed herself for life to the latter. In both cases, physical and
spiritual death loomed as the consequences of these acts of folly. (Thormählen 205)
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Hush, Jane! you think too much of the love of human beings, you are too
impulsive, too vehement: the sovereign hand that created your frame, and put life
into it, has provided you with other resources than your feeble self, or than
creatures feeble as you. Besides this earth, and besides the race of men, there is an
invisible world and a kingdom of spirits: that world is round us, for it is
everywhere; and those spirits watch us, for they are commissioned to guard us;
and if we were dying in pain and shame, if scorn smote us on all sides, and hatred
crushed us, angels see our tortures, recognize our innocence (if innocent we be
[…]), and God waits only the separation of spirit from flesh to crown us with a
full reward. Why, then, should we ever sink overwhelmed with distress, when life
is so soon over, and death is so certain an entrance to happiness—to glory? (59)
By recognizing the unity of the spiritual and material (the co-existence of the visible and
“invisible world”), Helen both demonstrates and anticipates higher innocence. Similarly, she
demonstrates the unity between these worlds by recognizing human love as a material
manifestation of spiritual divine love, and not to be valued purely on its own merit.
This relationship between human and divine love, of course, will become the central
theme of Jane’s growth. Cynthia Linder explains the message of Jane Eyre thus: “Romantic love
is an element in true Christian love, and that it is natural to man to aspire to both the natural and
the supernatural states of love” (59). Jane must learn to appreciate Rochester’s love as a
manifestation of the greater reality of God’s love. In Charlotte Brontë’s fiction, “true love is
never allowed to fructify unless there is religious harmony between the parties” (Thormählen
57). Rochester and Jane do not reunite until they recognize first and foremost the love between
creature and creator. Therefore, Jane’s eventual union with Rochester is not so much a story of
human love as of divine love, for only after they have each committed themselves to God are
they (re)united. In the novel’s climax Jane and Rochester communicate across time and space by
supernatural means, but this occurs only after Jane has “entreated of Heaven” to “show [her] the
path!” (357), and Rochester has not only “acknowledge[d] the hand of God” in his life, but
“supplicated God” to enact His will (380). Jane’s marriage becomes the conclusion of her story
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only insomuch as its divine sanction symbolizes her own movement towards higher innocence.
As the material symbol of spiritual union, her marriage is a symptom of her transformation,
rather than its culmination. Thus the “now and not yet” paradox comes into play, for Jane’s
higher innocence is both manifest in her marriage, yet simultaneously anticipated through her
parting quotation of St. John’s “come, Lord Jesus!”
The fact that Jane Eyre closes not with Jane’s, but with St. John’s words is a topic of
much scholarly discontent and debate. Jerome Beaty famously argues that the novel’s ending
solidifies Jane Eyre as “an unresolved dialogue between [Jane’s] values” and “St. John’s way”
(Beaty 503). In response, Thormählen suggests that it provides structural balance: “The ending of
Jane Eyre is not a closure so much as a balancing of the book, which leaves the reader to
contemplate two very dissimilar patterns of human endeavor under the Heaven to which both
assign ultimate power. It does not seem necessary to prefer one to the other or to pronounce a
verdict on either” (219). One might push Thormählen’s argument further, and say that the reader
is invited not only to withhold preference or judgment, but to embrace both patterns equally and
fully, to recognize in Jane’s domestic desires and St. John’s Heavenly ones a unity of course and
purpose; both grasp towards higher innocence. In this way, the novel’s ending embodies its
central polar logic.69
Like Jane, Esther’s narrative is also characterized by a dialectic and potential synthesis
between reason and imagination, depicted through the contemporary struggle between Puritan
(reason-based) and Romantic (imagination-based) child-rearing methods. The mind and narrative
of Esther Summerson have been the focus of much critical attention. In particular, scholars have

69

It is important to note that, like Jane, St. John has been transformed by his life experience, and he has undergone a
similar coming-of-age, though off-stage. While he once lusted after earthly greatness (only poorly concealed under a
façade of Christian rhetoric), the St. John at the end of the novel thirsts for higher things, recognizing the
prominence of spiritual reality in addition to material reality.
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frequently analyzed Esther as an object of psychological interest, and as an example of the
trauma and neglect of Victorian child-rearing culture.70 In Narratives of Child Neglect in
Romantic and Victorian Culture (2012), Galia Benziman helpfully posits the coexistence of—or
dialectic between—Puritan and Romantic child-rearing notions as a definitive characteristic of
Victorian culture and literature,71 and admits that “most […] readings [of Dickens] share […] the
view that [his] work reveals an ambivalent, inconsistent, or at least complex social stance,
somewhere in between political subversion and a reinforcement of bourgeois morality” (146).
Indeed, many critics have similar notions of Dickens’s fiction as a battleground between
contrasting ideas, even applying this tension specifically to Esther’s artistic and psychological
development.72 The critical consensus suggests that we may constructively view Dickens’s
fiction, and Bleak House in particular, as a space in which the novelist attempts, whether
successfully or not, to reach synthesis between his own warring ideologies and the warring
ideologies of his day.
Scholars have supposed Dickens to be an upholder of empathic, or Romantic, childrearing methods, and he at first appears in Bleak House to be consciously depicting the evils of
regulative, or Puritan, methods. He provides examples of children suffering from these practices,
as well as representing the adults that such treatment produces. Most memorable are the cruelty
of Esther’s legalistic godmother and Mrs. Rachael (whose harsh childhood treatment of Esther
we previously discussed), as well as the hideous Smallweed family. The Smallweeds are
depicted as a typical regulative family, for “Judy [Smallweed] never owned a doll, never heard
70

See Benziman, De Stasio, Dever, Jordan, Smith (Grahame), Ostry, and Winslow, to name a few.
I am very indebted to Benziman for her notion of this dialectic tension, and for the terminology she employs; I
borrow her terms for “Puritan,” “catechetical,” and “regulative” child-rearing, and for the contrasting “Romantic,”
“liberating,” “empathic,” and “dialogic” child-rearing.
72
Joan Winslow identifies what she calls a “division within the person of Esther Summerson” that, she believes,
“reflects a larger division found within Dickens’ fictional world” (12), and Robert Newsom founds his entire
analysis of the novel on Dickens’s conflicting desire to show readers “the romantic side of familiar things” (5).
71
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of Cinderella, never played at any game,” and “her twin-brother couldn’t wind up a top for his
life,” knowing “no more of Jack the Giant Killer, or of Sinbad the Sailor, than he knows of the
people in the stars” (Bleak House 290). Obviously, the fact that these young people were raised
in a restrictive environment, and not allowed to play or express their creativity resulted in their
appearance of “sordid age,” their inability to laugh, their familial simian qualities, and
ultimately, their inability to function as a productive force in society (290). Elaine Ostry
comments thus on the Smallweeds: “Indeed, Dickens suggests that without fancy, the child
withers and cannot grow—a decline that jeopardizes the survival of future generations” (61).
Such a harsh critique of the Smallweeds, whose habitual denial of expression and imagination
obviously represent the traditional Puritan approach to child-rearing, suggests that Dickens aligns
himself with the more progressive, Romantic approach, yet this is not entirely true.
Dickens provides equally troubling examples of the Romantic, liberating approach.
Richard Carstone, who is unable to settle down to any discipline and eventually dies from
disappointment in his Chancery suit, was apparently raised in an empathic atmosphere. Esther
reflects on Richard’s upbringing, wishing that someone had “directed his character,” instead of
allowing him to spend all of his time writing verse (167); later she again reflects, “[…]the better
I knew him, I still felt more and more, how much it was to be regretted that he had been educated
in no habits of application and concentration” (227). Apparently, it is because of Richard’s
Romantic upbringing and the freedom of expression that such an upbringing granted him that he
can waste his life—and Ada’s money—in hoping for the “imaginary time” when his Chancery
suit will finally be decided (527).
Another cautionary tale against Romantic ideology appears in the figure of Harold
Skimpole. Skimpole, whom Esther admits she “could not separate from the idea of a romantic
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youth” (Bleak House 69), lives his adult life like such a Romantic child, taking no responsibility
in financial or social matters. He is reinforced in this lifestyle by the empathic influence of
Jarndyce who “never seemed to consider Mr. Skimpole an accountable being” (435), and
positively states, “You can’t make him responsible” (79). Instead of taking financial, social and
moral responsibility for his actions, as one would be required to do in a puritanical environment,
Skimpole simply dismisses his culpability with the repeated expression, “I am a child” (433).
Esther and Ada ask Mr. Jarndyce “what made [Skimpole] such a child,” and the answer again
has to do with upbringing:
he is all sentiment, and—and susceptibility, and—and sensibility—and—and
imagination. And these qualitites are not regulated in him, somehow. I suppose
the people who admired him for them in his youth, attached too much importance
to them, and too little to any training that would have balanced and adjusted them;
and so he became what he is. (592-93)
Indeed, Skimpole seems to champion an empathic, Rousseauvian upbringing, asserting to Esther
that “we are all children of one great mother, Nature” (599). However, this purely Romantic
notion that the child can be raised successfully by nature itself is seen, in the novel, to be wholly
impracticable and, when attempted, wholly unsuccessful. The end result is that the over-liberated
Carstone and Skimpole, just like the over-regulated Smallweeds, fail to assume a productive role
in society, instead feeding on society’s generosity and misfortunes in leech-fashion.
Esther Summerson represents Benziman’s asserted co-existence between these two
camps. For instance, despite her own painful experience with the regulative approach, Esther
repeatedly wishes that Skimpole and Richard had been more regulated as children. Her wish for
this sort of balance between empathic and regulative approaches is reminiscent of the type of coexistence Benziman discusses. Such co-existence, however, is not a recognizable position in
Victorian culture. It is a liminal space, a war-zone of constant tension between two extremes, and
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in order to inhabit this space, Esther must effectively resist the bad and embrace the good of each
side.
Esther’s narrative is characterized by an unflinchingly held tension between the warring
empathic and regulative ideologies—a polarity that strengthens as her narrative advances. John
Jordan observes Esther’s narrative as an organized report of “[r]estoring order to broken or
chaotic households” (9), and Joan Winslow similarly recommends that Esther enacts a constant
repelling of the imagination, in favor of reason (8). Indeed, these interpretations are not without
foundation, for Esther does at times show regulative tendencies, scolding herself when she
becomes overly emotional or imaginative. For instance, she reprimands herself for becoming too
emotional in front of her Guardian: “I said to myself, ‘Esther, my dear, you surprise me! This
really is not what I expected of you!’ and it had such a good effect, that I folded my hands upon
my basket and quite recovered myself” (Bleak House 94-95). In this moment, Esther recognizes
the capacity of losing oneself to a wholly empathic existence, and must therefore check and
“recover” herself. Yet, Esther also shows a decided capacity for the imaginative, employing
fanciful imagery and symbolism amidst her realistic narration. In effect, Esther does the same
thing Robert Newsom attributes to Dickens, “setting up a powerful tension between the fictional
(romantic) and the real (familiar) worlds” (6), and “impos[ing] upon the reader a kind of
unsettled and unsettling double perspective which requires us to see things as at once ‘romantic’
and ‘familiar’” (7). Esther achieves this balance between the realist and the fantastic (or the
regulative and the empathic) by engaging in metaphorical and analogic descriptions of every day
events and people. She thus describes the Jellyby’s nanny as “charg[ing] into the midst of the
little family like a dragon” (Bleak House 42), a London day as “purblind” and “feebly struggling
with the fog” (45), the Dedlock carriage as “like a fairy carriage” (257), and her own illness as a
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journey across “a dark lake” (488). Indeed, Esther even occasionally refers to her regulative
tendencies as silly, admitting that she is “generally a methodical, old-maidish sort of foolish little
person” (92). All of these examples reveal the way in which Esther’s narrative enacts a
synthesizing work, embracing the best elements of reason and passion.
Just as Jane and Esther’s coming-of-age narratives follow a trajectory towards higher
innocence, so Orual’s ultimate transformation appears in her engagement of the Coleridgean
Primary Imagination—the realization of polarity between reason and passion, the material and
the spiritual, truth and beauty. Lewis embodies a sort of higher innocence in the form of Till We
Have Faces by unifying Orual’s psychological realism with a world of ancient gods and
goddesses. Similarly, Orual’s higher innocence is demonstrated in her acceptance of material and
spiritual reality as equal and intermingling. Of course, she initially resists this polarity: “that
moment when I believed I was looking at Psyche’s palace and did not see it [.…] the horror was
the same: a sickening discord, a rasping together of two worlds, like the two bits of a broken
bone” (TWHF 120). Eventually, however, Orual begins to embrace the union of realism and
fantasy, reason and passion, truth and beauty, saying,
Of the things that followed I cannot at all say whether they were what men call
real or what men call dream. And for all I can tell, the only difference is that what
many see we call a real thing, and what only one sees we call a dream. But things
that many see may have no taste or moment in them at all, and things that are
shown only to one may be spears and water-spouts of truth from the very depth of
truth. (277)
Jane’s spiritual growth depends on her ability to balance and fuse her reason and passions, and
Esther must reconcile reason and imagination (as embodied in Puritan and Romantic ideologies
and practices). Orual must also approach higher innocence by acknowledging the polar logic
between truth and beauty. In fact, Orual’s personal chronicle primarily demonstrates her cravings
for beauty and truth, which ultimately prove to be shallow manifestations of a sole, fundamental

136

longing for polarity. The climactic resolution of the novel therefore occurs when Orual enages
the Coleridgean primary imagination, apprehending a polarity between truth and beauty, or
reason and imagination.
Scholars have long noted the polar logic at the center of Till We Have Faces, without
attributing it as such. Colin Manlove argues that Till We Have Faces is distinct for Lewis,
because in it “the total incompatibility between good and bad” collapses (“Narrative Structures”
273). In Reason and Imagination in C. S. Lewis Peter Schakel argues that Lewis was always
trying to reconcile reason and imagination, and that only in Till We Have Faces (which Schakel
believes to be his best work) did he finally do so. He notes the roles of the Fox and Psyche as
reason and imagination; he also suggests that Orual represents Lewis, with her devotion to
reason, but also in her ultimate recognition of the unity of reason and imagination.
Orual’s narrative is divided into two sections. The first is her complaint against the
gods—a chronicle of events in which she asks her reader for justification and accuses the gods of
silence and injustice. The second is a shorter addition in which she relates a series of realizations
and spiritual vision-experiences shortly before her death. While the first is characterized by
questions, bitterness, rationalism and discontentment, the second reflects an atmosphere of
revelation and resolution. Part I of Orual’s manuscript reveals her two deepest desires: beauty
and truth. Furthermore, this first installment suggests a relation between truth and beauty, which
Orual attempts to define. The final resolution to these desires appears in Part II, with a fusion of
truth and beauty in the form of myth and the resulting recognition that Orual’s cravings are only
empty representations of her innate longing for the divine. This is where Lewis diverges from
Dickens and Brontë in his own Bildungsroman, for while Jane and Esther’s longings are resolved
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(at least for the purposes of completing their plots) through marriage, Orual’s longings can only
be resolved through a higher, more mystical union.
Orual’s narrative in Part I of Till We Have Faces not only recounts the Cupid and Psyche
story in a new way, but also grants the reader a glimpse into Orual’s mind. Through the writing
of her narrative, she reveals evidence of her subconscious thoughts and desires without explicitly
recognizing them. By exploring her actions and motives, therefore, it is possible to determine
Orual’s primary desires. For all the narrative webs she weaves, Orual ultimately pursues two
major concepts: beauty and truth.
In contrast to Jane, who initially errs on the side of passion, reason is the most readily
apparent of Orual’s desires, and she consciously admits it as an aim. From an early age, she
reveals herself to be a pursuer of truth. When a Greek slave, nicknamed the Fox, is brought to the
palace, Orual’s father assigns him to “see if you can make her wise; it’s about all she’ll ever be
good for” (TWHF 7). Perhaps for this reason (for Orual is extremely susceptible to any reference
to her physical ugliness—the mark of experience), Orual whole-heartedly applies herself to the
lessons of the Fox and learns to employ logic and reason in the determination of truth, a practice
which she only intensifies after the sacrifice of Psyche, when she confesses to the reader that “I
wanted hard things now, and to pile up knowledge” (184). In fact, it is with this very system of
logic that she writes her narrative.
Orual contends from the beginning that she writes her story in the pursuit of truth. Her
wish to provide her own version of the story is, in fact, a response to the gods who, ironically,
present a version of the story that follows Apuleius’s account. She claims that “they have now
sent out a lying story in which I was given no riddle to guess, but knew and saw that she was the
god’s bride, and of my own will destroyed her, and that for jealousy” (TWHF 249). Furthermore,
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she accuses the gods of shrouding the truth asking, “why must holy places be dark places?”
(249), and therefore attempts to present her own, complete record of events. In quest to clear her
name, Orual seeks a confirmation of her story’s truth through the consensus of her readership,
repeatedly entreating affirmation from the “wise Greek whom I look to as my reader and the
judge of my cause” (132). Truth, for Orual, is a matter of human understanding and therefore
largely determined by human consensus. Therefore, when she argues with Psyche against the
existence of the God of the Grey Mountain, her defense is that, “if we could ask every man and
woman in Glome, all would say the same. The truth is too clear” (160-61). Thus Orual reveals
her deep desire for truth, seeking the confirmation of her account through consensus as well as
logic.
In addition to truth, Orual’s other obsessive desire is that of beauty. She continually refers
to her own ugliness, and although she never explicitly says so, she clearly desires to be beautiful.
She despises the beauty of others such as her sister Redival as well as Ansit, the wife of Orual’s
favorite palace guard. In her half-sister Psyche, however, she finds the closest link to physical
beauty that she has ever enjoyed. Psyche is orphaned at the time of her birth, and Orual takes
charge of Psyche’s care, effectively asserting ownership over the child. In this way, Orual acts as
many mothers do, living vicariously through the youth and beauty of their daughters. Orual
enjoys Psyche’s beauty not as a detached observer, but in a deeper, more involved way. In fact,
her association with Psyche’s beauty becomes a defining factor of her existence. In her
recollection of years past she remembers the passing seasons through the changing silhouette of
the orchard trees as their “shadows [flow] water-like over all the hills and valleys of Psyche’s
body” (TWHF 23). Orual recalls the passage of time not as it concerns or affects her, but rather
in its physical manifestations through Psyche’s beauty, as though this beauty were the very locus
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of Orual’s existence. It is not surprising, therefore, that when Psyche is given as a sacrifice to the
God of the Mountain, Orual follows in hopes of retrieving her body, for Orual’s connection to
Psyche is a deeply physical one, again confirming a deep-seated desire for beauty.
Ironically, however, Psyche’s sacrifice functions as further evidence of Orual’s desire for
beauty. Although it is unclear in Part I of Orual’s narrative (because it is at this point unclear to
Orual herself), Part II reveals the very jealousy of the goddess Ungit to be Orual’s own. In the
first of her visions, when the king shows her the mirror and she confesses, “I am Ungit” (276),
she effectively confesses her desire for beauty, for Ungit is famously jealous of Psyche’s beauty.
Not only are beauty and truth Orual’s two chief desires, but she associates them with each
other in her narrative, as though she senses an inherent connection between the two. Neglecting
all others, Orual seeks to isolate the Fox and Psyche all to herself and it is fitting that these are
her two chosen companions as they are her incarnate sources of truth and beauty. She claims that
the years the three spent as an exclusive society were “all springs and summers” (22) and
recollects both the teaching of the Fox and Psyche’s beauty as record of these happy times.
Despite the jealousy with which she possesses both of these individuals, she does not express any
jealousy over their relationship with each other but encourages it. This suggests that Orual not
only desires truth and beauty individually, but seeks to connect the two. In fact, Orual often
attributes the signature characteristic of one individual to the other. She references Psyche’s
truthfulness as “Virtue herself […] put on a human form” (TWHF 26), and even provides the
witness of Redival and Psyche herself in defense of this truthfulness. Redival, who envies Psyche
not only for her beauty but for her popularity, bitterly admits, “I’ve been told often enough how
truthful you are” (27), and Psyche attests to Orual, “I have never told you a lie in my life” (123).
In the Fox, Orual takes note of a special affinity with beautiful verse, recognizing that when he
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recites poetry a “real lilt came into his voice and real brightness into his eyes” (9), and that “as he
grew older he seemed to be ever less and less a philosopher, and to talk more of eloquence and
figures and poetry” (235). By emphasizing truth in Psyche and beauty in the Fox, Orual forges a
bridge between not only the two individuals, but also the concepts they embody.
At the end of Part I, however, Orual has failed to satisfy either of her desires, much less
fuse the two together. Psyche has been exiled by the God of the Mountain and the Fox’s reputed
wisdom (with which he has always denoted the gods as “folly and lies of poets” [TWHF 28]) has
been shaken by Orual’s first-hand experience with these gods. The fact that Orual begins to wear
a veil is itself evidence of her failure as well as her own despair of ever attaining beauty. This
physical cover for her homely face represents Orual’s understanding that she will never become
beautiful and can endeavor only to mask her ugliness. She admits that the veil: “is a sort of treaty
made with my ugliness. There had been a time in childhood when I didn’t yet know I was ugly.
Then there was a time […] when I believed, as girls do […] that I could make it more tolerable
[….] Now, I chose to be veiled” (180-81). This narrative device of the veil once again raises a
similarity between Orual and her Victorian precursors, for Esther similarly veils her face after
the disfigurement of sickness, Lady Dedlock uses a veil to hide her identity, and Jane also
utilizes a veil to hide her emotions when returning to Thornfield from the Reeds. Lewis may well
have borrowed this veiling device from the Victorians, and just as the veil signifies shame and an
attempt at control for the Victorian heroines, it similarly represents Orual’s submission to her
ugliness, and her desperate wish for control. By the end of Part I, Orual admits defeat in the
pursuit of her desires. Instead of achieving the answers she seeks, only more questions emerge,
and her first narrative thus ends with the words “no answer” (TWHF 250).
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Orual’s second narrative is an answer to the irresolution of Part I. She begins with the
admission of death’s approach and a wish to amend her early writing, because, as she says, “I
know so much more than I did about the woman who wrote it” (TWHF 253). She explains the
answers she has received and how they were imparted to her, attributing the means of this
enlightenment to her interaction with art or myth. Neuleib affirms that “Orual’s lesson is
precisely the lesson about the divine nature that only art can illustrate” (47). This use of myth is
particularly suitable for Orual, because such art in its very nature employs a fusion of beauty and
truth, suggestive of the Hegel’s belief that, “the universal need for art […] is man’s rational need
to lift the inner and outer world into his spiritual consciousness as an object in which he
recognizes again his own self” (Hegel 640). In this way, her narrative art produces not only the
mirror reflection of Orual, previsouly discussed, but it also serves to link the concrete and the
abstract. Lewis applies these same concepts to the realm of myth, affirming that “in the
enjoyment of a great myth we come nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be
understood only as an abstraction” (“Myth Became Fact” 66). 73 Thus, in the words of Mark
Freshwater, “myth serves as a bridge between the infinite realm of Absolute Reality and the
finite realm of abstract, propositional truth” (39). This is important for Orual as art employs a
physical reality (beauty) to relate abstract concepts (truth), which lead not only to self-realization
but ultimately to their divine source.
One way in which myth acts as a source for enlightenment is in Orual’s visionary visit to
the house of the gods. After leaving the court, the Fox guides Orual into a room with walls that
are “painted with stories” (TWHF 297). She reflects that “before we came near enough to the
picture to understand it, the mere beauty of the coloured wall put that out of my head” (298).
Thus, she recognizes and appreciates the great beauty of the paintings, saying, “I think all
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In Poetic Diction Barfield similarly claims that “Mythology is the ghost of concrete meaning” (92).
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mortals would have wondered at these” (297). However, these paintings are more than pretty
pictures. They serve to reveal a narrative of all that has happened to Orual and to Psyche,
effectively transmitting truth through art-form.74 “But are these pictures true?” Orual asks, and
the Fox responds, “all here’s true” (300). Thus, the paintings present a fusion of beauty
(physical) and truth (abstract), which guides Orual towards understanding, not because the truth
is explained to her, but because the concrete reality of the paintings allows her to experience it
for herself.
As Part II nears its end, Orual finds herself reunited at last with Psyche. Just as Jane ends
with Rochester, whose love beautifies her, and Woodcourt assures Esther that she is more
beautiful than she ever was, Psyche imparts beauty to Orual. This beauty represents higher
innocence for Orual, as for Jane and Esther. Yet, in the same way that Jane’s marriage is only the
“now” and must be combined with the “not yet” of St. John’s “Come, Lord Jesus,” so Orual
immediately finds that she has not yet reached the true source and fulfillment of her longing. She
explains:
I thought I had now come to the highest, and the utmost fulfillment of
being which the human soul can contain. But now, what was this? You
have seen the torches grow pale when men open the shutters and broad
summer morning shines in on the feasting hall? So now. Suddenly, from a
strange look in Psyche’s face […] or from a deep, doubtful, quaking and
surmise in my own heart, I knew that all this had been only a preparation.
Some far greater matter was upon us. (TWHF 307)
Thus, now that she has obtained her deep desires, Orual quickly recognizes the extension of that
longing towards something more substantial. Voices echo through the corridors, heralding the
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Although it may not seem, upon first consideration, that paintings could plausibly be considered a form of myth,
the fact that these pictures create a world and tell Orual a story suggests that they are, in fact, mythic. Further, I
suggest that Lewis considers most forms of visual art to be the products of mythopoesis, as he interjects, “is not the
sky itself a myth,” in his essay “Myth Became Fact” (67). J. L. Morrow also compellingly suggests that “The act of
seeing beauty requires humans to employ the inherent capacity to peer into a deeper reality, whether this power is
exercised through the reading of fantasy literature or contemplating a painting or comprehending a flower” (184),
effectively equating the reading of myth to the experience of engaging a painting.
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entrance of a god, and Orual is both exhilarated and fearful. It is in this moment that she finally
receives her revelation. Rather than desiring to be beautiful herself, she has always innately
longed for this god, who is beauty, and rather than desiring to know the truth, she has desired to
know this god, who is truth. Only in this understanding can Orual finally recognize that she is
“no one,” and furthermore that “Psyche herself was, in a manner, no one,” that, “if she counted
(and oh, gloriously she did) it was for another’s sake” (TWHF 307). In this way, the divine
presence represents the harmony of polarity, as well as being the source of that polarity. In his
copy of Coleridge’s The Friend Lewis underlines the following passage: “O! for one piece of
egotism that presents itself under its own honest bare face of ‘I myself I,’ there are fifty that steal
out in the mask of tu-isms and ille-isms!” (emphasis added; Coleridge 13; Marginal Notes).
Orual’s movement towards polar logic (or higher innocence) requires that she recognize the selfcentered nature of all her previous motivations, that she literally and figuratively bare her face.
One must conclude that Lewis bore Coleridge in mind when he originally selected Bareface as
the name for his novel (Hooper, C. S. Lewis: A Companion 252), or when he renamed it to echo
Orual’s question, “How can [the gods] meet us face to face till we have faces?” (294).75 As
Gunnar Urang suggests, the Orual of Part I “loves the experiencing rather than the object
experienced. [She] seizes on the medium through which the vision comes (Psyche) and loves it
in place of, and even against, that which the vision beholds (the god)” (47), while the Orual of
Part II finally realizes the source of the beauty she has experienced in Psyche. Finally, after years
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Schakel recognizes this, explaining that “[t]he veil gives [Orual] a public identity as the Queen and allows her to
bury her personal self: she has no face, no identity, and thus no way to relate genuinely to a god, or to other people.
Only when she removes the veil, confronts her true self, and gains a ‘face’ can she encounter God, without defenses,
excuses of pretenses […]. By removing the veil, by dying to self, she becomes able to live to others” (Schakel,
Cambridge Companion 287).
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of pursuit, Orual has both recognized the true object of her desire, as well as the fulfillment of
that desire in the anticipation of this divine figure.
In fact, truth and beauty are again linked in this divine encounter. “Will the gods one day
grow […] beautiful, Grandfather?” Orual asks the Fox as he guides her through the house of the
gods, and in answering he reassures her that “nothing is yet in its true form” (TWHF 305). With
this statement, the Fox links the growth of beauty with increased reality or truth, suggesting that
for something to be true, it will also be beautiful, and vice versa. Another link between these two
concepts appears in Orual’s reunion with Psyche, wherein she notes that Psyche is more
beautiful than ever, yet more herself than ever before, suggesting that the truer a thing is the
more beautiful as well. This leads Orual to reflect that she “had never seen a real woman before”
(306). Psyche’s real-ness and beauty, however, is observed to be only a shadow compared with
the divine figure, which is reality itself. Higher innocence for Orual, as for Jane and Esther, is
characterized by a picture of polarity—a union of the physical and the spiritual, of truth and
beauty, of reason and imagination.
In particular, higher innocence culminates for all three heroines in a loving union. For
Dickens and Bronte, this union is actual human marriage, which—in the Christian worldviews of
these Victorian authors—symbolizes Christ and the Church.76 Lewis, on the other hand, chooses
to cast aside the social symbol for an actual depiction of divine union. As we witnessed in
chapter one, Lewis again seeks to further spiritualize the Romantic metanarrative, in this case by
exchanging the symbol of human marriage for an actual divine encounter. While it is unclear
how closely he perceives himself to be echoing the mingling of divine and human love displayed
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The degree to which Dickens and Brontë are deliberately embracing marriage as a Christian symbol is, of course,
debatable; however, the very culture of Victorian England that held marriage in such high regard, making it the ideal
resolution for any given novel, was certainly rooted in the western, Christian ideas about the sanctity and importance
of marriage as a religious sacrament reflecting Christ and his church. The Victorian veneration of marriage was
certainly rooted originally in Christian values and significance.
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in Jane Eyre, he surely considers his depiction of higher innocence as closer to the real thing
than Dickens’s. He writes to Dom Bede Griffiths in 1954, “I have a taste for Dickens but don’t
think it a low one. He is the great author on mere affection […]: only he & Tolstoi […] really
deal with it. Of course his error lies in thinking it will do instead of Agape” (Vol III 413).
Although it seems counterintuitive to the popular portrait of Lewis as allegorist or symbolist, he
actually finds the symbol of marriage, which these Victorian authors embrace as the ideal
resolution, to be insufficient. Nothing but the thing itself will do in this case—Joy must reach its
true conclusion. Orual must reach not simply a symbol of higher innocence, but the actual place
“where all the beauty came from” (TWHF 75).
Thus Till We Have Faces exhibits the deep, shaping influence of Victorian realism on C.
S. Lewis as storyteller and mythopoeist. Jane Eyre and Esther Summerson provide the models
for Orual, in their psychological realism, the form of their narratives, and in their embodiment of
the Romantic metanarrative as Bildungsroman. While Lewis diverges from, or builds upon,
Brontë and Dickens by making Orual’s story more deeply spiritual than Jane or Esther’s, Orual’s
transformative narrative hinges on the same romantic elements as Jane and Esther’s. Reading Till
We Have Faces thus, we must in turn read Lewis himself anew. Although the influence is
Romantic at heart—a narrative flowing from Blake, Wordsworth, and Coleridge into the realist’s
shaping hands—Lewis nonetheless preserved a foundational commitment to the Victorian novel
throughout his life. Despite anything in the Victorian age that may “appall Lewis” (Durie 229), it
is in these Victorian texts that he finds higher innocence, Joy, and the inspiration for his greatest
novelistic success. Orual, despite her ancient Greek ancestry, has roots in Victorian England, for
Till We Have Faces is not only a “myth retold” but Miss Eyre and Miss Summerson retold as
well.
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CHAPTER THREE: “Science Fantasy” as Higher Innocence: Neo-Victorian Genre
Blending in The Space Trilogy
At a pivotal moment in the final installment of Lewis’s space trilogy, That Hideous
Strength (1945), Jane Studdock finds herself part of a search party, traipsing across a darkened
field in search of a “true myth.” Merlin, the wizard of Arthurian legend, has arisen from a long
sleep and Jane and her party must recruit him to join in their battle against the diabolical
influence of the National Institute of Co-ordinated Experiments. Those who oppose the NICE
and its menacing scientism are rallying under the orders of their Director, Elwin Ransom, who, it
turns out, is the mythic Pendragon of Logres. It is the influence of the Pendragon that has
awakened Merlin, and Jane, Dimble and Denniston hope to locate him before the enemy is able
to do so. The enthusiasm of their search, however, is tempered somewhat by trepidation:
The fear which Dimble had felt from the first began to trickle into the minds of
the others as they proceeded—like water coming into a ship from a slow leak.
They realized that they had not really believed in Merlin till now. [….] The shock
was still to take. Out here with only the changing red light ahead and the black all
round, one really began to accept as fact this tryst with something dead and yet
not dead, something dug up, exhumed, from that dark pit of history[…] (229;
emphasis added)
This is a strange turn of events for characters and reader alike. The reader, like Jane and her
companions, experiences confusion, even fear from the eruption of this mythical figure in the
supposedly real world, for That Hideous Strength is set not on another planet or in in another
world, but in a sleepy British university town. On another level, the reader is shocked by the
sudden appearance of Arthurian myth—first in the Pendragon and now in Merlin—in what has
heretofore seemed a science fiction series about space adventures. Surely Lewis could have
anticipated such disconnect. One must question why he would so deliberately jar the reader.
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As the reader’s experience aligns with Jane’s in this particular scene, it is possible to infer
the reader’s intended response through that of Jane. In Jane, the jarring realization and
imminence of real myth leads to philosophical reflection:
If it had ever occurred to her to question whether all these things might be the
reality behind what she had been taught at school as “religion,” she had put the
thought aside. The distance between these alarming and operative realities and the
memory, say, of fat Mrs. Dimble saying her prayers, was too wide. The things
belonged, for her, to different worlds. [….] But this time […] the thought would
not be put aside. Because, really, it now appeared that almost anything might be
true. The world had already turned out to be so very unlike what she had
expected. The old ring-fence had been smashed completely. One might be in for
anything. Maleldil might be, quite simply and crudely, God. (THS 231)
Apparently, the experience of myth “accepted as fact” has shocked Jane into a revelation about
the potential reality of Christianity. It has opened her mind to the possibility that “anything might
be true,” and thereby begun a transformation. The startling appearance of Merlin in twentieth
century England has effectively reunited two concepts that were hitherto divided in Jane’s
experience: reality and the Christian myth—which we might also label empirical, scientific
narrative and mythic, or Biblical narrative. This encroachment of myth will slowly ripple
through Jane’s experience as the novel continues, resolving various philosophical dichotomies.
Clearly, Lewis is up to something. On the surface, the Arthurian mythology in That
Hideous Strength is startling, frightening, even offensive to the unprepared reader, yet it is this
sense of violation that incites Jane’s conversion and ultimate renewal. One must necessarily
assume that the reader’s experience should be the same, that Lewis intentionally interjects this
“true myth” into his novel, and his series, with the intention of similarly transforming the novel,
the trilogy, and its reader. This point of apparent discord thereby becomes the space trilogy’s
most integral source of accord, and will become the crux of my argument in this chapter.
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While chapter two dealt with Lewis’s debt to early and mid-Victorian realism, I will now
prove a similar debt to late-Victorian fantasy and speculative fiction in his work. Lewis
embodies the same Coleridgean polar logic of form and content discussed in chapters one and
two in the space trilogy through the combination of two Victorian genres: speculative fiction and
fantasy. Fantasy and science fiction (as it is now more commonly known) represent two
strikingly different trajectories in the Victorian imagination— that of supernatural, spirituallyminded Christianity and that of empirical, scientific materialism. By combining the narratives of
these diverging genres, Lewis once again engages the Romantic metanarrative, moving through
all three books towards higher innocence that is both described and embodied in the final book
through the concept of Incarnation, or “true myth,” as illustrated in the above example of Jane’s
experience with Merlin. Lewis’s work in combining Victorian science fiction and fantasy is
integral to his purpose, as he needs to fuse the empiricism of science fiction with the supernatural
character of fantasy in order to present the series itself as a sort of factual myth—an embodiment
of polarity, and thus higher innocence. For this reason, That Hideous Strength is the linchpin of
my argument, because it contains the most overt depiction of true myth and thus the
consummation towards which the entire trilogy moves. It is also the most appropriate focus of
our attention because it has suffered far more critical derision and confusion than Out of the
Silent Planet or Perelandra. By demonstrating exactly why That Hideous Strength and its
Arthurian mythology is integral to Lewis’s romantic vision for the space trilogy, I will also
answer questions that have plagued scholars and readers for decades.
That Hideous Strength has engendered much controversy, not simply as a book in
isolation, but as the final installment to Lewis’s cosmic series. According to Tolkien, it “spoiled”
the entire space trilogy (Letters 342). While it is true that Tolkien begrudged the influence of
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Charles Williams and his “‘Arthurian’ stuff” on Lewis’s work (Letters 361),77 the fact remains
that the jarring intrusion of Arthurian mythology into That Hideous Strength is one of the
commonly cited complaints against the novel. That Hideous Strength, with its pre-Christian
wizards and mythic British chieftains, seems a strange postlude to Out of the Silent Planet (1938)
and Perelandra (1943).
In Out of the Silent Planet Elwin Ransom is kidnapped and taken to Mars, where he
escapes his imperialistically-minded kidnappers (the scientist, Weston, and the entrepreneur,
Devine). Ransom befriends the planets diverse inhabitants, and discovers that they are ruled and
protected by a powerful, beneficent Oyarsa—an angelic being. Through his interactions on Mars,
or Malacandra, Ransom also learns that earth once enjoyed its own Oyarsa, yet has become
spiritually silent, ruled by an evil power, and cut off from the glorious communion of the rest of
the cosmos. Perelandra details a similar space voyage, this time to Venus. Ransom is sent on
mission by the Oyarsa of Malacandra to protect Venus from the evil influence of the now
demonically possessed Weston, with whom he struggles both rhetorically and physically,
preserving the unfallen planet from taint. Unlike the other two stories, The Hideous Strength
does not take Ransom as its central character and involves no space travel at all. Instead, it is a
more novelistic account of the dual narratives of Jane and Mark Studdock—characters yet
unknown to the reader—who find themselves caught up in a struggle between angelic and
demonic forces warring over earth. Even more disconcerting, this story involves a transfigured
Ransom, who is now supposed to be the Kingfisher of Arthurian legend, and a re-awakened
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C. S. Lewis and Charles Williams began their acquaintance in 1936 when Lewis wrote a letter admiring
Williams’s novel The Place of the Lion (1931)—Lewis calls the novel “one of the major literary events of my life”
(Vol. II 183). Lewis was immediately charmed by Williams upon meeting him and became increasingly influenced
by his taste and opinions until Williams’s premature death in 1945. Williams was particularly interested in Arthurian
legend and wrote a poem cycle called Taliesin through Logres (1938), which the character Camilla reads in That
Hideous Strength. Tolkien and Lewis were inseparable friends, but their friendship dwindled in later life and
Tolkien claimed, “We were first separated by the sudden apparition of Charles Williams” (Letters 341).
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Merlin, who performs pre-Christian, druidical magic in the fight against the demonic forces of
the NICE. The disparities between the first two books and the third book are clear. Thus, while
Tolkien admits that That Hideous Strength is “good […] in and of itself” (342), he and numerous
readers have felt that this sudden insertion of mythological characters and concepts, among other
stylistic and formal discontinuities, breaks the organicism of the trilogy as a whole by veering off
too drastically from the spirit (and, perhaps, genre) of the series.
George Orwell, in an oft-quoted review from the Manchester Evening News (16 August
1945), wrote that That Hideous Strength “would probably have been a better book if the magical
element had been left out,” recommending that such “miraculous happenings […] are not
integral to it” (Orwell). Orwell finds it unfortunate that “the supernatural keeps breaking in,” and
concludes that only “by the [assumedly poor] standard of the novels appearing nowadays” is it a
“book worth reading” (Orwell). Science fiction critics from Orwell’s day into our own have
tended to agree, giving Out of the Silent Planet and Perelandra a patronizing nod, while
rejecting That Hideous Strength completely.
While critics who are less genial to Lewis’s agenda tend to tolerate the first two novels
and decry the third, others show a general charity to Lewis’s tripartite structure and assume the
organicism of the series. These critics—such as Humphrey Carpenter, Wayne Shumaker, and
David Downing—fail, however, to defend or elaborate on this cohesion, largely avoiding any
discussion of the novel’s striking differences from the first two. Carpenter notes that That
Hideous Strength was “very different in character” from the other two novels, and explains this
by postulating that it was “a celebration of everything that had happened in [Lewis’s] life up to
now” (198). While this could be argued, it hardly defends the novel’s place in the cosmic trilogy
or makes sense of the book’s surprising differences.
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More promising is Shumaker’s purported defense of the trilogy’s structural wholeness.
Shumaker argues that “all three volumes were the products of a single creative urge” (51), and
suggests that the three novels were three separate stages (Mars, Venus and Earth) on which
Lewis made “the same point three times and yet, since the volumes were to be organically
connected, once only on three levels” (54). The point Lewis makes, according to Shumaker, is
“the placing of Earthly experience in a context of cosmic purpose” (54), and he defends this
claim with a very thorough treatment of Out of the Silent Planet and Perelandra. Yet Shumaker
devotes only one paragraph of his argument to That Hideous Strength, ultimately characterizing
it as an exception to the “steadily credible” nature of the series (63).
Even Downing gives only moderate praise to That Hideous Strength, focusing more on
its biographical significance than its artistic wholeness within the trilogy. He mounts an implicit
defense of the series’ organicism, saying, “Lewis’s strategy is to make readers sense that his
fantasy world is more real than they might have supposed—and that their ‘real world’ is more
filled with the fantastic than they might have supposed,” and arguing that each book in the series
makes this progressively more explicit (Planets in Peril 47). In his treatment of That Hideous
Strength, however, he admits that perhaps Lewis tried to do too much in the book. While these
renowned Lewis experts have taken important steps towards a unified vision of the trilogy, the
task remains incomplete.
In hopes of completing such a critical task, this chapter will suggest that the seemingly
problematic characteristics of That Hideous Strength are, in fact, the most important points of
contact with Lewis’s vision not only for the novel in itself, but for the series as an organic whole.
Under this assumption the formal and stylistic discontinuities between Perelandra and That
Hideous Strength become part and parcel of Lewis’s overarching image of Incarnation—
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Incarnation, for Lewis, being the intrusion of myth into the empirical world, the ultimate
manifestation of Coleridgean polarity. In order to fully comprehend the significance of Lewis’s
formal structure, however, one must first understand the constellating genres at work within the
interplanetary novels. Although Lewis seemingly enters into the community of science fiction
with Out of the Silent Planet, he brings with him deep roots in fantasy literature. The result, I
suggest, is a deliberate fusion of scientific narrative, characteristic of the early science fiction of
H. G. Wells (1866-1946), and spiritual narrative, akin to George MacDonald’s fantasy stories
(1824-1905). By blending the empirical nature of science fiction with the mythic elements of
fantasy, Lewis practices the same jarring, incarnational fusion of myth and reality via genre as he
does within the narrative through the appearance of Merlin and the Kingfisher. In this blending,
Lewis practices a neo-Victorian innovation, and the Incarnational theme he foregrounds through
the fusion of spiritual and material narratives grows from what he learned from his Romantic and
Victorian predecessors.
David Downing notes that Lewis “seemed to view the Ransom books as a deliberate
fusion of two genres” (“Science Fiction” 299), but there has been no discussion, to date, on the
neo-Victorian nature of this fusion. Nonetheless, Lewis’s “Science Fantasy”—as he dubs the
cosmic trilogy—has its roots in Victorian genre, texts, and practices. In the sense that Ann
Heilmann and Mark Llewellyn identify the Neo-Victorian as any work that is “self-consciously
engaged with the act of (re)interpretation, (re)discovery and (re)vision concerning the
Victorians” (4), the series is obviously neo-Victorian, as its first installment revises H. G.
Wells’s First Men in the Moon.78 But the association does not stop here. Not only are H. G.
Wells and George MacDonald the most significant influences on the trilogy, as I will argue, but
in characterizing fantasy and science fiction as representatives of competing spiritual (Biblical)
78

Both Lewis’s preface and Downing’s Planets in Peril thoroughly corroborate this fact.
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and scientific (evolutionary or simply empirical) narratives, Lewis draws from a philosophical
divide that finds its birth in Victorian thought and has endured for centuries as a popular emblem
of Victorian culture. Furthermore, Lewis enacts a Victorian practice—most notably that of
Charles Kingsley—by intermingling these narratives. Even Lewis’s conception of the
Incarnation as “true myth” is a revision of MacDonald’s Victorian Romanticism and the
Coleridgean concept of polarity, as discussed in chapters one and two. Overall, Lewis’s “Science
Fantasy” genre is undoubtedly neo-Victorian in so much as it, in the words of Elsie Michie,
“meditate[s] on [its] relation to […] Victorian precursors” (170).79
The Victorian Dilemma: Scientific Versus Biblical Narrative
The Victorian era is widely acknowledged in popular and critical imagination as a time of
scientific progress and corresponding religious upheaval. In Father and Son (1907) Edmund
Gosse corroborates such a picture of the Victorian crisis of faith. Gosse’s father is an eminent
scientist, yet also an unwaveringly religious man. In the wake of Charles Lyell’s Principles of
Geology (1830-33) and Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), the elder Gosse
confronts a terrible dilemma: he must choose between two of the things he holds most dear—
science and religion. Specifically, Edmund’s father must choose between the contradictory
creation narratives of scripture and evolutionary theory, as the advent of evolutionary science
seems to have made religion and science mutually exclusive. At this important moment, Edmund
reports that his father “allowed the turbid volume of superstition to drown the delicate stream of
reason” (61). What followed was the publication of Philip Henry Gosse’s Omphalos, in which he
asserted a universally scorned “appearance of age” theory of geology. Edmund suggests that this
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In “Kidnapped Romance: From Walter Scott to C. S. Lewis” Michie argues that Lewis appropriates and revises a
Victorian theme of children’s literature: kidnapping. Michie also notes the significance of Elwin Ransom as another
instance of this kidnapping theme, and as a connection to the work of Christ as a ransom for sinners.
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marked the end of his father’s scientific reputation, and the decline of a fading generation of
Victorian Christianity. Just as Gosse views his autobiography as the “clash of two
temperaments” in which his own asserted individuality emerges victorious, so he posits
Victorian faith and science as adversaries in a struggle ultimately won by science (186).
Gosse’s account of these opposing narratives has remained a part of popular Victorian
mythology for decades, yet recent scholarship has introduced two important innovations. First, it
has shown that Christianity was not utterly defeated in Victorian England, as Gosse’s account
might suggest. The work of critics including Christine Kreuger, Charles LaPorte, Stephen
Prickett and Kirstie Blair unites in one argument: Christianity was far from dead in Victorian
culture, and still enjoyed wide influence in the arts. Second, recent scholarship has suggested that
many Victorians saw evolutionary theory and Biblical theology as compatible. Although, as
Gillian Beer notes in Darwin’s Plots, the evolutionary narrative became a prominent influence
on literary form in the second half of the 19th century, it did not necessarily do so to the
exclusion of Christian narrative. Blair is quick to point out that, “Where there is form, there is
faith” (2), and that “deliberately to approach literary forms—especially Victorian literary
forms—with the view that they are disruptive and disorderly forces is again to value doubt over
faith, and to take the exception for the rule” (15). Both Beer and Blair are, in a manner, correct:
evolutionary and Biblical narrative both thrived in Victorian art, and rather than seeing religious
and secular narratives as incompatible, many 19th century authors integrated both into their work.
Notable Victorians, like George Eliot and Charles Kingsley, consciously combined narratives of
belief with those of doubt, Biblical narratives with scientific ones.
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Despite much co-mingling, however, the fact remains that Biblical and evolutionary
narrative represented two separate and sometimes oppositional mythologies for Victorians.80
Although the two were often blended in Victorian poetic and novelistic practice, these opposing
narratives found their separate embodiments in two Victorian genres: fantasy and science fiction.
Both genres are characterized by fantastic events and other worlds, but fantasy traditionally
justifies its unrealistic elements through supernatural explanations, or else makes no explanation
at all. Science fiction, on the other hand, employs science to explain its more unrealistic
elements. In the words of Robert Philmus, “science fiction differs from other kinds of fantasy by
virtue of the more or less scientific basis, real or imaginary, theoretical or technological, on
which the writer predicates a fantastic state of affairs” (2). Science fiction, therefore, represents
an increasing interest in scientific explanations, particularly those offered by evolutionary theory,
while fantasy simply depends upon the faith of the reader and the fantasist’s skill in convincing.
Perhaps the two most important representatives of these respective genres—and certainly
the two most significant influences on C. S. Lewis’s conceptions of those genres—are George
MacDonald (fantasist and pastor) and H. G. Wells (father of modern science fiction). These two
authors not only embody Victorian ideas about their respective genres, employing their
characteristic narratives of faith and science, but their work plays an integral role in Lewis’s
personal and literary development, so that these Victorian genres actually embed themselves into
Lewis’s personal narrative, to resurface in his writing.
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In discussing “scientific mythology” throughout this chapter, I am not proposing that science is, itself,
mythological, but rather referring to the way in which scientific theory (particularly that of evolution) provided a
competing narrative to that of Christianity. While true science is not a narrative, but a collection of data, Gillian
Beer demonstrates the way in which evolutionary theory became a mythological narrative, with which many
Victorians replaced the mythological creation narrative of scripture. Science is not, therefore, mythological in
nature, but can become mythological when utilized to give meaning to the world and man’s existence in that world.
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George MacDonald: Fantasy as Spiritual Journey and Myth Become Fact
Perhaps no author had a more profound effect on C. S. Lewis than George MacDonald,
and it is certainly MacDonald’s fantasy that taught Lewis the characteristic spirituality of the
genre, particularly through his Christianization of Romantic ideas. MacDonald’s fantasies
employ Romantic, yet simultaneously Biblical, metanarrative in both form and content. They
replicate the scale and trajectory of scripture in their mythopoeic nature—creating and inhabiting
worlds, and more often than not, redeeming these worlds from fallen-ness. Phantastes, Lilith,
and the Curdie books all depict kingdoms and individuals in need of redemption, and then set out
to redeem them. Additionally, MacDonald’s fairylands are often landscapes that the perspective
character—if not a first-person narrator—must learn to “believe” in, echoing the continual
scriptural call for faith and the Biblical centrality of story itself. In George MacDonald we find a
model for the two most important concepts in Lewis’s space trilogy: an infusion of traditional
Romantic metanarrative with Biblical/spiritual myth, and the mythopoeic concept of “true
myth.”81
Particularly important to MacDonald’s influence on Lewis, and on the Space Trilogy, is
the Victorian fantasist’s reliance on the Romantic metanarrative. Although the Romantic
metanarrative runs through all of MacDonald’s work, “The Golden Key” (1867) is an ideal
example of this Romantic structuring, as it closely and clearly echoes Blake’s conception of
innocence, experience, and higher innocence. Tangle and Mossy reflect a Blakean image of
innocence at the story’s beginning, both embracing a naïve belief in fairy tales, and Tangle also
displays the vulnerability of the innocent, being “neglected,” “untidy,” and “sometimes ill-used”
81

McGillis has clearly demonstrated how “MacDonald is indeed a belated Romantic” and how “he re-Christianizes
Romanticism” (“Childhood and Growth” 150). Colin Manlove has suggested that “apart from The Pilgrim’s
Regress, there is very little in Lewis’ fiction that may be indebted to MacDonald’s” (“Parent or Associate” 232).
Manlove makes this argument with the assumption that Lewis, and his fellow Inklings, were more deeply interested
in physical realities, while MacDonald was invested almost completely in spiritual ones. I would, of course, suggest
that this is exactly how MacDonald influences Lewis, through spiritual narrative, which he then fuses with more
physically-invested narratives.
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(254). While they begin their quest for the golden key out of innocent wonder and curiosity, they
find that experience is a necessary step towards their goal. MacDonald’s conception of
experience is, like Blake’s, a recognition of lack and a discontent with the world, for the children
sit in a field full of shadows and realize that they cannot remain in the field, but “must find the
country from which the shadows come” (280). By the time they have crossed the field “Mossy’s
hair was streaked with grey, and Tangle had got wrinkles on her forehead” (281), symbolizing
their experience. Higher innocence in MacDonald’s fairy tale is clearly linked to dying to the
world, and waking to a better one, depicted as growing younger. When the Old Man asks Mossy,
“is [death] good?” Mossy answers, “It is good, […] it is better than life” (302). The Old Man
corrects him, saying, “it is only more life” (302). Furthermore, the process towards “more life” is
depicted as growing younger, for the children encounter a number of sages along their journey,
and the older these men are, the younger they appear, so that the oldest and final man is “a little
naked child” (295). The tale ends with hints of higher innocence in the promise that Tangle and
Mossy “knew that they were going up to the country whence the shadows fall. And by this time I
think they must have got there” (308).
Clearly Lewis received the Romantic metanarrative in some portion through MacDonald,
as he often identifies MacDonald’s fairy tales as a major influence. MacDonald first appears in
Lewis’s letters in 1916, when a young, non-Christian Lewis reports to Greeves that he has just
discovered Phantastes. “[Y]ou simply MUST get this at once,” writes Lewis, and what follows is
a multi-year correspondence between the two friends as they read their way through
MacDonald’s entire fictional oeuvre (Vol. I 170). In 1930 a newly-converted Lewis writes to
Arthur, “I know nothing that gives me such a feeling of spiritual healing, of being washed, as to
read George Macdonald” (Vol. I 936), and admits to a 1939 correspondent, “Phantastes & Lilith
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I found endlessly attractive, and full of what I felt to be holiness before I really knew that it was”
(Vol. II 263). Although Lewis identifies Phantastes as the MacDonald novel which first
influenced him, he also repeatedly identifies Lilith as one of MacDonald’s masterpieces.
Lilith (1895), a story in which the protagonist—a Mr. Vane—travels to a parallel
universe in order to discover spiritual truth, displays some of the concepts which most influenced
Lewis and informed his beloved concepts of “myth” and “sub-creation.” In Lilith God is
primarily identified and described as a creator and origin of all things, and this is a concept
which Lewis absorbs and integrates into the center of his own philosophy of creation: the belief
that man is a natural myth creator, because he instinctually mimics the work of his own creator,
and thereby creates myths which echo the “true myth.” Furthermore, MacDonald draws Lilith—
the ultimate failed mother figure—into this creation motif, and Lewis accordingly weaves similar
themes of motherhood and creation into his central female characters.
In Lilith, the book-smart yet naive Mr. Vane learns that the source and destination of his
identity and purpose is the creator from whence he came. Early on Mr. Raven (who acts initially
as guide to the alternate world) tells Vane that, “When a heart is really alive, then it is able to
think live things. There is one heart all whose thoughts are strong, happy creatures, and whose
very dreams are lives” (Lilith 18-19). This is the first of many allusions to the creative power of
God, the one true life which gives birth to all life. Thus, when Vane meets Lilith—the failed first
wife of Adam—she is identified as both dead and a failed creator, lacking the life of the origin of
all life. Lilith, who bucks the perfect creation order by rebelling against God and Adam,
therefore becomes figuratively barren, uncreative. The Green Lady of Perelandra is a clear foil
to MacDonald’s depiction of Lilith, as she is in perfect obedience to Maleldil and thus in
harmony with creation. In That Hideous Stength, on the other hand, Jane is in danger of
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following Lilith, as seen in the barrenness of her doctoral thesis on Donne. Jane even foresees,
and then reads a passage contrasting the “vanity of Lilith” with the “obedience of Eve” (61).
Because she is following the path of MacDonald’s Lilith, Jane is unproductive in every sense.
Another aspect of this creation motif is the prevalence of childbirth in Lilith’s defeat, and
therefore her redemption. The woman from Bulika tells Vane, “There is an old prophecy that a
child will be the death of her. That is why she will listen to no offer of marriage, they say” (89).
Yet Adam later states that “even Lilith shall be saved by her childbearing” (116). In
MacDonald’s world, therefore, the will of God is enacted through human procreation—itself
another form of subcreation, which Lilith mistakes as her own creation. This creative motif in
MacDonald is again echoed by Lewis in both Perelandra and That Hideous Strength. While the
Lady of Perelandra is the “Great Mother” of her world because of her harmonic place within
Maleldil’s creation (Perelandra 152), Jane is condemned by Merlin as “the falsest lady” because
of her rebellion against “the purpose of God” through willful barrenness (THS 275-76). Indeed,
like Lilith, having a child will signal the defeat of Jane’s fierce independence, but also her
salvation, for it is her child “by whom the enemies [shall be] put out of Logres for a thousand
years” (276). Ultimately, Jane, like MacDonald’s Lilith, will find true freedom only in
obedience, and the sub-creation associated with obedient recognition of the one true creator.82
Lilith is harshly rebuked for her denial of God as creator and source of all creation. Her
adamant assertion that, “Another shall not make me” is the most fundamental and evil notion
possible in the created thing, because it is a denial of the “light that goes deeper than the will”
(156). Lilith’s creation of herself is a misguided one, because she does not understand the true
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moments; yet it is important in both cases to note that these female characters are exhorted towards ultimate
submission not to a husband or father, but to God himself—something that is similarly required of male characters.
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source and power of the creative will. Her self-creation has deformed her, so that she must give
herself over to be “remade” (158). Similarly Jane must have her own “world […] unmade” (THS
140), and her redemption is then signaled by “a resolution to give Mark much more than she had
ever given him before, and a feeling that in so doing she would be really giving it to the
Director,” and, of course, in turn to Maleldil—to God (148). In redeeming Lilith through her
acceptance of obligation to her true creator, MacDonald upholds God as the ultimate creative
force, or the “true myth,” from which all myth flows and towards which all myth leads.
Lewis relates that he was always, from an early age, deeply impacted by mythology, and
his experience with MacDonald’s work was no different. In his introduction to Lilith, Lewis
extols MacDonald as master of the “mythopoeic art” (xi). He notes that while, “In poetry the
words are the body and the ‘theme’ or ‘content’ is the soul […] in myth the imagined events are
the body and something inexpressible in the soul” (x), and suggests that while MacDonald
sometimes lacked skill in his craft as a weaver of words, it is the inexpressible soul of his created
worlds that is important. Rather than the words, the story or myth takes precedence and
transforms the reader, so that MacDonald’s fiction was able “to convert, even to baptize
[Lewis’s] imagination,” even when “Nothing was at that time further from [his] thoughts than
Christianity” (xi). Later in life Lewis realized that the “quality which had enchanted me in his
imaginative works turned out to be the quality of the real universe, the divine, magical, terrifying
and ecstatic reality in which we all live” (xii). Just as the world explored by Mr. Vane is full of
creatures and their creations which all must finally return to their divine creator and origin,
Lewis came to believe that all man-made myth is a mere reflection or shadow of the “true myth.”
Indeed, it was this very concept that helped to bring about Lewis’s conversion to Christianity,
facilitated predominantly through Tolkien. Lewis describes these ideas in a letter to Greeves:
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Now what Dyson83 and Tolkien showed me was this: […] in Pagan
stories I was prepared to feel the myth as profound and suggestive of
meaning beyond my grasp even tho’ I could not say in cold prose ‘what it
meant’.
Now the story of Christ is simply a true myth: a myth working on us in the
same way as the others, but with this tremendous difference that it really
happened: and one must be content to accept it in the same way, remembering
that it is God’s myth where the others are men’s myths. (Vol. I 977)
The concept of mythopoeia, as Lewis understood and came to believe it, was that, in Tolkien’s
words, “in practicing ‘mythopoeia’ […] a storyteller, or ‘sub-creator’ […] is actually fulfilling
God’s purpose, and reflecting a splintered fragment of the true light” (“On Fairy Stories” 43). In
this way, writers of myth may actually reflect truth because they are reflecting God’s very action,
which is truth, just as MacDonald’s creatures who are “alive” are “able to think live things”
(Lilith 18). Although these ideas are largely associated with Tolkien and others, Lewis first
encountered them and was captured by them in MacDonald. As Kirsten Johnson suggests,
Among the insights Lewis discovered as he re-read (and well-marked)
MacDonald’s books were a number of important touch-points that Lewis scholars
have often associated with other influences. Yet, it was not just J. R. R. Tolkien
and Hugo Dyson who taught Lewis that mythic Truth was part of the Deeper
Magic, nor was it only Owen Barfield who taught him of ‘ancient semantic
unities.’ Lewis scholars frequently—and rightly—refer to these influences;
however, it is mostly overlooked that Lewis had been undergoing a study of these
concepts (consciously or not) for many years. The seeds had been repeatedly
sown by [MacDonald]. (46)
Under the tutelage of MacDonald, and others, Lewis came to believe that God himself
was the creator of reality and therefore of “true myth.” For Lewis, therefore, “myth is a kind of
shadow of Christianity” (Loganbill 55). According to Humphrey Carpenter, Lewis also believes
that “the essence of the myth” is dependent on its having “no taint of allegory to the maker and
yet [it] should suggest incipient allegories to the reader” (30). This notion is another that he
inherited from George MacDonald, who says of fairy tales:
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The true fairytale is, to my mind, very like the sonata. We all know that a sonata
means something; and where there is the faculty of talking with suitable
vagueness, and choosing metaphor sufficiently loose, mind may approach mind,
in the interpretation of a sonata, with the result of a more or less contenting
consciousness of sympathy. But if two or three men sat down to write each what
the sonata meant to him, what approximation to definite idea would be the result?
Little enough--and that little more than needful. We should find it had roused
related, if not identical, feelings, but probably not one common thought. Has the
sonata therefore failed? Had it undertaken to convey, or ought it to be expected to
impart anything defined, anything notionally recognizable? (“The Fantastic
Imagination” 318)
In Lewis’ introduction to Lilith, he makes a similar comparison between myth-making and
music, saying that mythopoeia “is in some ways more akin to music than to poetry” because “it
goes beyond the expression of what we have already felt” (x). Thus the very real, yet mythic
world of Perelandra impacts Ransom like a “symphony” or an “air in the opera” (Perelandra 46;
48). In reading myth, MacDonald and Lewis deem it necessary for the reader to put aside all
notions of symbols and simply experience the text, for “myth must first be understood, or
experienced rather, in total, as a concrete reality, and not read for abstract meaning” (Loganbill
55). In fact, Lewis suggests that myth in its very nature has a greater capacity to relate truth than
any other medium because humanity may employ stories to impart and receive concepts that
cannot be expressed in straightforward language, or even in the types of symbols which allegory
employs. As Mark Freshwater suggests, “in allegory, the images stand for concepts. In myth, the
images symbolize and imagine something which cannot be reduced to a concept” (38). Alison
Searle presents Lewis’ definition of the ‘mythic’ as, “the quality of literature that provides such
‘intimations of transcendence,’ which break into the relative smallness of an empirical,
naturalistic mindset, with the sense of something greater, more beautiful, eternal” (231)—a
definition which clarifies Lewis’s own claims about myth and the “true myth,” and illuminates
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the space trilogy as a series in which the supernatural fantasy genre “break[s]” in on the
empirically minded genre of science fiction.
In the essay “Myth Became Fact,” Lewis outlines his philosophy concerning myth’s
impact and its relation to the Christian story. He argues that when we read myths, we “are not
looking for an abstract ‘meaning’ at all. If that was what you were doing the myth would be for
you no true myth but a mere allegory” (“Myth” 66). Furthermore, he confirms the existence of
the Christian story as the “true myth,” suggesting that it is just like any and every other myth,
with the single, compelling distinction that it is true, and thereby the source of mythology:
Now as myth transcends thought, Incarnation transcends myth. The heart
of Christianity is a myth which is also a fact. The old myth of the Dying
God, without ceasing to be myth, comes down from the Heaven of legend
and imagination to the earth of history. (“Myth” 66)
The point of all this returns to Lewis’s assertion that myths can convey special truth. Lewis
states, “I suspect that men have sometimes derived more spiritual sustenance from myths they
did not believe than from the religion they professed” (67), and concludes that because God—the
origin and creator (or poet) of the universe—is “mythopoeic,” mankind must therefore be
“mythopathic” (67). Myth, by this estimation, must be the most fundamental medium for the
revelation of truth.
In Lilith, God, or the origin of all things, is repeatedly characterized as Love, Truth, Light
and Life, all of which are not only titles God assigns to himself at various points in scripture, but
also the things towards which all of the creatures in the novel ultimately gravitate. And as these
creatures become loving, truthful, full of light and alive, they in turn create loving, truthful,
enlightened and live things. This culminates in the novel’s end, for it is at the very climax of
Vane’s ascent towards the creator that he is sent home from this other world, or perhaps simply
from a vast and beautiful dream. Vane longs for that inexpressible sense of purpose and truth and
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sometimes despairs in his return to his former life, yet reflects, “In moments of doubt I cry,
‘Could God Himself create such lovely things as I dreamed?’ ‘Whence then came thy dream?’
answers Hope” (Lilith 196). Even if the entirety of the narrative was simply the creation of Mr.
Vane’s mind, he recognizes that his creative ability and its resulting fantasies stem from a divine
inventive source and therefore appreciates the knowledge that the emotions inspired by his own
myth are an echo of the true myth that created his mind.
After examining the motif of God as the creative origin of all things in Lilith, one may
easily imagine how C. S. Lewis reached his own unique conclusions about mythopoeia under the
tutelage first of MacDonald’s fairy tales and later of Barfield, Tolkien, Dyson, and others.
MacDonald’s fantastic renderings of the Romantic metanarrative, infused with Biblical richness,
instilled in Lewis the foundations for his lifelong convictions about faith and story. Throughout
his literary career Lewis would continue to employ these concepts of mythopoeia and the “true
myth” in his own fiction. Thus MacDonald’s spiritually rich fantasy narratives provide the basis
for half of the genre equation in the space trilogy, the other half being supplied by H. G. Wells.
H. G. Wells: The Father of (C. S. Lewis’s) Science Fiction
While MacDonald enjoys a widely accepted and celebrated influence on Lewis, scholars
are often reluctant to admit any similarity between Lewis and H. G. Wells. This reluctance has
many roots, but its primary source is a hesitance to connect Lewis with an author and thinker
who placed such great faith in science and progress, particularly that involving evolutionary
theory. In one such case, John West and his fellow contributors to The Magician’s Twin: C. S.
Lewis on Science, Scientism, and Society (2012) aim to establish Lewis as a believer in
“intelligent design,” and make numerous efforts to distance Lewis from evolutionary theory,
citing his many departures from modern scientific values. Clearly, there are vast differences
between Lewis and Wells, and they certainly did not share an identical faith, or even an identical
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perspective on nature and science, but their scientific and sociological outlooks are probably not
as antithetical as many scholars would suggest, for even West admits that “Lewis distinguished
cosmic evolutionism from the ‘science’ of evolution” (137).
In a 1951 letter to Dom Bede Griffiths, Lewis expresses an apparently theistic
evolutionary mindset, stating, “As to Man being in ‘evolution,’ I agree, tho’ I wd. rather say ‘in
process of being created’” (Vol. I 111). In fact, even when Lewis corresponds with Bernard
Acworth, founder of the Creationist movement, he carefully avoids a disavowal of belief in
evolutionary theory, saying, “I must confess [your book] has shaken me: not in my belief in
evolution, which was of the vaguest and most intermittent kind, but in my belief that the question
was wholly unimportant” (Vol. III 138). He continues to explain that the thing that most
convinced him in Acworth’s book was “not so much your arguments against [evolution] as the
fanatical and twisted attitudes of its defenders” (138). Clearly it is not the scientific theory of
evolution with which Lewis takes exception, but rather the elevation of that theory into an
aggressive, quasi-religious ideology.
While the exact nature of Lewis’s investment in evolutionary theory is unclear (he
himself calls it “vague” and “intermittent”), it is important to recognize that he is invested in
evolutionary thought, and finds that material narrative not only unthreatening to his Christian
beliefs, but mutually enriching. Indeed, evolution (and, along with it, degeneration—a very
Victorian concern in itself) crops up in almost all of Lewis’s fictional works, as well as in The
Problem of Pain (1940) and Mere Christianity (1952). In all of these textual examples, the
material process of evolution is connected not only to physical development, but also to spiritual
development, just as Lewis connects it in his letter to Griffiths, wherein he discusses the
necessity for “doing full & generous justice to the Natural while also paying unconditional &
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humble obedience to the Supernatural” (Vol. III 111). In fact, Lewis’s sympathy, even interest, in
the spiritual possibilities within evolutionary narrative is one that he shares with George
MacDonald. Roderick McGillis notes that “MacDonald, like many of his Victorian
contemporaries, interprets Darwin’s theory of evolution as teleological” (“Childhood and
Growth” 157), and, indeed, MacDonald employs evolutionary concepts in his fiction (in
particular, many of MacDonald’s characters undergo a physical degeneration as they grow
spiritually wicked).84 He also integrates evolutionary ideas into his theology, writing in one of
his Unspoken Sermons that God is “ever uttering himself in the changeful profusions of nature”
and “takes millions of years to form a soul that shall understand him and be blessed” (“The
Child” 23). Lewis owned a copy of MacDonald’s Unspoken Sermons, and his marginal notes
evidence multiple readings, making it impossible to imagine that he was unaware of
MacDonald’s evolutionary undertones in this particular instance, or elsewhere. The point, of
course, is not that Lewis learns evolutionary theory from MacDonald, but that he, like his
predecessor, is amicable to the science behind it, and willing to integrate it into his creative
work.
While Lewis encounters occasional infusions of material, or evolutionary, narrative in the
predominantly spiritual narratives of George MacDonald, he primarily consumes evolutionary
narratives through the Victorian science fiction of Wells. Of all influences on the space trilogy,
Wells’s is most overt. Lewis read, enjoyed, and internalized not only the specific conventions of
Wells’s science fiction, but also the scientific narratives that characterize it. Countless scholars
have analyzed Wells’s The Time Machine (1895) and The First Men in the Moon (1901;
probably Wells’s best romances, and Lewis’s consistent favorites) for their scientific outlook,
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specifically as relates to evolutionary theory.85 The Time Machine utilizes time travel to provide
a futuristic look at earth and the degeneration, or devolution, of humanity, first into the childish
Eloi and monstrous Morlocks, and finally into utter extinction. The First Men in the Moon
presents the reader with travel through space, rather than time, but the result is much the same; in
the Selenites we find once again a species whose evolutionary trajectory is troubling. In both
novels, Wells employs an overt evolutionary narrative to warn society against the dehumanizing
effects of industrialization and class division implicit in a holistic application of evolutionary
theory. He ultimately utilizes the evolutionary narrative to imagine the scientific progress
necessary for time and space travel, to make predictions about the future, and, perhaps more than
anything else, to comment on the present state of earth.
H. G. Wells appears in Lewis’s letters in 1909, when he reads The First Men in the Moon
(Vol I 11), and Lewis continues to mention Wells’s works throughout his early life, not always
with pleasure, but always with interest. He writes to his father in 1917, “Being interested in
[Wells] is a very different thing from liking him,” and admits in 1920, “I am inclined to agree
with you […] about the lack of charm in Wells: but there are other qualities as important, if less
delightful” (Vol I 335;475). These sort of comments, as well as assertions that Jules, the
pompous yet ignorant puppet of the NICE in That Hideous Strength, is modeled upon Wells,
have led critics of science fiction and Lewis alike to assume that Lewis despised Wells, and that
he wrote the space trilogy as a sort of anti-Wellsian series. Peters, Downing (Planets 36),
Herrick, and Dickerson and O’Hara (163-65) all propose Lewis’s opposition to Wells. In The
Science Fiction of H. G. Wells Frank McConnell reads Lewis’s space trilogy as an unfair
caricature of Wells:
It used to be fashionable to speak of [Wells], if at all, as a historical curio of
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English letters, the author of a few interesting realistic novels and a few more
vastly entertaining tales that ‘fathered’ the minor genre of science fiction; but, ran
the conventional appraisal, the young author of those interesting stories turned, by
the second decade of the twentieth century, into a windy and pompous bore, a
shrill controversialist whose dismal themes were the glory of technology, the
irrelevance of the fine arts, and the coming wonders of the Age of the Scientific
Man. (McConnell 12)
While such a depiction of Wells may seem to lurk beneath the surface of Lewis’s cosmic series
(most obviously in the character of Jules), the reading is exaggerated at best. A more appropriate
reading, however, is Sanford Schwartz’s. Schwartz argues that there are “surprising similarities
between the ‘unfallen’ worlds of Mars and Venus and the seemingly antithetical ‘evolutionary
model’ propounded by the terrestrial invaders” and that “Malacandra […] should be viewed not
as the polar opposite but as the transfiguration or ‘up-grading’ of the Wellsian war between the
species” (12). Indeed, close attention to Lewis’s various writings reveals that he was simply not
as antagonistic to Wells as many critics would suggest.
Lewis openly admires Wells’s romances in several places, and even defends Wells from
early critics of the space trilogy who suggested an antipathy between himself and Wells. In
December of 1938 Lewis wrote to Roger Lancelyn Green, in response to a letter about his
recently published Out of the Silent Planet:
I like the whole interplanetary idea as a mythology and simply wished to conquer
for my own (Christian) pt. of view what has always hitherto been used by the
opposite side. I think Wells’ 1st Men in the Moon the best of the sort I have read.
(Vol. II 236)
This particular passage has been used as proof of Lewis’s wish to rewrite, write against, even
“conquer” H. G. Wells’s science fiction; unfortunately, such an interpretation neglects the
complexity of Lewis’s comment. Lewis states first that he likes mythopoeic science fiction,
second that he wished to write such a work from a Christian perspective (or perhaps, for our
purposes, wished to blend a scientific mythology with a Biblical one), and thirdly suggests that
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of the mythopoeic science fictions he has read, Wells’s is the best. From this comment, we can
actually assume that Lewis is more interested in imitating Wells than he is in undermining him.
It also represents one of many instances when Lewis praises Wells as the best writer of his kind.
In a 1949 letter to I. O. Evans Lewis explains that “in Wells it seems to me that one has first
class pure fantasy (Time Machine, First Men in the Moon) and third class didacticism: i.e. I
object to his novels with a purpose not because they have a purpose but because I think them
bad” (Vol II 918). Again, although Lewis admits a distaste for some of Wells’s literary
approaches, he similarly avows a deep admiration for two of the author’s most famous and
successful romances, emphasizing an aesthetic, rather than ideological displeasure. Finally, in
1957 Lewis writes to Green, in response to his Into Other Worlds: Space-Flight in Fiction, from
Lucian to Lewis:
I think you are too hard on Wells. Obviously, he touches off something in you
which he didn’t in me. I still think that a v. good book indeed and don’t dislike the
Selenites themselves so much as you do. (Vol. III 898-99)
Once again, Lewis downplays any animosity he feels for Wells, instead defending The First Men
in the Moon as laudable fiction. The evidence of Lewis’s personal correspondence, joined with
Wells’s obvious influence on Out of the Silent Planet, suggest that critics have distorted the
authors’ relationship. While Lewis may have disagreed with Wells on many philosophical issues,
he certainly appreciated Wells’s work in science fiction, and clearly utilized the narrative
structures and practices he found in Wells.
Lewis borrows heavily and openly from H. G. Wells in his cosmic trilogy, particularly in
the opening book, Out of the Silent Planet. This first Ransom novel serves to introduce the series
and establish it in a science fiction tradition, yet in Lewis’s very borrowings from Wells rest
clues to his actual artistic goal: a blend of science fiction and fantasy, which becomes more
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overt, even intrusive, as the series continues. While Lewis is happy to follow Wells’ scientific
narratives to great lengths, he finds them incomplete without blending in spiritual aspects as
well.
Before he kicks off his science fiction trilogy with Out of the Silent Planet, Lewis
acknowledges a debt to H. G. Wells as a primary influence in his novel, saying, “The author
would be sorry if any reader supposed he was too stupid to have enjoyed Mr. H. G. Wells’s
fantasies or too ungrateful to acknowledge his debt to them” (Out of the Silent Planet 6). Indeed,
Lewis does not exaggerate this debt, for Wells’s work permeates the opening of the trilogy. Out
of the Silent Planet echoes The Time Machine first through the character of Ransom, who is
largely a revision of the Time Traveler, as well as through the very style of narrative, Lewis’s
narrator resembling Wells’s.
Ransom is strikingly similar to Wells’s Time Traveler. Just as the Time Traveler is
identified with his title as sojourner, Ransom is identified throughout the opening passage of Out
of the Silent Planet only as “the Pedestrian” (7). This title and its capitalization immediately
identifies Ransom with the Time Traveler, and suggests that Ransom’s story is similarly a tale of
travel adventure. Another key similarity between the two men is their social arena—both are
academic, learned men, surrounded by a community of similar scholarly peers. Yet, a distinction
also arises. While the Time Traveler is a man of science, Ransom is a philologist and professor
of the humanities. While the Time Traveler’s journey is one in which he relies on and confirms
his scientific theories of Darwinian evolution and social change (albiet a prophecy of ultimate
doom and extinction), Ransom makes scientific observations yet also experiences spiritual
awakening, discovering that the earth has become a silent planet, a spiritual dead zone, due to a
disunion between science and religion, the empirical and the spiritual, the head and the heart.
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The character of Weston, in particular, serves as a biting commentary on the social theories of
eugenics which the Time Traveler ponders:
For the first time I began to realize an odd consequence of the social effort in
which we are at present engaged. [….] One triumph of a united humanity over
Nature had followed another. [….] We improve our favorite plants and animals –
and how few they are – gradually by selective breeding [….] The whole world
will be intelligent, educated and cooperating; things will move faster and faster
towards the subjugation of Nature. In the end, wisely and carefully we shall
readjust the balance of animal and vegetable life to suit our human needs. (Time
Machine 31)
Weston represents this sort of Darwinian, eugenic mindset, in his strict loyalty to the physical
welfare of mankind, at the expense of all else. He says to the Oyarsa, “No care for hnau. Care for
man” (OSP 138). In this way, the Time Traveler and Ransom share a common insight,
recognizing the futility of humanity’s attempts to take natural selection into their own hands; yet
while the Time Traveler relates a fatalistic prophecy for the inexorable evolution of the world,
Ransom’s journey leads him to an answer for this bleak forecast—a spiritual battle must be won,
as opposed to the purely materialistic battle between the Eloi and Morlocks.
Another similarity between Lewis’s science fiction and The Time Machine is in the
telling of the tale. Lewis seems to have borrowed from Wells the conceit of telling the story from
the eyes of a secondhand witness. In both narratives, the protagonist’s story is told to the reader
through the lens of a third party observer, who both relates, and interprets the story for himself,
thereby guiding the reader’s response to the fantastic story. Both narrators are educated men—
friends and colleagues of these scholarly protagonists—and both struggle with doubts as to the
plausibility of the story.86 Both narratives, however, end with a hint of hope, a cause to believe.
The narrator of the Time Machine finishes his Epilogue with reference to the faded flowers from
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172

the future that are still in his possession, while Out of the Silent Planet ends with a letter from
Ransom himself, lending plausibility to the reality of the story, and giving a closing nod to
Wells: “if there is to be any more space-travelling, it will have to be time-travelling as well . . . !”
(Time Machine 160).
The influence of H. G. Wells’s First Men in the Moon is similarly unmistakable and
again suggests Lewis’s intention to blend genres. Although Lewis and Wells pull from the same
space voyage trope, Out of the Silent Planet finds its birth specifically in Wells’s Cavor and
Bedford: Cavor is Weston, Bedford is Devine, their cavorite spaceship is Weston’s sphere—
down to the detailed explanation of the gravitational center of the vessel—and Lewis revises the
climactic audience with the Grand Lunar as a hearing with the Oyarsa of Malacandra. Ransom is
a new addition to the tale, although even his spiritual and philosophical journey is largely
inherited from Wells’s characterization of Cavor and Bedford. The primary divergence from
Wells in Lewis’s myth is in the nature of the planets visited and the social reality of their
inhabitants.
The moon that Cavor discovers is a veritable anthill of specialized workers. “There are
almost innumerably different forms of Selenites” (First Men 138), Cavor explains, and these
have been organized into a society where every individual performs a highly expert and specific
task. Aided by the most extreme applications of science, the Selenites’ evolution is not naturally
driven, but chemically and mechanically engineered, so that rather than allowing the individual
to grow and discover its special talents and capabilities, society actually manufactures its
members to fulfill particular roles. In this depiction of Lunar society, Mark Hillegas suggests that
Wells is wrestling with one of the inherent paradoxes of his own progressive theories: “how, in
an age of science and technology, can the world achieve economic, social, political stability and
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efficiency and, at the same time, not dehumanize the individual by completely controlling him?”
(Hillegas 52). Wells gives no real answer to this question, and Cavor exhibits simultaneous
feelings of admiration and horror as he observes the flawless, yet inhuman structure of lunar
society. Cavor attests that the Selenites are “colossally, in intelligence, morality and social
wisdom, higher than man” (First Men 138), and explains with satisfaction that, “In the moon
[…] every citizen knows his place. He is born to that place, and the elaborate discipline of
training and education and surgery he undergoes fits him at last so completely to it that he has
neither ideas nor organs for any purpose beyond it” (143). Despite all this admiration for the
social structure in the moon, however, Cavor also witnesses glimpses of the horrible destruction
of individualism and freedom in Selenite society. He stumbles upon “a number of young
Selenites […] who were being compressed to become machine-minders” and later admits, “That
wretched-looking hand sticking out of its jar seemed to appeal for lost possibilities; it haunts me
still” (146). Ultimately, Cavor (and through him, Wells) cannot find any solution between the
need for societal structure and the need for human dignity, for he both admires and abhors the
dystopian society of the Selenites.
Where Wells’s purely scientific narrative can give no answer to the yearning for a
perfectly structured yet free human society, Lewis provides a spiritual solution: an Edenic
paradise. Malacandra is such a society. Instead of being ordered by a central scientific power, the
inhabitants of Malacandra simply pursue and fulfill their natural, “unbent” inclinations. Every
creature naturally enjoys and seeks that which it most excels at and every creature finds
gratification in its natural role. Despite Ransom’s logical attempts to determine the dominant
species on Malacandra, he is continually discredited by his companions. After hearing of the
wisdom of the sorns (the equivalent of Malacandrian naturalists) Ransom thinks to himself,
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“Ah—the intelligentsia […] They must be the real rulers, however it is disguised” (OSP 69). Yet
when he attempts to ask the hrossa “what would happen if the sorns used their wisdom to make
the hrossa do things,” reflecting that this “question did not sound nearly so urgent in this form as
it would have done if he had been able to say ‘used their scientific resources for the exploitation
of their uncivilized neighbors,’” he receives no answer besides a discussion of the sorns’
“inadequate appreciation of poetry” (OSP 69-70). Similarly, the sorn Augray casually dismisses
the poetic passion of the hrossa, valuing his species’s technical, scientific understanding of the
environment around him. The hrossa perform the role of society’s poets, the sorns of its
philosophers and scientists, and the pfifltriggi its skilled laborers, yet none of these roles are
valued or esteemed any higher than the others and all enjoy a healthy anchoring in the natural
world. Again, the text reflects Lewis’s aesthetic approach, for just as the sorns and hrossa
healthily coexist, so the scriptural and evolutionary narratives of fantasy and science fiction are
married in the text. In the unfallen society of Malacandra exists the true socialist ideal: no
alienation, no disillusionment, no manipulation, and perfect egalitarianism—so egalitarian, in
fact, that such a notion in all probability would not exist in the Malacandrian lexicon.
Kanakaberaka, the only pfifltriggi of Ransom’s personal acquaintance on Malacandra is
mystified by Ransom’s description of the distribution of labor on Earth and illustrates the lack of
alienation that exists between the Malacandrian worker and its labor:
All keep the mines open; it is a work to be shared. But each digs for himself the
thing he wants for his work. [….] How would a maker understand working in
suns’ blood unless he went into the home of suns’ blood himself and knew one
kind from another and lived with it for days out of the light of the sky till it was in
his blood and his heart, as if he thought it and ate it and spat it? (OSP 115)
In essence, Lewis presents the naturally occurring utopia possible only in a world free from the
effects of the fall as an answer to the dystopia of Wells’s lunar society. In characteristic fashion,
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Lewis answers Wells’s materialistic paradox with a spiritual solution. While Wells’s pure
science fiction poses questions, Lewis answers those questions with a fusion between science
fiction and fantasy, suggesting that neither genre is entirely complete without the other.
The differences in the cruel, scientific society of the Selenites and the social structure of
peaceful Malacandra largely determine the fates of their respective other-worldly visitors. Once
the Great Lunar hears of the violence and chaos of humanity, he perceives a threat to Lunar
society, and spurred on by fear of such earthly colonizers eliminates Cavor, thereby eliminating
all human potential for space travel. The Oyarsa of Malacandra, on the other hand, tells Weston,
“one thing we left behind us on the harandra: fear. And with fear, murder and rebellion. The
weakest of my people does not fear death” (OSP 140). Rather than killing the human threat to
Malacandra, Oyarsa instead sends them back to the planet from which they came, and simply
disembodies their spacecraft to discourage further cosmic exploration. Nonetheless, both
hearings entail a critique of Earth.
Ultimately, Lewis employs the genre characteristics of Wells’s science fiction in order to
accomplish similar work to Wells. Just as Wells must take his reader to the moon in order to
offer a warning about life on earth, Ransom’s adventures on Mars and Venus are not only
journeys of interplanetary discovery, but open the door to a widening knowledge of Earth and its
place in the cosmos. Yet, even while Lewis mimics Wells’s scientific narrative, he provides
spiritual answers to the philosophical questions implicit in Wells. In order to provide these
answers, Lewis blends the genre conventions he inherits from Wells and from MacDonald,
creating a hybrid genre that combines characteristics of fantasy and science fiction, and, by
virtue of the Victorian genre identities, reconciles a scientific narrative with a Biblical one.
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In fact, Lewis is quite explicit about this genre combination when he writes about the
process through which he began to conceptualize his own science fiction trilogy. He writes on
multiple occasions of David Lindsay’s Voyage to Arcturus (1920), and the way this book
suggested a genre hybrid to him. In October of 1944, he writes to Charles A. Brady:
The real father of my planet books is David Lindsay’s Voyage to Arcturus, [….] I
had grown up on Well’s stories of that kind: it was Lindsay who first gave me the
idea that the ‘scientifiction’ appeal could be combined with the ‘supernatural’
appeal—suggested the ‘Cross’ (in biological sense). His own spiritual outlook is
detestable, almost diabolist I think, and his style crude: but he showed me what a
bang you cd. get from mixing these two elements. (Vol. II 630)
Again, in January of 1947 he writes to Ruth Pitter:
From Lyndsay I first learned what other planets in fiction are really good for: for
spiritual adventures. Only they can satisfy the craving which sends our
imaginations off the earth. Or putting it another way, in him I first saw the terrific
results produced by the union of two kinds of fiction hitherto kept apart: the
Novalis, G. Macdonald, James Stephens sort and the H. G. Wells, Jules Verne
sort. (Vol. II 753)
This second letter reveals not only that Lewis consciously thought of his space trilogy as a blend
between “supernatural” and “scientifiction,” but that he saw these “two kinds of fiction” as
nineteenth century fantasy and Victorian science fiction, mentioning MacDonald and Wells by
name.
Victorian Genre-Blending: George Eliot and Charles Kingsley
Having established Lewis’s conscious blending of Victorian science fiction and fantasy, I
now wish to take the argument a step further. Lewis’s “Science Fantasy” is not simply a
combination of Victorian genre conventions, but is itself a neo-Victorian practice. As I will
demonstrate, Victorians practiced this strange synthesis of spiritual and scientific narratives long
before Lewis took up his nib pen. With the popularization of evolutionary theory that
corresponded with Darwin’s Origin of the Species in 1859 came a literary shift that Gillian Beer
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has explained in Darwin’s Plots: evolution, as an explanation for life, become a central narrative
(even myth) for humanity, and began to shape literary narratives in the same way that the
Biblical narrative of existence had formerly done. As previously stated, this idea has supported
many scholars in their assertions that science effectively replaced faith in Victorian culture, but
such suggestions are a gross exaggeration. Not only did Christianity continue to flourish in
Victorian culture, many Christians willingly embraced scientific advances, finding evolutionary
science compatible with their faith, and many non-Christians maintained an attachment to the
literary potency of Biblical narrative. The result is not only a co-existence between scientific and
Biblical narratives, but, in many cases, a combination of the two.
An important example of these intermingling narratives appears, significantly, in one of
Lewis’s favorite novelists: George Eliot.87 Lewis’s letters establish at least four readings of
Middlemarch (1871-72),88 which he hailed as “by far the best of G. Eliot’s books” (All My Road
262). In Middlemarch Lewis found a delicious nostalgia for the past, and an inspiring narrative
structure. Lewis admits to being “quite ‘caught’ by George Eliot’s books” in a 1918 letter from a
hospital near the French front (Vol. I 362), and Gilchrist suggests that Lewis used such
intellectual landscapes as Eliot’s provincial, by-gone Middlemarch to escape from his modern,
wartime reality. Yet the groundbreaking structure of Eliot’s realism would also influence
Lewis’s own work. In Middlemarch one finds the prime example of what Beer identifies as
“evolutionary narrative,” which Lewis inherits.
Middlemarch (1874), hailed as the pinnacle of realism in the novel and a quintessentially
Victorian—therefore Darwinist—narrative, consists of an intricately connected society and plot,
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See chapter two for more detail about Lewis’s interest in Eliot, and an explanation of the impact her philosophy of
realism may have had on Lewis’s own literary philosophy.
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See Feb. 21, 1918, to Greeves (Vol I 360); Feb. 22, 1918, to Albert (Vol I 362); Feb. 24, 1930, to Greeves (Vol I
883); 1930, to Owen Barfield (Vol III 1521); Jan, 1943, to Greeves (Vol II 549). Also, May 8, 1939, to Dom Bede
Griffiths: “The best of all her books as far as I have read is Middlemarch.” (Vol II 257).
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forming a web that plays out in complex strands of cause and effect, and embodying the sort of
evolutionist mythology that Beer associates with Darwin’s work. This scientific myth appealed
to George Eliot, as someone who turned away from Christian faith in favor of scientific truth and
deep human sympathy; however, in The Reader’s Repentance Krueger traces humanitarian
writing like George Eliot’s to a tradition of women preachers, who used scriptural authority to
attain their own authoritative voices, suggesting that Eliot did not fully abandon her religious
roots, literary or biographical. Indeed, Biblical narratives appear in Middlemarch, coexisting
with the larger evolutionary frame. Interspersed with the famous “parable” of the “pier-glass”
and the narrator’s sympathy for Lydgate’s scientific ambition (264), are references to Dorothea
as saint (“New Theresa” [838]), inferences of Bulstrode’s need for grace, and a general sympathy
for humanity (the narrator is frequently “sorry” for characters [192; 241]) that finds its match in
Christ’s sermon on the mount. Despite religious disinclination, therefore, Eliot illustrates
compatibility between the Biblical and scientific narratives that were intermingling in the lives
and works of Victorians.
Kingsley’s The Water Babies (1863) is another prime example of the multifaceted or
multi-plot Victorian text that blends evolutionary and spiritual narratives. Kingsley, writing in
the wake of Darwin, seeks to promote a Christian message of redemption in his story, yet his
narrative follows evolutionary tracks, mirroring Tom’s spiritual development in his physical
development from boy to water baby to man. Before Tom has turned into a water baby, his
actions are frequently compared to that of a gorilla, and the fairies say of him, “He is but a
savage now, and like the beasts” (39), and after Tom’s transformation the narrator asks of a
supposedly cynical reader, “if a water animal can continually change into a land animal, why
should not a land animal sometimes change into a water animal?” (49). Kingsley also refers
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repeatedly to “the great hippopotamus test” (96), punning on contemporary debates about the
hippocampus minor. All of this evolutionary thought is not, however, meant to suggest a threat to
God, anymore than it can suggest a threat to the existence of water babies, as Kingsley attests
that, “Wise men know that their business is to examine what is, and not to settle what is not”
(48). Kingsley openly embraces Darwin’s theory, yet simultaneously encourages Christian
belief, saying: “You do not know what Nature is, or what she can do; and nobody knows; not
even […] Mr Darwin, […]whom good boys are taught to respect” (46). The overall trajectory of
Tom’s journey is a process of Christian redemption, foreshadowed by his early attraction to a
painting of Jesus and fulfilled through his transformation by the Holy Spirit as Mrs
Bedonebyasyoudid, but Kingsley manages to masterfully interweave his Biblical narrative with
an evolutionary one, suggesting that the two are not only compatible, but potentially identical.
In contrast to Eliot and other Victorian realists, Kingsley’s practice is not only a mixture
of Christian and scientific elements, but a fusion of genres. By mixing scientific elements into
his “Fairy Tale for a Land Baby” (3), Kingsley gives his fantasy a twist of science fiction, and
thereby suggests a hybrid genre. This, of course, is strikingly similar to Lewis’s approach in the
space trilogy, though inverted. Kingsley presents the reader with a fairy tale and injects science
fiction, Lewis presents the reader with science fiction and injects fairy tale.
While it is easy to invoke Kingsley as an illustration of Victorian genre blending and to
maintain that Lewis mimics this practice, the connection between Kingsley’s Water Babies and
Lewis’s space trilogy is rather more elusive. Lewis’s repeated assertion that he first got the idea
to combine scientific and supernatural narratives from David Lindsay’s Voyage to Arcturus
complicates the supposed connection to Kingsley. Nonetheless, two things are undeniably true.
First, Kingsley’s The Water Babies was a significant book in C. S. Lewis’s life. Second, Lewis
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habitually repressed or suppressed certain details of his life from public view, and had reason to
suppress reference to Kingsley’s text.
Apparently The Water Babies was one of Florence Lewis’s prized books, which she read
aloud to her sons, and when she died in 1908, Albert must have put away some of her most
prized volumes, making them inaccessible to the boys. After his father’s death, however, Lewis
regained access to these books, and he relates a seemingly traumatic re-encounter with The
Water Babies in a 1930 letter to Greeves:
It was one of the books belonging to my mother which my father had locked up at
her death and I only recovered at the recent clearance. It was strange—after the
first few pages the most incredibly faint memories began to come about me: she
must have read it, or started to read it, to me when I was very small indeed. I had
even a curious sense of bringing my mother to life—as if she were reading it
through me. The feeling was impressive, but not entirely pleasant. (I don’t mean
that it was at all unpleasant in the commonplace ghostie sense.) The book itself
seems to me not very good. There is some fancy, and I don’t object to the
preaching: but after Macdonald it is tasteless. Put the two side by side and see
how imagination differs from mere fancy, and holiness from mere morality. [….]
it is not very good: but well worth reading. (Vol. I 901)
Despite the book’s being “not very good,” it must have been an object of interest, for he
confesses to “[…]glancing through Mammy’s old copy of the Water Babies[…]” again in a 1939
letter to Warnie (Vol. II 288). Clearly the book was not only familiar to him, but may have
haunted him with complex, even disturbing, feelings about his mother.
Scholars from Tolkien to Downing to Ward have noted Lewis’s selective presentation of
his own life, recognizing that he was prone to leaving out bits that he wished to obscure. 89 It is
popularly remembered that one of his friends, after reading Surprised by Joy, suggested that it
might be better titled Suppressed by Jack (Ward 15). In fact, many biographers and critics attach
this tendency of repression to the death of Florence Lewis, which was the major catastrophe of
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The central argument of Ward’s Planet Narnia is built upon the assumption that Lewis was not always completely
honest (or at least did not always share the whole truth) when discussing his own life and work.
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Lewis’s young life. His mother’s death not only produced Lewis’s first religious doubts, but
effectively alienated him and Warnie from their father, and resulted in their being sent off to the
various boarding schools that Lewis so passionately hated. Downing asserts that Lewis saw the
time before his mother’s death as his true “childhood,” and that this childhood was something
Lewis attempted to return to throughout his life, but particularly in the space trilogy, in which
“the recovery of childhood” is a “master motif” (33). What Downing identifies as “childhood” I
am, of course, characterizing as Blakean innocence, and I perceive the trilogy’s concern as
higher innocence, rather than the recovery of innocence. But the result is the same in reference to
Water Babies. Surely the man who “could call to mind a passage he had seen that week or
something he had read in school decades earlier” (Downing 121), would have had Kingsley’s
Water Babies in his mind while writing a series of books that connected so deeply with the
longing associated with the lost childhood innocence in which his mother read the book to him.90
This seems particularly likely, as his traumatic re-reading of the text occurred in 1930, the year
in which Walter Hooper places Lewis’s first conceptualization of the series (Companion and
Guide 206-208), and we see him leafing through the book again in 1939, having already
published Out of the Silent Planet and potentially planning Perelandra.
Considering the book’s association with his mother, it is unsurprising that Lewis makes
little reference to Water Babies, for he often avoids reference to Florence. A. N. Wilson notes
that she is only “a shadowy figure” in Surprised by Joy (11). Because of this silence, it is
impossible to prove a definite connection between Kingsley’s Water Babies, with its
narrative/genre blending, and Lewis’s science fantasy; nonetheless, Lewis consciously works
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Jane and Mark both demonstrate their movement towards higher innocence by reading stories from their
childhoods; Jane asks for “the Curdie books, please” (THS 160), and Mark reads “a serial children’s story which he
had begun to read as a child but abandoned because his tenth birthday came when he was half way through it and he
was ashamed to read it after that” (358).
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with Victorian genres, and his decision to blend those particular genres is an equally Victorian
convention, whether consciously or subconsciously so.
Romantic Metanarrative in The Space Trilogy: Higher Innocence as “Science Fantasy”
Perhaps the most important outworking of Lewis’s neo-Victorianism in the space trilogy
is his deliberate employment of form to match the central theme of the series: the concept of
“myth become fact,” which he inherits from George MacDonald and Coleridge. In achieving this
thematic harmony, Lewis first introduces the series as though it were purely science fiction, and
introduces fantasy elements into the story with increasing rapidity, so that the reader becomes
jarred by unexpected content, as well as unexpected form. As the series has been traditionally
interpreted as science fiction, rather than a fantasy, I will proceed to explain the formal
characteristics of fantasy as they appear in the series, eventually linking these formal
characteristics to the central theme of “myth become fact.” Ultimately, it becomes clear that
Lewis’s work in combining Victorian science fiction and fantasy is integral to his purpose, as he
needs to fuse the empiricism of science fiction with the supernatural character of fantasy in order
to present the series itself as a sort of factual myth—an embodiment of polarity, and thus higher
innocence.
In order to analyze the Ransom trilogy as fantasy, Farah Mendelsohn’s Rhetorics of
Fantasy (2008) will be particularly helpful. Interpreting the space trilogy through an application
of Mendelsohn’s taxonomy of fantasy, it becomes evident that Lewis is working within
particular fantasy conventions. While they are simultaneously grounded in common scientific
perception, Out of the Silent Planet and Perelandra follow the structure of Mendlesohn’s PortalQuest Fantasies. Similarly, That Hideous Strength deals with modern scientific progress in a
dystopian fashion, yet simultaneously, and significantly, functions as what Mendlesohn identifies
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as Intrusive Fantasy, highlighting the transformative effect of myth become fact. This embodied
myth, possible only through the intrusive story form, is the key event towards which all three
novels tend.
The intrusion of the fantastic into the scientific novel form is therefore Lewis’s deliberate
mirroring of form and content, further emphasizing the Incarnational renewal of the divisions of
fallen reality. Just as the form (body) of the trilogy matches its content (soul), so the renewing
effects of true myth introduce reunion between the dichotomies of body/soul, language/meaning,
and female/male, to name a few. Lewis, whose conversion to Christianity hinged on his
understanding of myth become fact, held this theory of incarnate myth—as achieved through his
genre mixing—as the central resolution not only for That Hideous Strength, but also for his
entire cosmic trilogy, proposing a marriage to fantasy as the answer for the misguided
anthropocentrism of the science fiction genre,91 and re-engaging the Victorian dialogue between
scientific and scriptural narrative.
Mendlesohn sums up the difference between fantasy and science fiction succinctly:
Fantasy, unlike science fiction, relies on a moral universe: it is less an argument
with the universe than a sermon on the way things should be, a belief that the
universe should yield to moral precepts. This belief is most true of the portalquest narratives, and of the intrusion fantasies. (5)
It is questionable whether Lewis was capable of writing anything that denied a moral universe,
and he certainly made no attempt to do so in the interplanetary novels; quite the contrary, in fact.
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The space trilogy has been admitted into the science fiction canon, and yet some prominent science fiction
scholars retain doubts. In Science Fiction: The Illustrated Encyclopedia John Clute’s sole comment on Lewis’s
interplanetary trilogy is the recognition that the series is “much loved by many who dislike S[cience ]F[iction]”
(215). Lewis was an avid reader not only of the scientific romances of Wells, but also the “eschatological” category
of science fiction, concerned with the final destiny of humanity, such as Olaf Stapledon’s Last and First Men (1930)
(“On Science Fiction” 65). This particular type of science fiction, in which the longevity of the human race is upheld
with a sort of inhuman amorality, Lewis considers “brilliant” though “depraved” (66).
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By this definition, therefore, we may analyze his novels within the frame of fantasy, even while
recognizing them as science fiction.
First in the series is Out of the Silent Planet, in which Ransom is unwittingly kidnapped
and taken on a spaceship to Mars. In and of itself, this novel works as a portal-quest story in both
content and style. In addition to informing a reading of the single novel, however, these
characterizations recommend the function of Out of the Silent Planet within the trilogy. While
the novel in itself acts at a portal-quest, the novel within the series acts primarily as a portal, a
door into the rest of the series. As the first in the three books, it sets up the conflict of the trilogy
and then points towards the other stories to come. In this way, it serves as the first step in
Lewis’s tripartite structure of portal/quest/intrusion or innocence/experience/higher innocence.
As far as structure is concerned, Out of the Silent Planet coincides with Mendlesohn’s
portal-quest taxonomy. The structure of the plot is primarily one of “transition and exploration”
(Mendlesohn 2). The narrative details the journey to Malacandra, Ransom’s experiences there,
including his quest to visit the great Oyarsa of that world, and Ransom’s journey back to earth.
Also in correlation with the structure of the typical portal-quest, Ransom’s experience traversing
space (the spaceship being, for all practical purposes, the actual portal) and his exploration of
Malacandra function as a catalyst for his personal growth. Mendlesohn explains that “Although
‘the journey’ is a recognized function-trope in portal-quest fantasies, it is usually interpreted as a
metaphor for a coming of age—it provides a space for the protagonists to grow up” (7), and,
indeed, Ransom undergoes a sort of innocence/experience transition in the novel. Early in the
novel, Ransom is an innocent, as expressed through his role as an unwitting victim. Rather than
saving Harry, an “idiot boy,” from the clutches of Devine and Weston, Ransom takes on the role
of that child, being drugged, kidnapped and taken to space (OSP 10). In this, Ransom actually
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becomes what Elsie Michie calls a “neo-Victorian child, a child, like those evoked in Scott’s and
Stevenson’s novels, that must be kidnapped” (170). What follows in the novel, therefore,
becomes Ransom’s coming of age story, and we follow his growth from innocence to experience
throughout the text. While travelling through space, we are told that Ransom’s position as a
hostage “did not very greatly disquiet him,” in light of the engrossing and surprising things he
learns about the “sweet influence” and “vitality” of space (OSP 31-32). Once on Malacandra,
Ransom uses his extensive knowledge of philology to learn the language and thereby the culture
and history of the planet. The intellectual capacity that enables Ransom to glean information
about the planet is itself a part of the portal-quest outline, as “portal-quest fantasies are full of
learned people, who have read many books” (Mendlesohn 16), yet his interest in Malacandra
also has a childlike curiosity and naivete, to which the Malacandrans are often forced to
condescend. In one such instance, Ransom simplistically tells the hrossa that he “had come out
of the sky,” and instantly finds himself lectured like a child:
Ransom, who had deliberately given a childish version of the truth in order to
adapt it to the supposed ignorance of his audience, was a little annoyed to find
Hnohra painfully explaining to him that he could not live in the sky because there
was no air in it; (67)
As previously discussed in the novel’s relation to Wells, Ransom’s attempts to fit Malacandra
into his own conceptions of evolution and species dominance turn out useless, even naive, and he
must repeatedly take the position of a child, learning from the native species about their world.
Not only the structure of the novel, however, but also the narrative technique establishes this
coming-of-age trope.
The portal-quest structure that Lewis chooses for Out of the Silent Planet provides an
ideal setting in which to infantilize a grown protagonist like Ransom in a non-pejorative manner.
In this type of fantasy, the narrative style “positions both protagonist and reader as naïve”
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(Mendlesohn 2). This naïveté allows the reader to share Ransom’s experience and growth. The
only way to ensure this naïveté in the adult character or reader, however, is to present a reality
that is unknown, or, as in Lewis’s particular case, to present a reality that does not meet typical
expectations. This type of “defamiliarization” serves to “justify the explanation of the world to
the reader,” as well as providing him with a clean slate, equipped “for the process of
familiarization that takes place throughout the novel” (8).
Lewis’s particular brand of protagonist/reader naïveté has to do with typical reader
assumptions, and particularly the common archetypes in the mind of the science fiction reader. In
the Note that precedes Chapter 1, Lewis makes the reader aware of previous science fiction
stories by acknowledging his “debt” to “Mr. H. G. Wells’s fantasies” (OSP 6). Ransom, the
reader’s experiential guide, is similarly aware of traditional Victorian science fiction tropes. “His
mind,” the narrator explains, “was richly furnished with bogies. He had read his H. G. Wells and
others” (35). Apprehensions about the horrible monsters he will meet on Mars build throughout
the journey. These apprehensions, however, prove to be nothing more than childish nursery
fears, thereby functioning for Ransom and the reader as naïveté. Shattered expectations therefore
operate as an allegory of reading, and Ransom, as well as the reader, must abandon their
assumptions in favor of new reading approaches within the science fiction genre.
For Ransom, the letting go of his innocent, ignorant assumptions about the Malacandrans
is a slow realization of experience, for it causes him to look back critically on his own planet,
thereby taking on the knowledge and cynicism of experience. The inhabitants of Malacandra turn
out to be peaceable, intelligent creatures, who slowly assuage Ransom’s childish fears and
ultimately instill in him a deep understanding of the fallen nature of Earth, as opposed to the
unfallen Malacandra. Although, in a portal fantasy, “the fantastic is on the other side and does
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not leak” (Mendlesohn 1), the protagonist’s experience in the fantastic reality often causes
reflection on the world from which the protagonist came. In such moments, “we look back
through the portal to have the frame world described to us as audience” (32). Thus both Ransom
and the reader experience anew the transition from innocence into experience through
defamiliarization and re-familiarization. A striking example of this mirror effect occurs in the
hearing with Oyarsa. Weston zealously describes the “destiny of the human race” and its “right
to supersede,” while Ransom translates his words into the Solar Tongue (135). The effect,
however, of expressing these prevalent Earthly theories in the Malacandran language reveals
their depravity: “He says we have many ways for the hnau of one land to kill those of another
and some are trained to do it. [….] Because of all this, he says it would not be the act of a bent
hnau if our people killed all your people” (135-36).92 Just as Ransom’s past attempts to treat the
native Malacandrans like savages or children have rebounded on him, Weston’s grand theories
come out sounding childish, even savage in translation. In this moment Ransom’s innocence and
therefore childish language serves to contrast with the explicit violence of Weston’s ideology,
heightening the contrast of transition between innocence and experience. This self-reflective
tendency thus highlights not only Ransom’s transition from innocence to experience, but also
lays out the larger metanarrative for the entire series.
Although it functions as a portal-quest, or growth story in itself, Out of the Silent Planet
functions specifically as the portal story of the cosmic series, representing innocence in the larger
tripartite movement of both metanarrative and trilogy. Specifically, this portal functions not only
to open up the fantastic or cosmic reality, but the portal allows Ransom, and therefore the reader,
to recognize the fallen nature of earth and humanity by experiencing an unfallen world. In the
Romantic narrative of the trilogy, this novel particularly depicts innocence and experience, as
92

As previously mentioned, Lewis borrows this particular technique of juxtaposition from First Men in the Moon.
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Ransom understands the depth of Earth’s experience in juxtaposition to Malacandra’s innocence.
The suggestion that Earth is flawed in a way other planets are not is implicit from the moment
Ransom’s innocent assumptions about space and about extra-terrestrials begin to dissolve. In a
way, Ransom’s journey to Malacandra is an anti-fantasy because he discovers the unnatural,
strange and horrific not on Mars, but on Earth. This idea of the Fall, or experience, is
encapsulated in the novel’s climax and turning point: Hyoi’s murder. Ransom has now lived
among the hrossa and begun to practice and admire their ways. The hunting of the hnarka
represents a sort of coming of age ritual for the hrossa, and Ransom’s participation in the killing
of the beast brings about Ransom’s own tragic crash into experience. At the moment Ransom
finally accepts the hrossa as non-alien—“That difficulty […] was now overcome. They were all
hnau” (81)—experience intervenes:
Ransom was deafened by a loud sound—a perfectly familiar sound which was the
last thing he expected to hear. It was a terrestrial, human and civilized sound; it
was even European. It was the crack of an English rifle; and Hyoi, at his feet, was
struggling to rise and gasping. There was blood on the white weed where he
struggled. (81)
The contrast drawn here is starkly Romantic, with the innocent pastoral image of the rustic
fishing boats shattered by the industrial, “civilized” sound of an English rifle. Immediately
Ransom, and the reader, recognize the capacity of humanity to carry experience, or sin, wherever
it goes. “Hyoi,” he says, “it is through me that this has happened. It is the other hmana who have
hit you, the bent two that brought me to Malacandra […] I should have told you. We are all a
bent race” (81). This transformational moment functions as epiphany and call to action for
Ransom. He (and the reader) has plunged into experience, and now longs for higher innocence.
As I have previously discussed, the solution to Ransom’s problem of experience within
the isolated narrative of Out of the Silent Planet is an infusion of higher innocence in content and
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form. Ransom comes to realize that the purely material narrative he has attempted to assign to
Malacandra will not fit. The species do not seem to follow his own ideas about evolution, species
domination and survival of the fittest. The solution, he discovers, is an intermingling of spiritual
narrative with the material narrative of the planet. Thus the Oyarsa is revealed to be not merely a
physically dominant species, but also a spiritual ruler of the planet, clearly signaling for the first
time that this is not merely science fiction, but “science fantasy.” The realization of spiritual
narrative also causes Ransom to reflect on his way back to Earth:
Those handramits [.…] put to shame his original impression that they were
natural valleys. They were gigantic feats of engineering, about which he had
learned nothing; feats accomplished, if all were true, before human history
began… before animal history began. Or was that only mythology? He knew it
would seem like mythology when he got back to Earth (if he ever got back), but
the presence of Oyarsa was still too fresh a memory to allow him any real doubts.
It even occurred to him that the distinction between history and mythology might
be itself meaningless outside the Earth. (144-45)
Malacandra, unlike Earth, enjoys higher innocence, manifest through the polar unity of history
(the material) and myth (the spiritual). The solution is not purely spiritual, and does not abolish
Ransom’s scientific understanding of evolution, instead Malacandran evolution has been both a
spiritual and a physical process, thus evincing growth without violence, competition and
destruction, but instead with greater and more complex harmony. Within Out of the Silent
Planet, this glimpse of “true myth,” and thus of higher innocence, provides resolution to the
innocence/experience plot of the novel. Within the larger series, however, the novel serves
simply as a defamiliarizing taste of innocence, only to send Ransom back to Earth with a deep
understanding of experience, and Earth’s plight within cosmic contexts. Ransom’s realization
that “the distinction between history and mythology might be itself meaningless” only “outside
the Earth” functions as call to action within the trilogy. The conflict of the trilogy is thus
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established: the portal has effectively opened up the cosmos and illuminated Earth’s corruption,
heralding an impending quest for the containment and healing of Earth’s brokenness.
Like Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra functions as a portal-quest fantasy, and thus
another (further) growth narrative for Ransom. This time the portal is not a space ship, but a
coffin, which is supernaturally carried to Venus by the eldils. Again, it is a story of “transition
and exploration,” following Ransom’s journey to Venus, his experience of observing,
understanding, and appreciating the paradisal Perelandran seascape, as well as his interactions
with the innocent and newly-created Mother of that planet. But Perelandra’s function as a quest
story is more defined than that of Out of the Silent Planet, as Ransom is sent to Venus on quest
to protect the planet from evil powers that seek to invade it.
Stylistically speaking, the narrative approach of Perelandra is even closer to
Mendlesohn’s ideal portal-quest, as it employs a standard frame narration. In portal-quests, “the
tales are usually told in third person” and “the listener is represented as if present at the telling of
a tale” (Mendlesohn 1). In Perelandra the narrator, who was identified as “Lewis” only in the
Postscript of Out of the Silent Planet, enters the action of the story, placing Ransom’s story
within the frame of Lewis’s experience. The novel begins with Lewis’s journey to visit Ransom,
providing the characteristic frame. Lewis, in this first chapter, recognizes the reader’s reliance
upon him since “the reader, not knowing Ransom,” could not receive Ransom’s story except
through Lewis’s telling (Perelandra 18). However, Chapter 1 of Perelandra, while confirming
the novel’s characteristic portal-quest narrative style and structure, presents another aspect that
somewhat undermines the classification.
Unlike Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra erodes the characteristic of the portal fantasy
as a type of fantasy in which “individuals may cross both ways [but] the fantastic does not”
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(Mendlesohn 2). In Perelandra the portal leaks. In Chapter 1 Lewis confides a “growing
conviction that, since his return, the eldila were not leaving [Ransom] alone,” citing various
evidences that Ransom “was keeping strange company; that there were—well, Visitors—at that
cottage” (Perelandra 10). Mendlesohn suggests that any leaking of a portal, any occasion in
which the fantastic appears in non-fantastic reality “would move the fantasy into the category of
intrusion, which uses a very different grammar and tone” (2). In fact, it is an intrusion, an eldil,
which appears in Ransom’s home, inviting his entrance into the portal and inciting his quest,
which is the substance of the novel. On the scale of the individual novel, this still functions as a
contained portal-quest fantasy, yet the hint of intrusion is significant for Perelandra’s role within
the series as a whole: it foreshadows the inversion from a portal to an intrusion fantasy in That
Hideous Strength. The momentum towards higher innocence via polar logic of form and content
increases steadily in this novel, beginning with the stark difference in Ransom’s passage to the
planet. Instead of the purely science fiction trope of the space ship, Ransom now travels in a
supernaturally propelled craft. In “On Science Fiction” Lewis suggests that this decision was an
attempt to improve in Perelandra what he should have done better in Out of the Silent Planet: “I
am inclined to think that frankly supernatural methods are best. I took a hero once to Mars in a
space-ship, but when I knew better I had angels convey him to Venus” (69). It seems highly
probable, however, that this remark is a sort of red herring, to distract us from what he was really
up to in the space trilogy. Michael Ward has compellingly argued for Lewis’s interest in “hidden
meanings,” even to the extent that he sometimes deliberately led readers and correspondents
away from the scent of his true literary intentions (5). Ward begins his book with a 1916 letter to
Greeves, in which Lewis reflects that it “is proper in romance, [that] the inner meaning is
carefully hidden” (qtd. in Ward 3). We may readily assume that the transition from scientific to
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angelic propulsion between the first two books of the trilogy was more strategic than Lewis
attests. These supernatural details are hints at the intrusive fantasy to come, and Ransom’s means
of conveyance signal the steadily increasing presence of the supernatural. Lewis may well have
wished to obfuscate this movement somewhat in order to hide the meaning behind it, so that the
reader could experience and enjoy the supernatural intrusion, rather than merely contemplating
it.
Yet Perelandra is not a purely spiritual narrative. While Out of the Silent Planet began as
a material narrative and then integrated supernatural elements, Perelandra at first appears to be
primarily concerned with spiritual matters, but these matters turn out to have serious, material
requirements and repercussions. Where Out of the Silent Planet functioned as a portal in the
series and found its turning point in the recognition of experience, Perelandra operates primarily
as a quest and centers around an event of higher innocence attained through sacrifice, so that the
very center, or crux, of the trilogy itself is the incarnation myth, an echoing of the original
instance of “myth become fact.” Ransom’s quest on Perelandra is to defend the planet from the
“Dark Lord,” the “depraved Oyarsa of Tellus” who “is meditating some sort of attack on
Perelandra” (Perelandra 32-33). The ensuing battle between Ransom and the newly possessed
professor Weston is deeply saturated with Christological imagery, but only after Ransom has
grasped its physical component. At first, he attempts to avert the Lady’s spiritual ruin through
philosophical and theological abstraction, discoursing with the Lady and the Un-man for days on
end. Finally, however, he grows weary, admitting that “but for a miracle, the Lady’s resistance
was bound to be worn away in the end” (140). A moment later he realizes that “he himself was
the miracle” (141), and then considers the possibility of a physical altercation with the Un-man,
reflecting:
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It stood to reason that a struggle with the Devil meant a spiritual struggle . . . the
notion of a physical combat was only fit for a savage. [….] no such crude,
materialistic struggle could possibly be what Maleldil really intended. [….] It
would degrade the spiritual warfare to the condition of mere mythology. But here
he got another check. Long since on Mars, and more strongly since he came to
Perelandra, Ransom had been perceiving that the triple distinction of truth from
myth and of both from fact was purely terrestrial—was part and parcel of that
unhappy division between soul and body which resulted from the Fall. Even on
earth the sacraments existed as a permanent reminder that the division was neither
wholesome nor final. The Incarnation had been the beginning of its
disappearance. In Perelandra it would have no meaning at all. (143-44)
Thus Ransom enters the battle after recognizing a polar logic between the mythic and the real,
that “the distinction between fact and myth, was purely terrestrial” (147), and that, in this world
he can assume the figure of the Christ myth. After a long, desperate struggle involving equal
amounts of physical and spiritual strain, Ransom and the Un-man find themselves in utter
darkness. Ransom succeeds in choking the monster and, like Christ, spends roughly three days in
the darkness. He eventually crushes the head of the Un-man—alluding to the Genesis 13:15
prophecy concerning the serpent and Eve’s seed—and emerges victorious, yet permanently
scarred. After recovering, Ransom recognizes “his most serious injury. It was a wound in his
heel. The shape made it quite clear that the wound had been inflicted by human teeth” (187).
This wound seals Ransom’s embodiment of Christ on Perelandra; it represents the stigmata of
the Christ and the wound from the serpent that bites his heel. Ransom’s presence on Perelandra
now consists of a polar logic between his real, physical self, and his spiritual representation of
Christ, thus paradoxically embodying a reality and a myth, engaged simultaneously in physical
and spiritual battle. Ultimately, it represents his ascent to higher innocence, as someone who has
become “true myth.”
In fact, higher innocence becomes, once again, the solution to the conflict of Perelandra,
just as it served in Out of the Silent Planet. Ransom, by enacting factual myth, achieves the
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higher innocence in which he will be depicted in That Hideous Strength. But it is not only
Ransom that reaches this state, but also the inhabitants of Perelandra. Diverging from Milton’s
fortunate fall and Blake’s necessity of experience, Lewis suggests that higher innocence is
possible (if only outside of Earth) without passing through experience, for the King and Queen of
Perelandra remain unfallen, yet grow “older.” Tor explains, “Maleldil sent you into our world at
that day when the time of our being young drew to its end” (208). The King and Queen of
Perelandra are able to grow “older” without aging or dying because Ransom (in Christ fashion)
takes their potential experience upon himself, enacting the necessary violence of that state on the
Un-man. Thus, while the Lady can say “I am older now” (61), she does not experience the
disenchantment from which Ransom’s actions protect her, and we find in her an uninterrupted
polar unity: “Opposites met in her and were fused in a fashion for which we have no images”
(64). Tor clearly expresses this state of non-experienced higher innocence:
There is an ignorance of evil that comes from being young: there is a darker
ignorance that comes from doing it, as men by sleeping lose the knowledge of
sleep. [….] But Maleldil had brought us out of the one ignorance, and we have not
entered the other. (209)
While it is tempting to view Perelandra as a story merely of innocence maintained, it actually
reinforces the same overarching drive towards higher innocence that guides the entire space
trilogy, and drives Ransom back to Earth, to bring similar transformation in the terrestrial sphere.
Perelandra functions as the crux of the trilogy in many senses. It is the central book, and
its turning point rests on a reiteration of the Christ myth, suggesting a literal and figurative
“cross.” This instance of “myth become fact” within the text—Ransom stepping into the role of
Christ—also signals the polar logic of Lewis’s genre blending activity. And, indeed, Lewis
recognizes these connections (although subtly) in his famous letter to Charles A. Brady, writing
that “the ‘scientifiction’ appeal […] combined with the ‘supernatural’ appeal—suggested the
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‘Cross’ (in biological sense)” of genre (Vol II. 630). Although Lewis parenthetically clarifies that
he is making a biological reference with the word “Cross,” his capitalization implies that he is
also thinking about an actual cross, in fact, the cross of Christ, which itself represents to him both
a spiritual and a scientific turning point, the primary instance of true myth. He attests in Mere
Christianity (1952), “People often ask when the next step in evolution—the step to something
beyond man—will happen. […] it has happened already. In Christ a new kind of man appeared”
(62), and in The Problem of Pain (1940), written within a year of Perelandra, he identifies the
evolutionary development of humanity as a “long spiritual preparation” for the “catastrophic
historical event” of Christ’s incarnation, the original myth become fact (21). 93 Ransom’s
reenactment of the Christ myth in Perelandra serves as a perfect hinge for all of Lewis’s genre
blending, polarity of form, and polarity of content, as it is both a materially real, physical
struggle, yet simultaneously a spiritual one, both representative of Christ’s material and spiritual
victory over death on Earth. In this way the climax at the center of the middle book in the cosmic
trilogy presents a fusion not only between science fiction and fantasy, material and spiritual, fact
and myth, but also between form and content by serving as the literal cross in the series. It also
mimics not only the Biblical metanarrative, but also the cosmic narrative which Lewis himself
creates in the series. Lewis has clearly made this concept of Incarnation (with all its polar
implications) the center of his trilogy, and indeed, he makes the actual Incarnation the center of
his fictional universe, for it is the turning point of all worlds. Thus, the Lady of Perelandra
informs Ransom that all hnau have taken human form since the Incarnation: “Since our Beloved
became a man, how should Reason in any world take on another form? [….] That is all over.
Among times there is a time that turns a corner and everything this side of it is new. Time does
93

Hooper suggests that Lewis wrote The Problem of Pain from the summer of 1939 through the spring of 1940
(Companion 295). Lewis’s first mention of Perelandra is in a 1941 letter, but his description suggests that he has
already written through chapter 5 (Companion 224).
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not go backward” (62). Just as the Incarnation serves as a crossroads in cosmic history, so
Ransom’s stepping into a mythic, salvific role on Perelandra serves as the major crossroads for
the trilogy, as this experience forges Ransom into a bridge by which the powers of Heaven will
proceed to invade Earth.
That Hideous Strength is the answer to all of the questions raised in the first two
interplanetary novels. While Out of the Silent Planet functions within the series as a portal
transition from innocence to experience—opening the cosmic reality of the fantastic, or mythic,
and simultaneously reflecting the corruption of earthly reality—Perelandra functions as a quest
to protect innocence and reach higher innocence—the reward for Ransom’s accomplishment of
this quest being a submersion in the harmony of true myth and the revelation that this polarity is
an answer to earth’s depravity. In fact, Ransom now becomes the bridge by which the Heavenly
powers may enter Earth. That Hideous Strength must necessarily, therefore, function as the
culmination of the forward momentum created through the innocence and experience tropes, and,
as this culmination requires the embodiment of true myth, it also requires the form that
Mendelsohn designates as intrusion fantasy.
Because That Hideous Strength is set on Earth, it cannot feasibly take the portal-quest
form of Out of the Silent Planet or Perelandra, which requires both protagonist and reader to be
unfamiliar with the setting. In order for the reader to experience the intrusive in its full force, the
point of view character must be one who is familiar with Earth, but unfamiliar with the fantastic.
“Unlike the portal fantasy, which it otherwise strongly resembles,” Mendlesohn remarks,
“protagonists and the reader [of an intrusion fantasy] are never expected to become accustomed
to the fantastic” (xxii). Thus, in practical terms, it is impossible for Ransom to be the protagonist,
or focalizing character in That Hideous Strength. At this stage in the trilogy Ransom is so
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familiar with the fantastic as to have become its representative, and, as the reader eventually
discovers, its embodiment. The narratorial voice can no longer depend upon Ransom as a naïve
protagonist and must therefore achieve point of view from the characters of Jane and Mark
Studdock, who are positively ripe with naïveté. This fact answers, in the most practical terms of
artistic craftsmanship, the complaint of many readers regarding Ransom’s apparent distance in
That Hideous Strength, because keeping the narrative close to Ransom would, in effect, spoil all
the interest of the story and cause the structure of the intrusion fantasy to dissolve into absurdity.
For the purposes of this particular story, to know the mind of Ransom would be as anticlimactic
as knowing the mind of God—there would be no surprises—thus the necessity for new “readers”
within the text, namely Jane and Mark.
The use of Mendlesohn’s taxonomy for the intrusion fantasy is, however, not as simple as
the application of her portal-quest fantasy to the earlier books. Mendlesohn writes, “The
trajectory of the intrusion fantasy is straightforward: the world is ruptured by the intrusion,
which disrupts normality and has to be negotiated with or defeated, sent back whence it came, or
controlled” (115). This construction is applicable to That Hideous Strength as concerns the
intrusion of the dark eldila under cover of NICE. Most of the intrusion fantasies Mendlesohn
cites are horror stories, such as Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897), and the scenes set in Belbury
betray a stylistic flare towards horror: the slavering and artificial breathing of the bodiless Head,
the seeming ubiquity of Wither’s hunched, glazy-eyed form stalking the corridors and grounds of
the mansion, the unrealized impression of dark, dank cells where Fairy Hardcastle has her
“private pleasures” with “little fluffy” girls (THS 157; 345). All of these add to the traditional
latency of the horror novels to which Mendlesohn applies the intrusion fantasy. They also apply
well to the nineteenth century Gothic tradition, which Schwartz has noted as a major influence in
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That Hideous Strength. However, within That Hideous Strength there is not only the intrusion of
the depraved eldila, but also the intrusion of Deep Heaven: the embodiment of myth that brings
renewal.
Despite the apparent inconsistency of a beneficent intrusion fantasy, Mendlesohn admits
that “any story into which magic intrudes fits this category,” whether the magic is good or evil
(121). Furthermore, she cites examples of what she calls “indigenous fantasies,” in which the
fantastic is some geographically based myth or legend, suggesting that in these situations “it is
necessary (as in the portal-quest fantasies) to emphasize continually the need to ally with the
‘good’ intrusion” (153). Ransom’s embodiment of the Arthurian myth is just this sort of
“indigenous fantasy,” for it is the mythology of Britain, of Logres. Thus, Tolkien’s complaint
about the misplaced Arthurian “stuff” in the trilogy is partially answered by the necessity of
beneficent intrusion as the trilogy’s ultimate solution, as well as the practical implementation of
such beneficent intrusion.
The movement from denial to acceptance of the magical is another characteristic of the
intrusion fantasy that functions as an integral part of That Hideous Strength. Mendlesohn
observes that, “For all that the intrusion fantasy appears—usually—to be a ‘this world’ fantasy,
the narrative leads always toward the acceptance of the fantastic, by the reader if not the
protagonist” (Mendlesohn 115). In this light, the intrusion fantasy is, in essence, a call for the
reader to adopt a new perspective on her own world—a notion that applies to Lewis’s scope of
vision within the trilogy and within his hybrid genre form. The purported goal of the intrusion
story, by this definition, is to convince the protagonist and reader of the existence of true myth:
“The intrusion of the fantastic is matched by a dragging of the protagonist into its range, or into
the ‘true story’ of the world” (Mendlesohn 137). This hearkens back to Mendlesohn’s assertion
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that fantasy, as opposed to science fiction, “is less an argument with the universe than a sermon
on the way things should be, a belief that the universe should yield to moral precepts” (5). The
sermon metaphor aligns with an explanation of intrusion fantasy as “a narrative of
convincement,” for its central drive is a recognition of the true myth (148).
In this way, the intrusion fantasy becomes the best formal expression of Lewis’s
Coleridgean polarity. The sort of story that forces both protagonist and reader to accept the
existence of the supernatural in the real world draws its reader, by its very nature, towards an
engagement of the Primary Imagination, balancing two seemingly opposing ideas in union. Just
as Lewis embodies Higher Innocence through the fusion of science fiction and fantasy, material
and spiritual narrative, so he once again embraces this central theme through the content and
narrative structure of That Hideous Strength. Once we understand his polar logic, we also begin
to understand his seemingly random, chaotic, even disturbing choices in this controversial book.
In fact, we recognize that without the jarring tensions the book would lose its potency altogether.
Thus, higher innocence creeps in through a process of eliminating denial and eliciting
acceptance of true myth within That Hideous Strength, but the process also plays a major role in
the momentum of the trilogy as a whole, and represents the fictional embodiment of Lewis’s
formal hybridization. The transformational moment both for the novel and for the entire cosmic
series is the same. The pivotal moment of acceptance, the moment in which myth becomes fact,
is in Jane’s first meeting with Ransom—the Pendragon—at St. Anne’s. As Jane approaches the
house she realizes that “she was standing on the shore of a little green sun-lit island looking
down on a sea of white fog, furrowed and ridged yet level on the whole, which spread as far as
she could see” (THS 135). This island rising out of a sea of mist is a real-life echo of the isle of
Avalon, hinting that it is the residence of Britain’s mythic protector. Jane is ushered inside and
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upstairs to the Blue Room where “the Director” resides (for Ransom has not been openly
identified, or seen, at this point in the novel). Upon entering his chamber, “She looked and her
world was unmade” (140). Ransom’s higher innocence is reflected in characteristic MacDonald
fashion, through his apparent agelessness. Jane first perceives him to be “a boy, twenty years
old,” but reflects that “no boy could have so full a beard. And no boy could be so strong. [….]
this face was of no age at all” (139-40), for Ransom has become a human myth. The result of this
mythic intrusion is an instantaneous influence of renewal over the major divisions inherent in
Jane’s fallen, human experience:
For the first time in many years the bright solar blend of king and lover and
magician which hangs about the name stole back upon her mind. For the first time
in all those years she tasted the word King itself with all linked associations of
battle, marriage, priesthood, mercy, and power. At that moment, as her eyes first
rested on his face, Jane forgot who she was, and where, and her faint grudge
against Grace Ironwood, and her more obscure grudge against Mark, and her
childhood and her father’s house. It was, of course, only for a flash. Next moment
she was once more the ordinary social Jane, flushed and confused to find that she
had been staring rudely […] at a total stranger. But her world was unmade; she
knew that. Anything might happen now. (THS 140)
In this flash, Jane experiences the power of true myth to heal such divisions as those between
language and meaning, philosophy and reality, the physical and the spiritual, and male and
female. In her deepened understanding of the word King, she experiences the reunion of a word
and its true meaning. In forgetting her grudge against Grace she experiences a reunion between
the philosophical ideas embodied in the name and person of Miss Ironwood, with the reality of
that person. By forgetting her misgivings towards Mark, and the socialization of growing up in
her “father’s house”—which one may assume to have been suffocatingly patriarchal, being
identified by her father’s very possession of it—Jane tastes a reunion between the sexes and a
resolution to the tensions of male and female gender relations. Later in their conversation Jane
also recognizes a reunion between humanity and nature as she watches Ransom share his crumbs
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with a family of mice. This unmaking and remaking of Jane’s world—with the admission that
“anything might happen now”—is the acceptance characteristic of Mendlesohn’s intrusion
fantasy. Ransom, who embodies a reunion between myth and fact (providing in content what
Lewis has already practiced through his “science fantasy” form), is the catalyst for the healing of
all of the major schisms in Jane’s experience and in the novel. Furthermore, this movement from
denial to acceptance runs not only through That Hideous Strength, but through the entire trilogy,
building up towards the climactic encounter between Jane and Ransom.
In Out of the Silent Planet, Ransom (and therefore the reader) traverses a portal which
opens up the world of fantasy to his comprehension, revealing the fallenness of Earth in
juxtaposition to the unfallen nature of Malacandra. Perelandra functions within the series as a
quest in which Ransom (and therefore the reader) attains higher innocence in the unfallen
cosmos and implicitly apprehends Earth’s similar need for the renewing force of myth become
fact. In That Hideous Strength, therefore, Ransom himself becomes the true myth which is
needed to renew Earth’s fallenness and the reader is, once again, entreated to share in the
experience of the point of view character, accepting Ransom as Pendragon, and thus accepting
the reality of true myth. It could even be posited that this artistic manipulation is Lewis’s way of
testing his reader’s faith—seeing if they will accept the intrusion, on a contextual and stylistic
level. In this moment of pivotal transformation for the point of view character and the reader,
Lewis achieves the climax of his space trilogy—a flash in which higher innocence is depicted
through Ransom’s embodiment and Jane’s revelatory experience, but also through a unity of
image and form. The seeming tension of the intrusive fantasy thus actually brings a balance and
unity which the narrative would otherwise lack.
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With Jane’s acceptance of true myth, and thus of higher innocence, we see her undergo a
re-enactment of her various stages of development. Travelling home after seeing Ransom, she is
described as being “so divided against herself that there were three, if not four, Janes in the
compartment” (147). “The first” Jane is a representation of her innocent self, which is “simply
receptive of the Director” and “delight[ed],” while the “second” Jane represents experience,
being “grown-up,” “regard[ing] the first with disgust,” and identifying the first (innocent) Jane as
a “girl” (148). The “third Jane” is the debatable presence to which the narrator’s “if not four”
refers, and represents simply Jane’s conscience, reflecting on herself, and thus flowing into “the
larger experience of the fourth Jane” (148). Finally, this fourth Jane is “simply in a state of joy,”
a state of higher innocence—Joy in Lewis’s famous sense—which is now “supreme” over all the
other Janes (149). The supremacy of this fourth Jane signals the ultimate resolution of the novel,
and of the series, which is to come.
Yet, as the series winds down, it appears to wind up, for another characteristic of the
intrusion fantasy is that of escalation. In Mendlesohn’s words, “Escalation—of many kinds—is
an important element of the rhetoric” of the intrusive fantasy (xxii). In order to stave off
familiarization in the protagonist and reader, the magical element must necessarily increase,
whether in a quantitative or qualitative fashion; in addition to increased numbers, the intrusions
“seem to get louder” (Mendlesohn 153). Upon the appearance of the Intrusion (Ransom as myth
become fact), the escalation of intrusions in That Hideous Strength seems to increase speed, next
in Merlin’s appearance and finally culminating in the “descent of the gods” and “the banquet at
Belbury” (THS 317; 340). The god’s descent over St. Anne’s is heralded by an increase in
volume. First, it begins as a “region of tingling sounds” in the lobby outside the Blue Room
(317), then, as the first god (Viritrilbia or Mercury) descends everyone in the kitchen “of a
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sudden […] all began talking loudly at once” (318). By the time Jove, or Jupiter, has arrived, the
kitchen of St. Anne’s is a veritable wingding: “No one afterwards knew how it happened but
somehow the kettle was put on, the hot toddy was brewed. Arthur—the only musician among
them—was bidden to get out his fiddle. The chairs were pushed back, the floor cleared. They
danced. [….] it involved beating the floor, clapping of hands, leaping high” (323). This
escalation, represented here by music and dance, is itself a depiction of the advent of higher
innocence, or Joy, which Lewis so frequently associates with the great power of music. The
beneficent intrusion at St. Anne’s escalates into joyous celebration, but this intrusion looks quite
different within the sinister halls of Belbury.
In the case of the “banquet at Belbury” episode, the formal concept of escalation is
particularly helpful as it explains an aspect of That Hideous Strength that is deeply troubling.
The steadily escalating nature of the evil Oyarsa’s intrusion on Earth (which, one must
remember, has been evident since the beginning of Perelandra, and therefore growing over the
course of two novels) sheds light on what could only be characterized as scenes of giddy,
frenzied bloodshed in the rectification of Belbury. George Orwell summarizes these sequences as
“so preposterous that it does not even succeed in being horrible in spite of much bloodshed”
(“The Scientists”), and the characterization is perhaps more correct than Orwell knew. It is not
without reason that the chapter is titled as a “banquet,” and it is not a stretch to read the passage
as humorous. While the embodiment of myth at St. Anne’s manifests through unified merrymaking, the myth embodied at the NICE is the divisive curse of Babel. The attendees of the
NICE banquet begin first to speak gibberish, then disintegrate into disorderly panic. 94 The panic
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This gibberish significantly begins with Jules’s accidental mention of “Calvary” rather than “Cavalry” (341), once
again reinforcing Lewis’s central reliance on the concept of incarnation. While Jules intends to refer to a reliance on
cavalry—a blunt physical force—he unintentional refers to reliance on Calvary—a popular metonymy for Christ and
his crucifixion, which represents both a physical and a spiritual event.
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increases, people shoot and trample one another, and a tiger inexplicably appears and begins
preying upon attendees. The scene is horrid, yet the narrator welcomes the animals with an ironic
smirk, observing that, “For the first time that evening everybody realized how many hiding
places the room contained” (345). Even Mr. Bultitude (the resident domestic bear of St. Anne’s)
joins in on the “banquet” and has the great privilege of eating the Deputy Director. There are
several factors at work in this gleeful treatment of grotesque violence. The scene bears an
unmistakeable resemblance to the reckoning scene in MacDonald’s The Princes and Curdie, in
which Curdie’s monster allies enter the royal banquet hall and massacre those unfaithful to the
king. MacDonald describes “A scene of confusion and terror” with an almost identical tone to
that of Lewis, humorously noting such details as a footman who is nonplussed until his “finger
lay on the floor. Then indeed did the footman run” (Princess and Curdie 180). Like MacDonald
before him, Lewis’s gleeful tone represents the inherent joy of experience being wiped clean—
and what better illustration of this than nature wiping out the humans who would dominate and
abuse it? In addition, the horrifying, almost ludicrous bloodshed represents the continued
escalation of the magical intrusion. This escalation culminates and then ceases in the obliteration
of the entirety of Edgestow, leaving only a “cataract of loose earth” (THS 365), just as the city of
MacDonald’s Princess and Curdie ultimately “fell with a roaring crash,” “went up with its dust,”
and then fell into “a great silence” (221).95
Yet That Hideous Strength, and with it the entire space trilogy, does not end with the
judgment and escalating destruction of Edgestow. On the contrary, it returns finally to the
restorative power of true myth, manifest in Venus’s descent on St. Anne’s. A final characteristic
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See Johnson for a more detailed analysis of That Hideous Strength alongside the Curdie books. Jeff McInnis has
also drawn parallels between MacDonald’s Curdie books (specifically The Princess and the Goblins) and That
Hideous Strength.
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of intrusion fantasy, as cited by Mendlesohn, is a “sense of encroaching intimacy,” suggesting
overtones of sexual intrusion (116). While this sense is for Mendlesohn a menacing one, Lewis
inverts it in the same way he inverts malevolent intrusion for the benevolent Intrusion (or
Incarnation). Mendlesohn suggests that the latency and suspense of the intrusion fantasy “is
constructed in part through a holding back, a denial of sexuality—and of the truth of
relationships between the protagonists” (176). On the level of the novel, the lack of connection
between Mark and Jane, both physically and relationally, has instilled a sense of latency, and
their reunion at the novel’s end is sexually charged. The novel concludes with Jane hastening to
a second wedding night, crossing the garden to meet her husband in a “place of sweet smells and
bright fires, with food and wine and a rich bed” (380). But this consummation is not limited
simply to the central married couple. All the inhabitants of St. Anne’s, animal and human alike,
pair off with such gusto that MacPhee remarks, “this is becoming indecent” (374). This
triumphant celebration of love represents the consummation of the tension that has been building
not only in That Hideous Strength, but in the entire cosmic trilogy. The disunity that was first
recognized by Ransom on Malacandra has finally found union through the embodiment of true
myth, and Lewis therefore engages the image of physical, emotional, and spiritual union between
male and female as a poignant image of polarity.
How the cosmic trilogy could possibly exist without its final installment is difficult to
imagine in light of the over-arching form of the series. The beneficent Intrusion of myth in That
Hideous Strength answers the growing sense of dissatisfaction produced by an expanding
realization of Earthly disharmony in Out of the Silent Planet and Perelandra. This movement is
reflected simultaneously in the content, style, and form of the three novels, not in spite of, but
because of the unusual choices Lewis makes to construct these portal, quest, and intrusion
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fantasies within a science fiction series, not only depicting innocence, experience, and higher
innocence through story, but also through the fusion of two genres that represent them well—the
spiritual, imaginative and improbable character of fantasy embodying innocence, and the hard
factuality, and evolutionary pragmatism of science fiction representing experience.
Most importantly, we must return to the roots of Lewis’s series, with which we began.
With the origins of the cosmic trilogy resting on Victorian shoulders, we might say that the
central theme that unites the trilogy is itself of Victorian heritage. The Victorian division
between Biblical and scientific narratives, as begun with Darwin and perpetuated by Edmund
Gosse might be categorized in Lewis’s conceptualization of experience, and characterized in the
genre division between fantasy and science fiction. But continuing the blending practiced by
Charles Kingsley, Lewis therefore practices a sort of narrative higher innocence, realizing his
“myth become fact” theme through a genre fusion. This sort of scientific fantasy was not only
the type of story Lewis longed to read, but he believed the union of such things to be an integral
need for humanity. In Perelandra “Lewis,” the narrator, explains:
We tend to think about non-human intelligences in two distinct categories which
we label “scientific” and “supernatural” respectively. We think, in one mood, of
Mr. Wells’ Martians (very unlike the real Malacandrians, by the bye), of his
Selenites. In quite a different mood we let our minds loose on the possibility of
angels, ghosts, fairies, and the like. But the very moment we are compelled to
recognize a creature in either class as real the distinction begins to get blurred…
(Perelandra 11).
Ransom’s role as the Pendragon was thereby intended not only as the turning point of a novel, or
a trilogy, but of an entire literary genre, and the Victorian era serves not only as the locus of all
that needs repair within these genres, but as the origin of their redemption as well.
A comprehensive treatment of the space trilogy as a whole recommends rather a different
conclusion than Tolkien’s dismay. That Hideous Strength plays an integral, intrusive role in the
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trilogy, hinging on the shock value of the Arthurian materialization. Despite any personal
distaste for the marriage of seemingly opposing genres, or for the intrusive Arthurian fantasy, the
critical reader must not overlook the significance of his or her offended sensibilities. Rather than
representing an artistic slip-up, Lewis’s neo-Victorian use of genre and genre blending to
embody myth in both form and content is intended to startle and even offend readers, for such
shock and bewilderment mirrors the inherent scandal of God becoming a man, and such tension
must be endured, embraced, resolved, and thus beautified by the unifying power of higher
innocence.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Romantic Metanarrative in The Chronicles of Narnia: How Lewis
Empowers the Nineteenth-Century Child
The Romantic metanarrative, with its emphasis on the child, is nowhere more apparent
than in Lewis’s stories for children, The Chronicles of Narnia. In fact, before the series has even
begun, the dedication of The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe provides a hint at his central
aims and ideas. “My dear Lucy,” he writes:
I wrote this story for you, but when I began it I had not realized that girls grow
quicker than books. As a result you are already too old for fairy tales, and by the
time it is printed and bound you will be older still. But some day you will be old
enough to start reading fairy tales again. You can then take it down from some
upper shelf, dust it, and tell me what you think of it. I shall probably be too deaf
to hear, and too old to understand a word you say, but I shall be
Your affectionate Godfather,
C. S. Lewis (LWW v)
The progression that Lewis describes in this dedication—a child reading fairy stories, an
adolescent rejecting them, and an adult returning to them with delight—is based on his own
experience of growing up, and the spiritual awakening he experienced upon returning to the Joyladen literature of childhood. As we have seen, Lewis’s autobiography is romantic in idea and
structure, following a Blakean trajectory, and it is no difficult task to correlate the dedication’s
fictionalized Lucy Barfield with that same Romantic metanarrative: the child Lucy represents
innocence, the adolescent Lucy, experience, and the hypothetical, hoped-for adult Lucy, higher
innocence. Lewis also hints at this romantic influence explicitly in his essay “On Three Ways of
Writing for Children,” when he proposes that he wrote the Chronicles in defiance of “an age so
ferociously anti-romantic as our own” (27). That Lewis had a romantic vision at heart is
undeniable, and I argue that this dedication specifies that vision. Alister McGrath believes that
the overarching project of Narnia is “about finding a master story that makes sense of all other
stories—and then embracing that story with delight” (279). In this argument McGrath is
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supposing a Christian metanarrative, yet the statement applies equally well to Lewis’s use of the
Romantic metanarrative and, in fact, the Romantic metanarrative does not clash with the
Christian foundations of Lewis’s imagination, or at least did not appear to do so to Lewis. Thus
Lewis hints at the impetus behind the Narnian Chronicles: rather than merely teaching children
Christian theology and morals through Biblical allegory, the stories are meant to delight
innocence and awaken a longing for higher innocence. The result of these Romantic encounters
will, Lewis hopes, drive readers towards Christian truth, but he deliberately foregrounds the
Romantic metanarrative, with its universal applicability to human experience, outside of
religious creed, practice, or tradition.
Another assumption implicit in the dedication is that Lewis, as author, has reached the
requisite stage where one can not only “start reading fairy tales again,” but also start writing
them. This assumed higher innocence seems to give Lewis special understanding of his child
audience; thus Lewis frequently addresses the child not only as a conscious individual, but as an
equal. When describing the process of writing for children, Lewis attests:
We must meet children as equals in that area of our nature where we are their
equals. Our superiority consists partly in commanding other areas, and partly
(which is more relevant) in the fact that we are better at telling stories than they
are. The child as reader is neither to be patronized nor idolized: we talk to him as
man to man. [….] we may, under the Omnipotence, sometimes dare to hope that
we may do them good. But only such good as involves treating them with respect.
We must not imagine that we are Providence or Destiny. (“On Three Ways of
Writing for Children” 34)96
The result is a style of children’s fiction that appeals to children because it gives them moral
responsibility and adventurous agency, but some have considered it indicative of Lewis’s own

96

This sentiment is strikingly akin to Nodelman’s assertion: “I suspect it is the fatal contradiction at the heart of
most adult views of childhood, which insist both that children are different from and even opposite to adults and that
they are in the process of becoming more adult all the time” (67).
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childishness.97 Laura Miller notes that Lewis’s “facility at writing for children has ever since
offered his biographers cause to describe him as a man who never entirely grew up” (9). Indeed
A. N. Wilson famously suggests that Lewis was psychologically stunted by the loss of his
mother, and that he never properly grew up. But the attribution of childishness is not uncommon
even among Lewis’s friends and more sympathetic critics. Ruth Pitter said that he possessed “an
almost uniquely persisting child’s sense of glory and nightmare” (qtd. in Downing, Into the
Wardrobe xiii), and Barratt argues that Lewis never lost his childhood (316). Downing similarly
believes that “the unique narrating voice in the chronicles […] sounds like the part of Lewis who
is fifty writing for the part of him who is still twelve” (Into the Wardrobe xv). In line with
Lewis’s romantic fictionalization of himself in Surprised by Joy, it is perhaps most accurate to
imagine that Lewis underwent an era of exile from fairy land, that he lost his childhood, and only
regained an appreciation for innocence later in life. Unlike Downing and Barratt, I perceive a
Lewis who is not split between his adult and child selves, but who holds the two in the polar
logic of higher innocence.98 For, as we shall see, Lewis is explicit about the necessity of
maturation, just as he is insistent that certain child-like qualities are a sign of that maturation. In
this way, the dedication sets the tone for the deep romanticism of the Chronicles.
In addition to revealing Lewis’s reliance on the Romantic metanarrative for structure and
trajectory, the dedication also suggests how distinctly neo-Victorian Lewis’s romanticism is in
the Narnia stories. By dedicating the book to a child who shares the name of his central
protagonist, Lewis steps into the Golden Age tradition of child-inspired storytelling. Surprisingly
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Rowland notes that “the literature of the period we now call Romantic was characterized as infantile and childish”
by its contemporary critics (4). This, of course, is not far off from the way critics like A. N. Wilson criticize Lewis
of failing to grow up. Lewis is often infantilized by both critics and allies. These childish descriptions are sometimes
garnered as accusation, but also as praise—belying the fact that those who remain sympathetic to Lewis’s
Romanticism see his “child-like-ness” as a positive emblem of that movement.
98
Gubar makes a similar argument about Golden Age children’s authors. She wishes to dispel the myth
characterizing those authors as eternally childlike, suggesting that they are actually very aware of the adult, social
world, and are empowering children to not only be a part of that world, but to join into the task of shaping it (7).
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little has been made of actual children’s significance in the creation of Narnia, probably because
there is little evidence to support Lewis’s creating Narnia with or for any specific child or
children. Nevertheless, while Lewis did not partake in the society of children on the level of
Lewis Carroll, J. M. Barrie, or Frances Hodgson Burnett, neither was he the misanthrope that
biographers and critics of the Wilson school would suggest. Joan Murphy, a younger cousin in
the Lewis family, recollects that “Jacks” (as the family affectionately called him) played the role
of an engaged and enthusiastic uncle to her when the family was together. She not only
remembers the warmth and familiar intimacy of sitting on Jacks’s knee, but she also recounts,
“he encouraged us […] more than anything else—to make up stories” (172). In one such
instance, Lewis was with the children, who were playing with toy boats. Murphy recalls, “I can
remember Jacks telling us stories about those boats having adventures—they sailed across the
sea and got to the other side—and then he made us make up stories. He never let you get off
lightly, we knew we had to do some work—we had to decide where our boats were going”
(Murphy 172). Although nearly twenty years before the publication of The Voyage of the Dawn
Treader (1952), the similarity between Jack’s game with the children and the Dawn Treader’s
quest is notable. Just as Lewis and the children created a story in which their boat “sailed across
the sea and got to the other side,” so the crew of adventurers on the Dawn Treader sail across the
Narnian sea and reach Aslan’s country on the utter edge of the ocean. Furthermore, Lewis places
himself in the Golden Age tradition in his essay on writing for children, stating, “This is the way
of Lewis Carroll, Kenneth Grahame, and Tolkien. The printed story grows out of a story told to a
particular child with the living voice and perhaps ex tempore” (“On Three Ways” 23). There can
be no doubt that Lewis enjoyed children, and was even inspired by them in the writing of Narnia.
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The real-life inspiration for the first Narnia story (to whom the dedication is addressed)
was Lucy, the daughter of Lewis’s close friend and fellow Inkling, Owen Barfield. She was also
Lewis’s goddaughter, as the dedication suggests. Little writing exists on Lewis’s actual
relationship with Lucy, though her niece and nephew contribute a few insights. Adelene and
Owen A. Barfield report that Lewis “behaved just as an affectionate godfather would” towards
their aunt (31). In describing the real Lucy, they report that she “was a happy, lively child who
loved dance and music—very outdoorsy, physical, and practical. As in Lewis’s descriptions of
Lucy Pevensie, she had fair hair that, in her case, came almost to her waist” (Barfield and
Barfield 29). Despite lack of evidence for her involvement with the story’s creation, Lucy
certainly inspired her namesake character in The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. 99
Furthermore, Lucy reportedly adored the book, which she saw as “her own” (Barfield and
Barfield 31), and continued reading it throughout her lifetime with unfading delight.
Yet Lewis may have specifically chosen Lucy Barfield as the inspiration and recipient of
the first Narnia story not merely because she was a real child to whom he was close, but also
because of the Romantic associations her name evokes. Adelene and Owen A. Barfield suspect
that Lewis and Barfield both loved the name Lucy long before Lucy Barfield was adopted.
Particularly, they note Wordsworth’s use of the name in his famous poems, and they also recall
Barfield’s depiction of a character named Lucy in The Rose on the Ash-Heap, wherein Lucy is
“the adoptive daughter of the Lord of Albion, with whom she ‘guides and guards all that is good
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Lewis was probably first inspired by the children living at the Kilns as evacuees from World War II bombings in
London. It is highly likely that Jill Flewett, one evacuee child with whom Lewis stayed in close contact, is the
inspiration for Jill Pole of the later books. Hooper recalls, “Though Lewis had probably forgotten it, there is some
evidence which would seem to indicate that the initial impetus behind his Narnian stories came from real children”
(Past Watchful Dragons 29). Hooper, and others, note that the first manuscript evidence of Narnia, a paragraph
which resembles the opening paragraph to The Lion, was recorded by Lewis while the Kilns was inhabited by these
evacuee children. Telling, however, is the fact that this initial paragraph did not include a character by the name of
Lucy. Clearly, Lewis found some greater inspiration in Lucy Barfield that precipitated the story’s completion.
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in the English spirit’” (Barfield and Barfield 32). 100 Both associations, of course, are Romantic,
for while Lucy is a prominent figure in Wordsworth, Albion is an even more notable character in
Blake’s mythology, from which Barfield, no doubt, drew inspiration. And thus an inspection of
Lewis’s goddaughter brings us full circle—back to the Blakean paradigm, the Romantic
metanarrative which Lewis outlines in his dedication, and which drives the Narnian Chronicles.
In fact, the Barfields suggest that Lewis’s portrayal of Lucy captures not only the real child’s
vitality and innocence, but also the higher innocence towards which the reader is meant to aspire.
They argue that “in the character of Lucy Pevensie, [Lewis] has given not only my aunt but also
every child (of any age) a higher self into whom she might project herself” (Barfield and Barfield
31).
Lewis is following in the tradition of Golden Age children’s literature by suggesting that
his story is inspired by the child to whom he dedicates it, yet he is also basing his child
protagonists on romantic dream children—the fictionalizations of those real Victorian children.
Victorian and Edwardian children’s authors frequently developed stories with and for significant
children in their lives: Lewis Carroll wrote Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and
Through the Looking-Glass (1871) for Alice Liddell; J. M. Barrie’s Peter Pan (1911) arose from
imaginary games he played with the Llewellyn-Davies boys; George MacDonald’s fairy tales
and Curdie books (1872 & 1883) originated as bedtime stories for his own children; Colin of The
Secret Garden (1911) was inspired by Frances Hodgson Burnett’s son Lionel; and Kenneth
Grahame invented the talking animals of The Wind in the Willows (1908) in letters to his son,
“Mouse.” In all of these cases of Golden Age children’s literature, the child protagonists are
simultaneously based on a real child and a romantic dream child, for the real child elicits or
100

Prothero and Williams similarly note that “In Narnia, it is Lucy Pevensie who is a very Wordsworthian sort of
child” (49). She is “Nature’s Priest” to her siblings and friends (50).
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inspires the story, but the fictional representation of that child is unavoidably romantic—frozen
in the stasis of literature, unaging, the image of all that is good and innocent. Knoepflmacher has
famously described the fusion of real and imaginary child thus: “To ‘behold’ in a younger […]
Other ‘what I was once,’ each writer must create an imaginary dream-child” (12). Lewis
similarly bases his child characters on both real and unreal children. But instead of fusing the
real and the romantic child, he fuses the real child with his favorite Victorian and Edwardian
iterations of that romantic dream child.101 In this way he mimics the creative (and highly
romantic) method of Golden Age authors, as well as allowing their creations to inspire his
own.102
By recognizing and understanding Lewis’s connection to Golden Age authors and texts, I
will accomplish several objectives. I will trace and confirm the centrality of the Romantic
metanarrative in the Narnia stories, particularly in shaping the appearance and growth of the
child protagonists. I will also answer some of the most popular objections to Narnia. Some have
argued that Lewis wishes to freeze the child in innocence, or that he punishes his protagonists for
reaching sexual maturity, especially in the case of Susan. When we view Narnia as working
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I can by no means prove that Victorian and Edwardian children’s authors were not similarly influenced by
fictional children. It is probable that they were influenced by other contemporary writings for and about children;
however, their processes of creation imply a much more explicit link between their real child subjects and their
resulting fictional characters. For instance, Carroll’s Alice is a direct representation of Alice Liddell (to the extent
that Carroll pasted a picture of Alice into the original manuscript), and differs from Liddell primarily in her romantic
characteristics: she is an eternal, un-aging child, she can enter imaginary worlds, she can talk to animals and shapeshift, among other things. Lewis’s Lucy, on the other hand, is similar to Lucy Barfield only in limited ways, and
shows as many—if not more—similarities to Alice, with whom she shares common characteristics including, but not
limited to, her romantic traits. Lucy is clearly based directly on Alice, therefore absorbing Alice’s romantic
characteristics, rather than appearing to be a version of Lucy Barfield, translated through general romantic concepts.
102
Green and Hooper express a dis-ease with any attempt to attach the Narnia books to any sources other than the
obvious: the Bible. They recommend that everything Lewis read had an influence on him, even when he himself did
not realize it (251-52). In their attempts to preempt research on Lewis’s “influences,” Green and Hooper
simultaneously discourage yet encourage the critic by admitting that Lewis’s work is deeply, even subconsciously,
infused with a variety of literary influences. In fact, Hooper at times argues against himself on this topic. In his essay
“Narnia: The Author, the Critics, and the Tale” he admits that everything Lewis writes is rife with literary allusions
and borrowings—including those from the Bible; yet the Bible is not the only or central source for Narnia (112). We
must proceed, therefore, with care, but also with confidence.
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within and building upon the tradition of Victorian and Edwardian children’s literature, however,
it becomes clear that he not only encourages spiritual and physical growth in the child, but that
he also seeks to empower the child through imaginative agency. Thus, I will demonstrate Lewis
not merely recycling the tropes and characters of Golden Age children’s literature, but actually
advancing a literary genre, and providing a refined and compelling image of romantic ideals that
builds on his nineteenth century precursors. In short, I claim that the Romantic metanarrative is a
central structuring agent in Narnia, that Lewis takes inspiration for Narnia from Golden Age
children’s literature, and that Narnia furthers the empowering objective of that literary movement
through his own unique reimagining of its romantic ideals. I will therefore proceed to examine
the Narnia stories through several different lenses, all relating to nineteenth-century texts,
authors, or popular discourse about the child.
First, I will argue for the influence of the “secret garden” concept on Lewis’s creation.
Gardens feature prominently in Golden Age children’s stories, particularly Alice in Wonderland
and The Secret Garden. Readers tend to interpret Lewis’s garden imagery in the Narnia stories as
allusions to Eden, whether in its Biblical, Miltonic, or Spenserian iterations. I would like to
suggest that reading Narnia itself and the gardens within it as an allusion to the “children’s
garden” of nineteenth century literature opens up new interpretations of exactly what Lewis is
doing; namely, Lewis uses Golden Age garden imagery to highlight the child’s imagination,
agency, and radical growth potential.
Next, I will turn my attention to two nineteenth-century concepts that play a major role in
Narnia. On the one hand, Lewis utilizes the trope of the talking animal, as employed by Carroll,
Burnett, Grahame, and others. The child’s ability to communicate with animals represents the
Romantic notion that innocence enjoys a special communion with the natural world. On the other
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hand, Lewis also alludes to the Victorian fear of degeneration, frequently calling badly behaved
children “beasts” and threatening Narnia’s talking animals with the loss of their speech. In
introducing degeneration motifs into his fantasy world Lewis most prominently follows the
footsteps of George MacDonald, and—like him—employs degeneration not merely as a warning
or a punishment, but as an example of regression and an encouragement towards progressive
movement. In this way I will argue that Lewis empowers both the innocent child, through her
ability to enter Narnia and communicate with its inhabitants, and even empowers the child that
moves into experience by suggesting that experience must be countered by the forward
momentum of higher innocence. In this, I will once again examine Lewis’s use of evolutionary
narratives. As demonstrated with the space trilogy in chapter three, I will highlight the ways in
which Lewis relies on nineteenth-century Darwinian thought (and anxieties) to depict spiritual
growth and regression in Narnia.
Having hinted that experience is a form of stasis, I will then examine Lewis’s allusions to
the conundrum of Peter Pan. I will suggest that Lewis embraces the fantasy landscape of
Barrie’s work, while rejecting his fixation on the un-aging child. While both Barrie and Lewis
present the reader with dead children, Barrie’s dead child is static, and Lewis’s are dynamic. In
particular, his depiction of Susan is a condemnation of the Peter Pan complex, and suggests that
experience, rather than innocence, encourages detrimental stasis.
Finally, I will demonstrate the influence of MacDonald’s depictions of higher innocence
on Lewis’s own portraits of that state. Focusing specifically on The Last Battle (1956), I will
argue that Lewis builds on MacDonald’s Victorian Romantic pictures of higher innocence, and
produces the most successful representation of Christianized Coleridgean polarity to date. As in
chapters two and three, I will demonstrate how Lewis invokes Christ’s incarnation through his
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depiction of higher innocence, once again employing this Christian image as the ultimate
instance of polarity, and therefore of higher innocence.
These pursuits resonate with Laura Miller’s sentiments in The Magician’s Book: “while
religion is an unavoidable subject when considering Narnia, my goal has been to illuminate its
other, unsung dimensions, especially the deep roots of the Chronicles in the universal
experiences of childhood and in English literature” (14-15). Miller is perhaps over-ambitious in
attempting to focus purely on non-religious ideas, yet it is often most productive to approach
Lewis’s religious meanings and themes through his more immediate literary strategies. In other
words, the religious meanings in Narnia become most powerful only when we read Narnia as
story, rather than allegory. This is the argument of most Christian Lewis scholars. Hooper,
Downing, Schakel, and others concern themselves with refuting claims that Narnia is allegory,
largely because of the way this belief impacts (or, rather, detracts from) the experience and
enjoyment of reading. My project, however, is the first to promote such a reading of Narnia
through the lens of Golden Age texts.
“A World All Her Own”: Narnia as Secret Garden
Although gardens have a long history in England, they rose to particular prominence in
the Victorian era. While the Renaissance garden served as an emblem of scientific,
technological, and social progress,103 Victorian gardens embodied the nostalgic, pastoral
longings of the Romantics, and increasingly offered respite from the chaos and fog of the
“satanic mills” of industrialized city life. They also become ideological landscapes for popular
thought: “Victorian concerns […] found in gardens a useful metaphor—control of the landscape,
gendered roles, and competing philosophies of education and child development” (Jenkins 427).
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See Amy L. Tigner’s Literature and the Renaissance Garden from Elizabeth I to Charles II.
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Perhaps most prominent was the association of the garden (and/or its floral inhabitants) “with
young girls and the cultivation of desired female conduct” (Jenkins 427).104 As a feminized,
domesticated space, however, gardens were also seen as the province of children more generally,
particularly because of the Romantic associations between child and nature. Pierce notes: “The
garden became a way for the Victorians to bring something of the natural world into their
domestic spheres, a way to bring something of the country into the towns and the cities” (473); in
this way, the garden represented the perfect place for the child’s imagination. In the garden the
child had free rein to play and enjoy the natural world, to engage in imagination and creativity
outside of the formal constraints of the mother-dominated house.
Perhaps the touchstone of the Victorian “child’s garden” is R. L. Stevenson’s A Child’s
Garden of Verses (1885). This poetry collection consists of poems addressed to the child, and
written in a child’s voice. While the focus of the poems varies considerably, they are all
concerned with capturing the experience of childhood, and most frequently the child’s power of
imagination, which is repeatedly located in the garden. One such instance, “Pirate Story,”
repeatedly parallels a real garden scene with a child’s imagined sea voyage: “waves are on the
meadow like the waves there are at sea” (9). Colley notes:
In these verses the dualities of home and distant skies, land and sea, trees and
ships, are not alienating; they do not exile the child, for the child belongs to a
larger perspective that collapses the distant and the contiguous. With ease, he
journeys back and forth between modes of consciousness and terrain without the
experience of difference and duality that can complicate the adult experience and
exacerbate the sense of difference. [….] These verses […] recover what Carlyle
termed the ‘elasticity’ of childhood. (304)
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Pierce, Price and Jenkins all discuss Victorian gardens as spaces of female cultivation and (limited) power. Price,
in particular, stresses the manner in which John Sedding’s Garden Craft—Old and New (1891) describes the garden
in female terms, while characterizing the gardener with masculine language. Also see Lynch’s article on Austen and
“Greenhouse Romanticism” to trace this concept back to earlier nineteenth-century roots.

219

The garden provides the child a “subjective,” “self-contained,” and “malleable space” (Colley
307, 308), in which the child’s imagination paradoxically experiences the freedom of nature and
the cultivation of nurture. Stevenson’s garden exists in dual forms as both the collection of verses
itself and the space in which the child protagonist of many of the poems plays, and both are
depicted as the province of childhood, to the exclusion of adults. Thus the narrator wistfully
reflects that he “has grown up and gone away,” leaving only “a child of air”—the memory of his
childhood—“that lingers in the garden there” (“To Any Reader” 101). This nostalgic memory of
the child in the garden represents a Victorian iteration of Romantic longing for lost innocence,
and appears not only in Stevenson, but throughout Golden Age literature, often to the detriment
of the child’s agency.
Victorian nostalgia for childhood too frequently manifests itself in surveillance of the
child. Even though the garden provides relative freedom for imaginative play, Stevenson admits
that “from the house your mother sees / You playing round the garden trees” (“To Any Reader”
101). Many Golden Age authors have been accused not merely of surveying, but of controlling,
punishing, even kidnapping the child, and this colonization extends to the garden motif in
literature. In Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland a garden is placed before Alice not as her special
domain, but as “the loveliest garden you ever saw,” from which she is exiled, despite her
“longing” to enter (21). While she is big, Alice cannot fit through the door into the garden, yet,
while she is small, she cannot reach the key to open the locked door into that garden. Apparently,
though the garden is a perfect fit for the child’s smallness, only the larger adult can retrieve its
key. Thus Alice is punished both for being a child, and for growing up. In hopes of entering the
garden, Alice willingly changes her size and shape through the consumption of various foods and
drinks, but the result is confusion about age and identity. While trapped in the rabbit’s house she
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reflects, “when I grow up, […]—but I’m grown up now, […] at least there’s no room to grow
any more here” (55), and when questioned by the Pigeon she “doubtfully” replies, “I—I’m a
little girl,” as if she were no longer sure whether she is a child or not (79). Even when Alice
finally does get into the garden, she does not find the idyllic setting of “bright flower-beds and
cool fountains” that it appeared to be from without (113). Instead, Alice finds that the garden is
already tainted—the pure whiteness of the roses being besmirched with red paint by “three
gardeners” (115). Despite its initial appearance of innocence, the garden is actually under adult
rule, and the gardeners are an extension of that power. Furthermore, the “play” that takes place
in this garden is neither childish, nor innocent, but a bad-tempered and confusing game of
croquet, which is subject at all times to the Queen of Hearts’ whims.105 In Carroll, therefore, we
find that the garden only initially appears to be an empowering child’s space, but cannot be
properly enjoyed while under the surveillance of the adult. 106 As long as the adult controls
access, the supposed “child’s garden” cannot offer true freedom, empowerment, or imaginative
agency.
The child’s garden must therefore be hidden from adult surveillance, an innovation
introduced by Frances Hodgeson Burnett in The Secret Garden (1911). In Mary’s case, a garden
that was once closed by adult hands is re-opened into her sole control. Nature, rather than an
adult figure, holds the garden key, and nature—via the robin, the wind, and the natural magic of
happenstance—entrusts Mary with access. Monica Hughes perceives a shift in children’s
105

It is highly likely that Carroll is here parodying Ruskin’s “On Queens’ Gardens” by showing the Queen of Hearts
to be an inept tyrant. For a more in-depth exploration of the relationship between Carroll and Ruskin’s work, see
Pierce and White.
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There are over twenty references to the Alice books in Lewis’s letters (for some examples see Collected Letters
Vol. I 185-86; 226-27; 272; 276; 439; 440; 570; 628; 693; Vol. II 687; 992; Vol. III 221; 403-04; 769; 824; 922;
1498). Carroll’s books were clearly dear to Lewis and he also took an interest in Carroll’s biography, for he read R.
L. Green’s Lewis Carroll (1952) at least twice, and also wrote approvingly of The Life and Letters of Lewis Carroll,
written by Stuart Dodgson Collingwood (Vol. II 687). There is also evidence to suggest that Through the LookingGlass may have been a model for The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe. The books share some key scenes, a
common jovial atmosphere, and a similar monarchical theme.
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literature with The Secret Garden. While Burnett’s early books, such as A Little Princess (1905),
portray children as virtuous victims, “her last book, The Secret Garden, […] is the beginning of
‘empowerment.’ Most importantly, this book acknowledges the need for a secret and imaginative
life for the growing child” (154).107 Having understood the Victorian Romantic associations of
childhood and gardens, it is appropriate that Burnett should choose a garden as the central image
in her story. The garden is the space in which Mary takes action, makes decisions, learns to
engage her imagination. The budding and growth within Mary’s secret garden represents (and
mirrors) her own internal development. Unlike Alice, whose innocence (embodied through
smallness) keeps her from the garden key, Mary’s innocent ability to connect, even
communicate, with nature leads her to recovering the garden’s lost key. Furthermore, the garden
is a space in which Mary and her friends have complete autonomy; the secrecy of the garden
walls means they are hidden away from regulative adult influence. In The Secret Garden it is the
children themselves who foster the growth of the garden, who better themselves and strengthen
themselves within the garden walls. They deliberately cultivate the power of nature and
successfully achieve their aims.
Despite movement towards empowerment, however, Hughes notes that Edwardian, like
Victorian children’s fiction offers only fake, imaginative worlds for children—“an unreal world,
with no real empowerment” (155). While Mary and Colin enjoy the secrecy of their garden for
some time, the novel ends with a restoration of the garden to its original owner, Archibald
Craven. Critics have scorned the movement of narrative focus from Mary, to Colin, to Mr.
Craven’s reclamation of son and garden as a “capitulation to androcentric values” (Jenkins 426),
and it is likewise a final homage to adult power. Mary and Colin only imagined that the garden
107

Hughes lists Edith Nesbit as similarly encouraging child empowerment (154). Nesbit is another famous influence
on Lewis’s writing for children, but I have chosen to exclude her from this chapter, as her influence on Lewis has
been widely discussed. For one such example, see Nicholson.
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somehow belonged to them—it really belonged to Mr. Craven all the time—and they only
imagined that “magic” made them happy and strong—healthy diet and exercise did the real
work. All of the fun, in other words, was only in the children’s heads; their imaginative world
and experience is ultimately undermined by social and scientific reality.
In Narnia, Lewis takes the “child’s garden” concept a step further. Rowan Williams
observes that “one feature of the Edwardian style which Lewis reproduces to great effect” is his
capacity for “creating a sense of collusion between author and young reader at the expense of the
adult world” (Williams 35). Even more than the narrator of The Secret Garden, Lewis manages
to ally himself with his child readers, to place them truly outside of adult surveillance. More than
this, however, Narnia is a turning point, because the landscape is a real place, and “the juvenile
protagonists suffer, are afraid and have real interior and external conflicts” (Hughes 155). Thus
Laura Miller recalls, “The girl I was fast growing into fiercely seized upon the idea of possessing
an entire, secret world of my own. And the seeds of the adult I would become reveled in the
autonomy of Lewis’s child heroes and the adventures that awaited them once they escaped the
wearying bonds of grown-up supervision” (25). Unlike Alice, whose disillusioning garden
experience is further undermined upon her realization that it was merely a dream, or Mary and
Colin, who must exchange their childish fancies for adult realities, Lewis’s child protagonists
embark on real quests in an actual parallel world. This also explains Lewis’s insistence on the
portal quest fantasy (as discussed in chapter three), rather than a wholly independent fantasy
world. In order for the child’s experience of its “secret garden” to be real, it must begin in the
real world, rather than some dreamscape or fantasy land—thus necessitating the passage between
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England and Narnia.108 Somewhat similarly, Norris argues that the portal structure of the Narnia
stories keeps them from being escapist, and instead allows the children to face real world
problems, fears and trauma, but in a liminal space, thereby avoiding the unbearable ugliness of
reality, and simultaneously engaging the imagination. She asserts that Lewis “believed children
have the capacity to overcome the horrors to which they are subjected in the outside world—that
they, too, are survivors” (76). Narnia thus becomes the perfect secret garden, for it is a world
hidden away from the real world and adult authority, yet the return to the real world does not
undermine Narnia’s reality so much as confirm it. Thus the Pevensies can enjoy discussing their
secret world even whilst living fully in the real world.
At the beginning of The Voyage of the Dawn Treader (1952) Lucy and Edmund are
“talking about Narnia, […] their own private and secret country” (VDT 3). Lewis as narrator
admits that “for us it is only an imaginary country,” but significantly explains that “Edmund and
Lucy were luckier than other people in that respect. Their secret country was real” (3). Even in
The Last Battle, when all of the protagonists—except for Eustace and Jill—have grown too old
to visit Narnia, they still meet to secretly reminisce about their adventures, calling themselves
“the seven friends of Narnia” (43). Clearly Narnia is more significant as a secret garden for the
sole purpose that it is a real place and exists not only in the imagination, but in reality.
Lewis also alludes to Burnett’s work more directly within the text of the Narnia stories.109
One significant instance is in the manner that the Pevensies discover Narnia. In Burnett’s story,
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Tolkien was famously displeased with Narnia, taking particular exception with the portal structure of Lewis’s
romances. Tolkien felt that a created world should be self-sufficient, and should exist without any reference to the
real world. This is one possible answer to Tolkien’s disapprobation.
109
There is surprisingly scant archival evidence that Lewis owned or read The Secret Garden. It is not mentioned in
his letters or notebooks, and if he owned a copy of it, the C. S. Lewis Library Collection at the Wade Center did not
inherit that copy. The only positive evidence of Lewis’s familiarity with Burnett’s masterpiece is through R. L.
Green, whose scholarship on Victorian children’s authors made them of enduring interest to Lewis. Green discusses
The Secret Garden in his work, Tellers of Tales: Children’s Books and Their Authors (1946), of which Lewis’s copy
is retained by the Wade Center.
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Colin and Mary take advantage of “wet days” (153) to explore Misselthwaite Manor. On a
similarly rainy day in The Lion, Peter announces, “I’m going to explore in the house” and the
narrator explains, “Everyone agreed to this and that was how the adventures began” (LWW 3).
Like Misselthwaite Manor with its large “galleries where you could run” and examine portraits,
its exotic Indian knick-knacks, and its “weird old things they did not know the use of” (Burnett
154-55), the Professor’s house has “a very long room full of pictures” and curiosities such as “a
suit of armor,” “a harp,” and “a room all hung with green” (LWW 3). When Mary suggests that
they explore the unused rooms in the house, Colin replies, “A hundred rooms no one goes into,
[….] It sounds almost like a secret garden” (Burnett 154). When the Pevensies, like Colin and
Mary, are denied a day outdoors in “the garden” (Lion 3), they also embark on a search, which
leads Lucy to the wardrobe, and thus into their own secret garden: Narnia. For Colin, and thus
for Burnett, the thrill of the “secret garden” clearly has to do with a state of mind, an awakening
of the imagination, which is why the gothic sublime of endless empty rooms engages the same
romantic wonder as the isolation, beauty, and mystery of the garden. In the Pevensies case, this
gothic curiosity leads to the more tangible sublime of stepping into another world, and thus into
the most truly secret of gardens.
The greatest wealth of allusions to Burnett’s Secret Garden appears in The Silver Chair
(1953). The entrance to Narnia in this particular story is through a door not unlike that into
Burnett’s secret garden—a door that has long been locked: “at the top of the shrubbery was a
high stone wall and in that wall a door[….] This door was nearly always locked. But there had
been times when people had found it open; or perhaps there had been only one time. But you
may imagine how the memory of even one time kept people hoping, and trying the door” (SC 8).
Just as Mary yearns to enter the secret garden, Eustace longs, “If only the door was open again”
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(SC 8). By a strange series of events (in both cases too remarkable to be labeled anything less
than destiny), he, like Mary, finds that “the handle turned and the door opened” (8).110
Finally, The Silver Chair is the first of the Narnia stories in which a single boy and a
single girl enter Narnia, and it is surely no coincidence that Eustace and Jill both start out as
rather unattractive subjects, mirroring Mary and Colin. Jane Darcy observes that The Secret
Garden “brings together a neglected garden and two neglected children and shows how their
growth is interdependent” (77). This is similar to the process by which Lewis’s protagonists are
always brought to Narnia to solve major problems in that world, and experience personal growth
through the accomplishment of their various quests. “Most of Lewis’s children are quite
unattractive before they visit Narnia, and they come back much improved,” notes Hooper (Past
Watchful 85), and this is nowhere more true than in the case of Eustace and Jill.111 Just like Mary
and Colin in The Secret Garden, Eustace and Jill begin their journey with constant bickering and
general crossness, but they return to the real world as allies and friends.
In both Burnett and Lewis the child’s improvement is based less on strict moralism and
instead on an expansion of imagination. In The Way Into Narnia (2005) Peter Schakel suggests
that “[t]he sheer imaginativeness of such stories, like that of much poetry, adds to life, creates
sensations we never had before, and enlarges our conception of possible experience” (34). Susan
Sowerby expresses this when she says that “there’s nothin’ children likes as much as play actin’”
110

Additionally, the character of Puddleglum bears a striking resemblance to Ben Weatherstaff. Both characters are
initially unattractive to the eyes of the children, and have a gruff, pessimistic manner, yet are ultimately sentimental,
optimistic and endearing. Biographers frequently mention (and Lewis’s letters confirm) that Lewis consciously
based Puddleglum on his gardener, Fred Paxford, who has been described as “inwardly optimistic, outwardly
pessimistic” (Hooper, Collected Letters, Vol II 213). Striking, however, is the fact that Paxford, like Ben
Weatherstaff, was a gardener; Lewis may have, in this case as in so many others, fused a real-life inspiration with a
fictional one, for Puddleglum is not only reminiscent of Weatherstaff in appearance, personality and narrative
function, but his habitation in the northern Marsh, near Ettinsmoor, is certainly more akin to Weatherstaff’s
Yorkshire moorland’s than to Paxford’s Oxfordshire.
111
They also participate in a ritual similar to that which Colin leads in the secret garden. While Colin commands
everyone to sit in a circle and chants about his “magic”—saying “Magic! Magic! Come and help!” (Burnett 141)—
Eustace makes Jill stand with arms outstretched in a chant of “Aslan, Aslan, Aslan! […] Please let us two go into”
Narnia (SC 6-7).
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and “[t]h’ more they laugh th’ better for ‘em!” (Burnett 145). Clearly the key to the secret
garden’s success as a moral enrichment is the imaginative play involved. By engaging their
imaginations Mary and Colin learn to be more responsible and pleasant human beings, friends,
family members. But perhaps the improvements of Narnia as a secret garden are weightier than
those of Burnett’s garden. Miller admits, “I don’t believe that my appreciation [for Narnia]
amounts to mere nostalgia or a yearning for my own lost innocence. […]the child I once was
[…] prized the Chronicles” based on “her belief (correct, I still think) that they educated her on
the nature of evil as well as good, and that she was the better for it” (Miller 15). In response to
critics who perceive Narnia as too overtly Christian, moralistic and narrow-minded, Heather
Meacock proposes that “the Narnia Chronicles […] transcend genre specification,” and “lend
themselves to a broad and inclusive concept of spirituality” (96). Ultimately, Meacock argues
that this openness of interpretation and application represents an empowerment of the child’s
ability to read, interpret, and even discourse with the author and ideas: “Within this dialogue
[between writer and reader], meaning is neither fixed nor absolute. Children are able to locate
themselves in culture and in history, in dialogue with a teacher or in silent dialogue with the
writer. For this hidden relationship to flourish, freedom to imagine is needed; this space is
provided by writers such as Lewis” (99). In this way Narnia provides a secret garden space
where the child reader does not passively receive the story, but is an active imaginative
participant, shaping and interpreting the story he or she reads. Notably, this echoes Marah
Gubar’s argument about Golden Age authors, who, she claims, were “Self-conscious about the
fact that adult-produced stories shape children” and therefore “represented children as capable of
reshaping stories, conceiving of them as artful collaborators in the hope that—while a complete
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escape from adult influence is impossible—young people might dodge the fate of functioning as
passive parrots” (6).
By equipping the child as active reader and interpreter, Narnia also intertwines the
concept of the secret garden with reading. Miller notes this connection both in Lewis’s stories,
and in his early experience of Joy with Warnie’s toy garden; she furthermore states:
Gardens are man-made concentrations of the natural world, places where nature is
trained to seem more itself than it is when left to its own devices. In a way, the
artificiality of gardens is like the artificiality of stories, which take the
components of life and arrange them into forms that intensify and order them,
saturating them with meaning. (43)
Narnia as a secret garden is repeatedly tied up also into the metaphor of reading. Adventures in
Narnia are secret garden experiences that teach one to be a good reader, and, in turn, Narnia
reveals the power of stories and reading as a preparation for true adventure.
In the same scene of The Voyage where Edmund and Lucy discuss Narnia as “their own
[…] secret country” we are also introduced to Eustace, who serves as a foil for the Pevensies.
Eustace refers to Narnia as the Pevensies’ “old game” and the narrator informs us, “He thought
[…] they were making it all up; and as he was quite incapable of making anything up himself, he
did not approve of that” (VDT 4-5). Even when he arrives in Narnia, Eustace cannot appreciate it
because he has no imaginative capacity, and he has no imaginative capacity because, we are told,
he has not read “the sort of books those Pevensie kids read,” which are “the right books” to
prepare one for adventuring (VDT 61, 68). Yet, the very experience of being in Narnia apparently
has the same impact as the books Eustace has hitherto failed to read, for in Narnia “he began to
be a different boy” (VDT 92). It is no leap to suggest that the experiences of the child
protagonists are meant to mirror the experience of reading itself, and many scholars have noted
as much. Downing aptly observes, “Each Narnia book is like a little wardrobe. It contains a
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looking glass in which readers will see themselves in surprising new ways” (Wardrobe xvii). But
this concept is further enriched when adding a layer of metaphor, when considering the
connection between the book and the garden. Perhaps the best textual blending of these concepts
appears at the beginning of The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. When all four Pevensies
finally arrive in Narnia, the first creature they encounter is, significantly, a robin:
They were all still, wondering what to do next, when Lucy said, “Look! There’s a
robin, with such a red breast. It’s the first bird I’ve seen here. I say!—I wonder
can birds talk in Narnia? It almost looks as if it wanted to say something to us.”
Then she turned to the Robin and said, “Please, can you tell us where Tumnus the
Faun has been taken to?” As she said this she took a step towards the bird. It at
once hopped away but only as far as to the next tree. There it perched and looked
at them very hard as if it understood all they had been saying. Almost without
noticing that they had done so, the four children went a step or two nearer to it.
[….]
“Do you know,” said Lucy, “I really believe he means us to follow him.”
[….] “We’re following a guide we know nothing about. [….]Why shouldn’t it be
leading us into a trap?” [said Edmund.]
“That’s a nasty idea.” [said Peter] “Still—a robin you know. They’re good birds
in all the stories I’ve ever read.” (LWW 48-49)
Just like Mary’s robin in The Secret Garden looks “as if he were talking” (40), so this bird
appears to have a high level of consciousness and to communicate with the children, and just as
the robin leads Mary to the secret garden’s key, so this robin leads the Pevensies deeper into their
own secret country. Yet, this is also a moment in which reading is a literal and metaphorical
guide. Peter knows to trust the robin because he has read stories about them (presumably he has
even read Burnett),112 but the very exchange represents a moment of interpretation. The children
must read this new world in its complexity and determine correct meanings and loyalties. The
garden becomes a text that requires interpretation, and rewards good reading.
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This is only one of many cases where characters make good decisions based on stories. Downing illustrates this:
“Throughout the Narnia Chronicles, good characters pay heed to nursery stories and rhymed messages, while evil
characters ignore them. Both Caspian and Reepicheep turn out to be wise in believing their nurses; but Miraz, the
usurper in Prince Caspian, dismisses the idea of Talking Beasts as ‘fairy tales’ and ‘nonsense . . . only fit for
babies’” (Wardrobe 90).
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Not only does Narnia itself represent a secret garden, however, but there is one
particularly important garden that appears twice in the series. This is the walled garden of both
The Magician’s Nephew (1955) and The Last Battle (1956), which plays a significant role in
Narnia’s beginning and end. In The Magician’s Nephew Digory is sent on quest to this walled
garden to retrieve a piece of fruit for Aslan. This garden is, without a doubt, an echo of Eden,
and strongly relates to Spenser and Milton’s gardens, but it is also reminiscent of Burnett’s secret
garden. The narrator observes, “You never saw a place which was so obviously private. You
could see at a glance that it belonged to someone else” (MN 140). Just as Mary enjoys Craven’s
garden, so Digory enters with the knowledge that he is enjoying another’s special place. The
garden also represents an interpretive task for Digory, as he must read its inscription, interpret
this along with Aslan’s instructions, and act accordingly. Inside the garden, Digory chooses
obedience and the good of others over his own selfish desire for the fruit. When he returns to
Aslan with the fruit, he is rewarded—the improvement of his own secret garden experience then
pours out into his real life, when he is allowed to take the fruit he retrieved from the garden to his
sick mother. Again, this garden is a picture of the garden as book, and the fruit Digory retrieves
represents the benefit of reading, of visiting a secret garden.113 The metaphor grows more
complex in The Last Battle.
In The Last Battle Digory, along with the friends of Narnia, returns to the walled garden.
When Jill, Eustace, and Tirian are thrown through the stable door during the last battle for
Narnia, they find themselves not in a dark stable, but in a new, more vibrant Narnia. They are
reunited with Digory, Polly and the Pevensies, and by looking back through the stable door they
witness Narnia’s judgment and destruction. Turning away from the door, they travel “further up
113

It is also pertinent that unlike the fruit of Eden, which represents the knowledge of good and evil, the fruit Digory
picks from the Narnian garden is the “Apple of Youth” (MN 162). Clearly there is some link between this garden
and eternal youth, or higher innocence.
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and further in” to this new land, and eventually find themselves at the gate of the walled garden.
Once inside the garden, “Lucy looked hard at the garden and saw that it was not really a garden
at all but a whole world” (LB 170). She exclaims, “This is still Narnia, and, more real and more
beautiful than the Narnia down below, just as it was more real and more beautiful than the
Narnia outside the Stable door! I see . . . world within world, Narnia within Narnia” (170-71). In
this way the garden, like a book, is bigger on the inside. Just as enclosing the child in the garden
actually results in an expansion of their imagination and perception, so enclosure within a book
expands the mind that reads it. For this reason, Lewis provides one more metaphor to explain this
Heavenly Narnia: not only is this Heavenly reality like a garden—expanding as it encloses—but
it is also like a never-ending story. Thus, upon entering this garden, Digory, Polly, Jill, Eustace,
and the Pevensies find that “at last they were beginning Chapter One of the Great Story, which
no one on earth has read: which goes on forever: in which every chapter is better than the one
before” (174). In this climactic ending of the series, Lewis once again utilizes the concept of the
nineteenth century children’s garden, specifically Burnett’s secret garden, to express the
invocation of Joy through reading, and thus the perfect textual image of the ascent towards
higher innocence. The lineage of the Romantic child, as translated through Golden Age garden
imagery, clearly informs Lewis’s own construction of Romantic metanarrative.
Talking Animals and Beastly Children
It seems fitting to move from a discussion of the child in nature to one about the child’s
ability to communicate with the animal world. One of the most iconic and memorable
characteristics of Narnia as a fantasy world is its talking animal inhabitants. Child readers tend to
relish the idea of animals that speak and act like humans. Lewis himself was interested in
“dressed animals” as a child, inventing the fictional world of Animal Land. Unlike the dressed
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animals of Lewis’s Boxen stories, however, Narnian “animals appear in their natural beauty and
interesting differences. They are the real thing” (Hooper, Dragons 75). Walter Hooper suggests
that talking animals were well suited for the brevity of Lewis’s fairy tale genre, because he could
quickly and efficiently characterize them without copious amounts of description or event (81).
Also, “They do not have to be children or adults. There is no struggle for existence, no domestic
worries” (83). Lewis’s decision to place talking animals in the Narnia stories was thus based not
merely on his own tastes, but also on literary tradition, and narrative concerns. Lewis speculates
that talking beasts are useful as “an admirable hieroglyphic which conveys psychology, types of
character, more briefly than novelistic presentation and to readers whom novelistic presentation
could not yet reach” (“On Three Ways” 27). Morgenstern notes that the talking animal is often
an innocent being that is given the adult attributes of language and culture, yet retains its childlike-ness through its “flatness” or simplicity as a character (119). In other words, the talking
animal is a useful tool for the type of fiction Lewis wanted to write, because different animals
naturally suggest certain qualities, and require less narrative exposition to establish character. As
Morgenstern suggests, the talking animal is also a perfect fit for a children’s story, as there is an
innate connection between the child and the animal world. Children are imagined to be closer to
animals than adults because they have not yet mastered speech, and, indeed, the very young
among them are completely without speech. This concept, which posits the child as a sort of
missing link between animal and adult human, echoes recapitulation theory, and opens the door
to the same Darwinian ideas discussed in chapter three. As we shall see, Lewis once again
employs evolutionary narratives in Narnia, just as he did in the Ransom stories, hearkening back,
once more, to Victorian interest in both evolution and degeneration.114 Furthermore, Lewis is not
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Cosslett’s investigation of the talking animal story in British fiction suggests a divide between two types of
stories for children. On the one hand, fairy tales were meant to delight or frighten the child into increased
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the first to recognize this connection between child and animal, but once again steps into a longstanding tradition that was popular in Golden Age children’s literature.
The child’s connection not only to the natural world but specifically to the animal world
is a clear feature of Romantic innocence. Blake’s children in Songs of Innocence converse with
lambs and even resemble them—the poems as well as the illustrations depict the child frolicking
in England’s “pleasant pastures.” Wordsworth similarly describes his child self as “a roe
[…]bound[ing] o’er the mountains” (“Tintern Abbey” 67-8). Victorian and Edwardian children’s
authors took this Romantic imagery to heart and wrote stories in which animals talk and/or
children enjoy special communication with animals. Tess Cosslett is quick to note that, though
“differently expressed,” the Romantic idea “that children are somehow ‘nearer’ to nature and to
animals than adults” was also embraced by Darwin (2). In the Victorian stories, therefore, the
Romantic connection between child and nature also adopts an evolutionary subtext, with the
child, in its early stage of development, often being more clearly linked to the animal world than
to adult human society.
In Alice and Wonderland as well as Through the Looking-Glass Alice converses with
various animals including the white rabbit, the Cheshire cat, mice, dodos, lizards, pigeons,
puppies, unicorns, and the list goes on and on. Significantly, however, that communication
happens only in the imaginary dream worlds Alice enters, and not in the real world. In
Wonderland Alice’s older sister demonstrates this point by recognizing that awaking from the
dream state means that “all would change to dull reality—the grass would be only rustling in the
wind, and the pool rippling to the waving of the reeds” rather than rustling “as the White Rabbit
“superstition,” while animal stories were traditionally more like fables, and meant to instruct: “Animals, even when
talking, were allied with science, ethics and truth” (1). In this light, we can see Lewis enacting the same sort of genre
blending in Narnia that we explored in the space trilogy in chapter three. By combining the animal fable and the
fairy tale in Narnia, Lewis is once again combining a characteristically spiritual narrative with a scientific one, just
as he is combining the delight of the fairy tale with the instruction of the beast fable.
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hurried by—the frightened Mouse splashed his way through the neighbouring pool” and “the
sneeze of the [pig] baby, the shriek of the Gryphon, and all the other queer noises, would change
(she knew) to the confused clamour of the busy farm-yard—while the lowing of the cattle in the
distance would take the place of the Mock Turtle’s heavy sobs” (190-91). Being more grown up
than Alice, her sister recognizes animal noise as no more than “confused clamour,” while Alice’s
innocence still allows her to enter the imaginary, evolutionary state in which she converses with
animals. In Looking-Glass the frame story actually provides an even clearer contrast, for Alice
interacts with the kittens on both sides of the looking-glass. Before she enters the looking-glass
world, she interacts with the kittens in a common dynamic of human vs. animal, or even adult vs.
child. She scolds the black kitten for being “wicked” (8), and talks to the kitten with no
anticipation that the kitten will answer back. At this stage, the kittens are subject to her will as
the dominant, more highly-evolved creature. While in the looking-glass world, however, the
kittens become the queens with whom Alice has multiple conversations and interacts as an
inferior and aspiring equal.115 Because her quest in the world is to become a queen herself, she is
instructed by the red and white queens. As Alice begins to wake, however, the queens diminish
in size, and become once again kittens. As soon as this transformation is complete, and Alice is
awake, she once again relates to the kittens from a position of authority, and they are no longer
able to communicate with her. Thus, Alice finds that the kitten cannot answer her questions: “If
they would only purr for ‘yes,’ and mew for ‘no,’ or any rule of that sort […] so that one could
keep up a conversation! But how can you talk with a person if they always say the same thing?”
(145). Once again, outside of the dream world, Alice cannot communicate with the animals, and
their purring becomes only a sound without meaning. Also again, we find that it is not so much
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Catherine Elick makes a similar observation about the animals in Alice in Wonderland: “Wielding the power of
the word in Wonderland, they now compete with Alice as equals, especially since most of them speak in the same
privileged sociolect that Alice and her creator Carroll use” (36).
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the distinction between waking and sleeping, but between childish imagination and adult prosody
that determines whether animals can speak or not. When Alice pretends to be a grown up and
treats the kittens as inferiors, as children, she cannot communicate with them, but when she
engages in the imaginative play of the looking-glass world, she is able to communicate with
them quite fluidly.
Similar connections appear in J. M. Barrie’s Peter Pan, wherein the child’s innocence is
mingled with a lack of evolutionary development, therefore bringing the child closer to the
animal than the adult. Nana the dog is a perfect nursery maid to the children, but she is, of
course, doubted by Mr. Darling, who cannot see her value as the innocents around him do. Even
Peter Pan he writes off as “some nonsense Nana has been putting into their heads” (7), once
again suggesting that to the grown man Nana can only offer nonsense, while the children
somehow share meaningful communication and imagination with her. Another instance of
child/animal interaction is in the incident of the Never bird. Barrie narrates, “In fanciful stories
people can talk to the birds freely, and I wish for the moment I could pretend that this was such a
story, and say that Peter replied intelligently to the Never bird; but truth is best, and I want to tell
only what really happened. Well, not only could they not understand each other, but they forgot
their manners” (92). Peter and the bird continue in a quarrel, he misunderstanding that she
wishes to save him from drowning, and she finding him rude and ungrateful. Finally, however,
they make themselves clear and “The Never bird […] screamed her admiration of him; and, alas,
Peter crowed his agreement with her” (93). Although Barrie playfully parodies the trope of the
talking animal, he nevertheless demonstrates a special relationship between Peter and the bird,
emphasizing Peter’s “crowing” as a form of animal language.
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In The Secret Garden we also see the connection between child and animal. As
previously discussed, it is Mary’s relationship with the robin that leads her into the secret garden,
and it is repeatedly suggested that the robin can communicate with Mary, Ben Weatherstaff, and
particularly with Dickon. Dickon is the quintessential Romantic nature child in the story, and
thus when he speaks to the robin it “listened for a few seconds, intently, and then answered quite
as if he were replying to a question” (58). When Mary asks, “Do you understand everything birds
say?” (59), Dickon answers: “I think I do, and they think I do. […] I’ve lived on th’ moor with
‘em so long. I’ve watched ‘em break shell an’ come out an’ fledge an’ learn to fly an’ begin to
sing, till I think I’m one of ‘em. Sometimes I think p’raps I’m a bird, or a fox, or a rabbit, or a
squirrel, or even a beetle, an’ I don’t know it” (59). In Dickon’s case, the Romantic child is
empowered by its innocence and its place in the evolutionary hierarchy to such an extent that it
cannot be fully distinguished from the animal world at all.
Finally, Kenneth Grahame’s masterpiece, The Wind in the Willows is one of the most
celebrated talking animal stories in Golden Age children’s literature, and particularly wellknown as a romantic text.116 It is also widely celebrated as one of Lewis’s favorite books.117
Grahame’s story does not demonstrate animals and children interacting, but concerns itself
purely with animal characters in an animal society. While Toad, Rat, Mole, Badger and their
other acquaintance are highly anthropomorphized—they wear clothing, attend picnics, engage in
complex social battles—they are also somewhat infantilized, at least in the sense that their stories
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The other obvious examples of talking animal stories from this era are the tales of Beatrix Potter. Potter had a
considerable influence on Lewis as a child—Squirrel Nutkin in particular—but I have chosen not to discuss her
here, as Grahame and other authors more directly influenced Lewis as an adult.
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In “On Three Ways of Writing for Children” Lewis provides Grahame’s book as an example of the type of
children’s book that can be read with pleasure by an adult: “I never met The Wind in the Willows […] till I was in
my late twenties, and I do not think I have enjoyed [it] any less on that account. […] a children’s story which is
enjoyed only by children is a bad children’s story” (24). He makes extensive reference to The Wind in the Willows in
many of his essays and critical works. See his two reviews of Tolkien’s The Hobbit in Image and Imagination, as
well as “Membership,” “On Stories,” “On Three Ways of Writing for Children,” The Four Loves, etc.
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are wholly unconcerned with adult worries and problems. Their society is in many regards a
childish one, separate and safe from the “wild wood” and the “wide world” (Grahame 22). Mole
in particular illustrates this fact, as he is characterized by the warring of his two childish
impulses: a longing for home and hearth, and a longing for adventure. Although the animals
seem grown up in their attire and conversation, their animal realities provide a certain freedom
that is enjoyed in humanity only by children. In his essay, “On Stories,” Lewis explains it thus,
“it paints a happiness under incompatible conditions—the sort of freedom we can have only in
childhood and the sort we can have only in maturity—and conceals the contradiction by the
further pretense that the characters are not human beings at all” (14). For instance, when the
Otter ducks underwater mid-conversation, “Mole recollected that animal-ettiquette forbade any
sort of comment on the sudden disappearance of one’s friends at any moment, for any reason or
no reason whatever” (25). Although Mole notes this like an adult societal convention, in reality it
is a rule of conduct that protects any creature following its animal impulses—something that is
acceptable in childish and animal society, but certainly disallowed in regulated adult society. In
this way the talking animals of Grahame’s story become empowering representatives of the child
reader, for they simultaneously enjoy the dignity and agency of adults, as well as the protected
freedoms of children. Furthermore, it is the childish innocence of Grahame’s animals that opens
them up to experiences and longings that can only be identified as romantic, and which certainly
translate into Lewis’s own understanding of Joy as sublime. In the much-beloved chapter “The
Piper at the Gates of Dawn” Rat and Mole encounter the god, Pan, and experience intense,
romantic longing. Rat describes Pan’s music thus:
“So beautiful and strange and new! Since it was to end so soon, I almost wish I
had never heard it. For it has roused a longing in me that is pain, and nothing
seems worthwhile but just to hear that sound once more and go on listening to it
for ever. No! There it is again!” he cried, alert once more. Entranced, he was
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silent for a long space, spellbound. “Now it passes on and I begin to lose it.” He
said presently. “Oh […] the beauty of it! The merry bubble and joy, the thin,
clear, happy call of the distant piping!” (Grahame 132-33; emphasis added)
Rat and Mole here represent both the animal and the child in their innocent ability to commune
with nature, and with Pan. Their innocence, like the other children in Golden Age stories,
empowers them not only to have such commerce with the natural and animal world, but it opens
them up to the ecstatic experience of romantic transcendence, of higher innocence, of Joy.
There can be no doubt that Lewis was deeply influenced by the Golden Age tradition of
children and talking animals. He clearly saw anthropomorphized animals as not only a narrative
expedient, but also the best means of embodying the Romantic metanarrative in Narnia,
employing evolutionary narratives of child development to demonstrate the innocence,
experience, or higher innocence of respective characters. The clearest instance of this, however,
is not actually in the published versions of the stories. The Romantic child of nature appears
most vividly in the so-called Lefay fragment.
The Lefay fragment is a handwritten manuscript fragment in one of Lewis’s notebooks,
now held by the Bodleian Library.118 Hooper and others believe it to have been written shortly
after The Lion,119 and it is clearly an abortive attempt at The Magician’s Nephew, which Lewis
abandoned in favor of Prince Caspian (1951). The manuscript tells the story of a boy named
Digory who lives with his busy, bossy, bullying Aunt, Gertrude, who is a member of Parliament.
Gertrude thinks that trees are unhealthy and wants to cut down what Digory calls “The Wood”—
a clump of trees in the garden (“Lefay”). Digory is clearly a romantic child, in the sense that he
loves nature, can converse with trees, and is able to “understand all beasts” (“Lefay”).
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Walter Hooper quotes the fragment in full in Past Watchful Dragons (48-65). The book is now out of print.
R. L. Green recalls “Lewis read the fragment to him in June 1949” (Hooper Dragons 65).
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Digory speaks with an Oak, which he then climbs, and then talks to a red squirrel. The
squirrel (named Patterling) says, “If it was no offence to the present company, […] I’d like to ask
what Humans are there for at all. I never could see what they did except killing animals or
putting them in cages or cutting down trees. No offence, Digory: we all know you’re different”
(“Lefay”). The Fir suggests that, “Whatever it was, [that humans were meant for…] They’ve
forgotten it too. I mean, they can’t be doing whatever they were meant to do now” (“Lefay”).
About this time Digory sees Polly in the next garden. They meet, and she asks him if the squirrel
is tame, to which he says, “almost,” and Patterling angrily remonstrates, “Tame, indeed! What do
you mean by calling me tame?” (“Lefay”). Instead of exploring the attic passages, as they will do
in The Magician’s Nephew, Digory and Polly are making rafts to explore a stream that goes into
a tunnel in Polly’s garden. Digory, after being shamed and slightly bullied by Polly, cuts off a
branch from the oak for the raft.
The next day the trees refuse to talk to Digory and birdsong has now become
“meaningless chatter” to him (“Lefay”). He worries: “Supposing the trees and beasts and birds
were still the same and that the change was in him, that he had lost his gift and become like
everyone else” (“Lefay”). “What a fool I’ve been—oh what a fool!” he exclaims (“Lefay”), for
he seems to have lost something irreplaceable—his innocence.
This is the point where Madame Lefay comes into the story. She instantly knows that
something is wrong with Digory, and says, “I’ll tell you how you look. You look exactly like
what Adam must have looked five minutes after he’d been turned out of the Garden of Eden”
(“Lefay”). She also suspects that Digory has “lost something […] in the last day or so”
(“Lefay”). Lefay has a handbag with a rabbit in it (named Coiny), and speaks about him in a way
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that suggests both that he is rational and communicative. She gives Digory her address, begins
relaying directions to her house, and here the fragment ends.
Exactly why Lewis abandoned this manuscript is unclear. Hooper believes that “Lewis
decided against having talking animals and trees in England—thus causing, as I think he
intended, a sharper contrast between our world and that of Narnia” (Dragons 67). It seems
equally likely, considering the overwhelming romanticism of Digory’s characterization, the very
obviousness of the talking animal trope as a picture of innocence, and the lack of nuance in
Lefay’s comments about Digory’s loss of that innocence, that Lewis probably discarded this out
of a wish for greater complexity. Lewis, who was famously secretive about his aims and his
influences, may easily have felt that this particular fragment was too openly romantic, too openly
invoking the Victorian Romanticism of the children’s talking animal.120
What Lewis did publish in the Narnia Chronicles are much subtler homages to the
Golden Age talking animal tradition with all its allusions to innocence and experience. Thus, in
The Magician’s Nephew Digory and Polly enjoy Aslan’s creation song, while Uncle Andrew can
“hear nothing but roaring” (113); The children hear Aslan say “Narnia awake,” while Andrew
hears “only a snarl” (MN 113); and the children hear how “the Beasts spoke in answer,” while
Andrew “heard only barkings, growling, bayings and howlings” (MN 113). The children, in their
innocence, understand the animals’ speech, but Andrew—who is soaked in the trappings of
experience, such as greed, materialism, ambition, lust—is severed from the animal world and
from Aslan. Another such instance is the robin’s appearance at the beginning of The Lion, the
Witch and the Wardrobe. Peter Schakel notes this scene, arguing that, “Recognizing conventions,
particularly conventions borrowed from the romance tradition, can help prevent misreading or
120
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misunderstanding of the Chronicles” (Reading with the Heart 13). While Schakel interprets this
interchange as an homage to the romance tradition—supposing that we are meant to trust the
robin because they are often good in romances—I would argue that this is not so much a
recognition of romance as of The Secret Garden; as previously discussed, the robin in that story
communicates with the innocent child, and leads it into secret, magical places, just as this robin
leads the Pevensies. In The Horse and His Boy (1954) Lewis performs a reversal of normal ideas
about animal ownership by suggesting that Bree, the talking horse of Narnia, actually steals
Shasta, the boy, rather than the other way around: “it there’s been any stealing, you might just as
well say I [Bree] stole him [Shasta]” (HHB 25). Most significant, however, is the fact that both
Bree and Hwin reveal their identity as talking beasts only to Shasta and Aravis while in
Calorman. Outside of Narnia, therefore, the animals appear to speak only to the child, and trust
in the children’s assistance for their deliverance from bondage. There are endless references of
this kind throughout the Chronicles, but it is perhaps most effective to simply note that Narnia
itself, as a land of talking animals, is open only to the innocent child. For this reason each child
protagonist is warned that they will not be allowed to return to Narnia when they are “getting too
old” (VDT 185). This circumstance has led to much criticism of Narnia as a world that punishes
the child for growing up, a world that attempts to force the child into innocent stasis. While I will
answer some of this criticism in detail later, for the moment, it is worth pointing out that Lewis
does not limit those who talk to animals exclusively to children.
In Lewis’s view, communicating with animals is not merely the province of innocence, or
childhood, but also of higher innocence, and therefore of true adulthood, true evolutionary
progress. Morgenstern picks up on this when he notes that Ransom’s communion with the hrossa
(a form of talking animal) in Out of the Silent Planet is “a moral awakening that is presented as
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an initiation, a passage into adulthood. […This offers] an interesting reversal of the conventional
view in children’s literature that only children can talk to animals” (111). In the Narnia stories as
well there are instances of true grown-ups who can communicate with the talking beasts of
Narnia. For instance, the London cabbie, Frank, and his wife Helen—who are made the first king
and queen of Narnia—are able to understand the Narnian beasts’ speech. Frank is pleased to hear
his old cab horse, Strawberry, speaking, and says, “Strike me pink. I always did say as that ‘oss
‘ad a lot of sense, though” (MN 104). Finally, too, Lewis brings all of his child characters121 back
to Narnia as adolescents and adults in The Last Battle. In this “new” Narnia the humans once
again commune with the talking animals of Narnia.
Just as Lewis emphasizes innocence and higher innocence’s ability to communicate
freely with animals, he also characterizes experience as not only an inability to understand
animal speech, but a potential loss of speech altogether, or a regression into a less-evolved form.
He borrows on nineteenth century paranoia about degeneration to demonstrate that experience
can become an agent of regression rather than growth. For this reason, badly behaved children in
the Narnia stories are repeatedly referred to as “beasts.” Elizabeth Hale acknowledges both the
Romantic and Darwinian roots of this term, explaining:
Particularly when they write about children, [many Edwardian authors…]
characterize bad behavior as wild, natural, and even honest. They do this by
associating wildness with animal behaviour; in doing so, they draw on Romantic
ideals of the child’s purity and honesty (in the face of corrupt adult society), as
well as ideals of animality. The term ‘beastly’ is thus useful here. Bad behavior
can be termed ‘beastly,’ in the sense of ‘acting in any manner unworthy of a
reasonable creature,’ but it can also simply mean ‘resembling a beast in conduct
or in obeying the animal instincts.’ (191)
In The Lion Edmund is described as “being beastly to anyone smaller than” himself, and is called
a “poisonous little beast” for betraying his siblings (LWW 36, 45). Lucy also calls all three
121
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siblings “beasts, beasts” when they refuse to believe her story about entering Narnia (LWW 37).
Digory calls Uncle Andrew “a beast” for kidnapping Polly and both children call Jadis a “beast”
for her infamous villainy (MN 22; 54; 73). The list could continue to include comments about
other evil-doers, including Eustace, who actually turns into a beast—a dragon—before reforming
and improving (VDT). By suggesting that humans who act wickedly are “beastly,” Lewis taps
into the popular nineteenth century idea of degeneration as being not merely a potential
biological reality, but also a potential spiritual one. The concept of degeneration as a sort of
backwards evolutionary progress, linked with a creature’s moral character, is popular in Golden
Age children’s writing, and perhaps nowhere clearer than in George MacDonald.122
Degeneration is a major theme in George MacDonald’s Curdie stories—The Princess and
the Goblin (1872) and The Princess and Curdie (1883). Reiter notes that MacDonald “employs
biological retrogression as a trope for spiritual retrogression” (222). Indeed, the Goblins in The
Princess and the Goblin are depicted as a degeneration of humanity, not merely in form, but in
their wickedness as well. The Goblins, who plot against the humans above the surface—in a
manner too similar to the witch’s Underland plot in The Silver Chair to be coincidental—are not
merely wicked in manner, but manifest their wickedness in their degenerate form. For instance,
the goblins have neither fingers or toes, and “One of the miners, indeed, who had had more
schooling than the rest, was wont to argue that such must have been the primordial condition of
humanity” (Princess and Goblin 55). One of the goblins states, “we excel [the humans] so far in
mental ability as they excel us in stature” and acknowledges that the humans “look upon us as a
degraded race and make a mockery of all our finer feelings” (62). Curdie notices the “subnatural
ugliness of their faces” (88), and the narrator suggests that the Goblins “had sunk towards” the
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animal world, and away from the human (90). The Goblins therefore represent a regression in
stature and beauty, alongside a movement towards nefarious craft and cunning—certainly a
spiritual degeneration. Similarly, in The Princess and Curdie Princess Irene grants Curdie the
ability to sense degeneration by the touch of a person’s hand. She explains, “Since it is always
what they do, whether in their minds or their bodies, that makes men go down to be less than
men, that is, beasts, the change always comes first in their hands [….] Hence […you] will always
be able to tell, not only when a man is growing a beast, but what beast he is growing to, for you
will know the foot” (71). In this way, Curdie is able to discern whom to trust and whom to
distrust when he reaches the King’s city and court. When shaking the hand of one man he feels
“the cold, smooth, leathery palm of a monkey” (99), of another “the belly of a creeping thing”
(134), and by thus discerning the King’s enemies, he is able to save the Kingdom.
Like MacDonald, Lewis frequently employs the grotesque theme of degeneration as a
warning against spiritual decay. After creating and granting speech to the Narnians in The
Magician’s Nephew, Aslan tells them to, “Treat [the Dumb Beasts] gently and cherish them but
do not go back to their ways lest you cease to be Talking Beasts” (MN 105). This warning
against degeneration plays out at various moments throughout the Narnia stories. In Prince
Caspian the talking animals who turn away from Aslan have simultaneously “gone enemy and
gone dumb,” losing their speech—turning into beasts (100). Lucy whispers to Susan, “Wouldn’t
it be dreadful if some day in our own world, at home, men started going wild inside, like the
animals here” (PC 101); and, indeed, human degeneration also appears in Prince Caspian. Aslan
frees a schoolmistress from a class of priggish male students who “looked very like pigs” (PC
168), and who threaten to “tell the inspector” on her (PC 169). These boys, who are insinuated as
being the worst sort—no doubt the sort that terrorized Lewis in his own traumatic schooldays—
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supposedly degenerate into the pigs their actions so resemble: “it was said afterwards (whether
truly or not) that those particular little boys were never seen again, but that there were a lot of
very fine little pigs in that part of the country which had never been there before” (PC 169). In
The Silver Chair the Lady of the Green Kirtle also embodies degeneration in her identity as
lamia. Witnessing the transformation of her human body into the “loathsome body” of a snake
causes the protagonists such disgust that “their hair nearly stood on end” (SC 156; 155).
Finally, in The Last Battle, we once again witness the talking animals of Narnia “moving
beast-ward” (to borrow Reiter’s phrase) by turning their backs on Aslan. The more the Narnians
succumb to the deception of Shift, Rishda Tarkaan, and Ginger, the more their reason itself
seems to wane. Manlove notes this process, and suggests that it has the flavor of H. G. Wells:
These disorganized bemused figures are not those we saw in the prime of Narnia.
They have in a sense devolved, been diminished. Perhaps that is why dwarfs and
their poverty of attitude are so present in this book[…]. The ape, by contrast,
claims to be a man, in a reversal of Darwin he says that he is so old and wise a
man that he has come to look like an ape; it is the rest who are ‘a lot of stupid
animals’ (32). Indeed, to a large extent the Narnian Talking Beasts are bereft of
the intelligence that distinguished them from mere brutes. Increasingly they are
referred to collectively as ‘beasts.’ (Chronicles 106)
Ginger the cat provides a perfect instance of this degeneration. Ginger, who has betrayed Aslan
and joined with Rishda Tarkaan to dupe the Narnians, loses his ability to speak:
What followed was rather horrible. Tirian felt quite certain (and so did the others)
that the Cat was trying to say something: but nothing came out of its mouth
except the ordinary, ugly cat-noises you might hear from any angry or frightened
old Tom in a backyard in England. And the longer he caterwauled the less like a
Talking Beast he looked. [….]
“Look, look!” said the voice of the Boar. “It can’t talk. It has forgotten how to
talk! It has gone back to being a dumb beast.” [….] then the greatest terror of all
fell upon those Narnians. (LB 103)
Although the Narnians do not fully understand it, Ginger has just demonstrated to them the
physical degeneration that accompanies spiritual decay in Narnia. For Lewis, like MacDonald,
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employs the Victorian paranoia of devolution to suggest that not all “growth” is beneficial.
Ginger, possibly the most skeptical Narnian in all the Chronicles, believes himself to espouse
progressive ideas, and to be “more enlightened” than the rest of the Narnians, because he
believes that “there’s no such person” as Aslan (76); however, his is the disenchantment of
experience, and his growth is not the progress he believes it to be, but a regression, a dumbing,
which eventually manifests in his lost voice. Thus Lewis first employs the Golden Age trope of
the talking animal as a sign and gift of innocence and higher innocence, and second he applies
Victorian notions about degeneration to his talking animals as a warning against experience, and
specifically against experience’s tendency to reverse or suspend growth.
The Problem of Peter Pan
Having suggested that degeneration may represent experience in Lewis, I would
furthermore suggest that Lewis portrays experience in a unique light in the Narnia stories. Unlike
many who seem to view experience as necessary, even good, Lewis suggests that experience is
not so much a growth, as a regression, or a form of stasis. This is particularly significant because
innocence is typically seen as the stage in which stasis is most threatening; many Golden Age
authors are accused by critics of attempting to keep the child character and/or reader from
growing up, of denying the child growth. Peter Pan is the iconic example of suspended
childhood, and Lewis deliberately plays upon the Peter Pan convention, while focusing on
experience, rather than innocence. In this way he both borrows from Barrie and critiques the
Golden Age fetishization of innocence. He proposes that only through higher innocence can a
person truly “grow up.”
Lewis was certainly familiar with Peter Pan, for he owned a copy of Barrie’s plays,
which is now housed in the Lewis Library Collection at Wheaton College. In notes on a
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manuscript of R. L. Green’s The Wood That Time Forgot, Lewis makes reference to something
or someone as “a sort of Peter Pan” (Handwritten Manuscript; also in Collected Letters). In fact,
his friendship with Green suggests a familiarity with Barrie’s most famous character, for Green
published a history of the play in 1954, entitled Fifty Years of Peter Pan, which is also present in
Lewis’s library collection at Wheaton. Lewis also references Peter Pan in the essay, “Hamlet:
The Prince or the Poem?”.
In light of Lewis’s familiarity with Barrie’s creation, it is notable that the main character
of the Narnia stories was originally meant to be Peter, who shares a name not only with the
Biblical disciple, but also with the eternal boy. What is supposed to be the first manuscript of
Narnia dates back to 1939 and begins, “This book is about four children whose names were Ann,
Martin, Rose, and Peter. But it is mostly about Peter who was the youngest” (qtd. in Hooper,
Dragons 29). Lewis probably considered the connection to Peter Pan when naming the similarly
alliterative Peter Pevensie, and there are striking differences between them. First, Lewis seems to
have made a conscious decision to decenter Peter, and to give the spotlight to a girl, Lucy,
instead. Another difference is that Peter Pan remains eternally young, while we watch Peter
Pevensie grow up over the course of the Narnia books. Peter Pevensie’s adventures are also more
concretely real than Peter Pan’s; Neverland is interwoven with children’s dreams and makebelieve, while Narnia is an incontrovertibly real world. Furthermore, Pan remains in Neverland,
while Peter leaves Narnia. Again, this is connected with the obvious fact that one child grows up,
while the other does not. Neverland keeps children from growing, while Narnia assists their
growth and then sends them back to the real, or adult, world.
Strangely, however, Peter Pevensie finishes the Narnia series with a striking affinity to
Peter Pan: both characters are presumably dead. In the case of Peter Pan, it is commonly believed
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that J. M. Barrie based the character on his dead brother, David, whose tragic childhood death
left him “frozen forever in time” as his mother’s remembered “golden boy” (White 26). Because
of this connection to the dead child, Peter Pan enjoys all the playfulness and splendor of endless
childhood, yet his story is laced with sadness and forgetting. Peter can never understand the love
that Wendy or Tinker Bell feel for him, he is “gay and innocent,” but he is also “heartless”
(Barrie 164), and he is often to be found “cr[ying] in his sleep” because of his “dreams” (146).
Growing up, it seems, is “the one joy from which he must be forever barred” (156), and while
eternal youth is Peter Pan’s special gift, it haunts the text with a pervasive melancholy.
Peter Pevensie, on the other hand, grows into adolescence, from which time he is no
longer allowed to visit Narnia, moves into adulthood, and returns to Narnia only after dying in a
train accident. Edmund, Lucy, Digory, and Polly, who have also outgrown Narnia, are similarly
killed in the rail accident and thus also return to Narnia. The fact that Lewis kills of all his main
characters troubles many critics, and has often been cited as a misplaced Peter Pan strategem on
Lewis’s part—wishing to bar his child characters from growing up. Philip Pullman lambastes
Lewis for this decision in his 1998 Guardian article, saying, “To solve a narrative problem by
killing one of your characters is something many authors have done at one time or another. To
slaughter the lot of them, and then claim they're better off, is not honest storytelling: it's
propaganda in the service of a life-hating ideology” (Pullman). Perhaps the root of Pullman’s
disagreement with Lewis rests in their very definitions of what “death” and “life” entail. While
Pullman suggests that death is the enemy of life—thus killing one’s characters betrays a “lifehating ideology”—Lewis depicts death not as an absence of life, but as more and greater life.
What Pullman interprets as a rejection of life itself, Lewis understands to be a rejection of
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experience in exchange for higher innocence. This becomes obvious when tracing the
distinctions between Barrie’s “dead child” and Lewis’s “dead children.”
Lewis’s protagonists find death dynamic, while Peter Pan’s death is static. Peter Pan
undergoes no change over the course of the text, and Barrie emphasizes this so far as to point out
that “he still had all his first teeth” when he revisits an adult Wendy (165). Peter cannot
remember anyone or anything for long, he cannot learn—we are told that he is “the only boy on
the island who could neither write nor spell” (73)—and he does not experience the passage of
time, for to him “the past year was but as yesterday” (162). Even Pan’s movement becomes a
perpetual, non-progressive cycle, for he is continually travelling back and forth between London
and Neverland, taking Wendy, her daughter, and her daughter’s daughter, to Neverland in a
never-ending cycle; Neverland’s very name becomes a tragic reminder that Peter can never land,
the he must be perpetually on the move to nowhere. In direct contrast to the stasis that Peter Pan
represents, Lewis’s protagonists experience death as a constant movement “further up and
further in” (LB 162). Upon finding themselves in Aslan’s country, the company begins running
and find that “[t]he air flew in their faces as if they were driving fast in a car without a
windscreen. The country flew past as if they were seeing it from the windows of an express train.
Faster and faster they raced, but no one got hot or tired or out of breath” (LB 162). Unlike
Neverland, which is an island prison for Peter, Aslan’s country is an ever-expanding land, so that
every time the company enters a place they find it “far larger than it had seemed from outside”
(169); indeed, Tumnus asserts that “the further up and the further in you go, the bigger
everything gets” (170). Finally, we are told that Lucy, Edmund, Peter, Jill, Eustace, Digory and
Polly will not share the fate of Peter Pan—to be always replaying the same make-believe over
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and over for eternity. Instead, their fate in death is a continual forward movement, a neverending story “in which every chapter is better than the one before” (174).
Lewis’s choice to depict death in this way has, as mentioned, been critiqued, yet it has
also been lauded. One such analysis concludes that “Lewis is concerned […] to remind us that
death is not the worst thing that can happen. [….and that] it is the passion to avoid death at all
costs that is commonly the root of the worst evils” (Williams 127). Perhaps when Lewis chose to
portray death and Heaven as the final destination of his characters he was thinking of Tolkien’s
words in “On Fairy Stories”:
The process of growing older is not necessarily allied to growing wickeder, [….]
Children are meant to grow up, and not to become Peter Pans. Not to lose
innocence and wonder, but to proceed on the appointed journey: that journey
upon which it is certainly not better to travel hopefully than to arrive, though we
must travel hopefully if we are to arrive. (44-45)
Lewis would certainly have appreciated Tolkien’s proposed alternative to the stasis of Peter Pan:
that innocence can actually be maintained, even expanded in the “hopeful journey” towards
higher innocence.
According to Margaret Esmonde, because of the shift of the 19th century, and its
promotion of deep time and Darwinian theory, which bestow cosmic insignificance on humanity,
and make death “the end of all things, rather than a new beginning” (34), “Death, which had
been a staple of children’s literature in earlier centuries, became taboo in children’s fiction by
mid-twentieth century. In his desire to protect children from all unpleasantness, twentiethcentury man suppressed their experience of death” (35). Lewis, it seems, breaks the taboos
against death in his own age’s fiction (and Pullman’s ire evidences as much); instead of
embracing twentieth-century norms, therefore, he falls in line with both of the competing
nineteenth-century trends to which Esmonde alludes—that of death as the unavoidable and, and
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that of death as “new beginning.” Lewis makes the death of Narnia and of its visitors the end of
the Chronicles; yet, he also refuses to let it be the end, instead providing Aslan’s dynamic
country as the perfect “happily ever after” for his fairy tale.
While this provides some answer to complaints about the protagonists’ deaths in The Last
Battle, perhaps the most important complaint against The Last Battle has yet to be addressed:
Susan’s absence. Upon meeting all the former Kings and Queens of Narnia in Aslan’s country,
Tirian asks, “Where is Queen Susan?” and learns that she “is no longer a friend of Narnia,”
because “she’s interested in nothing now-a-days except nylons and lipstick and invitations. She
always was a jolly sight too keen on being grown-up” (LB 126-27). Seemingly for these reasons
Susan has been cast out of the paradise her siblings and friends enjoy.
This scene has outraged fans and critics alike, who assume that Susan is denied entrance
back into Narnia—and, essentially, into Heaven—because she has grown-up, discovered
sexuality, and no longer wishes to remain a child. Goldthwaite rages that Narnia is driven by “a
debilitating animus” (223), and that Lewis “literally […] damn[s Susan] to hell” (226). Dorwick
sums this up when he states that “being grown-up is not only uninteresting; for Lewis, it is
damnable. As […] Neil Gaiman and Philip Pullman[…]have noted, Susan so wants to be an
adult that she is no longer a friend of Narnia” (58). Furthermore, the damning of Susan, and
particularly with reference to her lipstick, has led scholars to conceive of Lewis as not only
resistant to growing-up, but to women more generally. Pullman attributes to Lewis the belief that
“boys are better than girls,” Laura Miller suggests that the only way to escape Lewis’s misogyny
is to die young, and thence “to remain a child forever, as Lucy does” (142), and Rodriguez
bemoans the fact that “Narnia is a boy’s world” (191). Perhaps taking the matter further than
anyone else, Goldthwaite draws the rather extreme conclusion that “Lewis feared women and
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disliked them categorically. Femininity he saw as an imperfection, the sin of Eve, unspiritual and
sinister” (230). He even goes as far as suggesting that the Narnia stories themselves are a
predatory attack on young female readers:
The voice of the hall proctor stalks these pages, monitoring the children’s every
move and thought. [….] If the books had quite so regimental a feel to them as I
am here making out, of course, they would not be as popular as they apparently
are, especially with girls. Lewis is sly. [….] The method is one of innuendo. [….]
I do not pretend to understand why girls like these stories as much as they do. As
far as I can tell, boys have not cared for them much. It may be that boys are
quicker to sense when another boy is making a grab for the whistle and clipboard.
Insofar as girls today can more readily take their intellect and talents as a given, I
suppose it is natural that they should be attracted to the challenges being offered
them in Narnia. Lewis does court them with the occasional bouquet. [….] The
seduction here for girls, I suspect, is their implicit induction into a private club
previously reserved for boys only. (226-27)
The result, then, of Susan’s absence from the end of The Last Battle is a disgust with Lewis that
leads critics to revile him as psychologically stunted by nostalgia and misogynistic, even to the
point of targeting young female readers in the manner of a sexual predator. 123 It also led to Neil
Gaiman’s story, “The Problem of Susan,” which describes Susan’s life after the traumatic loss of
her entire family. She recalls, “A god who would punish me for liking nylons and parties by
making me walk through that school dining room, with the flies, to identify Ed, well…he’s
enjoying himself a bit too much, isn’t he? Like a cat, getting the last ounce of enjoyment out of a
mouse” (Gaiman 178). Essentially, people accuse Lewis (through Aslan and Narnia) of
mistreating the child: “damning them to Hell, killing them, bullying them, spying on them, and
so on” (Eldridge 47). These are, of course, similar to the types of attacks that have been leveled
at nearly all Golden Age children’s authors—particularly Carroll, who is often accused of
bullying Alice in his text. All of these complaints ultimately arrive at Kincaid’s thesis about
123

Critics have spent extensive time and energy refuting these claims with varying success. See Women and C. S.
Lewis (2015), edited by Carolyn Curtis and Mary Pomroy Key. The arguments against Lewis’s supposed sexism
range from tenuous to convincing. Perhaps it is most accurate to suggest that Lewis was not consciously
misogynistic, but did embrace hierarchical views (of gender, among other things) that are now hugely unpopular.
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child-loving, suggesting that the author is somehow predatory, deriving pleasure from
colonization of the child’s innocence: “By insisting so loudly on the innocence, purity and
asexuality of the child, we have created a subversive echo: experience, corruption, eroticism”
(Kincaid 5). The problem of Susan thus raises important questions about the Narnia stories: is
Lewis no better—and perhaps worse—than his Golden Age precursors in his relationship to the
child? Does he wish to entrap the child and fetishize, even prey on, its innocence? Does Lewis
punish the child for growing up?
While these accusations of Lewis, Narnia, and Aslan are not to be taken lightly (and can
never, perhaps, be altogether dismissed), they can be moderated through close reading. To
accusations that Lewis kills his child characters in order to keep them from growing up, one need
merely point out that they have, in fact, already done so—at least by Lewis’s own definition of
romantic growth. The individuals who return to Aslan’s land at the end of The Last Battle are,
indeed, not children. Digory is 61, Polly 60, Peter 22, Edmund 19, Lucy 17, and Jill and Eustace
both 16.124 Though it is certainly an early death for most of them, all are past the age of sexual
maturation, which so commonly represents one’s departure from innocence.125 In Lewis’s own
vision of the Romantic metanarrative in Surprised by Joy, the onset of experience was earlier
even than puberty. Lewis distinguishes childhood from boyhood, and boyhood from adolescence.
Boyhood was the stage in which Lewis’s innocence was lost, and adolescence was the time in
which he had fresh visions of “Joy,” or intimations of higher innocence. Lewis did not consider
the death of adolescent characters an attempt to retain them as an innocent, sexless children. On
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See Lewis’s outline of Narnian/Earthly time in Hooper, Past Watchful Dragons (41-44).
This is an openly grey area in children’s literature scholarship. Lucy, Jill and Eustace, in particular, would
probably fall into the category of young adult, which is sometimes categorized as belonging to childhood, and at
other times as belonging to adulthood. Hintz suggests that adolescence is a liminal space between innocence and
experience, in which the individual can both “achiev[e] the autonomy of adulthood and keep[…] the clarity of vision
held by a child” (263). This stage has become increasingly associated with the teenage years, and is generally seen
as beginning with the onset of puberty.
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the contrary, he gave his child protagonists time to mature beyond the state of innocence and
decide whether they still believed in their childhood adventures in Narnia.126
These questions about adolescence lead naturally into the question of Lewis and
sexuality. Specifically, whether Susan is damned for liking lipstick and nylons—in essence, for
embracing adult sexuality. Close reading suggests that this is not the case. In fact, there are many
instances in the Chronicles where child characters are allowed, even encouraged to grow up, and
to engage in romantic relationships. All four of the Pevensies grow into adulthood in The Lion,
the Witch and the Wardrobe, and Susan in particular is said to be courted by many men. One
particular instance of this courtship appears in The Horse and His Boy, and although it is a
failure, the narrative does not suggest that sexuality is the problem so much as incompatibility. In
fact, the same story ends with the marriage of Shasta and Aravis, who began the narrative as
children. The Voyage of the Dawn Treader even details the beginning of a courtship between
Caspian and Ramandu’s daughter; Caspian later grows up to marry Ramandu’s daughter, who
becomes “a great queen and the mother and grandmother of great kings” (VDT 210). In all of
these examples, it appears that Lewis despises neither adulthood, nor sexuality, granting them to
many of his characters.
Another answer to these popular criticisms of Lewis is in the fact that scholars’ very
arguments tend to incriminate them as guilty of the sort of colonization Jacqueline Rose
attributes to J. M. Barrie. Rose argues that Peter Pan “shows innocence not as a property of
childhood but as a portion of adult desire” (xii), and further explains, “I am using desire to refer
to a form of investment by the adult in the child, and to the demand made by the adult on the
126

One must also acknowledge how present death was to Lewis’s own childhood and adolescence; he lost his
mother as a child and watched many of his companions—who were, like himself, no more than adolescents—fall in
the Great War. Lewis very likely found the death of his protagonists less shocking than the modern reader does.
Though this does not make the narrative decision more defensible, it certainly makes his choice of ending more
understandable.
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child as the effect of that investment, a demand which fixes the child and then holds it in place”
(3-4). Just as Barrie colonizes childhood by keeping Peter Pan young, Pullman and Goldthwaite
position child readers as powerless victims who must be protected from Lewis’s “seductive
adult” narrative voice, in “a kind of Christian stranger danger” (Eldridge 45). Unfortunately,
Eldridge points out, this assumption not only alienates and belittles the discernment of the child
reader, but it’s rhetoric also tends to evince sexists attitudes—assuming that boys sense the
danger, while girls are complicit in their own seduction by the dogmatic text. Furthermore, it is
interesting that Pullman, who draws such a distinction between the child self who was in danger
from Lewis and the adult self who sees through his “seduction,” would accuse Lewis of killing
children, when the protagonists are adolescents or adults by the time of their deaths. Ultimately,
we must return to the fact that Lewis not only allows, but encourages his child protagonists to
grow beyond childhood, as previously discussed.
Additionally, even in her supposed banishment from Narnia, Lewis is providing Susan
with a power that many child characters lack: the power of choice. Susan chooses not to return to
Narnia at this time, because she has chosen not to associate with the others in their gatherings as
“friends of Narnia” (126). Eustace reports that “whenever you’ve tried to get her to come and
talk about Narnia or do anything about Narnia, she says, ‘What wonderful memories you have!
Fancy your still thinking about all those funny games we used to play when we were children’”
(126). Thus, Susan chooses not to be present with the party who are all travelling together on the
train at the time of their death. To deny this reality would be a defiance of narrative rules, but
also a tyrannical move on Aslan’s part, forcing Susan to re-enter a world in which she no longer
has any interest. It is not Aslan’s wish that Susan be absent; instead Susan wishes to be absent,
and Aslan honors that wish. In contrast, Alice repeatedly works her way into the fantasy world
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only to be kicked out, Peter is allowed only to remain in the fantasy world at the price of
imprisonment in childhood, and Mary and Colin’s magic is, of course, only a childish ignorance
of natural processes. While children are banished from Narnia at a certain age, they are
welcomed back in the end, should they choose to come. Lewis is not seeking to punish the child,
like many of his Victorian precursors seem to do; instead, he employs Golden Age tropes in
order to build upon them, and make them more progressive by granting his child protagonists the
freedom of choice. He is, in essence, subverting the authority of “grown-ups” in a more real way
than Nesbit or Burnett ever did.
Most important in understanding the problem of Susan, is putting it in perspective as an
allusion to Peter Pan. What most critics ignore in The Last Battle, and indeed, throughout the
Chronicles, are repeated conversations about age and growth that evince Lewis’s own unique
understanding of the Romantic metanarrative, and particularly his emphasis on higher innocence.
Judith Plotz suggests that a “relentless focus on an unchanging child forever fixed in childhood is
an important Romantic trope” (xiii), and this trope certainly influenced Victorian depictions of
the child, but Lewis advances and improves these Romantic notions by emphasizing higher
innocence rather than innocence. Higher innocence makes sense of the rhetoric of age in The
Last Battle, because it is repeatedly suggested that there is a difference between being “grownup” in Susan’s sense and truly “grown-up.” When Jill says that Susan is “a jolly sight too keen
on being grown-up,” Polly adds, “Grown-up, indeed, [….] I wish she would grow up. She wasted
all her school time wanting to be the age she is now, and she’ll waste all the rest of her life trying
to stay that age. Her whole idea is a race to the silliest time of one’s life as quick as she can and
then stop there as long as she can” (127). Susan, it seems, has a strange sort of Peter Pan
complex: she wishes to be always a certain age, but the age is not that of innocence, but of
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experience. Susan’s problem, in fact, is not that she wishes to grow-up, but that she resists
growing up. Like Peter Pan trapped in an eternity of Neverland make-believe, Susan traps herself
in a construct of “grown-up-ness,” an adolescent make-believe. Lewis specifically addresses this
problem in “On Three Ways of Writing for Children,” and specifically attacks it as arrested
development:
To be concerned about being grown up, to admire the grown up because it is
grown up, to blush at the suspicion of being childish; these things are the marks of
childhood and adolescence. [….] When I was ten, I read fairy tales in secret and
would have been ashamed if I had been found doing so. Now that I am fifty I read
them openly. [….] I now enjoy Tolstoy and Jane Austen and Trollope as well as
fairy tales and I call that growth: if I had had to lose the fairy tales in order to
acquire the novelists, I would not say that I had grown but only that I had
changed. [….] I think my growth is just as apparent when I now read the fairy
tales as when I read the novelists, for I now enjoy the fairy tales better than I did
in childhood: being now able to put more in, of course I get more out. (25-26)
The comparison to Peter Pan in particular is overt in a similar comment in his essay, “Hamlet:
The Prince or the Poem?”:
You must not think I am setting up as a sort of literary Peter Pan who does not
grow up. On the contrary, I claim that only those adults who have retained, with
whatever additions and enrichments, their first childish response to poetry
unimpaired, can be said to have grown up at all. Mere change is not growth.
Growth is the synthesis of change and continuity, and where there is no continuity
there is no growth. To hear some critics, one would suppose that a man had to
lose his nursery appreciation of Gulliver before he acquired his mature
appreciation of it. It is not so. If it were, the whole concept of maturity, of
ripening, would be out of place […]. (105)
Susan’s abandonment of Narnia is not a sign of “growth” in Lewis’s terminology, but simply a
sign of “change.” By contrast, the other characters have aged, grown in the wisdom of that
transformation, and yet embraced an allegiance to Narnia—their own true fairy tale. This, for
Lewis, is higher innocence, and true growth.
The true problem of Susan is therefore most fully understood in light of the problem of
Peter Pan—particularly as set forth in Rose’s The Case of Peter Pan. While Peter is arrested by
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adult desires to capture, even colonize, childhood, Susan’s growth is similarly interrupted by her
own childish desire to capture and colonize “adulthood.” Susan’s mistake is not in the embrace
of parties and sexuality, but in the denial of all else. Just as Peter Pan is trapped in a stasis of
dead, unchanging innocence, Susan has willingly barred herself from higher innocence because
she clings to stagnant experience.
George MacDonald and the Agelessness of Higher Innocence
In discussing higher innocence in the Narnia stories, one must necessarily turn to George
MacDonald. MacDonald, who influenced Lewis so deeply in so many ways, originates the
primary image of higher innocence that Lewis takes up in the Chronicles: that of agelessness.
McGillis affirms that, for MacDonald, “Childlike innocence is a quality inherent in everyone
(like poetry); it may be latent or muted by sin and age, but it cannot be annihilated, and it
partakes of God” (“Childhood and Growth” 153). In “The Golden Key” MacDonald anticipates
Lewis by connecting higher innocence with a Christian notion of afterlife. In the story, higher
innocence is clearly linked to dying to the world, and waking to a better one. When the Old Man
asks Mossy, “is [death] good?” Mossy answers, “It is good, […] it is better than life” (302). The
Old Man corrects him, saying, “it is only more life” (302). Furthermore, the process towards
“more life” is depicted as an attainment of agelessness, for the children encounter a number of
sages along their journey, and the older these men are, the younger they appear, so that the oldest
and final man is “a little naked child” (295). The point is not that one must regress to childhood;
instead, MacDonald’s characters of this sort blend all the best qualities of innocence and
experience—the beauty of youth and the wisdom of age.
Another notable instance of agelessness in MacDonald is in the higher innocence of the
elder Princess Irene in The Princess and the Goblin. Although Princess Irene is extremely old,
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she appears to be paradoxically youthful and beautiful as well. She says to the younger princess,
“it is so silly of people to fancy that old age means crookedness and witheredness and feebleness
and sticks and spectacles and rheumatism and forgetfulness! It is so silly! Old age has nothing
whatever to do with all that. The right old age means strength and beauty and mirth and courage
and clear eyes and strong painless limbs” (106). For MacDonald, therefore, true growth
manifests itself not in age and decay, but in eternal, ageless beauty.
My claim that Lewis embraces growth, even through the paradoxical agelessness of
MacDonald’s higher innocence, must necessarily confront a disagreement with one of the best
articles yet written on Lewis and the Victorians. In “Kidnapped Romance: From Walter Scott to
C. S. Lewis,” Elsie Michie argues that Lewis appropriates and revises a Victorian theme of
children’s literature: kidnapping. This kidnapping theme—begun by Scott and carried on by
Stevenson—represents a process in which the child is stolen away from the present moment of
technological and economic progress and instead placed in a world where time does not move
forward with the real world. Michie believes that this kidnapping represents a suspension of
growth that bars the child from puberty or adulthood. She notices that many Victorian stories
involve an adult looking back at childhood, and argues that this process of looking back is one of
romance, in contrast to history; romance focuses on a suspended event of adventure and intrigue,
while history is concerned with details of the forward progress of time. According to Michie,
Lewis, revising the Victorian trope, represents kidnapping as similar to the reading of romance:
children are whisked away into another world, from which they cannot and do not wish to
escape. She also notes that Lewis takes this kidnapping a step further over the course of the
series, for while most Victorian stories end with a return to real time, adulthood and inheritance,
Lewis’s protagonists ultimately inherit the fantasy world, and their deaths eternally protect them
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from adulthood. While the death of Lewis’s protagonists certainly sets him apart from the
Victorian tradition to which he ascribes, I believe it does so not by suspending the child’s
growth, but by aligning with George MacDonald in advocating not only adulthood, but growth
beyond adulthood, into higher innocence. The “neo-Victorian child” in Lewis is, therefore, not
only an actual child, but a higher innocence that can apply to any and all ages by erasing the
distinctions between child and adult.
This idea of growing ageless appears first in The Silver Chair, and arises most clearly in
The Last Battle. At the end of The Silver Chair Jill and Eustace find themselves on Aslan’s
mountain, mourning King Caspian, who has died at a very old age. We are told, “all three stood
and wept. [….] And Jill noticed that Eustace looked neither like a child crying, nor like a boy
crying and wanting to hide it, but like a grown-up crying. At least, that is the nearest she could
get to it; but really, as she said, people don’t seem to have any particular ages on that mountain”
(SC 203). Lewis is clear that Eustace, in this foretaste of higher innocence, should have neither
the innocence of the child, un-self-consciously crying, nor the cynicism of experience, hiding his
tears like an embarrassed boy127; instead, he is ageless, and thus most truly “grown-up.”
Similarly, Caspian begins undergoing a transformation, growing younger, until “suddenly he
leaped up and stood before them—a very young man, or a boy. (But Jill couldn’t say which,
because of people having no particular ages in Aslan’s country[…])” (SC 204). Again in The
Last Battle Tirian finds Jill ageless in Aslan’s country: “at first he thought she looked older, but
then she didn’t, and he could never make up his mind on that point” (125). Even “the eldest of
the Queens,” Polly, who is 60 years old at the time of the train accident, is “not old, and there
were no grey hairs on her head and no wrinkles on her cheek” (LB 126). When contrasted with
127

“Boyhood” often represents experience for Lewis. By “boyhood” he generally refers to the onset of selfconsciousness, of adolescence. This is the time of life in Surprised by Joy when Lewis was first tempted by lust,
snobbery, priggery, etc., and the time at which he turned away from the faith of his childhood.
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Susan’s wish to be unchangeably “grown-up,” Polly, Jill, and Lucy evince a growth that
embraces the best elements of childhood and adulthood.128 For indeed, “Even in this world, of
course, it is the stupidest children who are most childish and the stupidest grown-ups who are
most grown-up” (SC 204); 129 higher innocence, therefore, reflects both a growing younger—an
inward journey—and a growing older—an upward journey, so that the call to move “further up”
and “further in” itself is a reference to the polar logic of the ageless state.130
In this agelessness, we must return once more to the genre of Lewis’s writing in The
Chronicles of Narnia. As his dedication of The Lion to Lucy Barfield suggests, the Narnia stories
are meant to be themselves ageless, and therefore accessible both to the innocent child, and to the
higher innocence of maturity. Lewis discusses the need to break down barriers between
children’s and adults’ reading in “On Juvenile Tastes.” He argues that, “the specifically childish
taste has been generally held to be that for the adventurous and the marvellous. Now this, you
may notice, implies that we are regarding as specifically childish a taste which in many, perhaps
in most, times and places has been that of the whole human race” (40). Because “children read
only to enjoy,” Lewis asserts that “juvenile taste is simply human taste, going on from age to
age, silly with a universal silliness or wise with a universal wisdom, regardless of modes,
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Pauline Baynes’s illustration of Tirian’s reunion with the seven Queens and Kings of Narnia depicts them not as
children, but as young adults. All seven are fully physically mature and appear to be in the prime of life (LB 125).
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Manlove, like many others, believes that Narnia reveals Lewis’s nostalgic wish to re-enter childhood, and that
therefore “grow[ing] younger […is] the ideal of development in the Chronicles” (Chronicles 63). While Manlove
pinpoints an important concept in this argument, I believe he has slightly misread Lewis’s pervasive rhetoric about
age, “childishness,” and being “grown-up.” Characters are just as frequently accused of being too childish as they
are of being too adult, suggesting that it is not a return to childhood that Lewis desires, but the best of both worlds.
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This perhaps supplements Elsie Michie’s argument: “In Lewis’s novels transport to that other world is always an
inward journey. When the children in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe are forced to play in the house because
it is raining, this circumstance drives them to hide in the wardrobe through which they enter Narnia. His stories have
to do with what he calls, in the case of the child hero of The Magician’s Nephew, ‘indoor exploration’ (Lewis 1998:
7). This strategy creates an absolute boundary between worlds and between child and adult” (Michie 168). It should
come as no surprise that boundaries of age and between worlds simultaneously dissolve in Aslan’s country. The
Pevensies not only find themselves ageless in the new Narnia, but they find that new Narnia linked to a new
England. Tumnus explains, “That country and this country—all the real countries—are only spurs jutting out from
the great mountains of Aslan. We have only to walk along the ridge, upward and inward, till it joins on” (LB 172).
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movement, and literary revolutions” (40-41).131 The description of the literary taste for fairy tale
as both silly and wise, both childish and adult, is undeniably akin to his descriptions of human
agelessness in the Narnia stories themselves. It also bears out Miller’s belief that “[i]n Narnia,
the boundary between childhood and adulthood […] could be elided” (61).
This agelessness, higher innocence, or universal appeal of the Narnia stories (particularly
as fairy tales) applies equally well to their moral, even spiritual, impact. When viewed through
the lens of higher innocence—and thus seen to be equally applicable to child and adult—one can
set aside the notion that children and adults read the Narnia stories differently. Critics such as
Pullman and Goldthwaite tend to suggest that children are naïve and miss the underlying morals
of the Chronicles, while adults notice Lewis’s religious strategies and recoil. Yet the reality is
that adults and children often find the stories similarly meaningful. Miller explains the universal
nature of Lewis’s Narnian morals in contrast with a nineteenth-century American children’s text
by Martha Finley—Elsie Dinsmore (1867):
It was precisely the propaganda aspect of Elsie Dinsmore that offended me, the
subservience of the story and characters, of the entire book, to the task of
instructing me morally. I recognized that the Chronicles also sometimes spoke to
me about virtue—in fact, I regarded those parts of the books as among their most
thrilling and important moments. The difference was, as I saw it, fundamental.
The morality of Elsie Dinsmore was the morality of childhood, where the choice
was between obedience and naughtiness. The morality of Narnia was grown-up, a
matter of good and evil. […] Adult readers, who detect the Christian symbolism
of the Chronicles so readily, often can’t see the distinction. (Miller 61)
The fact that Miller characterizes the moral gravity of Narnia as “grown-up” is yet one more
proof of the Chronicles’ higher innocence not only of form, but of message. For the moral
lessons of Narnia are not the sorts of lessons that only adults can teach to children, but moral
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McGillis and Nodelman are similarly outspoken in the opinion that “the pleasures of children’s literature are
essentially the pleasures of all literature” (Nodelman qtd. in McGillis, The Nimble Reader ix).

262

imperatives that apply to all people of all ages. Lewis suggests as much in “On Three Ways of
Writing for Children”:
I feel sure that the question “What do modern children need?” will not lead you to
a good moral. [….] It would be better to ask “What moral do I need?” [….] But it
is better not to ask the question at all. Let the pictures tell you their own moral.
For the moral inherent in them will rise from whatever spiritual roots you have
succeeded in striking during the whole course of your life (33).
The spiritual insights in Narnia are not, therefore, messages tailored to children, but messages
Lewis himself needed to hear. And, indeed, Lewis wrestles with deep philosophical questions in
Narnia—the same questions with which he wrestled in his adult science fiction novels, and the
same questions he would approach in his most mature novel, Till We Have Faces. In this way the
universal philosophical and moral messages in the Chronicles, as well as their fairy tale form,
echo the central theme of higher innocence that so permeates the texts.
Clearly, for Lewis, fantasy (or fairy tale) as a genre represents a sort of literary higher
innocence, that must be embraced, and this, in and of itself, is not only a continuation, but a
progression of the Victorian fantasist’s project:
What the Victorians could not readily admit was their own personal involvement
with fantasy and the longings that fantasy stirs. [….] They began therefore by
collecting and classifying fairy tales or by reading them to their children and
moved then to creating original fairy tales for the entertainment of children. Only
slowly did fairy tales become a form admittedly aimed at adult readers” (Burns 9).
As MacDonald and Morris are the only well-known Victorian fantasists who wrote openly for
adults (Burns 10), it comes as no surprise that Lewis builds upon MacDonald’s characterizations
of higher innocence as agelessness. In following MacDonald, Lewis both embraces and rejects
certain aspects of the Golden Age tradition, just as did his Victorian precursors. In fact, many
Golden Age children’s authors like Lewis Carroll were critiqued for writing books that were
simultaneously for children and adults—supposedly missing the true intellect of children and
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pandering to the adult audience by “failing to endorse the new ideology of innocence, which
aimed to erect a firm barrier between adult and child.” (Gubar 6). Marah Gubar champions this
dual audience awareness as a sign of progress; instead of singling out the child reader as a
socially-Othered innocent, these authors recognized that children and adults could read the same
things and enjoy the same things, even if they did so on different levels (22). By writing for the
delight of child and adult alike, therefore, Lewis firmly places his fairy tales in a line of descent
from Golden Age fiction.
Thus Narnia represents a neo-Victorian romantic vision of innocence and experience, and
it also fulfills that vision by offering an excellent fictional and formal embodiment of higher
innocence. Specifically, Lewis presents higher innocence as a polarity of innocence and
experience, childhood and adulthood, faith and doubt. Monika Hilder argues that Lewis achieves
“consolation with the tenuousness of an un/certain hope, a belief in ultimate wholeness in the
face of adversity and brokenness and plain lack of understanding” (236). He “allow[s] for
both/and—doubt and […] the determination to counter this with defiant hope” (Hilder 236).
Schakel similarly remarks that, for Lewis,
The imagination, by making connections and establishing relationships between
ideas, enables one to grasp and internalize the truths apprehended by the reason;
through metaphor, myth, and symbol, it renders them in concrete ways we can
understand, or begin to understand. [….] The imagination bridges the divide,
reconciles the opposites, allows us to experience the abstract concretely.
(Imagination and the Arts 11)
In this we find that Lewis is still deeply indebted to Coleridgean polarity, even as he follows
Victorian and Edwardian children’s writers. Furthermore, the incarnational emphasis of
Coleridgean polarity is still resonant in the Narnia stories.132 Children in the Narnia books are,
like Aslan’s country, “bigger on the inside.” They are allowed to be children, yet they are
132

See my argument about incarnation, polarity, and the Ransom stories in chapter three.
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empowered to make weighty moral decisions, to fight adult battles, to govern and rule lands. It is
fitting that Lewis should throw in a single incarnational reference at the end of The Last Battle.
Being thrown into the stable, Tirian, Eustace and Jill find themselves not enclosed or entrapped,
but released into an expansive and beautiful country. Digory confirms that “It’s inside is bigger
than its outside,” and Lucy comments, “In our world too, a Stable once had something inside it
that was bigger than our whole world” (LB 133). Christ’s incarnation is the key example of
polarity both as an instance of myth become fact and an instance of the powerful child. It may
very well be because of his own associations between higher innocence and Coleridgean polarity
that Lewis chooses to invoke the man who preached “faith like a child” and called little children
to himself at the close of the Narnia stories. Yet Lucy references Christ not in adult form, but in
his initial entrance into the Biblical story—divinity in the vulnerable body of a child. While the
Biblical story provides the substance of this central allusion, it is the Romantic associations that
give it power to transform reader and text. The splendor of that incarnational polarity drives the
Chronicles and emboldens Lewis to empower individuals of all ages, inspiring them to move
“further up and further in” on a captivating quest for higher innocence.
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CONCLUSION
Passing Down the Romantic Metanarrative: Narnia Revised in Neil Gaiman’s Coraline and
Lev Grossman’s Magicians Trilogy
As previous chapters established, Lewis’s legacy in twentieth and twenty-first century
fantasy writing, particularly that for children, is undeniable. In Narnia Lewis extended and
revised a tradition of fantasy that originated with the Romantics and flowed through Victorian
and Edwardian children’s writing via the Romantic metanarrative. Today, fantasy writers are
continuing that Romantic and Victorian legacy, as passed down by Lewis. Yet many of his
literary descendants are now complicating Lewis’s view of fairy lands in general, and Narnia in
particular. Specifically, contemporary fantasists are using their fiction to explore some of the
very questions that Lewis raises in his essays on fantasy and children’s literature.
In “On Three Ways of Writing for Children” Lewis sets out to defend fairy tales against
charges of escapism. He acknowledges that fairy stories are “accused of giving children a false
impression of the world they live in,” but counters, “I think no literature that children could read
gives them less of a false impression” (28). Instead, Lewis suggests that it is actually real world
stories, stories about becoming successful or popular in school, stories about being athletic or
attractive to the opposite sex, that will lead children astray. Such stories, Lewis contends, elicit a
“ravenous and deadly serious” longing in the reader, sending him or her “back to the real world
undivinely discontented” (29). On the other hand, he posits, the
longing […] for fairy land, is very different. In a sense a child does not long for
fairy land as a boy longs to be the hero of the first eleven. Does anyone suppose
that he really and prosaically longs for all the dangers and discomforts of a fairy
tale?—really wants dragons in contemporary England? It is not so. It would be
much truer to say that fairy land arouses a longing for he knows not what. It stirs
and troubles him (to his life-long enrichment) with the dim sense of something
beyond his reach and, far from dulling or emptying the actual world, gives it a
new dimension of depth. He does not despise real woods because he has read of
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enchanted woods: the reading makes all real woods a little enchanted. This is a
special kind of longing. [….] there are two kinds of longing. The one is an
askesis, a spiritual exercise, and the other is a disease. (29-30)
This “spiritual exercise” in longing is Lewis’s version of higher innocence (as discussed in the
previous chapters), and fantasy landscapes thus play an important role in Lewis’s Romantic
metanarrative.
While Lewis suggests that the longing Narnia enlivens is Joy, a hint of higher innocence,
and ultimately a taste of Heaven (as argued in chapter four), his heirs have begun to question
whether such longing has any “spiritual” element, whether it is not simply another “disease.”
Jack Zipes sums up this twenty-first century concern:
It is through fantasy that we have always sought to make sense of the world, not
through reason. Reason matters, but fantasy matters more. Perhaps it has mattered
too much, and our reliance on fantasy may wear thin and betray us even while it
nourishes us and gives us hope that the world can be a better place. (2)
Neil Gaiman and Lev Grossman—two giants of twenty-first century literary fantasy—both
question this “reliance on fantasy” by openly revising Narnia in their own fantasy stories.
Gaiman’s Coraline (2002) and Grossman’s Magicians Trilogy (2009-14)133 employ the
Romantic metanarrative as a frame for their protagonists’ character development, and both
deconstruct a concept that Lewis readily employed in The Chronicles of Narnia: the fantasy
world as an object for Joy, something that evokes longing for, and thus a taste of, higher
innocence. In doing so, both authors could be using Lewis’s question, “Does anyone suppose
that he really and prosaically longs for all the dangers and discomforts of a fairy tale?,” as a
narrative prompt, writing stories that explore exactly what it would mean for a real person to find
themselves in the sort of fantasy world for which they have always longed.
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The series includes The Magicians (2009), The Magician King (2011), and The Magician’s Land (2014).
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Clearly Gaiman and Grossman admire Lewis, just as Lewis admires his own nineteenthcentury precursors; yet, these twenty-first century authors, like Lewis, enact tesserae on their
literary forefather, furthering his vision by making the fantasy world more real and more
realistic. Ultimately, both authors redefine higher innocence. For Lewis, higher innocence is
essentially the divine presence, Heaven itself, or a foretaste thereof. For Gaiman and Grossman,
higher innocence is an embrace of things as they are, of beauty in the midst of brokenness, of
both innocence and experience. It is also an embrace of the self, a putting aside of divine
discontent in exchange for self-contentment.
Gaiman and Grossman’s protagonists, Coraline Jones and Quentin Coldwater, both step
into fantasy worlds (open revisions of Narnia) in hopeful innocence, longing naively for
something better and more magical than their current, boring lives. Both Coraline and Quentin
begin their stories as innocent believers, fully trusting that a fantasy other-world could solve their
discontent with the real world. Instead, however, they find that the other-worlds—the Narnias—
they encounter are consistently no better, and often much worse, than their own worlds. This
disenchantment with the fantasy world propells both protagonists into experience, their innocent
dreams turning to nightmares before their eyes. In a reversal of The Chronicles of Narnia,
Coraline and The Magicians depict fantasy worlds whose creators are not benevolent beings, but
selfish, wicked or childish tyrants, necessitating overthrow. For Coraline and Quentin, therefore,
higher innocence is attained not through submission to benevolent authority and embrace of a
Heavenly fantasy-scape, but by defeating the creators of the other-world, destroying the fantasy
world, and remaking their own worlds in which the fantasy is not pitted against reality, but
united with it.
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Gaiman’s Coraline is the story of a young girl who finds a parallel world in her family’s
new home. Coraline begins her story in a state of naïve innocence, longing for imaginative
stimulation and excitement. Like Lucy of the Narnian Chronicles, she stumbles upon this other
world while she is exploring a new, seemingly endless, “very old house” (1). Coraline finds a
locked door and becomes curious about where it goes. In her innocence she imagines it will lead
somewhere exciting. Instead, once she convinces her mother to unlock the door, she finds that
“Her mother was right. The door didn’t go anywhere. It opened onto a brick wall” (7). Much like
Lucy, whose entrance into Narnia is at first denied by Edmund and her other siblings, Coraline’s
innocent fantasy about the door is put firmly to rest by the experienced voice of her mother and
the prosaic reality of the bricks. This, and other instances early in the book, emphasizes
Coraline’s wish to cling to innocence in the face of encroaching experience. The result of her
denial of experience, and thus of the real world, is that “Coraline was bored” (22). Therefore, in
a moment of imaginative rebellion, she steals the key and reopens the door, finding this time that
“It opened on to a dark hallway. The bricks had gone as if they’d never been there” (24). Like
the unreliable magic of Lewis’s wardrobe, Gaiman’s door has opened unexpectedly for the
innocent child to enter the other world, and Coraline steps willingly through the portal.
What Coraline finds on the other side is an affirmation of her innocence. In this “other
world” everything appears to be a better, less boring, and more fun version of the real world—a
child’s fantasy. The old women who live downstairs are transformed into young beauties who
put on an endless theatre show for Coraline’s “forever and always” entertainment (42). Even the
dogs in this world report that “Maybe where you come from [chocolate is bad for dogs…but]
Here, it’s all we eat.” (41). Such wish-fulfillment leads Coraline to reflect that things in the other
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world are “much more interesting than at home” (43); however, this fantasy world comes with a
high price.
Coraline’s innocence is short-lived in the other world. Her dreamscape turns into a
nightmare when her “other mother and her other father” explain what she must do to remain in
the fantasy world “for ever and always” (44). They ask Coraline to let them sew black buttons
onto her eyes, an action that would make Coraline a metaphorical doll, a puppet of the other
world, in which her innocent self will be the other mother’s play thing. Coraline’s refusal to
undergo this operation represents her transition from innocence to experience. She is no longer
enchanted by the fantasy world, but finds it uncanny and retreats back through the portal.
The fact that Coraline’s fantasy world requires symbolic death is another probable nod to
Lewis, taking aim at The Last Battle, in which Lewis’s protagonists are pleased to learn that they
are in Narnia for good, being dead and in Heaven. Gaiman, whose “The Problem of Susan” was
discussed in chapter four, has a deep distaste for Lewis’s supposition that higher innocence is
something fully attainable only beyond life. He makes this particularly clear when Coraline
returns to the real world, only to find that her real parents have been kidnapped by the other
mother, and are held hostage in the hall mirror, a mirror that “had been, a long time before, the
inside of a wardrobe door” (51). Gaiman, who sees Narnia as holding the Pevensies hostage,
paints the fantasy world in Coraline as dangerous and threatening. Clearly the other world is not
a means to higher innocence; instead, higher innocence can be achieved in Gaiman’s story only
by toppling the fantasy world and its wicked hierarchy.
The other mother, who “made” the other world and then “waited” in it like a spider in its
web (69), “wants something to love” or eat least “something to eat” (63). She is, like Aslan, the
creator of the fantasy world, but unlike Aslan (or perhaps, Gaiman believes, exactly like Aslan)
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she uses the world to lure innocent children in so that she can consume them; in essence, she is
the White Witch and Aslan rolled into one.134 The other mother is experience, employing fantasy
to seduce and consume innocence. In a subversive allusion to Lewis’s Joy, the ghost of a
formerly consumed child warns Coraline that the other mother will “take your joy. And one day
you’ll awake and your heart and your soul will have gone” (84). In order to achieve Gaiman’s
version of higher innocence, Coraline must therefore defeat the other mother, destroy the fantasy
world, and release herself and her parents back into the real world.
Unlike Lewis’s protagonists, who must embrace the fantasy landscape, Coraline’s first
step towards higher innocence is a rejection of the fantasy world. When an other-world man tells
her, “Your other mother will build whole worlds for you to explore[….] Every day will be better
and brighter than the one that went before. [….] If you stay here, you can have whatever you
want,” Coraline counters: “You really don’t understand, do you? […] I don’t want whatever I
want. Nobody does. Not really. What kind of fun would it be if I just got everything I ever
wanted?” (117-18). She then acknowledges that the man, like the fantasy world he inhabits, is
merely a “bad copy” (118). This is a clear reversal of Lewis’s The Last Battle. Coraline is
rejecting Aslan’s proffered “Great Story, […] which goes on forever: in which every chapter is
better than the one before” (174), and while Lewis refers to the real world as a “shadowland”
(174) of Aslan’s country, Coraline instead dubs the fantasy world a “bad copy.” Increasingly
now, Coraline recognizes the fantasy world’s artificiality, noticing that it “reminded her of a
photograph […], not the thing itself” (119). This recognition is a step towards higher innocence,
for she increasingly sees the fantasy as fake and longs, in turn for the real.
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“The Problem of Susan” again backs up this reading of Coraline. In that story Gaiman depicts Aslan and the
White Witch engaging in sex acts after consuming the corpses of the Pevensie children.
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Coraline defeats the other mother, beating her in a game of hide and seek. This coup
destroys the fantasy world and returns Coraline and her parents to the real world, which she now
reinvests with meaning. Having returned victorious, Coraline reflects on her world:
The sky was a robin’s-egg blue, and […] beyond the trees, green hills, which
faded on the horizon into purples and grays. The sky had never seemed so sky, the
world had never seemed so world. Coraline stared at the leaves on the trees and at
the patterns of light and shadow on the cracked bark of the trunk of the beech tree
outside the window. Then she looked down at her lap, at the way that the rich
sunlight brushed every hair on the cat’s head, turning each white whisker to gold.
Nothing, she thought, had ever been so interesting. (136)
By giving Coraline newfound ownership of the real world, Gaiman revises Lewis’s fantasy
conventions to suggest that higher innocence is not an ultimate escape from experience, but a comingling of innocence and experience. For Coraline, this higher innocence means she has the
ability to discern the fancy of innocence from the reality of experience, but also to re-invest the
reality of experience with meaning, meaning that Lewis’s higher innocence supposedly threatens
to diminish. The result is a self-empowerment that Gaiman no doubt considers beyond that of
Lewis’s protagonists, and the story concludes with Coraline’s realization that “there was nothing
left about school that could scare her anymore” (159). By overcoming the allure of the fantasy
world, Coraline has reached a higher innocence in which she can master and enjoy the real
world, secure in her own capacities.
At heart, Gaiman’s children’s story is akin to Lewis’s, for the child travels to the fantasy
world to overcome evil, to progress through experience towards higher innocence. Just as
Lewis’s child reader is meant to find reality enchanted because of her reading, so Gaiman’s
protagonist finds her interest in the real world re-enlivened. The point at which Gaiman corrects
and completes Lewis’s version of the Romantic metanarrative is in his depiction of higher
innocence. While Lewis spiritualized the Romantics and Victorians, Gaiman demystifies Lewis,
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rooting higher innocence in deeply humanistic, rather than spiritual, terms, in mundane, daily life
rather than a distant, Heavenly existence. Gaiman, who admits in a speech to the Mythopoeic
society that “C. S. Lewis was the first person to make me want to be a writer” and that
throughout his life he “read other books […] only because there wasn’t an infinite number of
Narnia books to read,” clearly steps into the legacy of Lewis with Coraline, revising Lewis’s
Romantic metanarrative to fit a new era, a new worldview.
Grossman’s Magicians Trilogy performs a similar revision, though perhaps an even more
self-conscious one. In the series, Quentin Coldwater, like Coraline, struggles with a sort of divine
discontent and boredom. He finds that reality cannot make him happy because he longs for the
fantasy world of his childhood reading: Fillory. The narrator describes Fillory thus:
Christopher Plover’s Fillory and Further is a series of five novels published in
England in the 1930s. They describe the adventures of the five Chatwin children
in a magical land that they discover while on holiday in the countryside with their
eccentric aunt and uncle. [….] every summer for three years, the children leave
their various boarding schools and return to Cornwall, and each time they do they
find their way into the secret world of Fillory, where they have adventures and
explore magical lands and defend the gentle creatures who live there against the
various forces that menace them. (The Magicians 6)
The comparison between Narnia and Fillory is obvious, down to the Baynes-esque illustrated
map of Fillory in the front matter of The Magicians (2); Plover is a revision of Lewis, the
Chatwins are his Pevensies, and Fillory is his Narnia, for which Quentin longs as for “a book that
did what books always promised to do and never actually quite did: get you out, really out, of
where you were and into somewhere better” (7). Although Quentin often reminds himself that
life is not “a Fillory novel” (8), he cannot keep from innocently wishing that it were, and, like
Coraline, he eventually finds that his wish comes true.
Quentin experiences two wish-fulfillments in the first book of the series, The Magicians.
First, he is accepted to a Hogwarts-style college of magic, called Brakebills. Second, he learns
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that Fillory is, in fact, a real place. Like Coraline, however, he discovers that these supposedly
magical places are no improvement on his normal life, and, at times, they are much worse. At
Brakebills Quentin finds the work taxing, often boring, and struggles to fit in socially. After
graduating he is listless and as discontent as ever. He wastes his time partying with his fellow
graduates and destroys his only legitimate relationship by cheating on his girlfriend in a moment
of drunken weakness. Despite all of this, Quentin continues to innocently long for Fillory,
assuming that Fillory can salve his discontent with the real world, and with his now lusterless
Brakebills society. In a stupor, Quentin ponders an excursion to Fillory, and the narrator reports,
“He was like a kid on Christmas morning who couldn’t wait for the grown-ups to waken. Santa
was here, and he was going to fix everything” (278). Despite one cycle of innocence shattered
through his experience of Brakebills, Quentin still places naïve trust in Fillory as an escape from
the real world.
Upon entering Fillory Quentin thinks, “This was his life now, the life he had always been
waiting for. It was finally here” (288), but he is soon disillusioned once more. Within pages of
Quentin and his friends arriving in Fillory, the narrator reports:
The novelty of actually, physically being in Fillory was wearing thin. In spite of
everything a mood of general grumpiness was growing, a spoiled-picnic mood.
Every time a bird perched overhead for more than a few seconds Josh would say,
“Okay, this is the one,” or “I think it’s trying to tell us something,” or eventually,
“Hey asshole, fly away from me, please.” (296).
Instead of embarking on a noble quest, led by a robin like Lewis’s Pevensies, Quentin and
company wander aimlessly through the fantasy world, as bored and bad-humored as ever. Even
worse, when they finally undertake the quest to become Kings and Queens of Fillory, they find
the battle even more horrifying. Upon sight of first blood, Quentin ruminates that “He wasn’t
ready for this. This wasn’t magic. This was the opposite of magic” (322). By the end of the
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novel, approximately half of their company has been slaughtered, including Quentin’s girlfriend,
and Quentin is left totally bereft of the innocent longing he once felt for Fillory.
In The Magician King Quentin undergoes a similar, repeating cycle of innocent
enthusiasm crushed by experience. Even now that Quentin rules Fillory as King, he longs for
something more. He sets out on a sea voyage, akin to that in Lewis’s Voyage of the Dawn
Treader, seeking a golden key that is supposed to open a door to another world. Having secured
the key, he opens “a door in the air” and observes, “It was bright in there, and there was warmth,
and sunlight, and green. This was it. Already the gray stone of the After Island looked
insubstantial. This was what he’d been missing—call it adventure or whatever you wanted to. He
wondered if he was going somewhere in Fillory or somewhere else entirely” (104). Having built
this excited tension, Quentin steps through the magical door and finds himself “on the warm
concrete sidewalk in front of his parents’ house in Chesterton, Massachusetts” (104). Once again,
his clutching at innocent wonder is quelled by prosaic reality, shattered by the experience
inherent in real life and the real world. This cycle repeats a number of times in The Magician
King, Quentin attempting to re-enchant himself or his surroundings, and finding them
nevertheless dull, real, disappointing. Yet, Grossman does not leave Quentin to wallow in
experience.
Quentin reappears in The Magician’s Land, weathered but also softened by his
experiences in the first two books. Older and wiser than he once was, Quentin returns to Fillory,
which appears to be dying in a manner very similar to Narnia’s decline in The Last Battle.135
Quentin learns that the death of the ram gods, Ember and Umber could save Fillory, but unlike
Aslan, who nobly lays down his life for Edmund in the Narnia Chronicles, Ember and Umber are
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For instance the inhabitants of Fillory are engaged in an all-out bloodbath at the gates of Castle Whitespire (the
Fillorian Cair Paravel).
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weak, selfish, limited, and unable to sacrifice themselves. As he kills them, he thinks, “Die, you
selfish bastard, you miserable coward, you old goat. Die and give us life” (380). By killing the
gods, Quentin is transformed into a god himself, and restores Fillory to some of its former glory,
re-sculpting the land, healing the inhabitants, setting the sun “back on its eternal track,” and then
“rest[ing],” before “allow[ing] the power to leave Him” (384). Like Coraline, Quentin thus
defeats the rulers and creators of the fantasy world, but unlike Coraline, Quentin does so to
restore and save that world. Nonetheless, it is not in Fillory that Quentin finds higher innocence.
As a reward for Quentin’s salvific work, he is taken to the “Drowned Garden” on the far
side of Fillory. In that garden a demi-goddess explains to him that the plants are all feelings, and
points out one particular plant, saying:
This is a feeling that you had […] Once, a very long time ago. A rare one. This is
how you felt when you were eight years old, and you opened one of the Fillory
books for the first time, and you felt awe and joy and hope and longing all at
once. You felt them very strongly, Quentin. You dreamed of Fillory then, with a
power and an innocence that not many people ever experience. That’s where all
this began for you. You wanted the world to be better than it was.
Years later you went to Fillory, and the Fillory you found was a much more
difficult, complicated place than you expected. The Fillory you dreamed of as a
little boy wasn’t real, but in some ways it was better and purer than the real one.
That hopeful little boy you once were was a tremendous dreamer. (389)
Upon hearing this description of his past innocence, Quentin reflects on how experience has
shaped him:
He felt full of love for that little boy he’d once been, innocent and naïve, as yet
unscuffed and unmarred by everything that was to come. [….] He wasn’t that boy
anymore, that boy was lost long ago. He’d become a man instead, one of those
crude, weather-beaten, shopworn things, and he’d almost forgotten he’d ever been
anything else—he’d had to forget, to survive growing up. But now he wished he
could reassure that child and take care of him. (390)
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This nurturing urge to protect and comfort his past, innocent self is the beginning of higher
innocence for Quentin, for it whispers of a new creative capacity within him. Taking a seedpod
from the plant, Quentin returns to Earth and takes up a new project: building his own world.
Having completed his new world, Quentin fully embodies higher innocence, and the text
explains, “The curse was lifted. [He] really had made a land, alive and brand new” (397). In this
moment of creative achievement, Quentin finally realizes that the longing he had always felt for
Fillory was wrong, that higher innocence must come from within himself, rather than from any
fantasy world. He recalls himself as a disillusioned teen and concludes,
He’d been right about the world, but he was wrong about himself. The world was
a desert, but he was a magician, and to be a magician was to be a secret spring—a
moving oasis. He wasn’t desolate, and he wasn’t empty. He was full of emotion,
full of feelings, […] that’s what being a magician was. [….] Magic was wild
feelings, the kind that escaped out of you and into the world and changed things.
[…He had] the power to enchant the world. (399)
Like Coraline, Quentin realizes that higher innocence is a power within himself, a power to reenchant the real world, to make it better than the fantasy world. He finds that the world he has
created is not an “island,” but a “bridge connecting Fillory and Earth” (401). The real world, or
Earth, is now united to the supposed magic of the fantasy world, and Quentin is himself reenchanted.
In a revision that is ultimately more sympathetic to Lewis than Gaiman’s, Grossman
traces Quentin’s development through the Romantic metanarrative and finally recommends that
it is not the fantasy world in-and-of-itself that holds the key to higher innocence. Just as Lewis
suggests that Narnia was only attractive because “it sometimes looked a little like” Heaven (LB
196), Grossman posits that Quentin was attracted to Fillory not for itself, but because he “wanted
the world to be better than it was” (Magician’s Land 390). Unlike Lewis, however, Grossman
does not requisition higher innocence to an afterlife, or a mystical union with the divine (in fact,
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Quentin personally places the dead of Fillory into an eternal sleep when he remakes the world).
Instead, like Gaiman, Grossman’s higher innocence manifests itself within the individual, and
within the real world, transforming and reshaping that world.
In conclusion, Gaiman and Grossman represent the continuation of a literary heritage,
passing from the Romantics and Victorians, through Lewis, and into the twenty-first century.
Lewis revises the Romantic metanarrative to expand its spiritual implications, while Gaiman and
Grossman revise Lewis’s metanarrative to bring it back to Earth. Lewis builds on nineteenthcentury texts to craft his “enchanted woods,” and the twenty-first century fantasists extend his
vision, making “all real woods a little enchanted.”
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